made; to kill, is to cause to be killed; to quicken, is to caufe to be quickened; and to excite, is to caufe to be excited. To excite, is to be a Cause, in the most proper Senfe, not merely a negative Occafion, but a Ground of Exiftence by pofitive Influence. The Notion of exciting, is exerting Influence to caufe the Effect to arile or come forth into Existence.

2. Mr. Chubb himself, p. 317, fpeaks of Motives as the Ground and Reason of Action BY INFLUENCE, and BY PREVAILING INFLUENCE. Now, what can be meant by a Caufe, but fomething that is the Ground and Reason of a Thing by its Influence, 'an Influence that is prevalent and fo effectual?

3. This Author not only speaks of Motives as the Ground and Reafon of Action, by prevailing Influence; but exprefly of their Influence as prevailing FOR THE PRODUCTION of an Action, in the fame Page: which makes the Inconfiftency still more palpable and notorious. The Production of an Effect is certainly the Caufing of an Effect; and productive Influence is caufal Influence, if any Thing is; and that which has this Influence prevalently, fo as thereby to become the Ground of another Thing, is a Cause of that Thing, if there be any fuch Thing as a Cause. This Influence, Mr. Chubb fays, Motives have to produce an Action; and yet he fays, 'tis abfurd and a Contradiction, to fay they are Causes.

4. In the fame Page, He once and again speaks of Motives as difpofing the Agent to Action, by their Influence. His Words are thefe: "As Mo"tive, which takes Place, in the Understanding, "and is the Product of Intelligence, is NECES

K 4

"SARY

"SARY to Action, that is, to the EXERTION "of the active Faculty, because that Faculty "would not be exerted without fome PRE"VIOUS REASON to DISPOSE the Mind to "Action; fo from hence it plainly appears, that "when a Man is faid to be difpofed to one Action " rather than another, this properly fignifies the "PREVAILING INFLUENCE that one Mo"tive has upon a Man FOR THE PRODUC"TION of an Action, or for the being at Reft, before all other Motives, for the Production of "the contrary. For as Motive is the Ground "and Reafon of any Action, fo the Motive that "prevails, DISPOSES the Agent to the Perform66 ance of that Action."

Now, if Motives difpofe the Mind to Action, then they cause the Mind to be disposed; and to cause the Mind to be difpofed, is to cause it to be willing; and to caufe it to be willing, is to cause it to will; and that is the fame Thing as to be the Cause of an A&t of the Will. And yet this fame Mr. Chubb holds it to be abfurd, to fuppofe Motive to be a Caufe of the Act of the Will.

And if we compare thefe Things together, we have here again a whole Heap of Inconfiftences. Motives are the previous Ground and Reafon of the Acts of the Will; yea, the neceffary Ground and Reason of their Exertion, without which they will not be exerted, and cannot in the Nature of Things take Place and they do excite thefe Acts of the Will, and do this by a prevailing Influence; yea, an Influence which prevails for the Production of the Act of the Will, and for the difpofing of the Mind to it; And yet 'tis abfurd, to fuppose Motive to be a Cause of an Aft of the Will, or that a Principle of Will is moved or caufed to be exerted by it, or that it has

any

any Caufality in the Production of it, or any Caufality to be the Caufe of the Exertion of the Will.

A due Confideration of thefe Things which Mr. Chubb has advanced, the strange Inconfiftences which the Notion of Liberty confifting in the Will's Power of Self-determination void of all Neceffity, united with that Dictate of common Senfe, that there can be no Volition without a Motive, drove him into, may be fufficient to convince us, that it is utterly impoffible ever to make that Notion of Liberty confiftent with the Infiufluence of Motives in Volition. And as it is in a manner felf-evident, that there can be no Act of Will, Choice or Preference of the Mind, without fome Motive or Inducement, fomething in the Mind's View, which it aims at, feeks, inclines to, and goes after; fo 'tis moft manifeft, there is no fuch Liberty in the Univerfe as Arminians infift on; nor any fuch Thing poffible, or conceivable.

SECTION NXI.

The Evidence of GOD's certain Foreknowledge of the Volitions of moral Agents.

HAT the Acts of the Wills of moral Agents

TH

are not contingent Events, in that Senfe, as to be without all Neceffity, appears by God's certain Foreknowledge of fuch Events.

In handling this Argument, I would in the first Place prove, that God has a certain Foreknowledge of the voluntary Acts of moral Agents; and Secondly, fhew the Confequence, or how it follows from hence, that the Volitions of moral Agents

are

are not contingent, fo as to be without Neceffity of Connection and Confequence.

FIRST, I am to prove, that God has an absolute and certain Foreknowledge of the free Actions of moral Agents.

One would think, it should be wholly needless to enter on fuch an Argument with any that profess themselves Chriftians: But fo it is; God's certain Foreknowledge of the free Acts of moral Agents, is denied by fome that pretend to believe the Scriptures to be the Word of God; and efpecially of late. I therefore fhall confider the Evidence of fuch a Prefcience in the Moft High, as fully as the defigned Limits of this Effay will admit of; fuppofing myself herein to have to do with fuch as own the Truth of the Bible.

ARG. I. My first Argument fhall be taken from God's Prediction of fuch Events. Here I would in the first Place lay down thefe two Things as Axioms.

(1.) If God don't foreknow, He can't foretell fuch Events; that is, He can't peremptorily and certainly foretell them. If God has no more than an uncertain Guefs concerning Events of this Kind, then He can declare no more than an uncertain Guess. Pofitively to foretell, is to profess to foreknow, or to declare pofitive Foreknowledge.

(2.) If God don't certainly foreknow the future Volitions of moral Agents, then neither can He certainly foreknow thofe Events which are confequent and dependent on thefe Volitions. The Exiftence of the one depending on the Existence of the other, the Knowledge of the Existence of the

one

one depends on the Knowledge of the Exiftence of the other; and the one can't be more certain than the other.

Therefore, how many, how great, and how extenfive foever the Confequences of the Volitions of moral Agents may be; tho' they fhould extend to an Alteration of the State of Things thro' the Univerfe, and should be continued in a Series of fucceffive Events to all Eternity, and fhould in the Progrefs of Things branch forth into an infinite Number of Series, each of them going on in an endless Line or Chain of Events; God must be as ignorant of all thefe Confequences, as He is of the Volition whence they first take their Rife: All these Events, and the whole State of Things depending on them, how important, extensive and vaft foever, must be hid from him.

Thefe Pofitions being fuch as I fuppofe none will deny, I now proceed to obferve the following Things.

1. Men's moral Conduct and Qualities, their Virtues and Vices, their Wickednels and good Practice, Things rewardable and punishable, have often been foretold by God. Pharaoh's moral Conduct, in refusing to obey God's Command, in letting his People go, was foretold. God fays to Mofes, Exod. iii. 19. I am fure, that the King of Egypt will not let you go. Here God profeffes not only to guess at, but to know Pharaoh's future Difobedience. In Chap. vii. 4. God fays, But Pharaoh fhall not bearken unto you; that I may lay mine Hand upon Egypt, &c. And Chap. ix. 30, Mofes fays to Pharaoh, As for thee, and thy Servants, I KNOW that ye will not fear the Lord. See alfo Chap. xi. 9. The moral Conduct of Jofiah, by

Name,