pofterously mean actually prevailing in the Event; which is not in the Motive, but in the Will; fo that the Will is not always determined by the Motive which is ftrongeft, by any Strength previous to the Volition itself. And he elfewhere does abundantly affert, that the Will is determined by no fuperiour Strength or Advantage that Motives have, from any Conftitution or State of Things, or any Circumftances whatfoever, previous to the actual Determination of the Will. And indeed his whole Difcourfe on human Liberty implies it, his whole Scheme is founded upon it.

But thefe Things cannot ftand together. There is fuch a Thing as a Diverfity of Strength in Motives to Choice, previous to the Choice itfelf. Mr. Chubb himself fuppofes, that they do previously invite, induce, excite and difpofe the Mind to Action. This implies, that they have fomething in themselves that is inviting, fome Tendency to induce and difpofe to Volition, previous to Volition itself. And if they have in themselves this Nature and Tendency, doubtlefs they have it in certain limited Degrees, which are capable of Diverfity; and fome have it in greater Degrees, others in lefs; and they that have moft of this Tendency, confidered with all their Nature and Circumftances, previous to Volition, they are the ftrongest Motives; and thofe that have least, are the weakest Motives.

Now if Volition fometimes don't follow the Motive which is strongest, or has moft previous Tendency or Advantage, all Things confidered, to induce or excite it, but follows the weakeft, or that which as it ftands previously in the Mind's View, has leaft Tendency to induce it; herein the Will apparently acts wholly without Motive, without any previous

previous Reason to difpofe the Mind to it, contrary to what the fame Author fuppofes. The Act wherein the Will muft proceed without previous Motive to induce it, is the Act of preferring the weakest Motive. For how abfurd is it to fay, The Mind fees previous Reason in the Motive, to prefer that Motive before the other; and at the fame Time to fuppofe, that there is Nothing in the Motive, in its Nature, State, or any Circumftance of it whatsoever, as it ftands in the previous View of the Mind, that gives it any Preference; but on the contrary, the other Motive that ftands in Competition with it, in all these Refpects, has most belonging to it, that is inviting and moving, and has moft of a Tendency to Choice and Preference? This is certainly as much as to fay, there is previous Ground and Reafon in the Motive for the Act of Preference, and yet no previous Reafon for it. By the Suppofition, as to all that is in the two rival Motives which tends to Preference, previous to the Act of Preference, it is not in that which is prefer'd, but wholly in the other: Because appearing fuperiour Strength, and all appearing Preferableness is in that; and yet Mr. Chubb fuppofes, that the Act of Preference is from previous Ground and Reafon in the Motive which is preferred. But are these Things confiftent? Can there be previous Ground in a Thing for an Event that takes Place, and yet no previous Tendency in it to that Event? If one Thing follows another, without any previous Tendency to its following, then I should think it very plain, that it follows it without any Manner of previous Reason why it should follow.

Yea, in this Cafe, Mr. Chubb fuppofes, that the Event follows an Antecedent or a previous Thing, as the Ground of its Existence, not only

that

that has no Tendency to it, but a contrary Tendency. The Event is the Preference which the Mind gives to that Motive which is weaker, as it ftands in the previous View of the Mind; the immediate Antecedent is the View the Mind has of the two rival Motives conjunctly; in which previous View of the Mind, all the Preferableness, or previous Tendency to Preference, is fuppofed to be on the other Side, or in the contrary Motive; and all the Unworthiness of Preference, and fo previous Tendency to Comparative Neglect, Rejection or Undervaluing, is on that Side which is prefer'd: And yet in this View of the Mind is supposed to be the previous Ground or Reafon of this Act of Preference, exciting it, and difpofing the Mind to it. Which, I leave the Reader to judge, whether it be abfurd or not. If it be not, then it is not abfurd to fay, that the previous Tendency of an Antecedent to a Confequent, is the Ground and Reason why that Confequent does not follow ; and the Want of a previous Tendency to an Event, yea, a Tendency to the Contrary, is the true Ground and Reason why that Event does follow.

An Act of Choice or Preference is a comparative Act, wherein the Mind acts with Reference to two or more Things that are compared, and stand in Competition in the Mind's View. If the Mind, in this comparative Act, prefers that which appears inferiour in the Comparison, then the Mind herein acts abfolutely without Motive, or Inducement, or any Temptation whatsoever. Then, if a hungry Man has the Offer of two Sorts of Food, both which he finds an Appetite to, but has a stronger Appetite to one than the other; and there be no Circumftances or Excitements whatsoever in the Cafe to induce him to

take

take either the one or the other, but merely his Appetite If in the Choice he makes between them, he chufes that which he has leaft Appetite to, and refuses that to which he has the strongest Appetite, this is a Choice made abfolutely without previous Motive, Excitement, Reafon or Temptation, as much as if he were perfectly without all Appetite to either: Because his Volition in this Cafe is a comparative Act, attending and following a comparative View of the Food which he chufes, viewing it as related to, and compared with the other Sort of Food, in which View his Preference has abfolutely no previous Ground, yea, is against all previous Ground and Motive. And if there be any Principle in Man from whence an Act of Choice may arise after this Manner, from the fame Principle Volition may arife wholly without Motive on either Side. If the Mind in its Volition can go beyond Motive, then it can go without Motive: for when it is beyond the Motive, it is out of the Reach of the Motive, out of the Limits of its Influence, and fo without Motive. If Volition goes beyond the Strength and Tendency of Motive, and especially if it goes against its Tendency, this demonftrates the Independence of Volition or Motive. if fo, no Reason can be given for what Mr. Chubb so often afferts, even that in the Nature of Things Volition cannot take Place without a Motive to induce it.

And

If the most High should endow a Balance with Agency or Activity of Nature, in fuch a Manner that when unequal Weights are put into the Scales, its Agency could enable it to caufe that Scale to defcend which has the leaft Weight, and fo to raise the greater Weight; this would clearly demonftrate, that the Motion of the Balance does

not

not depend on Weights in the Scales, at leaft as much as if the Balance fhould move itself, when there is no Weight in either Scale. And the Activity of the Balance which is fufficient to move itself against the greater Weight, must certainly be more than fufficient to move it when there is no Weight at all.

Mr. Chubb fuppofes, that the Will can't ftir at all without fome Motive; and alfo fupposes, that if there be a Motive to one Thing, and none to the Contrary, Volition will infallibly follow that Motive. This is virtually to fuppofe an entire Dependence of the Will on Motives: If it were not wholly dependent on them, it could furely help itself a little without them, or help itself a little against a Motive, without help from the Strength and Weight of a contrary Motive. And yet his fuppofing that the Will, when it has before it various oppofite Motives, can use them as it pleases, and chufe its own Influence from them, and neglect the strongest, and follow the weakeft, fuppofes it to be wholly, independent on Motives.

It further appears, on Mr. Chubb's Suppofition,' that Volition must be without any previous Ground in any Motive, thus: If it be as he fuppofes, that the Will is not determined by any previous fuperiour Strength of the Motive, but determines and chufes its own Motive, then, when the rival Motives are exactly equal in Strength and Tendency to induce, in all Refpects, it may follow either ; and may in fuch a Cafe, fometimes follow one, fometimes the other. And if fo, this Diverfity. which appears between the Acts of the Will, is plainly without previous Ground in either of the Motives; for all that is previously in the Motives, is fuppofed precifely and perfectly the fame, with