or of that which is difagreeable and uneafy. 'Tis agreeable and pleafing, to avoid what is difagreeable and difpleafing, and to have Uneafinefs removed. So that here is included what Mr. Locke fupposes determines the Will. For when he speaks of Uneafinefs as determining the Will, he must be understood as fuppofing that the End or Aim which governs in the Volition or Act of Preference, is the Avoiding or Removal of that Uneafinefs; and that is the fame Thing as chufing and feeking what is more eafy and agreeable.

2. When I fay, the Will is as the greatest apparent Good is, or (as I have explain'd it) that Volition has always for its Object the Thing which appears moft agreeable; it must be carefully obferved, to avoid Confufion and needlefs Objection, that I fpeak of the direct and immediate Object of the Act of Volition; and not fome Object that the Act of Will has not an immediate, but only an indirect and remote Refpect to. Many Acts of Volition have some remote Relation to an Object, that is different from the Thing most immediately will'd and chofen. Thus, when a Drunkard has his Liquor before him, and he has to chuse whether to drink it, or no; the proper and immediate Objects, about which his present Volition is converfant, and between which his Choice now decides, are his own Acts, in drinking the Liquor, or letting it alone and this will certainly be done according to what, in the present View of his Mind, taken in the whole of it, is most agreeable to him. If he chufes or wills to drink it, and not to let it alone; then this Action, as it ftands in the View of his Mind, with all that belongs to its Appearance there, is more agreeable and pleafing than letting it alone.

But

But the Objects to which this Act of Volition may relate more remotely, and between which his Choice may determine more indirectly, are the prefent pleasure the Man expects by drinking, and the future Mifery which he judges will be the Confequence of it: He may judge that this future Mifery, when it comes, will be more difagreeable and unpleafant, than refraining from drinking now would be. But these two Things are not the proper Objects that the Act of Volition spoken of is nextly converfant about. For the Act of Will spoken of is concerning prefent Drinking or Forbearing to drink. If he wills to drink, then Drinking is the proper Object of the Act of his Will; and Drinking, on fome Account or other, now appears most agreeable to him, and fuits him beft. If he chufes to refrain, then Refraining is the immediate Object of his Will, and is most pleafing to him. If in the Choice he makes in the Cafe, he prefers a prefent Pleasure to a future. Advantage, which he judges will be greater when it comes; then a leffer prefent Pleasure appears more agreeable to him than a greater Advantage at a Distance. If on the contrary a future Advantage is prefer'd, then that appears moft agreeable, and fuits him beft. And fo ftill the prefent Volition is as the greateft apparent Good at present is.

I have chofen to exprefs myself thus, that the Will always is as the greatest apparent Good, or as what appears most agreeable, is, rather than to fay that the Will is determined by the greatest apparent Good, or by what feems moft agreeable; because an appearing most agreeable or pleafing to the Mind, and the Mind's preferring and chufing, feem hardly to be properly and perfectly diftinct. If ftrict Propriety of Speech be infifted on, it may more pro

perly

perly be faid, that the voluntary Allion which is the immediate Confequence and Fruit of the Mind's Volition or Choice, is determined by that which appears moft agreeable, than that the Preference or Choice it felf is; but that the Act of Volition itself is always determin'd by that in or about, the Mind's View of the Object, which caufes it to appear most agreeable. I fay, in or about the Mind's View of the Object, because what has Influence to render an Object in View agreeable, is not only what appears in the Object view'd, but alfo the Manner of the View, and the State and Circumftances of the Mind that views.-Particularly to enumerate all Things pertaining to the Mind's View of the Objects of Volition, which have Influence in their appearing agreeable to the Mind, would be a Matter of no fmall Difficulty, and might require a Treatife by itself, and is not neceffary to my prefent Purpose. I fhall therefore only mention fome Things in general.

I. One Thing that makes an Object proposed to Choice agreeable, is the apparent Nature and Circumftances of the Object. And there are various Things of this Sort, that have an Hand in rendring the Object more or lefs agreeable; as,

1. That which appears in the Object, which renders it beautiful and pleafant, or deformed and irkfom to the Mind; viewing it as it is in itself.

2. The apparent Degree of Pleasure or Trouble attending the Object, or the Confequence of it. Such Concomitants and Confequents being view'd as Circumftances of the Object, are to be confidered as belonging to it, and as it were Parts of it; as it ftands in the Mind's View, as a propofed Object of Choice.

3. The apparent State of the Pleasure or Trouble that appears, with Refpect to Distance of Time;

being either nearer or further off. 'Tis a Thing in itself agreeable to the Mind, to have Pleasure speedily; and difagreeable, to have it delayed: So that if there be two equal Degrees of Pleasure fet in the Mind's View, and all other Things are equal, but only one is beheld as near, and the other far off; the nearer will appear moft agreeable, and fo will be chofen. Because, tho' the Agreeablenefs of the Objects be exactly equal, as view'd in Themfelves, yet not as view'd in their Circumstances; one of them having the additional Agreeableness of the Circumftance of Nearness.

II. Another Thing that contributes to the Agreeableness of an Object of Choice, as it ftands in the Mind's View, is the Manner of the View. If the Object be fomething which appears connected with future Pleasure, not only will the Degree of apparent Pleasure have Influence, but also the Manner of the View, especially in two Respects.

1. With respect to the Degree of Judgment, or Firmness of Affent, with which the Mind judges the Pleasure to be future. Because it is more agreeable to have a certain Happiness, than an uncertain one; and a Pleasure view'd as more probable, all other Things being equal, is more agreeable to the Mind, than that which is view'd as lefs probable.

2. With respect to the Degree of the Idea of the future Pleasure. With Regard to Things which are the Subject of our Thoughts, either past, prefent or future, we have much more of an Idea or Apprehenfion of fome Things than others; that is, our Idea is much more clear, lively and ftrong. Thus the Ideas we have of fenfible Things by immediate Senfation, are ufually much more lively than those we have by mere Imagination, or by Contemplation of them when abfent. My Idea of the Sun,

when

when I look upon it, is more vivid, than when I only think of it. Our Idea of the sweet Relifh of a delicious Fruit is ufually ftronger when we tafte it, than when we only imagine it. And fometimes, the Ideas we have of Things by Contemplation, are much stronger and clearer, than at other Times, Thus, a Man at one Time has a much stronger Idea of the Pleasure which is to be enjoyed in eating fome Sort of Food that he loves, than at another. Now the Degree, or Strength of the Idea or Senfe that Men have of future Good or Evil, is one Thing that has great Influence on their Minds to excite Choice or Volition. When of two Kinds of future Pleasure, which the Mind confiders of, and are prefented for Choice, both are fuppofed exactly equal by the Judgment, and both equally certain, and all other Things are equal but only one of them is what the Mind has a far more lively Senfe of, than of the other; this has the greateft Advantage by far to affect and attract the Mind, and move the Will. 'Tis now more agreeable to the Mind, to take the Pleasure it has a strong and lively Senfe of, than that which it has only a faint Idea of. The View of the former is attended with the strongest Appetite, and the greatest Uneafinefs attends the Want of it; and 'tis agreeable to the Mind to have Uneafinefs removed, and its Appetite gratified. And if feveral future Enjoyments are prefented together, as Competitors for the Choice of the Mind, fome of them judged to be greater, and others lefs; the Mind alfo having a greater Senfe and more lively Idea of the Good of fome of them, and of others a lefs; and fome are view'd as of greater Certainty or Probability than others; and thofe Enjoyments that appear moft agreeable in one of these Respects, appear leaft fo in others: In this Cafe, all other Things being equal, the Agreeableness of a propofed Object of