yet are not neceffarily connected with their Caufe, is to fuppofe that they have a Caufe which is not their Cause. Thus; If the Effect be not necef farily connected with the Cause, with its Influence, and influential Circumftances; then, as I obferved before, 'tis a Thing poffible and fupposable, that the Caufe may fometimes exert the fame Influence, under the fame Circumstances, and yet the Effect not follow. And if this actually happens in any Inftance, this Inftance is a Proof, in Fact, that the Influence of the Caufe is not fufficient to produce the Effect. For if it had been fufficient, it would have done it. And yet, by the Suppofition, in another Inftance, the fame Caufe, with perfectly the fame Influence, and when all Circumstances which have any Influence were the fame, was followed with the Effect. By which it is manifeft, that the Effect in this laft Inftance was not owing to the Influence of the Caufe, but must come to pass fome other Way. For it was proved before, that the Influence of the Caufe was not fufficient to produce the Effect. And if it was not fufficient to produce it, then the Production of it could not be owing to that Influence, but must be owing to fomething else, or owing to Nothing. And if the Effect be not owing to the Influence of the Cause, then it is not the Caufe. Which brings us to the Contradiction, of a Caufe, and no Caufe, that which is the Ground and Reafon of the Exiftence of a Thing, and at the fame Time is not the Ground and Reafon of its Existence, nor is fufficient to be fo.

If the Matter be not already fo plain as to render any further Reasoning upon it impertinent, 1 would fay, that that which feems to be the Caufe in the fuppoted Cafe, can be no Cause, its Power

and

and Influence having, on a full Trial, proved infufficient to produce fuch an Effect: and if it be not fufficient to produce it, then it don't produce it. To fay otherwife, is to fay, there is Power to do that which there is not Power to do. If there be in a Caufe fufficient Power exerted, and in Circumftances fufficient to produce an Effect, and fo the Effect be actually produced at one Time; Thefe Things all concurring, will produce the Effect at all Times. And fo we may turn it the other Way; That which proves not fufficient at one Time, cannot be fufficient at another, with precifely the fame influential Circumftances. And therefore if the Effect follows, it is not owing to that Caufe; unless the different Time be a Circumítance which has Influence: But that is contrary to the Suppofition; for 'tis fuppofed that all Circumstances that have Influence, are the fame. And befides, this would be to fuppofe the Time to be the Caufe; which is contrary to the Suppofition of the other Thing's being the Caufe. But if merely Diverfity of Time has no Influence, then 'tis evident that it is as much of an Abfurdity to fay, the Caufe was fufficient to produce the Effect at one Time, and not at another; as to fay, that it is fufficient to produce the Effect at a certain Time, and yet not fufficient to produce the fame Effect at that fame Time.

On the whole, it is clearly manifeft, that every Effect has a neceffary Connection with its Cause, or with that which is the true Ground and Reafon of its Existence. And therefore if there be no Event without a Caufe, as was proved before, then no Event whatfoever is contingent in the Manner that Arminians fuppofe the free Acts of the Will to be contingent.

SECTION

Of the Connection of the Acts of the Will with the Dictates of the Understanding.

I

T is manifeft, that the Acts of the Will are none of them contingent in fuch a Senfe as to be without all Neceffity, or fo as not to be neceffary with a Neceffity of Confequence and Connection; because every Act of the Will is fome Way connected with the Understanding, and is as the greatest apparent Good is, in the Manner which has already been explained; namely, that the Soul always wills or chufes that which, in the prefent View of the Mind, confidered in the whole of that View, and all that belongs to it, appears most agreeable. Because, as was obferved before, Nothing is more evident than that, when Men act voluntarily, and do what they please, then they do what appears moft agreeable to them; and to fay otherwife, would be as much as to affirm, that Men don't chufe what appears to fuit them beft, or what feems moft pleafing to them; or that they dont't chufe what they prefer. Which brings the Matter to a Contradiction.

1

As 'tis very evident in itself, that the Acts of the Will have fome Connection with the Dictates or Views of the Understanding, fo this is allowed by fome of the chief of the Arminian Writers, particularly by Dr. Whitby and Dr. Samuel Clark.— Dr. Turnbull, tho' a great Enemy to the Doctrine of Neceffity, allows the fame Thing. In his Christian Philofophy (P. 196.) He with much Approbation cites another Philofopher, as of the fame Mind, in these Words; " No Man (fays an ex

cellent

"cellent Philofopher) fets himself about any

Thing, but upon fome View or other, which "ferves him for a Reafon for what he does; and "whatsoever Faculties he employs, the Under

ftanding, with fuch Light as it has, well or ill "informed, conftantly leads; and by that Light, "true or false, all her operative Powers are di"rected. The Will itfelf, how abfolute and in"controllable foever it may be thought, never "fails in its Obedience to the Dictates of the

Understanding. Temples Temples have their facred Images; and we fee what Influence they have "always had over a great Part of Mankind; But “in Truth, the Ideas and Images in Men's Minds "are the invifible Powers that constantly govern "them; and to these they all pay univerfally a "ready Submiffion."

σε

But whether this be in a juft Confistence with themselves, and their own Notions of Liberty, I defire may now be impartially confidered.

Dr. Whitby plainly fuppofes, that the Acts and, Determinations of the Will always follow the Understanding's Apprehenfion or View of the greateft Good to be obtain'd, or Evil to be avoided; or in other Words, that the Determinations of the Will conftantly and infallibly follow these two Things in the Understanding: 1. The Degree of Good to be obtained, and Evil to be avoided, propofed to the Understanding, and apprehended, viewed, and taken Notice of by it. 2. The Degree of the Understanding's View, Notice or Apprehenfion of that Good or Evil, which is increased by Attention and Confideration. That this is an Opinion he is exceeding peremptory in (as he is in every Opinion which he maintains in his Controverfy with the Calvinists) with Difdain of the contrary Opinion, as abfurd and felf-contradic

tory,

tory, will appear by the following Words of his, in his Difcourfe on the five Points *.

"Now, 'tis certain, that what naturally makes "the Understanding to perceive, is Evidence "propofed, and apprehended, confidered or ad"verted to: for Nothing elfe can be requifite to "make us come to the Knowledge of the Truth. ઠંડ Again, what makes the Will chufe, is fome"thing approved by the Understanding; and "confequently appearing to the Soul as Good. "And whatfoever it refufeth, is fomething reprefented by the Understanding, and fo appearing to the Will, as Evil. Whence all that God requires of us is and can be only this; to re"fufe the Evil, and chufe the Good. Where

fore, to say that Evidence propofed, apprehend"ed and confidered, is not fufficient to make the "Understanding approve; or that the greatest "Good propofed, the greatest Evil threatened, "when equally believ'd and reflected on, is "not fufficient to engage the Will to chuse the "Good and refufe the Evil, is in Effect to say, "that which alone doth move the Will to chufe or to

refufe, is not fufficient to engage it so to do; "which being contradictory to itself, muft of Neceffity be falfe. Be it then so, that we na"turally have an Averfation to the Truths. pro

pofed to us in the Gofpel; that only can make "us indifpofed to attend to them, but cannot "hinder our Conviction, when we do apprehend "them, and attend to them.-Be it, that there is "in us alfo a Renitency to the Good we are to "chufe; that only can indifpofe us to believe it "is, and to approve it as our chiefeft Good. Be "it, that we are prone to the Evil that we should "decline; that only can render it the more diffi

*Edit. 2d. P. 211, 212, 213.

"cult