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And how is Indifference effential to this Act? The Answer must be, according to what is fuppofed in the Evasion under Confideration, That the Liberty of the Will in this Act of Sufpenfion, confifts in a Power to fufpend even this Act, 'till there has been Opportunity for thorough Deliberation. But this will be to plunge directly into the groffeft Nonfense: for 'tis the Act of Sufpenfion itfelf that we are fpeaking of; and there is no Room for a Space of Deliberation and Sufpenfion, in order to determine whether we will fufpend or no. For that fuppofes, that even Sufpenfion itself may be defer'd: Which is abfurd; for the very deferring the Determination of Sufpenfion, to confider whether we will fufpend or no, will be actually fufpending. For during the Space of Sufpenfion, to confider whether to fufpend, the Act is ipfo facto fufpended. There is no Medium between fufpending to act, and immediately acting; and therefore no Poffibility of avoiding either the one or the other one Moment; and fo no Room for prior Deliberation.

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And befides, this is attended with ridiculous Abfurdity another Way: For now it is come to that, that Liberty confifts wholly in the Mind's having Power to fufpend its Determination whether to fufpend or no; that there may be Time for Confideration, whether it be beft to fufpend. And if Liberty confifts in this only, then this is the Liberty under Confideration: We have to inquire now, how Liberty with Refpect to this Act of fufpending a Determination of Sufpenfion, confifts in Indifference, or how Indifference is effential to it? The Answer, according to the Hypothefis we are upon, muft be, that it confifts in a Power of fufpending even this laft mentioned Act, to have Time to confider whether to fufpend that. And then the fame Difficulties and Inquiries

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return over again with Refpect to that; and fo on for ever. Which, if it would fhew any Thing, would fhew only that there is no fuch Thing as a free Act. It drives the Exercise of Freedom back in infinitum; and that is to drive it out of the World.

And befides all this, there is a Delufion, and a latent grofs Contradiction in the Affair another Way; in as much as in explaining how, or in what Respect the Will is free with Regard to a particular Act of Volition, 'tis faid, that its Liberty confifts in a Power to determine to fufpend that Act, which places Liberty not in that A&t of Volition which the Inquiry is about, but altogether in another antecedent A&t: Which contradicts the Thing fuppofed in both the Question and Anfwer. The Queftion is, wherein confifts the Mind's Liberty in any particular A&t of Volition? And the Anfwer, in pretending to fhew wherein lies the Mind's Liberty in that Act, in Effect fays, it don't lie in that Act at all, but in another, viz. a Volition to fufpend that A&t. And therefore the Answer is both contradictory, and altogether impertinent and befide the Purpofe. For it don't fhew wherein the Liberty of the Will confifts in the Act in Queftion; Inftead of that, it fuppofes it don't confift in that Act at all, but in another diftinct from it, even a Volition to fufpend that Act, and take. Time to confider of it. And no Account is pretended to be given wherein the Mind is free with Refpect to that Act, wherein this Anfwer fuppofes the Liberty of the Mind indeed confifts, viz. the Act of Sufpenfion, or of determining the Sufpenfion.

On the whole, 'tis exceeding manifeft, that the Liberty of the Mind does not confift in IndiffeH 3

rence,

rence, and that Indifference is not effential or neceffary to it, or at all belonging to it, as the Arminians fuppofe; that Opinion being full of Nothing but Abfurdity and Self-Contradiction.

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Concerning the fuppofed Liberty of the Will, as oppofite to all Neceffity.

IS a Thing chiefly infifted on by Arminians,

'T in this Controverfy, as a Thing most im

portant and effential in human Liberty, that Volitions, or the Acts of the Will, are contingent Events; understanding Contingence as oppofite, not only to Constraint, but to all Neceffity. Therefore I would particularly confider this Matter. And

1. I would inquire, whether there is, or can be any fuch Thing, as a Volition which is contingent in fuch a Senfe, as not only to come to pafs without any Neceffity of Conftraint or Co-action, but also without a Neceffity of Confequence, or an infallible Connection with any Thing foregoing.

2. Whether, if it were fo, this would at all help the Cause of Liberty.

I. I would confider whether Volition is a Thing that ever does, or can come to pass, in this Manner, contingently.

And here it must be remembered, that it has been already fhewn, that Nothing can ever come to pass without a Cause, or Reason why it exifts in this Manner rather than another; and the Evidence of this has been particularly applied to the

Act's

Acts of the Will. Now if this be fo, it will demonftrably follow, that the Acts of the Will are never contingent, or without Neceffity, in the Senfe fpoken of; in as much as thofe Things which have a Cause, or Reason of their Existence, must be connected with their Caufe. This ap pears by the following Confiderations.

1. For an Event to have a Cause and Ground of its Existence, and yet not be connected with its Caufe, is an Inconfiftence. For if the Event be not connected with the Caufe, it is not dependent on the Caufe; its Existence is as it were loofe from its Influence, and may attend it, or may not ; it being a mere Contingence, whether it follows or attends the Influence of the Cause, or not: And that is the fame Thing as not to be dependent on it. And to fay, the Event is not dependent on its Caufe, is abfurd: 'Tis the fame Thing as to fay, it is not its Caufe, nor the Event the Effect of it: For Dependence on the Influence of a Caufe, is the very Notion of an Effect. If there be no fuch Relation between one Thing and another, confifting in the Connection and Dependence of one Thing on the Influence of another, then it is certain there is no fuch Relation between them as is fignified by the Terms Caufe and Effect. So far as an Event is dependent on a Caufe, and connected with it, fo much Caufality is there in the Cafe, and no more. The Caufe does, or brings to pass no more in any Event, than is dependent on it. If we fay, the Connection and Dependence is not total, but partial, and that the Effect, tho' it has fome Connection and Dependence, yet is not entirely dependent on it; That is the fame Thing as to fay, that not all that is in the Event is an Effect of that Caufe, but that H 4 only

only Part of it arifes from thence, and Part fome other Way.

2. If there are fome Events which are not neceffarily connected with their Causes, then it will follow, that there are fome Things which come to pass without any Cause, contrary to the Suppofition. For if there be any Event which was not neceffarily connected with the Influence of the Cause under fuch Circumftances, then it was contingent whether it would attend or follow the Influence of the Caufe, or no; It might have followed, and it might not, when the Cause was the fame, its Influence the fame, and under the same Circumstances. And if fo, why did it follow, rather than not follow? There is no Cause or Reafon of this. Therefore here is fomething without any Cause or Reason why it is, viz. the following of the Effect on the Influence of the Caufe, with which it was not neceffarily connected. If there be not a neceffary Connection of the Effect on any Thing antecedent, then we may fuppofe that fometimes the Event will follow the Caufe, and fometimes not, when the Cause is the fame, and in every Respect in the fame State and Circumftances. And what can be the Cause and Reason of this strange Phenomenon, even this Diversity, that in one Inftance, the Effect should follow, in another not? 'Tis evident by the Suppofition, that this is wholly without any Caufe or Ground. Here is fomething in the prefent Manner of the Existence of Things, and State of the World, that is abfolutely without a Caufe. Which is contrary to the Suppofition, and contrary to what has been before demonftrated.

3. To fuppofe there are fome Events which have a Cause and Ground of their Existence, that

yet

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