chose rather to argue from the silence of Moses in general, than from the particular prohibition, that none, who was not of the posterity of Aaron, should approach unto the priestly office. So God himself comdemneth some instances of false worship on this ground, That he never appointed them; that they never came into his heart; and thence aggravates the sin of the people, rather than from the particular prohibition of them, (Jer. vii. 31.)"

That it may still farther appear we are not led by mere hypothesis thus to reason and thus to conclude, I will present my reader with an extract from another learned Pædobaptist and an able writer, who adopts the principle on which we argue in the present case, and considers it as applicable to laws and duties in general. "Since office, or duty," says Heineccius, "means an action conformable to law, it is plain that duty cannot be conceived without a law; that he does not perform a duty who imposes on himself what no law commands; that an action ceases to be duty, when the law, or the reason of the law ceases; and that when a law extends to certain persons only, of two persons who do the same action, the one performs his duty, and the other acts contrary to his duty."* To all which I may add, unless the principle of reasoning here adopted be just, the arguments of Protestants against unscriptural ceremonies in the Romish communion, will almost universally fail of proving the several points for which they were produced.

Reflect. X. Mr. Edward Williams, convinced there is no express precept, nor plain example for infant baptism in the New Testament, endeavours to evade the force of our arguments in the following manner: "Whatever there may be in the ordinance of baptism of a positive consideration, there is nothing relative to the subjects of it so merely positive as to be independent on all

* System of Universal Law, b. i. chap. v. § 121.

moral grounds;-nay farther, whatever relates to the qualifications of the subjects, is of a nature entirely moral; and to say otherwise must imply a contradiction. Baptism, therefore, is an ordinance of a mixed nature, partly positive and partly moral. As far as this, or any such ordinance, partakes of a moral nature, the reason and design of the law, or if you please the spirit of it, is our rule of duty-and only so far as it partakes of a positive nature is the letter of the law our rule. As what relates to the qualification of the subjects is of moral consideration, we are necessitated to seek in them the reason and intention of the command; but infants partaking of the great primary qualification, which the evident design of the ordinance requires, ought to be baptized; and it must imply a breach of duty in a minister to decline it. To argue on this principleBaptism is a positive rite, and therefore ought to be express, full, and circumstantial—is, on the principles, concessions, and practice of Antipædobaptists, demonstrably fallacious. For the law of baptism is evidently, in fact, not circumstantial and determinate; and therefore is not, cannot be an institution entirely positive."

Baptism then, according to Mr. Williams, is of a mixed nature; an ordinance, partly moral and partly positive. This, to me, is a new idea; for, of all the writers quoted in this work, of all the authors I have perused, not one occurs to remembrance who has thus represented baptism. Nor do I suppose Mr. Maurice's annotator would have adopted the singular notion, if he had not felt himself embarrassed by the want of both precept and precedent for infant baptism. If, however, the evidence produced be valid, the novelty of his notion is not material. His principal reason in favour of the position is; "Whatever belongs to the qualifications of the subjects is entirely moral." But will this prove that baptism is not, strictly speaking, a positive institute?

*Notes on Mr. Maurice's Social Religion, p. 68, 69.

Will it not apply with all its force to the Lord's supper? On this principle, we have no ordinance entirely positive under the new economy; because it is plain the qualifications for that appointment are chiefly of the moral kind. Many are those theological writers who have more or less treated on positive institutions; some of whose books I have seen and perused with care: but I do not recollect any author, who so defines or describes a religious appointment merely positive, as to exclude every idea of what is moral from the qualifications of its proper subjects. To constitute any branch of religious duty purely positive, it is enough that the rite itself, the manner of performing it, the qualifications of the subject, the end to be answered by it, and the term of its continuance, depend entirely on the sovereign pleasure of our divine Legislator. The nature of the qualifications, whether moral or not, makes no part of those criteria by which the definition of a positive rite should be directed. Consequently, baptism is a positive institute; and therefore, by his own acknowledgment, the letter of the law must be the rule of its administration, both as to mode and subject.'

Whatever belongs to the qualifications of the subjects is ENTIRELY moral. Agreed: it must be allowed, however, that those qualifications are absolutely dependant on the sovereign pleasure of God. But how should an infant, of a few days or of a month old, be a partaker of such qualifications, to render it a proper subject of baptism? Or, supposing such qualifications to exist, by what means are they to be discovered? What is there discernible, that can with propriety be called moral, in one that is not capable of moral agency ? Morality, in all its branches, is nothing but the discharge of moral obligation; or, a conformity of heart and of life to the rule of duty. Of this, it is manifest, mere infants are naturally incapable. On whatever ground,

* See Part I. Chap. I. No. 1-20.

therefore, Mr. Williams fixes the right of infants to baptism, I do not see how it either is or can be of a moral nature. Parents may have the requisite moral qualifications for the ordinance; but I cannot conceive how their new-born offspring, for whom our author pleads as proper subjects of the rite, should be so qualified; and yet he maintains, that "whatever belongs to the qualifications of the subjects is ENTIRELY moral." This respectable annotator is here guilty, if I may so express it, of logical felo-de-se; for his argument subverts the cause it was intended to serve, and proves the reverse of what he designed.

Infants partake of the great primary qualification which the design of the ordinance requires, and therefore should be baptized. Infants-what, in general? Of all mankind? He will not, I presume, assert it. Or if he did, his argument would be equally feeble. I take it for granted, however, that he means the infants of professed believers. But there is no more of a moral temper, or of a moral conduct, in the mere infant of a real Christian, than there is in that of a Jew, or of a Turk. Besides, Mr. Williams himself has opposed the notion of hereditary grace. * If then the infants he means be descended from parents of a certain description, their qualifications must be derived from those parents, whoever they be; consequently, not from any thing moral in themselves. But our author's position requires that the infants themselves possess moral qualifications, to render them the subjects of baptism. What that “great primary qualification" is which infants have, he has not informed us; nor will I indulge conjecture: but I may venture to say, that it is not their being taught; that it is not repentance; that it is not faith; that it is not a profession of the one or the other. Consequently, whatever it be, it is not that which John the Baptist required; it is not that which the evangelist Philip required; * See Part II. Chap. IV. Sect. IV. § ii. No. 11.

nor is it that which our Lord in his commission appointed; and if so, it is not the primitive qualification, whatever else it may be.

Our annotator speaks with a decisive tone when he adds; The law of baptism is evidently and in fact not circumstantial and determinate, and therefore cannot be an institution entirely positive. The LAW of baptism. Then some specific action, called baptism, is absolutely and in earnest required by it; contrary to what he maintains in another place, on which we have already animadverted. This divine law, however, is not circumstantial is not determinate. In one of his notes, to which I have just adverted, he would fain persuade us, that the meaning of our Lord, in his enacting term baptize, is not now understood with precision, even by the most eminent authors; and therefore he is of opinion, that persons concerned in the administration should have it performed according to their own mind; which, to be sure, is the way for every one to be pleased, whether Jesus Christ be obeyed or not. Now he tells us, with an air of assurance, that this law of the Lord is, "not circumstantial and determinate," with regard to the subjects of the institution. According to him, therefore, nothing is plain, determinate, or certain, relating to either the mode or the subject. Aristotle is reported to have said, of some of his works, "That they were Edita quasi non edita; so published as not to be made public, by reason of their obscurity."* Just such, according to our author, is the promulgation of the heavenly statute under consideration. But what a representation this, of a positive divine law! If Mr. Williams be right, one might almost as well study John viii. 6, 8, to know what our Lord wrote on the ground, as endeavour to penetrate his meaning in the law of baptism. When I consider the language of our annotator on another occasion, I do not see how he can steadily believe any thing

* History of Popery, vol. ii. p. 468.