From The Fortnightly Review. THE ESTHETICS OF HUMAN CHARACTER. WITHOUT seeking here to discuss the abstract theory of the Beautiful, we may define it provisionally as the objective side of the purely pleasurable. A cause of one's pleasure is not thought of as beautiful until it is conceived as holding this common relation to other minds besides a bodily movements and vocal sounds, it may be supposed that we attribute to these representatives qualities which of consciousness; and it will be found that properly belong to the represented states a large part of the beauty of expression is really due to the nature of the feelings expressed. Still, there are certain intrinsic beauties in expressional movement which of material beauty already alluded to; are easily accounted for on the principles and these in their turn lend, by association, much of their charm to ordinary conceptions of the inner character. What from the purely external presence may be amount of gratification is thus derivable his own. Even when we seem to call purely subjective fact beautiful, as a beautiful conception, it will be found that this is really due to its objective common originator, a written or spoken word. If this be so, the beautiful expresses the instinctive tendency of the emotional mind to be in harmony with other minds, roughly estimated by watching the infant's When a man standing alone on a cliff, eye as it closely follows the complex and and gazing on the sun setting below ever-varying movements of some lively the sea, exclaims involuntarily, "How boy. Very few, probably, are discriminabeautiful!" we may see an illustration of tractions from their idea of the indwelling tive enough to detach all such bodily atthis spontaneous movement. The very mind. strength of his emotion begets the craving This influence of the external on our for some sympathetic response, some re-æsthetic conceptions of character may be flection of his own feelings in another traced in the growth of language. It is a creature. The exposition of the various elements in external impressions of beauty has been carried far enough in existing works on psychology; and to these the reader must be referred for their formal classification.* The question now before us is how far and in what way human beings come to have æsthetic aspects attributed to them. as well-known fact in philology that distinctions between inner consciousness and the outer world are only very inadequately expressed in primitive tongues. The names of the various functions of mind, as thinking, feeling, and desiring, denoted originally material processes such breathing, rushing, expanding, &c. And features in terms of their external manifeseven now we familiarly describe mental ex-tations. We speak of a brilliant, acute intellect, a warm, quiet emotion, and a robust will. Along with the invariable concomitance of consciousness and bodily organism here implied, it must be remembered that although impressions of human character and those of material facts are The difficulty that at once meets us here arises from the fact that the objects citing the sentiment are identical with its conscious subjects. But every human being is not only a subjective mind; he is also, in regard to other minds, a part of the objective world. First of all, the bodily organism with its movements forms as much an external thing as a tree or a rock. Secondly, even the internal mental states become revealed by means of this material investiture in a way which will perfectly distinct genera, the emotional effects produced by them may be analogous; and that just as we speak of a warm colour or a bright melody, so the observabe dwelt on further on. Thus the whole tion of certain temperaments and dispoindividual existence, so far as it expresses sitions may produce feelings both pleasuritself outwardly, constitutes, in reference able and painful quite analogous to those to other minds, an object of contemplawe experience when acted upon by the tion, and may be found to present features sights and sounds of nature. As will be worthy of the name beautiful. The very seen presently, some of the mental princonsciousness which shares in the subject-ciples on which perceptions of beauty in ive feeling may, in turn, be the cause or objective source of the feeling for others. The feelings of others being known to us only through the external signs of * See especially the chapter on the Esthetic Emo tions in Mr. Bain's work, The Emotions and the Will, which has served as a starting-point and a guide-post to the present essay. external objects depend, as the effects of harmony and fitness, apply equally to our novelty, rarity, and contrast, or those of cognitions of others' minds; and in this way many of the rough analogies between properties of mind and matter are fully accounted for. But leaving the subject of expression and looking at mind as far as possible women. This interest, moreover, acts apart from its connection with body, it quite independently of the nature of the may be broadly asserted that, irrespect- feelings participated in. It is at the basis ively of any qualitative differences, all of sympathy with pains and pleasures, but manifestations of conscious life are inter- it includes the tendency to enter into esting; and since by their objective signs other modes of feeling which are neither they are the common possession of other pleasurable nor painful, and even into the minds, under the ordinary conditions of unemotional thought. observation, they easily come to be regarded as forms of the beautiful. Hence the many sayings about the superior and exclusive interest of man as an object of contemplation, as, for example, that which Goethe puts into the mouth of his hero in his Wilhelm Meister's Lehrjahre: "Man is the most interesting thing to man, and ought, perhaps, alone to interest him." * Another universal source of interest in the contemplation of others' feelings is the scope for imagination implied in the necessary indefiniteness of the intuition. Since we know the minds of others only mediately by the data of external signs, our cognitions are never precise like the intuition of something immediately present to consciousness. Even when the signs The causes of this are almost too obvi- are least equivocal, as in the case of a ous to require naming, though they may friend's words, perfect definiteness cannot not have been fully analyzed. It is not be attained. The feeling of any given necessary, for explaining our knowledge moment can never be expressed with abof each other, to assume any intuitive be- solute completeness by the greatest acculief in the existence of other minds than mulation of language. Some of its aspects our own; the objective sign, pre-eminently and relations still remain undetermined. the word, is the common meeting-point of Now, the vague and undefined is the our own and others' consciousness. A lit-source of a peculiar pleasure. It gives tle attention to the process here evolved liberty to thought winged by some emowill perhaps bring out the peculiar at- tion to follow out airy tracks of its own. traction of other minds just mentioned. The artist knows this when he introduces The first and most conspicuous feature into his picture the path or the brook of the case is, that our impressions of winding away into the wood, or the hazy others' feelings must be interpreted in expanse of distant air and mountain. So, terms of our own. The external move-in the case before us, a part of the subtle ment or sound calls up the idea of a influence exercised by every manifestation feeling we ourselves have experienced. of soul-life is due to this free play of the And here of course lies the main interest. idealizing impulse. This remark does not, Whatever comes into this close myste- however, imply that clearness of expres rious connection with our own sentient sion and utterance diminishes the interest; life, has all the borrowed interest of this on the contrary, it heightens it in the life itself. But this is not all. There is a large majority of cases. For there is alpositive pleasure in every feeling of re- ways left the region of imagination; and semblance; and this pleasure is heightened unless some distinctness of feeling is exin proportion as the resemblance strikes pressed, the sympathetic participation — us in the midst of diversity. All of us which is, after all, the chief element of have experienced the strange shock of dis- the pleasure — becomes impossible. And covering the rough image of a human face further, openness and candour are closely in a beetling crag. Now, the knowledge associated with clear expression, and give of another's mind is emphatically a con- it a value of a still higher kind. The imsciousness of likeness amid wide difference. aginative interest now spoken of is seen The boundary separating another's inner most conspicuously when a new charac life from our own is of the most insuper- ter is brought under our notice. The able character. What the whole distinc- idealizing impulse fashions the unknown tion involves need not be here discussed; depths of feeling and thought according to suffice it that it is most fundamental and its own arbitrary will; and, as we know, all-important throughout the whole range the result is often wide enough from the of our cognitions. It is this waking up to fact. The same tendency shows itself in a consciousness like our own, yet so widely the ideal future developments we paint sundered from our own, which gives some- for those who are objects of a constant thing of their exquisite delight even to the personal interest to us. Our knowledge interchanges of feeling of mature men and of each other is never so complete as not to leave ample space for this play of imagination. Buch i., cap. 4. Lest these general considerations should seem too vague to account for any of our actual impressions of beauty in human character, it may be well to trace their bearing on some of these perceptions. In doing this I shall speak occasionally of isolated feelings or states of consciousness, but more frequently of general dispositions or tendencies. It is implied here, of course, that, agreeably to what Mr. Bain calls the principle of Relativity, change of impression or variety is essential to these effects of conscious life. Sameness of impression is equivalent to absence of impression; and fulness of soul always means rich variety. The more important cases of this principle will be spoken of by-and-by. objects, becomes undoubtedly more interesting to witness. Quickness of observation and insight, fine discrimination and inference exercised upon the outer world, are deeply engaging as mere modes of active consciousness, though doubtless the keen feeling of interest in the pursuit commonly implied in these qualities is a part of the pleasing impression. Still more is the charm of feeling added to that of intellect in social vivacity, easy comprehension of others, and imaginative interpretation of their feelings and wants. In all these cases of intellectual attractiveness, the percipient mind has been engaged outwardly, and has thus betrayed its workings by a series of rapid and various movements. But the predominance of thought over feeling and action tends to a self-contained, unexpressive, and motionless attitude. If all exhibitions of consciousness are interesting, any rare degrees of it must be especially so. For example, the quick emotional temperament is commonly held Of the special sources of interest in huto be an exceedingly attractive object of man nature, one of the most important is contemplation. As a permanent possi- the pleasurable quality of the mental state bility of rich various sensibility, it tends exhibited. To witness the manifestation to engage the admiring gaze of others, of a pleasurable feeling is pleasing, and whether presented in actual life or in the vice versa. This follows from what has creations of fiction. For this reason, proba- been said concerning the mode of reaching bly, the female character is so much oftener the consciousness of others. The observadeemed beautiful than the male. Over and tion of another's pleasure is itself an idea above the pleasurableness of the mere of the feeling partaking of its pleasurable external expression already alluded to, nature. This first effect is no doubt often very much is due to the full fountains of counteracted by after considerations, as feelings themselves. And this interest when another's joy excites our envy, or does not depend on the quality of the injures our sense of justice; but the fundaemotion as pleasurable or painful, but mental fact remains. We are not speakflows from all varieties of exuberant feel- ing of the moral aspects of this tendency ing. When this nature is least fettered in active sympathy, but purely of its value by conventional rules, the charm is en- as an object of contemplation. The first hanced; from which cause arises much effect, then, of gladsome expression - all of the beauty of youth. Closely allied thoughts of the individual's relations to to emotion proper is the excitement ourselves and others being suspended — is of abundant activity. Mr. Bain has shown universally pleasurable. For this reason that previous to any stimulation from it is made a matter of refined taste to hide without, the system manifests a spontane- as far as possible painful feelings, such as ous vigour; and this impulse has a characteristic consciousness of its own which we commonly express as a sense of fresh vigorous life. It may be supposed to form, along with the great charm of its physical embodiment, a subordinate pleasure in the gratification we derive from the sight of health and youth. In the remaining departments of mind, thoughts, and volitions, there is less of this excited form of consciousness; and accordingly these aspects of human nature are of interest chiefly for other reasons. The intellectual states, again, being characterized by very little external movement, are of secondary interest as mere exhibitions of conscious life. Thought, when directed to external constraint or mortification, and to wear in society an even cheerfulness. The special beauty of some characters may be traced to a natural predisposition to pleasure. Although the acquired habit of repressing pain and exhibiting pleasure is pleasing, the natural disposition to this preference is much more so; for it is more perfect as a form of pleasure through the absence of everything like artificial restraint. The joyous temperament, prone to forget a pain, and to expand a pleasure, is singu larly beautiful to contemplate. It forms another source of attraction in the youthful nature, but is seen in its highest charm when it is found rare and unexpected in the habitual smile of a wrinkled old age. I know of no expression of this feeling so delicate and true as Heine's exquisite song suggested by the sight of youthful innocence, which begins with the line : "Du bist wie eine Blume." Hence art has chosen for the permanent charm of pleasurable manifestations. phases of her heroes and gods deep, quiet gladness; and of these representations the Greek Apollo, "whose bright eye lends brightness, and never yet saw a shadow," will probably always remain first in the order of beauty.* Of course this effect of pure gladsomeness is often modified by accompanying suggestions. Insensibility to pain is displeasing, as will be seen, through its unsympathetic character. Similarly the aesthetic anticipation of pleasurable expression is corrected by a recollection of its connection with physical constitution, health, &c. Rarely if ever is this sentiment the whole feeling of beauty, but a concomitant of other feelings and intuitions.* As a second illustration of these simple emotional effects, admiration may be named. The main element here is the perception of some novel and rare degree of a desirable quality. It has been noticed already Hitherto I have dwelt on gratifications that some degree of freshness and unfadepending on our entering into a feeling miliarity must be a characteristic of every of another through its expression. But impression of beauty. A commonplace there are pleasures derived from the spec- exhibition of the most attractive elements tacle of others' feelings not due to this of character can never be beautiful. But sympathetic action of the mind. Of in certain cases the degree of unexpectedcourse, so far as we conceive the consciousness and rarity may be the chief source of state of another, it must be by means of this same interpretation through our own. But in the class of cases now to be noticed the pleasure does not spring exclusively from this assumption of the feeling expressed, but from certain aspects and relations of the same viewed as objects of thought. And, first of all, the manifestations of human consciousness are, no less than impressions from the material world, the causes of special emotions. The one emotion characteristically awakened by the sight and observation of human beings is tenderness in all its varieties. Though the strongest forms of this feeling are confined to a few objects, other and fainter degrees are bestowed on all our fellowcreatures so far as we observe in them certain qualities of character. Thus the joyous temperament already described is commonly lovable. Many moral excellencies especially sympathy and self-sacrifice, generosity and lasting devotion, excite the same impulse of affection; and this effect lends much of their peculiar charm to the beautiful examples of virtue. Even the spectacle of weakness, and a suggestion of possible suffering, may call up a species of this feeling half pleasurable, yet with an under-current of sadness which we call pity. This case is curious, as being an apparent exception to the superior Mr. Carlyle has brought out this with other beautiful aspects of character in his Life of Sterling, So thoroughly joyful, light, and hoping a nature" was his, that even his religions feelings seemed to lack the element of terror. Next to this elasticity of heart, the great charm in Sterling's character was his abundance of nature, his "infinite susceptivity." the gratification. Thus all degrees of vir- • Mr. Mill, in his able exposure of Bentham's oneable as a third aspect of actions co-ordinate with slded view of human nature, distinguishes the lov the aesthetic and the moral. No doubt where the impulse to love depends on a special and restricted relation of the subject and object, it has no aesthetic character; as in the case of a prompting to reward a generous act to one's own child. But when the mere presentation of an action to our attention is followed by an ideal excitation of the emotion. I regard it as analogous to the other pleasurable er fects of beholding human character. The common uses of language confirm one in the belief that, to the majority, the sympathetic or amiable side of hu man nature is beautiful. No doubt in minds of high culture the connotation of the word becomes nar rowed, and acquires an esoteric value, so to speak, the more intellectual perceptions of harmony, &c, becoming the prominent associations of the word, and excluding the more vulgar sentiment. To most a strongly-marked individuality | element in the pleasure given us by the is apt to be unnatural; though to some it spectacle of human consistency. It is alis highly impressive and admirable for its ways an intellectual process, and as such rare manifestation of courage and force. enters largely into the perceptions of It might perhaps be thought by some beauty of the more cultivated minds. As that the ludicrous aspects of human na- a sense of correspondence between feelture ought to have a place here, as they ing and expression, it appears in the are the source of a special and pleasurable charm of candour and frank openness. It emotion in the beholder. But though the binds the attraction of the present to ludicrous is undoubtedly a part of the that of the past, and is one main force subject-matter of aesthetics, it is strongly sustaining our continued interest in the opposed to the beautiful and sublime, evolution of the individual. which are more especially the subject of Beyond the tracing of resemblances this paper, and would require a separate among different elements of the same indiand different kind of treatment. How-vidual character, the feeling of harmony ever engaging or diverting a laughable ec- shows itself in the reference of these features centricity or defect may be, it is obvious of character to an ideal devolopment of the that it has little to do with the aggregate individual in conformity to the conditions charm of a character. For the manifest of his environment. There is a gratificatendency of any excessive amount of tion in tracing the correspondence bequaintness of awkwardness in a character is to inspire contempt after the first impulse of laughter has been gratified. Still, a certain admixture of the ridiculous may add to the real interest of a nature. As will be hereafter seen, a suggestion of some common frailty in a great man will often be a relief, and serve to render his character more natural. Again, a certain voluntary gratification of our risible susceptibilities, whether in act or in speech, tends to please us through its exhibition of good-will and wish to entertain. But, with these exceptions, the ludicrous borders too closely on the unworthy to enter into our notion of a pleasing and admirable character as a whole. tween the character and the circumstances of individual men and women. The inheritance of a family trait, the willing adoption of the father's pursuit, the exhibition of taste and fitness for the prescribed situation in life, all afford pleasure to the observer. As a correspondence to an ideal of happiness for the individual, this harmony forms a part of our conception of a well-balanced mind, and gives to prudence what little of an aesthetic character it can ever possess. It appears as a well-ordering of energy and appetite in relation to supreme reason in Plato's conception of a just, harmonious, or beautiful man. A more important case of the pleasure In the following elements of beauty in derived from harmony in character is found character the pleasure results from a more in the perception of naturalness, or conintellectual process, the cognition of har- formity to the laws of human nature genmony among relations. The general prin- erally. This principle, it is obvious, is ciple of harmony as a main factor in supplementary to the last, adding the unithe beautiful is too familiar to require versal type to the individual ideal. It immuch illustration. In all our perceptions plies generally a facility in entering into of the beauty of human nature, some refer- the expressed feeling on the part of the ence of the feeling observed to other feel- observer, as is seen in the saying, “One ings or objective facts holding relations touch of nature," &c.; but it is an intelwith it, may be found. Single feelings, as lectual perception more than a sympaalready mentioned, are of interest chiefly thetic emotion. It varies with the observas criteria of general tendencies. Any er's knowledge and conception of mankind. given manifestation of feeling is at once This perception takes different forms acclassified with similar states, and, when this is done easily, a pleasurable feeling results, which is the rudimentary sense of harmony. This emotion is the chief The attractions of individual character are the only things intended to be discussed here. Considered as a member of a group, such as a novel paints for us, a thoroughly ridiculous type of nature may be the source of a high gratification as a relief and counterpoise to the more earnest characters. ↑ This gratification forms also the foundation to cording to the aspect of character presented. When the individual nature is viewed as a whole, it is judged to be complete or otherwise according to its participation in the various elements of the hu the intellectual enjoyment in reading and studying character. Curiosity and aesire to compreliend may blend in the interest awakened by the sight of a human being, though there are often painful accompaniments which rob the feelings of their æs thetic character. |