is mercilessly exposed and rejected as soon as discovered. And, finally, they know that still more conclusive testimony is to be found in the daily verification of scientific predictions and in the never-ceasing triumphs of those arts which Science guides."

Hence we find that Science has unimpeachable credentials. To regard it with hostility is an act of utter folly, equalled only by its utter irreverence. To fail to discern the ultimate fact which underlies Religion is to be very short-sighted; but to fail to see that Science is a mass of facts is to be stone-blind.

An impartial examination, then, compels us to admit that on each side of the controversy there is truth. "And, if both have bases in the reality of things, then between them there must be a fundamental harmony. It is an incredible hypothesis that there are two orders of truth in absolute and everlasting opposition." There is but one order of truth, expressed in two forms. Science and Religion do but show us opposite sides of the same fact. The near side, the front, is shown by Science; the distant side, the back, is shown by Religion.

Having found reasons for believing that Religion and Science will ultimately coalesce in some truth common to both, we have next to discover what that truth is. That it must be a general and not a special truth is evident from the nature of the case. It cannot be a religious dogma, such as that of the trinity or that of propitiation. Science takesno cognisance of them; they are outside its jurisdiction. Nor, on the contrary, can it be a scientific truth, such as some fact in Algebra or in Geometry. Mathematics belongs not to the sphere of Religion, and Religion can recognise no mathematical truths. Just as no belief within the domain of Religion can, under any conditions, become a scientific truth; sono truth within the domain of Science can, under any conditions, become a religious belief. It follows, therefore, that the truth which is to unite Religion and Science must be one common to both; and a truth which is common to both must be a highly abstract fact. It must, indeed, be the ultimate fact in human intelligence.

What that fact is we shall endeavour to indicate in another paper on "Religion and Science: the Reconciliation."

IGNOTUS.

THOUGHTS FOR OURSELVES.

THERE are two methods by which a special attitude, philosophical or religious, may be at once explained and recommended to a circle of readers. The first is by enumerating the various reasons for its adoption-its innate reasonableness, its depth and comprehensiveness, and the extent to which light is thereby shed at once on the history of the past and the questions of the present hour. In this first respect the cause of Agnosticism has not wanted apologists in the past, and is not likely to be without them in the future. The second method will attract and interest fewer minds: it is not calculated to make proselytes; rather does it tend to confirm those whose sympathies are already enlisted on our side, and thus to win respect and confidence from (more than to convince) those who are given to distrust and to oppose us. The former is the invitation specially addressed to those without-the latter the exposition for those within-our pale. Our present words take the latter form.

Agnosticism has been "wounded in the house of its friends " times out of number. Viewing some current definitions of its nature and scope, one is tempted at times to ask if the words employed are really intended to apply to the subject, or whether, by some printer or publisher's error, "The Sum of Saving Agnosticism" has not been mixed with some other treatise in the binding, and the pages strangely transposed. Agnosticism is broad and deep, but it has its limits; it cannot include everything. An Agnostic does not, necessarily, object to vaccination, nor is he committed to any particular conclusion in regard to the population question, although some persons apparently think so. Anything vehemently "destructive" (in the slang of religious controversy) ranks itself, by a kind of malignant destiny, under the Agnostic flag, as if Agnosticism pure and simple were directly "destructive" at all. Materialistic theories have not been slow to shelter with us, as if a declaration of nescience in regard to the problems of being necessarily implied the acceptance of something called Matter as, indeed, the mother of us all. Persons with peculiar views on all sorts of subjects, and riding a stud of limping hobbies, company with us gladly, until we have been compelled, in self-defence, to draw attention to the parting of the ways. And, as every one of these friends is supposed to have gained a complete acquaintance with our intellectual view-point in a very limited time, and to be yearning

to proclaim the same to the world at large, it is not to be marvelled at that the definition afforded of our Agnosticism has been, at times, confused and contradictory. For this we cannot hold ourselves to be blameable. There is no recognised Agnostic communion with which we are acquainted; and, if any person chooses to call himself an Agnostic, no one that we know of has any right to deny him the title Yet it is but fair that those who take our name and profess our position should conscientiously confine themselves, while doing so, to the subjects with which we are concerned and the views generally accepted as belonging to Agnosticism proper. Yet every man's Agnosticism may be regarded as different from his neighbour's, in some degree. Every allowance must be made, in estimating the Agnostic views of another, for the various colourings which they are apt to take from the persuasion which has preceded their adoption. No man can clothe or unclothe himself mentally at pleasure. Whether he will or not, a remnant of the old belief will cling to him through all the changes of his intellectual course. He will accentuate a point here, or dwell lightly on another there, of his new persuasion because of some former predilection, some long-forgotten leaning, still, unwittingly, his own. His very mode of thinking, the way in which he apprehends or examines a statement, is not that of his new, but of his former, type of conviction. Would that this freshness, this piquancy of mental accent, were all that we received from some of our Agnostic recruits! For it we were thankful; nothing is further from us than a desire for tame uniformity, dull agreement, consent born alone of slothful thought. Some, however, bring more with them than we desire. They bring us, in many cases, their former creed-not to be enlarged, vivified, and made new by that larger hope to which they come, but solely in order that they may, at their own leisure, and for our supposed edification, turn and rend it in our company.

Now, Agnosticism contradicts no creed which has seemly expression, save by implication; and its method of doing so is that which is most gentle. It but dissipates, by soothing counsel, the terrors of an illusive dream. It seeks to dispel the nightmare vision imaginatively woven round the future; but it has no harsh word for the dreamer, no coarse and foolish abuse to pour upon the subject-matter of the dream. Persuasively, Agnosticism reasons away the fear and dread prevailing in the perturbed mind. Although

But a word unworthy in connection with a faith newly left, an allusion barbed with intent to wound, a sneer at that which is, or was once, to another thrice-hallowed, is beneath us and beneath our Agnosticism. Language is the instant handwriting of the soul-indelible here and hereafter. The word thus written remains. Practically, a jest, a scurrilous word, at the expense of another's faith, is a heinous offence. It is meant to be—and gains its object in being-offensive. There is a reserve of sacredness in every faith, however lowly. The sanctity is proportionate to the depth of intellectual conviction with which it is held. With this sanctity no man intermeddleth. For ourselves, we see no reason, no excuse, for the neglect of this prime ordinance of cultivated thought. Criticism may be keen; but there are limits to criticism, which have been invariably respected by the informed and educated. Comment may be keen, but should, nevertheless, be courteous. That any man should dream of renouncing his religious belief because of ridicule, or from the fear of it, is scarcely credible. Such a convert would not be worth the cost of his conversion.

Agnosticism, again, by its very nature an admission of infinite possibilities, becomes dogmatic when exclusive of any possibility in particular. Yet some (in their own opinion) Agnostics do not hesitate to pronounce a definite conclusion in regard to matters on which faith itself is not assured. Granted the conclusion is negative on one side and affirmative on the other; but the negative conclusion is one which Agnosticism should shun.

Of course, it is not intended that, because every one of the problems of being is necessarily in suspense and matter of incertitude, every theory may shelter under that remote chance (one out of many) of proving true in the end. Nothing being necessarily true in this connection, no cover is thereby afforded for believing any particular solution as the one possibly correct. Truth and falsity, and the mean between them, which we meet with reserve of judgment, are matters to be determined by the nature of the problem at issue, the weight of evidence adduced pro and con., and the possibility of determining upon that evidence, if adducible. But the operation of the law of probabilities, in such instances, cannot be admitted.

H. DUNDAS.

THE POPULAR RELIGIOUS FAITH.

SECOND PAPER.

It is said by Christians that, if you want to know the truth of their religion, you must go back as far as possible to primitive times, and the nearer you can get to apostolic days the more sure you may feel that you are right. The first four centuries are very highly valued for Christian evidence. The first two stand still higher. And the first century, called the apostolic times, is a sure foundation, in which perfect confidence may be placed. If the tenets and Church discipline of this century could be restored, we should have doctrines, dogmas, and discipline, to which no gainsayer could make exception or hint a doubt. We purpose to follow this rule in the present paper, and see what were the tenets of Christians in the first century; after which we will, with the Editor's permission, extend our inquiry through the three succeeding centuries, taking it for granted that the nearer we get to apostolic times the nearer we get to the truth of the matter. We fancy that many of our readers, not well read in ecclesiastical history, will be not a little surprised at the revelations which will be unfolded before them.

Of the supposed history contained in the first five books of the New Testament we shall say nothing in this place. That was the time of seed-sowing, the time of laying foundations, when we must not look for fruits or edifices. The Acts of the Apostles closes A.D. 63, and within the next seven years Jerusalem was a heap of dust. Titus had taken the city, and one stone was not left upon another. Thousands died of famine, thousands were slain by the sword, and thousands more were sent into captivity. It was a time of desolation and great mourning. Those of a superstitious nature said it was a judgment of God, because his own elect people, whom he had himself taught by Moses and prophets, had forsaken the faith and gone after other gods, three gods instead of one; although they had been told over and over again that the "Lord thy god is one god," not three gods; and although the whole book of Judges was a book of judgments on their forefathers for forsaking the right ways and running into the ways of error. Captivity after captivity, for forty years or more, was sent in chastisement of their sins; then the long Babylonish captivity, and now a severer chastisement was sent on them, even the overthrow of their city and the destruction of their beautiful temple. They had forsaken the God to which Moses had directed them; they had abjured the dispensation so