it had been entered upon: those allies, hope and restoration, not like the meteor with whom his majesty's ministers, when which shines with temporary splendour, bat they knew all the extent of the calamities like the clear and steady ray that is the harin Spain, but the fatal consequences of binger of an opening auspicious dawn; not the affair at Corunna, had concluded a like the volcano which spreads terror, ruin, treaty of alliance, without stipulating any and desolation around, but like that heaone condition of reciprocity in favour of venly fire which cheers the gloom of desthis country; a treaty by which we pair, and lights the way over the wilderhad bound ourselves to wage war for them, ness. Then a new day-star seemed to and to acknowledge the sovereignty of have arisen, the auspicious omen of deany man they might elevate to the throne, liverance to Europe;-and but one wish even should the supreme power be vested pervaded the country-to promote the gein the hands of him against whom we nerous cause; but one regret was feltwere now fighting;-a treaty unexampled that we could not all participate in the in the annals of European diplomacy. glorious struggle. When under such cirBut they were not then to discuss the me- cumstances his majesty's ministers underrits of that treaty, nor whether it was not took to assist Spain, if there had been any right that this country should have afford- man in the country base enough to regret ed all the assistance which her means that the task had not been left to their poenabled her in the support of the Spanish litical opponents, or to wish, from such a cause. If these allies were incapable feeling, that the sanguine prospects then by their own councils to guard their own contemplated should terminate in disapinterests, his majesty's ministers should pointment, his revenge was complete. not have submitted to them the direction The first act of this unfortunate campaign of ours, nor concluded such an alliance consisted in the expedition to Portugalunder such circumstances: it was not to that specimen of the noble lord's power of these allies, then, that the house was to combination, in which general had been look as the source of the disasters which sent after general, in such unaccountable had befallen us. There was indeed, one but rapid succession, when neither was acexcuse which might be urged in defence quainted with the plans or instructions of of his majesty's ministers; that the disas- the other, and when the manner in which ters which took place had been the result the whole had been concerted and exeof events which it was not within the com-cuted had made us a mockery even to the pass of human power to resist, which no enemy whom we had beaten. This was foresight could anticipate; no possible the first effort of his majesty's ministers; combination guard against. But, if he the second was the direction of the British could demonstrate that they had been the army towards Spain. And here he must inevitable consequence of their incapacity observe, that those who could not justify, and mismanagement; if he could prove but wished to excuse the Convention of that these disasters had arisen from any Cintra, founded their excuse upon the neother cause, and this he pledged himself to cessity of expdeiting the march of the do from the documents they had them- British army to Spain. Even sir A. Welselves produced, then their excuse would lesley had asserted that if the army had fall to the ground. If blame attached any been detained by the prosecution of miliwhere, it was either to them, or to our tary operations against the enemy in Porallies; and ministers were so circum-tugal, it could not be ready to march into stanced, that they could not undertake to justify themselves, unless by an attack upon these allies, or their own friends. If so, he should leave it to the country and to the world to decide what credit ought to be given to those who, after having so conducted, should so defend themselves. After the hurricane, that had laid Europe prostrate, had nearly completed and confirmed the destruction of the nations of the continent; when the clouds that accompanied it were even bearing towards our own shores, the Spanish revolution presented a bright and unexpected gleam of

Spain before December. Yet it was somewhat curious to find, that, notwithstanding that very Convention, which was thus justified on the ground of expediting the march of the British army into Spain, it was not till that very December that the British army was able to act, in Spain. Thus it appeared, that what was apprehended as the consequence of protracted warfare in Portugal, had actually resulted from the inactivity, the want of all energy, and the gross want of foresight, on the part of his majesty's ministers. By this they had shewn, that they were

poured in his troops, in one continual uninterrupted stream, from the Rhine and the Vistula, into Spain. It was not, however, till September, that his majesty's ministers first communicated their intention to sir Hew Dalrymple to march a British force into Spain. If they had been deceived by diminished statements of the French force, and exaggerated accounts of the Spanish armies received from Spain, they might have had some excuse for their conduct at that period; but the contrary was the fact, as appeared from the first dispatches from lord William Bentinck, of which ministers were in possession before they ordered any troops to proceed to Spain. They had equally correct infor mation in the dispatch of general Broderick. There were only two men, Morla, who had sold the Spanish cause, and Buonaparté, who resolved on the conquest of Spain, who could wish an English army at that precise period to advance into Spain under the actual circumstances; that Morla, whose intrigues for the surrender of Cadiz, and the fleet and arsenal, to the French, were now well known, and who had shewn an invincible jealousy against the presence in the south of Spain of a British force which might watch, and be a check upon, his traiterous motions.Lord William Bentinck, in his first dispatch, stated that the Spanish armies were disorganized; that the Spanish government had not taken the first and most ne

as little capable of gathering the bright harvest of laurels arising from conquest, as they were of gleaning benefit by experience from the barren field of disaster. The only proof they had given of their vigour, was the conveyance of 22,000 French troops from Portugal, to a port of France much nearer for their co-operation with the French army in Spain. If Spain was to have been the ultimate object of the expedition, Portugal was not the point to which it should first have been directed; because Junot, who had no means of sending troops to suppress an insurrection at Badajoz, as appeared by the intercepted dispatches, could not march to the assistance of the French in Spain; and if our expedition had been sent directly to Spain, we might afterwards have accomplished our object in Portugal, without the blood it had cost in the actual accomplishment. The British army might have been more beneficially employed, conjointly with our maritime force, on the flanks of Spain, in Catalonia and in Biscay, where it might have occupied Barcelona and St. Sebastian, in which case it might have prevented the escape of Joseph Buonaparté from Spain; or the British troops should have been sent to the south of Spain, where they might have taken post with the Sierra Morena in their front, the Guadalquiver on one flank, and the arsenal and fortress of Cadiz in their rear, besides our own impregnable position at Gibraltar. It appeared that ministers had sent the army to the south when they ought to have sent it to the north, and to the north when they should have sent it to the south. His object, therefore, was to prove, as he should do satisfactorily from the papers on the table, that they had shewn themselves unable to execute even their own projects. They seemed to have been altogether inattentive to the situation of affairs in Spain, until the occasion had gone by for promoting her cause with any prospect of suc

cess.

So early as May, applications for assistance had been made by some of the provinces; Dupont had surrendered in July, and about the 1st of August Joseph Buonaparté had been obliged to withdraw from Madrid. On the 4th September, too, the emperor Napoleon, not disguising his views, had declared, in his message to his senate, his intention to conquer Spain, and thanked his God, his fortune, and his star, that the madness of the British cabinet had sent an army to encounter him in that country. The French ruler then

cessary step of placing them under the command of one general, and that they were all separated, and the several corps inferior to the divisions opposed to them by the French. Such was the account which lord W. Bentinck gave, and it was confirmed by that of general Broderick. There was, therefore, no one account in which ministers could plead even the miserable and lame excuse of having been deceived by those whom they employed. But notwithstanding the warning which had been given by Buonaparté of his intentions respecting Spain in the early part of September, and though the British army had been completely released in Portugal, it was not till the 26th of September, that lord Castlereagh wrote to sir Hew Dalrymple to prepare the army to advance into Spain, or to sir John Moore to place himself at its head. On the 28th, orders were sent to sir David Baird to proceed from an English port to Corunna. Yet it was not till the 14th of October (the day after he arrived there) that lord W. Bentinck, at

"Do good by stealth, and blush'd to find it fame."

Madrid, was made acquainted by a courier | subject, as to the expence, amount of tonfrom sir John Moore, with the circum- nage, &c. and had his pockets stuffed with stance of its being the intention of govern- calculations of that description. But the ment to send sir David Baird to Corunna. arrangements of his majesty's ministers General Leith, it appeared, received orders had been of a piece and perfectly consistabout the same time to prepare for the re- ent throughout. About the same time sir ception of the British force at Corunna, but David Baird was directed to send his transto make his preparations as secretly as pos- ports to the Tagus to convey the infantry sible. What could have been the meaning which they supposed sir John Moore might of such an injunction? Was the noble Se- wish to dispatch from Lisbon to Corunna ; cretary afraid of rousing the Spaniards or thus so curiously did they dovetail their gratifying their feelings by rendering no-combinations, that transports were to be torious the arrival of a large auxiliary sent in October from Corunna to the Taforce. He wished perhaps to gus for infantry, while transports were to come from the Tagus to England for cavalry, before we could have an effective army in Spain; in that country, which so early as May we had been earnestly solicited to assist. When the determination to send a British force to Corunna had been formed, one would have thought that ministers would have paved the way for its landing at that port. But no such thing: no communication had been previously made to our commissioners; no arrange ment entered into with the Junta of government; and sir David Baird at his arrival at Corunna not only found himself without money to pay his army, but was actually refused permission to land by the Junta of Gallicia. When at length the army was permitted to land, the last division did not enter Corunna till the 8th of November, only two days before two of the Spanish armies had been annihilated, and twenty-four before Buonaparté entered Madrid. No information had been previously sent even to lord William Bentinck, as to the destination of the army of general Baird, and upon this point he had remonstrated. But, to shew that the noble lord had not a patent for want of informa tion and want of foresight, Mr. Secretary Cooke, who replied to this remonstrance, stated, that government had had no reason to believe, from captain Kennedy's letters, that there would have been any difficulty as to the landing of the army; and yet, strange to state, on the very day this answer was dated, Mr. Secretary Cooke had received a letter from captain Kennedy, stating the difficulty that the Junta would place in the way of the landing of the army. How different was the conduct of the enemy! Buonaparté always flew to his object upon the wings of the eagle; whilst the noble lord crept upon the back of a tortoise to oppose him. eyes of Europe should not be open to the tardy character of his measures, the noble.

It did not please the noble Secretary previously to apprize the Spanish people of the blessings he intended for them, but suddenly to surprize them with his kindness. His kindness, however, was very incomplete. For, lest the combination of errors, incapacity, and mis-management, should not be carried to its fullest extent; cavalry, that arm upon which the result of the whole campaign was to depend; cavalry, which every commanding officer they had employed, and every Spanish officer that applied to them, had called for; cavalry, which lord William Bentinck, general Broderick, the Spanish Deputies, sir J. Moore, and that other great military authority Mr. Frere, thought most essential; cavalry was the very last thing that ministers thought proper to turn their attention to. Although they found sir John Moore saying, that with 7,000 or 8,000 cavalry, he could have done much in that country effectually to withstand the enemy; yet the noble lord opposite writes to him, that it would be time enough to send cavalry when he had sent the transports back from the Tagus to Great Britain, and that, too, at that time of the year when such a voyage was likely to be protracted by an inconvenient season. One would have thought that ministers would have been most anxious to shew an activity in the conveyance of cavalry beyond all other species of force; because it must be in the recollection of the house, that when the noble lord came into office, he made a charge against former ministers, for not having prepared cavalry transports. But the noble lord, who was so anxious to burthen the country for the multiplication of cavalry transports, when unnecessary, could find none, when the public service called for them. No doubt the noble Seeretary could say a great deal upon this

And lest the

known before-hand, and they were well ascertained previously to be men of established reputation. He was prepared to admit too, that there were still in Europe many foreign officers, under whom a British army might be safely and successfully employed. But this was the first instance of a British army being sent on a foreign service, and ordered to be put under the command of any person, whoever he might be, who should chance to be at the head of a foreign army. It would

lord, as appeared by one of the documents upon the table, started suddenly from his freezing career, and abandoned for the moment the snail-like sinuosities of his course: for on the 2nd of November, the noble lord wrote to sir John Moore that some mighty exertion was to be made for Spain, and that Buonaparte's preparations were only to be met by correspondent efforts; and this he wrote on the day that Buonaparté commenced his career on the Ebro with 120,000 men; and only a few days before all the Spanish armies were destroy-be fresh in the recollection of hon. gentleed. The disembarkation of the troops under sir David Baird did not commence before the 26th of October, and before the whole of his army was lan.led, the French had acquired such an ascendancy in Spain as to render the success of the campaign hopeless upon our part. But it was not alone the want of wise arrangement or of judicious combination in their military measures, that proved the misconduct and incapacity of ministers; they shewed themselves equally culpable and no less incompetent in having sent sir John Moore upon this arduous and important service without any settled plan of operations. The noble lord, indeed, (Castlereagh) wrote to him. on the 26th of September, telling him that he would be in great good time; that he should himself try to form a plan, and that he could consult upon that subject with the Spanish general. It was not till the 14th of November, however, that the noble lord began to recollect himself in his office in Downing-street, that something like a plan was necessary. He then wrote to sir John Moore on the necessity of adopting a plan from the situation in which he would then find himself, but yet without suggesting any thing as to the amount and situation of the Spanish armies with which sir J. Moore was directed to act. The only plan suggested by the noble lord was, that if he (sir J. Moore) found the Spanish armies headed by one individual, he should place himself under his command, and on the contrary, if under the command of many, he should act in concert with the officers commanding the armies in his neighbourhood. In this communication of the noble lord, the most important part was that which required sir J. Moore to place himself under the commander who might then be entrusted with the conduct of the Spanish armies. There were many instances on record of British troops serving under foreign offigers; their names, however, were always

men, that in the administration of Mr. Addington, when a charge had been made against ministers of having not done sufficient for Portugal at that period, it was answered by the present lord Liverpool, that the Portuguese would not in the first instance agree to put themselves under an officer even of known abilities; and this answer was received by the opposition as a sufficient excuse. The instruction therefore given by the noble lord to sir John Moore, to place himself under the command of any general that might be appointed to the command in chief of the Spanish armies, though he was only to act in concert and communication with the Spanish generals if they commanded separately, was a most extraordinary measure. The times of revolution usually raised up men to such stations who were often not competent to fill them. It was by such a popular impulse that Castanos had been removed from the head of the army in order to appoint the duke del Infantado; and Don Palafox raised to the command in chief in Arragon. The merit of these two illustrious individuals did not alter the nature of the case. Had fortune been as blind as the noble lord, it was unknown into what dangers this instruction might have led sir J. Moore. Morla was then in the government of Spain, and might with as much facility be placed at the head of its armies. Had he been so, and had he peremptorily ordered the advance. of sir J. Moore to Madrid, sir J. Moore could not, without violating his directions, and being guilty of insubordination, refuse to comply with those orders from a person whose object was evidently not to save, but to sell the interests of his country. Were such to have been the case, sir John Moore with his army, would infallibly have fallen into the snares of the enemy by pursuing the instructions given him by the noble lord. Under these circumstances, sir J. Moore, found himself at

Salamanca. He now came to that part of the scene in which Mr. Frere cut a conspicuous figure. He hoped the country would now be enabled fairly to appreciate the services of that gentleman. He trust ed also that gentlemen on the other side would not forget the various ways in which they had endeavoured to conceal the evi dence on this branch of the case: how it had been wrung from them like drops of blood; and the twists and turns and shifts after which it had at length been extorted from them First they did not know of such a correspondence; then it was private. Would any of those gentlemen, with unblushing front, now assert that any of these leters were private? Had they the mark "private" upon them; and even if they had such a mark, could any man suppose that they were any thing else than a public record of the business of his mission? They were not only public, but were meant to be

50.

upon

The

upon the officers they employed. gallant commander had only one alternaLive, either to go by sea, which was hardly possible at that time of the year, besides that he might not have been allowed to and, or to go by a road, by which his army cou'd not pass without being divided. It was, therefore, no fault on his part that he had been exposed to this inconvenience. If they told him that the French army was destroyed and annihilated, was it his fault if he afterwards found them in front of him? Were they to throw blame on him on account of their own information to him? Finding himself in this situation, he wrote a letter to Mr. Frere, remonstrating on the way in which he had been deceived, upon his want of information from the Supreme Junta, and that he had no communication with the Spanish commanders. Mr. Frere on receiving this letter gave in a remonstrance Then they were said to be of no conit to the government; adding a sequence; they had nothing to do with little asperity of his own, in language sir J. Moore's retreat, and very little with little suited to the character of a minister his advance; and if produced, they would at a foreign court. Sir John Moore findnot answer the purpose for which they ing himself in this situation, the Spanish were called for; as they contained no in- cause nearly ruined, but wishing to assist formation that would be of the smallest them if possible, follows the advice of advantage to the discussion. Were they Mr. Frere. Mr. Frere, in his letter to sir really unimportant? On the contrary, John Moore, advises him to advance, and were they not the sole and only cause of to join his troops to the Spaniards, informthat gallant and lamented officer's ad- ing him that by doing so he would prevance? It was solely on account, of vent an irruption of the French into Spain, them that he found it his duty to make and save the capital. This he writes on that advance. On the 13th of Novem- the very day when one of the entrances ber sir John Moore found himself at Sa'a- to the town was seized on by the French; manca. Of the Spanish army he knew Buonaparté himself was then only 17 miles nothing, of the French army he knew as from Madrid, and the next day was at the little; and, after advancing as directed, gates. He was not surprised that the he found himself in front of the French right hon. gent. (Mr. Canning) wished to, army, his own forces being divided. He conceal such letters as these, so derogatrusted he should hear no more blame tory to the character of the person by imputed to that brave officer, as if it pro- whom they were written, though on his ceeded from some fault of his own that own account he might wish to shew that his army had been divided into two corps. there was another person who had the He did not expect that the gallant officer same lack of information, and the same whom Mr. Pitt regarded as one of our ignorance as himself -There was, howgreatest military men, should have been ever, another reason which might induce one of the first on whom gentlemen on the the right hon. gent. to wish to conceal the other side would transfer blame from their letters. He might be averse from having own shoulders. When he recollected the it known that there was another person auspices under which the right hon. gent. who possessed the qualification of writing (Mr. Canning) had commenced his poli- in the same tone with himself; and he tical career under Mr. Pitt, he indeed might be afraid to shew how nearly the would be surprised to find him casting the pupil had approached to the perfection of blame from himself upon that officer, who the master. Sir John Moore, however, enjoyed Mr. Pitt's unlimited confidence, disregarded the rhapsody of Mr. Frere, and therein following the example of his col-wisely commenced his retreat, in conseleagues, who shifted the blame uniformly quence of the information he had received VOL. XIV. 2 G