every special case, though it be applicable to the generality of cases. The general conclusion is by strict logical deduction, inevitable from the scriptural principle, that—“without faith it is impossible to please God." But, we cannot say the same of special conclusions, because there may, and actually do exist a number of cases, many of which, I am convinced, have fallen under my own observation, in which the disposition to believe exists, but where the usual evidence of that disposition cannot be given. In many more, I am inclined to think, the disposition may exist, without any possibility of obtaining evidence thereof. I shall give a few examples. 1st. A person to whom the doctrine was never preached, may have the disposition to believe. 2d. A person to whom the doctrine was misrepresented, may be disposed to believe, though he may, from being told that the church taught absurdities and contradictions, and immoral principles, be disgusted with what he was taught were her doctrines, and be without the opportunity of correcting his errors. 3d. A person of weak or perverted intellect may have the disposition to believe, and at the same time may mistake error for truth Other instances might be added, in which the disposition may exist, but the evidence not be given. None of those persons profess the doctrines of the Roman Catholic Church, yet that church extends to them, as well as to those who profess her doctrines, capacity for salvation; therefore she does not confine that capacity to those in her external communion. But, although the church does not possess evidence by which she can discern those individuals, and upon which she could pronounce them to be members of her body, yet they are a portion of her soul. GOD, who searches the hearts of men, and who knows their disposition, discerns them; grants to them the benefit of their faith; and though they are not acknowledged as visible members, yet they are claimed as truly within the pale of the church. Thus the general propositions are true: "Without faith it is impossible to please God." "Out of the church there is no salvation." "The Roman Catholic Church is the only true church." "All persons are obliged to be members of the one true church." Yet the church would condemn as rash, presumptuous, illiberal, uncharitable, dangerous, and unjustifiable, the special conclusion: "But this individual is not in the church. Therefore this individual will be damned.” Whatever probabilities may exhibit themselves to our judgment, we can have no certainty of the truth of the second proposition, " But this individual is not in the church," and, without a certainty of its truth, we can never arrive at the special conclusion. It is true, we may know that he does not belong to the body; he is not in the external communion; but, whatever may be the force of probable circumstances, not even sometimes the declaration of the individual himself; in many cases, nothing short of supernatural revelation, can give us a certainty that he does not belong to the soul of the church. Therefore, although a Roman Catholic does believe that it is necessary for salvation to be a member of the true church, and that the Roman Catholic Church only is that true church: still he does not hold, nor is he obliged to believe, that every person who is not in her external communion will be damned; nor will truth require, nor charity justify, his forming special conclusions. He knows not who will be damned. The eternal condemnation of the wicked, is the prerogative EXCLUSIVELY OF GOD; and one which MAN CANNOT USURP. Nothing herein contained can excuse, or even extenuate, the heavy criminality of those who are careless in seeking after the true church; or who, having discovered it, basely and wickedly neglect to bear testimony to God's truth, through mean or mercenary human motives. 3d. We now come to the next proposition: "The Roman Catholic Church teaches that the dissenters from her doctrines ought to be persecuted in this world, before they are damned in the next." She teaches NO SUCH DOCTRINE. Does she not anathematize and curse all heretics? No. She anathematizes, that is, rejects, detests, condemns, and reprobates heresy, and not heretics. The erroneous doctrine, not the individuals. The doctrine may be detested, and execrated, and condemned, whilst the persons who have been innocently led to its adoption, may be pitied and beloved. The original seducer, the heresiarch, who, in his pride and malice, devised the error, and obstinately, and contumaciously, and cunningly led others to adopt, and they who, in like manner, plainly exhibit the malice of depravity, may be condemned and reprobated, without lessening the pity, or affection, for those whom they seduce. Let me suppose a person mixes a deleterious intoxicating draught, and induces many to partake of it, under the expectation, on their part, of improving their health; suppose I warn those deluded per But does not his religion require of him to hate all those whom he knows to be doomed to damnation? Does it not oblige him to hate all God's enemies, and is not every heretic an enemy to God? sons, whom he invites to take his potation; | luded individual who professes the erroneous suppose I threaten my children with my doctrine." displeasure, should they yield to the seduction; suppose him to be aided in his plans by men of plausible appearance, who proclaim me to be a jealous tyrant, who would deprive my children, and all others, of the benefits which this amalgamator would confer, because those benefits are not of my own invention; suppose my admonitions and threats to be disregarded, and that I see my friends, and my children, raving and pining in their intoxication: can I not condemn the seducer, and his assistants, and execrate the poisonous beverage, whilst at the same time I weep over my friends, and lament, and love, and pity them and my children? And can I not describe, and bewail, what I foresee will be the consequences of their misconduct, without being justly chargeable with desiring those consequences? These are consequences which I cannot avoid foreseeing, and which I am anxious to avert; but which, from the plans of the seducer, and the strength of the poison, and the lamentable delusion of my friends, and of my children, I am unable to prevent. If a Roman Catholic finds persons seduced into error of doctrine, and tells them that the consequence of their losing their faith will be perdition, is it not rather evidence of his sincere desire to save them from ruin, than of a wish to plunge them into damnation? If a man walks carelessly towards the brink of a precipice, is it my wish that he should be dashed to pieces, because I cry out to inform him that he will inevitably be lost, if he proceeds? Suppose I saw him advancing, and knew the consequences, and calmly looked on in silence, or carelessly and smilingly told him that, indeed, all the paths were equally safe, and that he ought to walk where he chose, and he fell and was destroyed; would my silence, or my delusive flattery, be charity, benevolence, liberality? Thus the Roman Catholic is not illiberal. First-" When he asserts the exclusive truth of his doctrines." Secondly-" When he publishes the consequences of error in faith." As well might the robber charge the moralist with illiberality for publishing damnation to be the consequence of robbery. If God declares the penalty for the transgression, there can be no illiberality in stating that fact of God's declaration. Thirdly-" Nor does his religion require of a Roman Catholic to believe that any individual out of the external communion of his church will be damned." Fourthly, "Nor is his condemnation of heresy evidence of his dislike of the de His religion does not require of him to hate any person, but it commands him to love all persons, and to do good to all: nor could he, if that obligation of hatred were his principle, reduce it to practice. The principle would oblige him to hate millions of his fellow Catholics, because, unfortunately, amongst them there are millions whose corruption of life is detestable, and who are greater enemies to God than are numbers of heretics and infidels. Millions of Catholics, whose misconduct will insure their damnation. How many hypocrites are there, with sanctified exterior, and filled with rottenness, concealed from the eye of man. By the imputed principle, all those must be hated. How shall they be known? Thousands who lived in error during many years, ultimately embraced truth, and became the brightest ornaments of the church. From the East and West they came to sit down with Abraham, and Isaac, and Jacob, and the children of the kingdom are cast out. How shall we draw the bounding line which must separate those who stand together; now in infidelity; now in heresy; now in Catholicity? All who live in the profession of infidelity are not infidels. All who live in the profession of heresy are not heretics. All who live in the profession of Catholicism are not Catholics. We have before seen several grounds of exception on one side; there are some upon the other; and many individuals stand upon each of these grounds. We could not, therefore, know whom to hate, were there an obligation of hatred. The principle is false, and even if true, it would be impracticable as a rule of conduct. It is false, for the gospel tells us we must hate no person. Though we may reprobate the conduct of many, we must love all. And that gospel is the code which contains the principles of the Roman Catholic. To that gospel the imputed principle is a plain contradiction. The principles of Roman Catholics are not contradictory. What then is religious liberality? The assertion of truth-the rejection of errorthe love of all mankind, without the sacrifice of our principle. In a word, it is CHRISTIAN CHARITY. It first loves God and his truth, and adheres firmly to his revelation. It next exhibits the practical love of every individual of the human race, without excluding sect or nation from benevolence of feeling and exertion for their welfare. It accords with evidence, it is allied to consistency, it urges us to search for the revealed doctrines of God, to BELIEVE and to PROFESS THEM: When likely to be profitable to others to manifest them; when such manifestation would be practically useless, or be injurious, to continue silent. It forbids us to flatter vice, or to encourage error. It commands us to hate no man-to persecute no man-to live in harmony with ALL men-to assist as far as we can, those who need it; whether their religious belief be correct or erroneous; to practise the duties of religion at the proper time and in the proper place; not to make of them an ostentatious exhibition; yet to give good example; not to annoy others by prying into their belief or conduct, except when our station makes it our duty; not to limit our friendship and good-will to those only who agree with us in faith; and whilst we endeavour to regulate our own conduct with propriety, to avoid speaking of the faults, or judging of the practice, or the claims to salvation of our neighbour. In a word, religious liberality teaches us to do unto all men as we would they should do unto us. This is the liberality of a Roman Catholic. It is not that unreasonable, unmeasured abandonment of every principle of common sense, and of religion, which places truth and falsehood upon a level; and rushing blindly from the extravagance of bigotry, to the extreme of folly, declaims much but means nothing; which puts contradictions in juxtaposition, and is unable, or unwilling, to perceive the absurdity. Which lavishly bestows everything to every claimant, and preserving nothing for itself, soon is found to be destitute of reason, consistency, even of common decorum. True liberality is to make every human being the utmost concession which truth, justice, and decency will permit. In the above observations I have assumed, as granted, what could be proved with faci lity, and what every Roman Catholic is bound to believe, viz.: "THAT EVERY DOCTRINE OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH HAS BEEN revealed by God." † JOHN, Bishop of Charleston. LETTER TO THE RIGHT REV. DR. DAVID, ON THE To the Right Reverend Dr. David, Bishop of Right REVEREND AND DEAR SIR-The letter written by you to the editors of the Miscellany, dated 11th of February, 1825, Bardstown, has been given to me by the publishers of that work, after they had taken from it those directions which regarded themselves. The following passage arrested my attention:-"I shall, however, take the liberty to remark, that the definition of faith, in No. 6, page 90, Vol. III., [Sup. 355.] Faith is the sincere disposition to believe all that God has taught, does not appear to me theologically accurate. For it seems to me that this disposition can be in one who as yet knows nothing of the revealed truths, and who consequently has no faith. The definition of St. Paul, Heb. xi., implies the knowledge of the things we hope for, and the conviction of the things that are not seen.' This passage, sir, was written by me, and I find, upon reading your letter, that it is at least liable to misconception. Perhaps, strictly speaking, it is theologically inaccurate. Nothing can be of greater importance; nothing more clearly your duty and mine, than in the language of doctrine to preserve the strictest accuracy. Allow me then to thank you for your remark, and to subscribe to the truth of your observation. In the essay in which the passage is found, my object was to examine the moral criminality or innocence of a person, who was invincibly ignorant of the truth: and the inaccuracy of my expression arose from my not clearly expressing the distinction between the disposition to believe and the actual belief. Actual faith is positive belief upon the testimony of God. It is not by faith we believe what reason exhibits to us as true; if reason exhibits truth, any farther evidence would be superfluous. We pay no homage to God by assenting to what is manifest to ourselves. The homage of faith consists in the recognition of God's superior knowledge, and of our obligation to believe what he knows and teaches, but which surpasses our comprehension; and this belief is founded upon our certainty that God cannot deceive us, that he cannot say that which is not the fact. When, therefore, I know that God has revealed any doctrine, I never attempt to test its truth or its falsehood by the criterion of my reason, for this would be to examine whether what God has revealed is true: this would be making my reason, and not the divine word, the criterion of truth. He, therefore, who knows that the Lord has revealed a doctrine which is above man's comprehension, and believes it upon the authority of God, has faith, provided he is disposed to believe in like manner every doctrine so revealed. But if, amongst such doctrines he should make selections, and receive some because he thinks them more rational than others, and reject those which he conceives to be not so rational, then he places his reason upon a tribunal to decide regarding the truth or falsehood, or rather the probability or improbability of those doctrines which have been revealed. His opinions are founded upon the decisions of his judge, to which he has submitted the doctrines. This is not faith: for although some of the revealed doctrines might have been received, others are rejected; and belief is not founded upon the authority of him who revealed, but upon the opinion of the judge who made the selection. Suppose even, by accident, that this man's reason should decide [that] all these doctrines are certainly true, or, he finds their truth to be extremely probable, and upon this ground he receives them; this is not faith, for the foundation of faith is the authority of God-but here the foundation is the authority of human opinion. Thus, the actual belief of all the doctrines might not be faith. Faith must be belief founded upon the divine authority, not upon human opinion. The disposition to believe all that God has taught, is not actual faith, but it is the preparation for faith. When the fact is then adduced, that God revealed certain doctrines, the mind examines evidence for the truth of the fact, to decide the question: "Did God reveal this doctrine?" If the evidence is sufficient to establish the fact that he did make the revelation, the person who has the sincere disposition will immediately believe without previously submitting the doctrine itself to the tribunal of reason; being perfectly satisfied that if God revealed it, it must be true, and knowing that human reason might err, but God cannot deceive. Hence it is clear that between persons who hold our principle of faith, there can be no division, particularly in those circumstances which exist in our church, where there is a perpetual and manifest tribunal to testify the fact, that God did reveal certain doctrines, that he did not reveal other doc trines. It is also very clear that unity cannot be expected amongst even the best informed persons who make the approbation of their private reason a prerequisite to the belief of any doctrine, because their opinions differ as much as countenances do, and are perpetually changing in a greater or less degree in even the same individual, so that from the declarations this day, you cannot with certainty tell what will be their belief twelve months hence. This is not unchanging faith: it is fluctuating opinion. It would exhibit God revealing as many sys tems of doctrine as there are individuals, and contradicting his own declarations as frequently as you would find those individuals contradicting each other. It would ultimately lead to the conclusion, that in religion we can have no certainty of truth, it would make divine faith, nothing more than human opinion, and inevitably produce perfect indifference as to [the] truth or falsehood of revealed doctrines. Revelation in this case becomes altogether useless, and faith no longer would be found, for men always abandon belief when they can find no certainty. Allow me to thank you again for drawing my attention to that distinction which Ï overlooked, and to amend my definition by taking in its stead, that which has the sanc tion of at least eighteen centuries. Faith is the belief upon God's authority, of those doctrines which he has revealed. All those doctrines might not be known to the believer, but it is sufficient for him to believe those which are exhibited to him, provided he has the sincere disposition of believing every other doctrine which God has revealed, as soon as it shall be also exhibited to him. The person who is invincibly ignorant of the truth might have this disposition, and where the disposition exists, the moral crime of infidelity is not. disposition is not so general, as charity But I fear, Right Reverend Sir, that this would desire. However, we cannot inspect the minds of our fellow-mortals. It would be rash and presumptuous for us to pronounce upon the state of individuals. To God they stand or fall: he will decide their fate and ours. Let us then hope for more than our fears would suggest. The general principle is undoubtedly true. Without faith, it is impossible to please God. May that God, in whose hands are the hearts of men, mould them into faith, and fill them with charity, is a prayer in which I know, Right Reverend Sir, you sincerely join with, Your brother in Christ, SUPPLEMENT TO APPENDIX TO LETTERS ON BLANCO WHITE. H. NAM de quibusdam levibus culpis esse ante corporum resurrectionem purgatorius ignis credendus est.Com. in 1 Cor. iii. I. lastic theology, but as meaning venial sins which merit a heavy punishment; unless it is understood of mortal sins which have been forgiven, for which satisfaction remains due. ΑΧ. 'Αυτω παρακατατιθέμενοι τας ημετέρας ψυχὰς, τὰς τε παρακαταλυόντων ὥσπερ ἐν ὁδῶ κοινή των ἑτοιμοτέρων. Orat. in Casar., § 31, prope finem, ΑΥ. Εἶτα και υπέρ των προκεκοιμημένων ἁγίων πατέρων, και ἐπισκόπων, και πάντων άπλως των ἐν ἡμῖν προς κεκοιμημένων, μεγίστην 'ονησιν πιστεύοντες ἔσεσθαι ταῖς ψυχαῖς, ὑπὲρ ὧν ἡ δέησις ἀναφέρεται της ἁγίας καὶ φρικοδέστατης προκειμένης θυσίας. Καὶ βούλομαι ὑμᾶς ἀπὸ ἀποδείγματος πεῖσαι. διδα γὰρ πολλους τούτο λέγοντας. τι ὠφελεῖται ψυχή, μετὰ ἁμαρτημάτων απαλλασσομένη του δε τοῦ κόσμου ἦ οὐ μεθ ̓ ἁμαρτημάτων, ἐὰν ἐπὶ τῆς προσευχῆς μνημονεύητε, ἄρα γὰρ εἴ τις βασιλεὺς προσκεκρουκότας αυτω, ἐξορίστους ποιήσειεν ειτα οι τούτοις διαφέροντες, στεφανον πλέξαντες ὑπερ των ἐν τιμωρίαις, αὐτῷ τοῦτον προσενεγκεῖεν, ουκ αν αυτοῖς ἀνεσιν δύη των κολάσεων ; τον αυτόν τρόπον και ἡμεῖς ὑπὲρ των κεκοιμημένων αυτω τὰς δεήσεις προσφέροντες κὧν ἁμαρτωλοὶ ὦσιν οὐ στέφανον πλέκομεν αλλα Χριστὸν ἐσφαλιασμένον ύπερ των ημετέρων ἁμαρτημάτων προσφέρομεν ἐξιλεουμενοι ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν καὶ · ἡμῶν τὸν φιλάνθρωπον Θεόν.— Cateches. Myst. v. prope med. ΒΒ. ΕΡΩΤΗΣΙΣ λδ. Τί ουν ; οὐκ αἰσθανονται τινός ευεργεσίας καὶ αυτών ἁμαρτωλῶν ψυχαὶ, γινομένων ὑπερ Εἰ μή τινος ευεργεσίας μετεῖχον εκ τούτου, οὐκ ἂν ἐν τῇ αὐτῶν συνάξεων καὶ ευποιϊῶν, καὶ προσφορῶν ; ΑΠΟΚ. προσκομιδῆ ἐμνημονεύοντο. αλλ ώσπερ ἡ ἄμπελος ἀνθεῖ εξωθεν τω αγρώ, αἰσθάνετο της ὀσμῆς αὐτῆς ὁ επικεκλεισμέν νος δινος, κ' συνανθεῖ καὶ αὐτός, οὐτῶς νόει καὶ τὰς τῶν ἁμαρτωλῶν ψυχας μετέχειν ευεργεσίας τινὸς ἐκ της ύπερ αὐτῶν γινομένης αναίμακτου θυσίας καὶ ευποιίας. Quest, ad Antioch. qu. xxxiv. Some quotations from the Greek fathers were given in the Appendix, according to the approved Latin versions, the originals not being accessible; and it has been thought unnecessary to repeat them again in Greek, as there is no room for mistranslation, and no probability that the reading or sense of any of them will be disputed. |