Principles of selection.

Thus an account of the causes of War in Europe, if unlimited by the purpose in hand, might include all such facts as the temper and manners of the tribes which founded the States of Europe, the geographical situation of the territory of those States, all the past relations of the several States to each other, and all the leading events of European history. It might be safely predicted that, the character of the populations being such as it was and is, the territory of the different States being assigned to them as it came to be, the reciprocal relations and general events and ideas being of the kind they have been for the last thousand years and more, the occurrence of occasional Wars must be a certainty, unless some counteracting cause, or assemblage of counteracting causes, intervene to prevent it.

Interesting as the enquiry might be, it would be quite beside the present purpose to enter upon the investigation, curious rather than profitable, into all the antecedents of the indeterminate class just mentioned, from which modern War results. There are, however, some antecedents which seem to stand apart from the rest, on the ground both of their more general and comprehensive character, and of their being open to the direct influence of International Law. There must, necessarily, be something arbitrary in this process of selection,

but inasmuch as the purpose is to fix attention upon facts which are not so much denied as accidentally overlooked, and not to enforce questionable theories about facts, there is little room for serious differences of opinion. The argument will proceed rather by the collection and arrangement of thoroughly admitted phenomena, and not by hunting out of their ambush facts of obscure and ambiguous import.

In speaking of the causes of War, an essential distinction has to be made at the outset between the real and the apparent causes of any particular War. It is very seldom that the real ground of a War, that which has brought matters to the state at which War seems the only and inevitable solution, is that which is publicly alleged to be so by the diplomatists and statesmen who are concerned with it. Indeed, these persons, on one side at least, are always interested in glossing over the reasons which seem to have compelled their State to take the final step of declaring War. If the assertions of the diplomatists of a Belligerent State were to be believed, such an event as the occurrence of an unjust or needless War would be impossible. Each War, they say, is waged, either in defence of a threatened right, or in order to avenge and punish a violated right, and the existence of the right, and the fact

of actual or apprehended violation, are matters upon which they are prepared to offer evidence to all the world. This evidence may seem more or less cogent to different persons or Governments, but respect for European opinion, and the hope of obtaining sympathy, if not co-operation, are always potent enough to lead to the evidence being prepared as skilfully as possible.

Thus there is almost always an ex post facto element in the causes of War as alleged by the contemporary diplomatists of the Belligerent States. It usually happens that on one side, at least, if not on both sides, the resolution to go to War has been long formed and, indeed, matured, a suitable occasion only being waited for; or it may be that it has only been foreseen that a War is probable, or no more than possible, and yet this probability, or possibility, may involve quite as much preparation as a War actually determined upon, and it will only depend upon very minute accidents whether the occasion for actual War is really held to have arrived or not.

In order, then, to understand the causes of modern War, it will not suffice to rely exclusively upon the despatches of diplomatists and the speeches of responsible statesmen, as illustrated by the abstract doctrines of International Law that no War can be lawfully entered upon, except in defence of an ascertained right, either

violated or menaced. This doctrine, valuable as it is, is rather a standard and a limiting rule, to which it has been attempted to make warlike States conform, than an expression of a subsisting practice. The doctrine, no doubt, has considerable influence, and, at least, cuts away the possibility of waging War on palpably unjust grounds, while it obliges statesmen always to shape their public apologies in conformity with the requirements of a legal rule. This is, no doubt, a gain in the direction of substituting legal methods for mere violence, and so deserves every encouragement. But the real causes of modern War are usually far deeper than the assigned ones, and are of a strictly political or moral, and not of a legal character.

It is well known that the established doctrine of International Law is that all States are equal. This is a doctrine which can only be made intelligible by tracing its actual legal consequences, as exhibited, for instance, in the identical rights of the smallest and the largest States to exemption from foreign interference, to the free use of the open sea, to the observance of treaty engagements, to the fair treatment of its citizens when abroad, to the immunity of its ambassadors, and to due ceremonial courtesy and respect.

All States are

regarded as

legally equal.

The validity of these rights is confessed on all hands, though momentous discussion often arises on two questions ;--first, whether a particular State claiming its exercise of these rights is, for all purposes, a true sovereign and independent State; and, secondly, whether the admitted right does or does not comprehend certain specific claims, alleged on any particular occasion to be contained in it.

The first of these questions is suggested by the various aspects which a State is apt to present, according as it has bound itself temporarily to another State by conventional ties, or has entered into a permanent league with other States, or, as in the case of Hungary and Austria, Prussia and the German Empire, Turkey and Egypt, is associated with another State through anomalous dynastic or constitutional relations. It is also presented in the case of a portion of a State becoming detached from the parent State, whether by successful insurrection, or colonisation, or, as in the case of Greece and Turkey, Belgium and Holland, by more or less voluntary separation. In all these cases difficult problems are apt to arise, as to the condition of the offshoot community, or of the two parties to the separation, while yet the whole proceedings are incomplete; and as to the finality and stability of the new Constitution, when they are alleged to be complete. Thus, in respect of