Literature to supply the urgent demand. interests involved keep expectation of All these institutions and practices, whether unavoidable or not, must have the effect of The numerous maintaining, among vast masses of personsive an directly, and among nearly all persons indirectly, war. a belief that the recurrence of War, at an earlier or later date, is as natural and certain an event as the recurrence of one of the seasons of the year; that the necessity of War, sooner or later, is the only explanation of some of the most striking and deeply-rooted institutions of society; that, but for the probability of War, millions of men would be without their current employment, and without such agreeably speculative chances of personal distinction as each rates so highly in his own favour; that, if War is deferred too long, the lives of millions may be passed without accomplishing the end, to which an assemblage of strong personal and national impulses has mainly devoted those State of International Law, most commonly recognised cause of War. Nature of Law. lives; and that if War be precipitated, the time is at hand to which the discipline and eager expectation of years have been directed, when, at last, each can know for himself, and demonstrate to his fellow, what he is worth, and when an expectant country, vitally concerned in the issue, will award the prize due to his bravery. 7. The cause of War which is often the most patent one, and, therefore, has attracted more attention than is, perhaps, really due to it, is the existing condition of International Law. This cause admits of more direct treatment than any of the causes above examined, and, therefore, it is natural that many persons, deeply persuaded that all War must come to an end sooner or later, have directed their main attention to, what seems to them, the only practicable remedy at present. It is well known that, owing to a number of historical and moral causes, the mutual relations to each other of the States of Europe, and of other States directly affiliated to them, have gradually evolved certain definite rules of action, which, in public profession at least, have an obligatory force on the several States concerned. These rules are closely analogous to the rules of national law, and, in fact, largely trace their origin to the ideas, the structure, and the language of Roman Law. Nevertheless, in many obvious respects, as in the absence of a Legislature, of Courts of Justice, and of an Executive Authority, these rules noticeably contrast with national law. According to some writers (as the late Mr. Austin), these points of contrast are sufficiently serious to rob these rules of all title to the name law. extensive with morality This is a question, in a great measure, of terminology, and it is equally true that these rules have no greater title to the name which Not coMr. Austin is ready to concede to them, that International of morality. Few people would, now-a-days, deny that States have moral obligations towards each other of a far wider and deeper kind than any which could be contained in the sharply defined language of a formal rule. In fact the relation of International Morality to these rules indicates a fresh ground of analogy between these rules and national law. National law is never identical, or even co-extensive, with morality, but it is the constant tendency of a progressive State to bring its law into harmony with the requirements of morality, as understood at the day. Thus it is an intelligible effort of terminology to designate the rules which, in the region of international society bear a relation to international morality exactly corresponding to the relation which national law bears to national morality, by the same name of law. But, in spite of the real and un but related to National Law is. morality as Vagueness of its rules. Sources of Consent of States, and Law of Nature. doubted efficacy of the rules of International Law, and their close parallelism with the rules of national law, it is none the less true that the rules of International Law are infected, at many points, with a peculiar measure of uncertainty; that, even where the form of the rule is certain, the interpretations that may be set upon it are numerous, conflicting, or ambiguous; and that, even when the meaning of the rules is clearly ascertained, the purport of them by no means, as yet, corresponds to the requirements of morality, expediency, or justice. The rules of International Law, as explained by the most competent Authorities, are said to be founded, partly in the actual or implicit consent of States, and partly in the deductions which, it is said, are capable of being drawn from a so-called Law of Nature. Some writers are rather disposed to rely upon the former of these sources, and others rather on the latter. Perhaps a meeting point of the writers who look mainly to the consent of States, as ascertained from their express conventions, or their tacit usages, and of those writers who are prone to refer mainly to the prescriptions of some abstract rule of right, however designated, may be found in the statement that the rules of International Law are such rules for the conduct of States in their mutual relations as they have sanctioned by express or tacit consent, and do not conflict with the requirements of International Morality, as those requirements are understood at the day. Thus an alleged rule of International Law must satisfy two conditions in order to maintain its validity. It must be the product of the actual, or the tacit, consent of States, that is, it must have been generally agreed to by treaty, or constantly observed in practice; and it must be in harmony with a scheme of International Morality, which is variously styled the Law of Nature, the Law of God, Abstract Justice, the Law of Right, Reason, and the like. forming distinct When it is remembered how comparatively rare, in past times, have been the points of contact of Eastern States otherwise than by War, Difficulty of in what a desultory way the intercourse be- rulestween the States has been conducted, how fragmentary and imperfect is the evidence of that intercourse, and yet how indefinitely extended in some directions is the field from which the International Lawyer has to glean his proofs of usage and consent, it does not seem surprising that the whole region of International Law should be one of uncertainty and conjecture. But, when to this are added the intricacy and depth of any problem which depends for its solution upon a true and exact view of Abstract Morality as binding on States, and the difficulties inherent in the interpreta |