in upholding the inviolable right of the Commons to pursue an impeachment, without interruption from any act of the Crown. It could not be suffered that offenders should be snatched from punishment, by ministers who might be themselves concerned in their guilt. Nor was it just to the accused, that one impeachment should be arrested before a judgment had been obtained; and another preferred,-on the same or different grounds,-perhaps after his defence had suggested new evidence to condemn him. Had not the law already provided for the continuance of impeachments, it would have been necessary to declare it. But it was agreed in both Houses, by large majorities, that by the law and custom of Parliament, an impeachment pending in the House of Lords continued in statu quo, from one Session and from one Parliament to another, until a judgment had been given.1

relations of

Commons.

As parliamentary responsibility has spared ministers Improved the extreme penalties of impeachments, so it has the Crown protected the Crown from those dangerous and haras- with the sing contests with the Commons, with which the earlier history of this country abounds. What the Crown has lost in power, it has gained in security and peace. Until the Commons had fully established their constitutional rights, they had been provoked to assert them with violence, and to press them to extreme conclusions; but they have exercised them, when acknowledged, with moderation and forbearance.

and weak

At the same time, ministers of the Crown have en- Strong countered greater difficulties, from the increased power governand independence of the Commons, and the more direct ments.

1 Com. Deb.; Parl. Hist., xxviii. Lords' Journ., xxxix. 125; Tom1018, et seq.; Lords' Deb.; ibid., line's Life of Pitt, iii. 161.

action of public opinion upon measures of legislation and policy. They are no longer able to fall back upon the Crown for support: their patronage is reduced, and their influence diminished. They are left to secure a majority, not so much by party connexions, as by good measures and popular principles. Any error of judgment,—any failure in policy or administration, is liable to be visited with instant censure. Defeated in the Commons, they have no resource but an appeal to the country, unaided by those means of influence, upon which ministers formerly relied.

Their responsibility is great and perilous; but it has at least protected them from other embarrassments, of nearly equal danger. When the Crown was more powerful, what was the fate of ministries? The first ten years of the reign of George III. witnessed the fall of five feeble administrations; and their instability was mainly due to the restless energies of the king. Until Mr. Pitt came into power, there had not been one strong administration during this reign. It was the king himself who overthrew the Coalition Ministry, the absolute government of Mr. Pitt, and the administration of" All the Talents."

For more than ten years after Mr. Pitt's fall, there was again a succession of weak administrations, of short duration. If the king could uphold a ministry,-he could also weaken or destroy it. From this danger, governments under the new parliamentary system, have been comparatively free. More responsible to Parliament, they have become less dependent upon the Crown. The confidence of the one, has guarded them from the displeasure of the other.

No cause of ministerial weakness has been more frequent than disunion. It is the common lot of men

acting together; and is not peculiar to any time, or political conditions. Yet when ministers looked to the Crown for support, and relied upon the great territorial lords for a parliamentary majority,-what causes were so fruitful of jealousies and dissensions, as the intrigues of the court, and the rivalries of the proprietors of boroughs? Here, again, governments deriving their strength and union from Parliament and the people, have been less exposed to danger in this form. Governments have, indeed, been weakened, as in former times, by divisions among their own party; but they have been, in some measure, protected from faction, by the greater responsibility of all parties to public opinion. This protection will be more assured, when the old system of government, by influence and patronage, shall give place to the recognition of national interests, as the sole basis of party.

The responsibility of ministers has been further simplified, by the dominant power of the Commons. The Lords may sometimes thwart a ministry, reject or mutilate its measures, and even condemn its policy; but they are powerless to overthrow a ministry supported by the Commons, or to uphold a ministry which the Commons have condemned. Instead of many masters, a government has only one. Nor can it be justly said, that this master has been severe, exacting, or capricious.

It can neither be affirmed that strong governments were characteristic of the parliamentary system, subverted by the reform act; nor that weak governments have been characteristic of the new system, and the result of it. In both periods, the stability of administrations has been due to other causes. If in the latter period, ministers have been overthrown, who,

at another time might have been upheld by the influence of the Crown; there have yet been governments supported by a parliamentary majority and public approbation, stronger in moral force, and more capable of overpowering interests adverse to the national welfare, than any ministries deriving their power from less popular sources.

After the reform act, Lord Grey's ministry was all-powerful, until it was dissolved by disunion in the cabinet. No government was ever stronger than that of Sir Robert Peel, until it was broken up by the repeal of the corn laws. Lord Aberdeen's cabinet was scarcely less strong, until it fell by disunion and military failures. What government was more powerful than Lord Palmerston's first administration, until it split upon the sunken rock of the Orsini conspiracy?

On the other hand, the ministry of Lord Melbourne was enfeebled by the disunion of the Liberal party. The first ministry of Sir Robert Peel, and both the ministries of Lord Derby were inevitably weak,-being formed upon a hopeless minority in the House of Commons. Such causes would have produced weakness at any time; and are not chargeable upon the caprices, or ungovernable temper, of a reformed Parliament. And throughout this period, all administrations.whether strong or weak, and of whatever political party,-relying mainly upon public confidence, have laboured successfully in the cause of good government; and have secured to the people more sound laws, pros perity, and contentment, than have been enjoyed at any previous epoch, in the history of this country. Control of One of the most ancient and valued rights of the Commons, is that of voting money and granting taxes to the Crown, for the public service.

the Com

From the

earliest times, they have made this right the means of extorting concessions from the Crown, and advancing the liberties of the people. They upheld it with a bold spirit against the most arbitrary kings; and the Bill of Rights crowned their final triumph over prerogative. They upheld it with equal firmness against the Lords. For centuries they had resented any "meddling" of the other House "with matter of supply;" and in the reign of Charles II., they successfully maintained their exclusive right to determine "as to the matter, the measure and the time" of every tax imposed upon the people.

In the same reign, they began to scrutinise the public expenditure; and introduced the salutary practice of appropriating their grants to particular purposes. But they had not yet learned the value of a constant control over the revenue and expenditure of the Crown; and their liberality to Charles, and afterwards to James II., enabled those monarchs to violate the public liberties.

rality to the Crown.

th

The experience of these reigns, prevented a repetition Their libeof the error; and since the Revolution, the grants of the Commons have been founded on annual estimates,-laid before them on the responsibility of ministers of the Crown, and strictly appropriated to the service of the This constant control over the public expendiyear. ture has, more than any other cause, vested in the Commons the supreme power of the state; yet the results have been favourable to the Crown. When the Commons had neither information as to the necessities of the state, nor securities for the proper application of their grants, they had often failed to respond to the solicitation of the king for subsidies,-or their libe