Arguments against change. Parliaments of those countries, and a fundamental change in that of England, much greater than the septennial act had made. That act could have been repealed at any time, if Parliament had deemed it advisable; and no other ground than that of expediency, can now be reasonably urged, for shortening the duration of Parliaments. The main ground, however, on which this change has been rested, is the propriety of rendering the representatives of the people, more frequently accountable to their constituents. The shorter the period for which authority is entrusted to them, the more guarded would they be in its exercise, and the more amenable to public opinion. It is said that a Parliament cannot be trusted, if independent of the people, and exposed to the influence of ministers, for seven years. And again, the circumstances of the country are likely to be changed during so prolonged a period; and the conduct of members, approved at first, may afterwards be condemned. On the other side it has been argued, that in practice no Parliament is permitted to continue longer than six years; and that frequent dissolutions have reduced Parliaments, at several periods, to an average duration of three, or four years. If Parliaments were elected for three years only, they would often be reduced by various contingencies, to annual Parliaments. They are already elected often enough to make them responsible to their constituents; and more frequent elections would 1 Sir Samuel Romilly stated, in 1818, that out of eleven Parliaments of Geo. III. eight had lasted six years. Hansard's Deb., 1st Ser. xxxviii. 802. But later periods present a different result. Since the accession of Will. IV., in 1830,—a period of thirty years, there have been no less than ten Parliaments, showing an average duration of three years only. unduly foment political excitement, and increase the expenses of elections, which are already a just ground of complaint. Of late years the popularity of this question has declined, not so much on account of any theoretical preference for septennial Parliaments, as from a conviction that the House of Commons has become accountable to the people, and prompt in responding to their reasonable desires. ballot. The "ballot" is another question repeatedly debated Vote by in Parliament, and a popular topic at the hustings, at public meetings, and in the newspaper press. No sooner had the reform act passed, than complaints were made that the elective franchise, so recently enlarged, could not be freely exercised. It was said that the landlords in counties, and wealthy customers in towns, coerced the free will of the electors, and forced them to vote against their opinions and consciences. As a protection against such practices, the necessity of secret voting was contended for. To give the franchise, without the means of exercising it, was declared to be a mockery. It was not for the first time that the influence now complained of, had been exerted over electors. It had formerly been recognised as one of the natural rights of property. It was known that a few landowners could nominate the county members. They conducted the freeholders to the poll, as naturally as a Highland chieftain led forth his clan to the foray. But now a new electoral policy had been commenced. The people at large had been enfranchised; and new classes of electors called into existence. The political ties which had bound the electors to the landlords were loosened; and the latter, being deprived of their absolute ascend ency, endeavoured to sustain it by other means. The leaseholders enfranchised by the reform act, being the most dependent, were the very class peculiarly needing protection. The ballot had been called by Cicero the silent assertor of freedom, — tabella, vindex tacita libertatis; and it was now proposed, in order to ensure freedom of election. The ballot has been sought mainly for the protection of voters from intimidation and undue influence; but it has also been recommended as a safeguard against bribery. It has been resisted by arguments too various to be briefly reviewed. The strongest, perhaps, is that every political function being publicly and responsibly exercised, and every debate and vote in Parliament published for the information of the people, electors can scarcely claim an exemption from that law of publicity, to which their rulers and representatives are subject. Why are they alone, to be irresponsible? Apart from theory, its practical efficacy has also been denied. It has been said that if intimidation were intended, means would be taken to discover the votes of electors, in spite of all the machinery of the ballot. Nor would bribery be prevented, as a candidate would secure fulfilment of corrupt promises, by making his payment for votes, contingent upon his success at the poll. The advocates of the ballot have, perhaps, exaggerated the advantages of their favoured scheme, while its opponents have magnified its evils and its dangers. It is a measure upon which sincere reformers have been, and continue to be, divided. At times, it has made progress in the number and influence of its supporters. Yet such have been its vicissitudes, that it is still difficult for a political observer to divine, whether it will be suddenly adopted,—in the crisis of some party struggle,—or be laid aside as a theory for the disputation of pamphleteers, and debating societies. In 1833, Mr. Grote took possession of the question of the ballot; and from that time until 1839, he continued to advocate the cause, in a series of temperate and philosophical speeches, as creditable to his political wisdom, as to his learning and ability. He argued in the calm and earnest spirit of the theoretical statesman; not with the fierce temper of the democrat. His honest labours greatly advanced the popularity of the cause, and improved its parliamentary position. In 1833 he found but one hundred and six supporters; in 1839 he had two hundred and sixteen.2 Mr. Grote having retired from Parliament, the question was not allowed to be forgotten. In 1842 Mr. Ward adopted it3; and since 1848, Mr. Henry Berkeley has made it his own. With ample stores of fact and anecdote, and with varied resources of humour, he has continued to urge on the question, year after year; but without increased support. In 1848 his motion was carried by a majority of five.5 In 1849, it was defeated by a majority of fifty-one: in 1852, by a majority of one hundred and two; and in 1860, by a majority of one hundred and seven. Such reaction of opinion, upon a popular measure, is more significant of ultimate failure, than a steady position, without progress indeed, yet without reverses. Since the reform act, the qualification laws,-which Qualificain different forms had existed for one hundred and tion Acts, fifty years, have passed away. It was ostensibly to cor 1 Hansard's Deb., 3rd Ser., xvii. 608-Ayes 106, Noes 211; Ibid. xxviii. 369; Ibid., xxxiv. 781; Ibid., xxxvii. 7; Ibid. (1838), xl. 113. 2 Ibid., xlviii. 442-Ayes 216, Noes 333. 3 Ibid., Ixiv. 348. 5 rect the evils of bribery at elections, that property in land was first proposed as a qualification for a member of Parliament. The corruption of boroughs being mainly due to the intrusion of rich commercial men, without local connexion, the natural jealousy of the landowners suggested this restraint upon their rivals. In 1696, the first measure to establish a qualification in land, was received with so much favour, that it passed both Houses; but the king, leaning rather to the commercial interests, withheld his assent. In the following year, a similar bill was passed by the Commons, but rejected by the Lords; who had now begun to think that a small landed qualification would increase the influence of the squires, but diminish the authority of the great nobles, who filled the smaller boroughs with members of their own family, and dependents. The policy of excluding all but the proprietors of land, from the right of sitting in the House of Com mons, was at length adopted in the reign of Queen Anne', and was maintained until 1838. In that year this exclusive principle was surrendered; and a new qualification substituted, of the same amount, either in real or personal property, or in both combined. In 1858, the law of property qualification was abandoned altogether. In its original form, it had been invidious and unjust; and, from its beginning to its end, it had been systematically evaded. It would probably not have survived so long the jealousies from which it had sprung, had it not been invested with undue importance, by radical reformers. But when the repeal of this insignificant law was proclaimed as one of the five points of the "Charter," it is not surprising that 19 Anne, c. 5; 33 Geo. II. c. 15. 2 1 & 2 Vict. c. 48. 3 21 & 22 Vict. c. 26. |