The ministers advise a creation of peers. had a strong feeling of the necessity of the case, in the very peculiar circumstances we were placed in; but such was my deep sense of the dreadful consequences of the act, that I much question whether I should not have preferred running the risk of confusion that attended the loss of the Bill as it then stood, rather than the constitution to so imminent a hazard of sub expose No sooner was the discussion of the Bill commenced in committee, than the ministers suddenly found themselves in a minority of thirty-five. 2 Now, then, was the time, if ever, for exercising the royal prerogative; and accordingly the ministers unanimously resolved to advise the king to create a sufficient number of peers, to turn the scale in favour of the Bill; and in the event of his refusal, to tender their resignation. He refused; and the resignation of the ministers was immediately tendered and accepted. In vain the Duke of Wellington attempted to form an administration on the basis of a more moderate measure of reform the House of Commons and the people were firm in their support of the ministers; and nothing was left for the peers, but submission or coercion. The king unwillingly gave his consent, in writing, to the necessary creation of peers3; but, in the meantime,-averse to an offensive act of authority, he successfully exerted his personal influence with the peers, to induce them to desist from further opposition. The to ensure the passing of the Reform Bill,-first calling up peers' eldest sons. WILLIAM R. Windsor, May 17th, 1832."-Roebuck's Hist. of the Whig Ministry, ii. 331–333. 4 See his Circular Letter, supra, p. 119; and infra, Chapter VI. greater part of the Opposition peers absented them- the Duke At no period of our history, has any question arisen Opinion of of greater constitutional importance than this proposed of Welcreation of peers. The peers and the Tory party viewed lington. it with consternation. “If such projects," said the Duke of Wellington, "can be carried into execution by a minister of the Crown with impunity, there is no doubt that the constitution of this House, and of this country, is at an end. I ask, my lords, is there any one blind enough not to see that if a minister can with impunity advise his sovereign to such an unconstitutional exercise of his prerogative, as to thereby decide all questions in this House, there is absolutely an end put to the power and objects of deliberation in this House, and an end to all just and proper means of decision. . . .? And, my lords, my opinion is, that the threat of carrying this measure of creating peers into execution, if it should have the effect of inducing noble lords to absent themselves from the House, or to adopt any particular line of conduct, is just as bad as its execution; for, my lords, it does by violence force a decision on this House, and on a subject on which this House is not disposed to give such a decision."1 He was finely answered by Lord Grey: "I ask what Opinion of would be the consequences if we were to suppose that 1 May 17th, 1832. Hansard's Debates, 3rd Ser., xii. 995. Earl Grey. A creation of peers equivalent to a dissolution. such a prerogative did not exist, or could not be constitutionally exercised? The Commons have a control over the power of the Crown, by the privilege, in extreme cases, of refusing the supplies; and the Crown has, by means of its power to dissolve the House of Commons, a control upon any violent and rash proceedings on the part of the Commons; but if a majority of this House is to have the power, whenever they please, of opposing the declared and decided wishes both of the Crown and the people, without any means of modifying that power, then this country is placed entirely under the influence of an uncontrollable oligarchy. I say, that if a majority of this House should have the power of acting adversely to the Crown and the Commons, and was determined to exercise that power without being liable to check or control, the constitution is completely altered, and the government of this country is not a limited monarchy: it is no longer, my lords, the Crown, the Lords and the Commons, but a House of Lords, -a separate oligarchy, governing absolutely the others." It must not be forgotten that, although Parliament is said to be dissolved, a dissolution extends, in fact, no further than to the Commons. The peers are not affected by it, no change can take place in the constitution of their body, except as to a small number of Scotch representative peers. So far, therefore, as the House of Lords is concerned, a creation of peers by the Crown, on extraordinary occasions, is the only equivalent which the constitution has provided, for the change and renovation of the House of Commons by a dissolution. In no other way can the opinions of the House of Lords be brought into harmony with those of the people. 1 May 17th, 1832. Hansard's Debates, 3rd Ser., xii. 1006. In ordinary times the House of Lords has been converted gradually to the political opinions of the dominant party in the state, by successive creations; but when a crisis arises, in which the party, of whose sentiments it is the exponent, is opposed to the majority of the House of Commons and the country, it must either yield to the pressure of public opinion, or expose itself to the hazard of a more sudden conversion. Statesmen of all parties would condemn such a measure, except in cases of grave and perilous necessity; but, should the emergency be such as to demand it, it cannot be pronounced unconstitutional. the Lords Reform It was apprehended that, by this moral coercion, Position of the legitimate influence of the peers would be impaired, since the and their independence placed at the mercy of any Act. popular minister, supported by a majority of the House of Commons. To record the fiats of the Lower House, -sometimes, perhaps, with unavailing protests,-sometimes with feeble amendments, would now be their humble office. They were cast down from their high place in the legislature, - their ancient glories were departed. Happily, these forebodings have not since been justified. The peers had been placed, by their natural position, in opposition to a great popular cause; and had yielded, at last, to a force which they could no longer resist. Had they yielded earlier, and with a better grace, they might have shared in the popular triumph. Again and again the Commons had opposed themselves to the influence of the Crown, or to popular opinion, and had been overcome; yet their permanent influence was not impaired. And so impaired. And so was it now with the Lords. The Commons may be overborne by a dissolution, the Lords by a threatened creation of peers, the Crown by withholding the supplies; and all Their inde alike must bow to the popular will, when constitutionally expressed. The subsequent history of the Lords attests their undipendence. minished influence since the Reform Act. That measure has unquestionably increased the authority of the House of Commons. But the Lords have not shown themselves less independent in their judgment, or less free in their legislative action. It had previously been their practice, not so much to originate legislation, and to direct the policy of the country, as to control, to amend, and to modify measures received from the Commons; and in that function, they have since laboured with as much freedom as ever. In 1835 and 1836, the Commons maintained that the principle of appropriating the surplus revenues of the Church of Ireland, was essential to the settlement of the question of Irish tithes. Yet the Lords, by their determined resistance to this principle, obliged the Commons, and the ministers who had fought their way into office by its assertion, definitively to abandon it. They exercised an unconstrained judgment in their amendments to the English Municipal Reform Bill, which the Commons were obliged reluctantly to accept. They dealt with the bills for the reform of the Irish corporations, with equal freedom. For four sessions their amendments, wholly inconsistent with the principles of legislation asserted by the Commons, led to the abandonment of those measures. And at length they forced the Commons to accept amendments, repugnant to the policy for which they had been contending. Again, they resisted, for several years, the removal of the Jewish disabilities, a measure approved by the settled judgment of the Commons and the people; and obliged the advocates of religious liberty to accept, at last, an unsatis |