artery in the room of vein, and you will render the sentence absolutely ridiculous. The two words beast and brute, are often metaphorically applied to human creatures, but not in the same signification. The former denotes either a blockhead or a voluptuary of the grossest kind; the latter, one in the highest degree unmannerly and ferocious. Accordingly we speak of beastly ignorance; we say, "gluttony is a beastly vice;" but we should say, "his behaviour to those unhappy people was quite brutal." The word brutish, however, though derived from the same root, is employed like beastly, to denote stupid or ignorant. Thus to say of any man," he acted brutishly," and to say "he acted brutally," are two very different things. The first implies, he acted stupidly; the second, he acted cruelly and rudely. If we recur to the nature of the things themselves, it will be impossible to assign a satisfactory reason for these differences of application. The usage of the language is therefore the only reason. It is very remarkable that the usages of different languages are in this respect not only different, but even sometimes contrary; insomuch that the same trope will suggest opposite ideas in different tongues. No sort of metonymy is commoner amongst every people than that by which some parts of the body have been substituted to denote certain powers or affections of the mind, with which they are supposed to be connected. But as the opinions of one nation differ on this article from those of another, the figurative sense in one tongue will by no means direct us to the figurative sense in another. The same may be said of different ages. A commentator on Persius has this curious remark, "Naturalists affirm, that men laugh with the spleen, rage with the gall, love with the liver, understand with the heart, and boast with the lungs "." A modern may say with Sganarelle in the comedy," It was so formerly, but we have changed all that." For so unlike are our notions, that the spleen is accounted the seat of melancholy and ill-humour. The word is accordingly often used to denote that temper; so that with us a splenetic man, and a laughing merry fellow, form two characters that are perfect contrasts to each other. The heart we consider as b Cornutus on these words of the first satire, Sum petulanti splene cachinno.— "Physici dicunt homines splene ridere, felle irasci, jecore amare, corde sapere, et pulmone jactari." In the ancient piece called the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs, supposed to be the work of a christian of the first century, we find these words in the testament of Nephtali, for illustrating that God made all things good, adapting each to its proper use, Καρδιαν εις φρόνησιν, ηπαρ προς θυμού, χολήν προς πικρίαν, εις γελωτα σπλήνα, νεφρους εις πανουργίαν Grab. Spicil. patrum, 1. Sec. t. i. ed. 2. p. 212. "Cela étoit autrefois ainsi; mais nous avons changé tout cela." Le Médécin malgré lui. MOLIÉRE. Alexander." Grotius hath also copied the same mode of expression, in a remark which he hath made, perhaps with more ingenuity than truth, on the two Apostles, Peter and John. The attachment of John, he observes, was to Jesus, of Peter to the Messiah. Accordingly their master gave the latter the charge of his church, the former that of his family, recommending to him in particular the care of Mary his mother. The following sentiment of Swift is somewhat - similar: I do the most that friendship can; I hate the viceroy, love the man. The viceroy for the viceroyalty. I shall only add two examples more in this way: the first is from Addison, who, speaking of Tallard when taken prisoner by the allies, says, An English muse is touch'd with generous woe, The foe, that is, his state of hostility with regard to us at the time: for the second I shall again recur to Dryden, A tyrant's power in rigour is exprest, The father yearns in the true prince's breast. The father, to denote fatherly affection, or the disposition of a father. In fine, it may justly be affirmed of this whole class of tropes, that as metaphor in general hath been termed an allegory in epitome, such metaphors and metonymies as present us with things animate in the room of things lifeless, are prosopopeias in miniature. But it will be proper here to obviate an objection against the last mentioned species of metonymy, an objection which seems to arise from what hath been advanced above. Is it possible, may one say, that the concrete put for the abstract should render the expression livelier, and that the abstract put for the concrete should do the same? Is it not more natural to conclude, that if one of these tropes serve to invigorate the style, the reverse must doubtless serve to flatten it? But this apparent inconsistency will vanish on a nearer inspection. It ought to be remembered, that the cases are comparatively few in which either trope will answer better than the proper term, and the few which suit the one method, and the few which suit the other, are totally different in their nature. To affirm that in one identical case, methods quite opposite would produce the same effect, might, with some appearance of reason, be charged with inconsistency; but that in cases not identical, nor even similar, con trary methods might be necessary for effecting the same purpose, is nowise inconsistent. But possibly the objector will argue on the principles themselves severally considered, from which, according to the doctrine now explained, the efficacy of the tropes ariseth: "If," says he, "the abstract for the concrete confers vivacity on the expression, by concentrating the whole attention on that particular with which the subject is most intimately connected, doth it not lose as much on the other hand, by presenting us with a quality instead of a person, an intelligible for a sensible, an inanimate for a living object?" If this were the effect, the objection would be unanswerable. But it is so far otherwise, that in all such instances, by ascribing life, motion, human affections, and actions, to the abstract, it is in fact personified, and thus gains in point of energy the one way, without losing any thing the other. The same thing holds of all the congenial tropes, the dole for the donor, and the rest. In like manner, when the concrete is used for the abstract, there is, in the first place, a real personification, the subject being in fact a mere quality both inanimate and insensible: nor do we lose the particularity implied in the abstract, because, where this trope is judiciously used, there must be something in the sentence, which fixes the attention specially on that quality. Thus, to recur to the preceding examples, when David and the king, though known to be the same person, are contra-distinguished in the same line, the mind is laid under a necessity of considering the word king as implying purely that which constitutes him such, namely the royal power. The same may be said of the other instances. So far indeed I agree with the objector, that wherever the trope is not distinctly marked by the words with which it is connected, it is faulty and injudicious. It both misses vivacity, and throws obscurity on the sentiment. I have here examined the tropes so far only as they are subservient to vivacity, by presenting to the mind some image, which, from the original principles of our nature, more strongly attaches the fancy than could have been done by the proper terms whose place they occupy. And in this examination I have found, that they produce this effect in these four cases: first, when they can aptly represent a species by an individual, or a genus by a species; secondly, when they serve to fix the attention on the most interesting particular, or that with which the subject is most intimately connected; thirdly, when they exhibit things intelligible by things sensible; and fourthly, when they suggest things lifeless by things animate. How conducive the tropes are in like manner both to elegance and to animation, will be examined afterwards. They even sometimes conduce to viva city, not from any thing preferable in the ideas conveyed by them, but in a way that cannot properly come under consideration, till we inquire how far this quality depends on the number of the words, and on their arrangement. PART III.—The use of those tropes which are obstructive to vivacity. Let us now, ere we finish this article, bestow some attention on the opposite side (for contraries serve best to illustrate each other), and make a few remarks on those tropes which either have a natural tendency to render the expression more languid, or at least are noway fitted for enlivening the diction. That there are trope's whose direct tendency is even to enfeeble the expression, is certainly true, though they are fewer in number, and more rarely used, than those which produce the contrary effect. The principal tropes of this kind which I remember at present, are three sorts of the synecdoché, the genus for the species, the whole for a part, and the matter for the instrument or thing made of it, and some sorts of the metaphor, as the intelligible for the sensible. Of the genus for the species, which is the commonest of all, vessel for ship, creature or animal for man, will serve as examples. Of the whole for a part, which is the most uncommon, I do not recollect another instance but that of the man or woman by name, sometimes for the body only, sometimes only for the soul; as when we say, "such a one was buried yesterday," that is, "the body of such a one was buried yesterday." "Eneas saw his father in Elysium,' that is, his father's ghost. The common phrase "all the world," for a great number of people, and some others of the same kind, have also been produced as examples, but improperly; for in all such expressions there is an evident hyperbole, the intention being manifestly to magnify the number. Of the third kind, the matter for what is made of it, there are doubtless several instances, such as silver for money, canvass for sail, and steel for sword. It is proper to inquire from what principles in our nature, tropes of this sort derive their origin, and what are the purposes which they are intended to promote. The answer to the first of the queries will serve effectually to answer both. First then, they may arise merely from a disposition to vary the expression, and prevent the too frequent recurrence of the same sound upon the ear. Hence often the genus for the species. This is the more pardonable, if used moderately, as there is not even an apparent impropriety in putting at any time the genus for the species, because the latter is always comprehended in the former; whereas, in the re verse, there is inevitably an appearance of impropriety, till it is mollified by use. If one is speaking of a linnet, and sometimes instead of linnet says bird, he is considered rather as varying the expression, than as employing a trope. Secondly, they may arise from an inclination to suggest contempt without rudeness; that is, not openly to express, but indirectly to insinuate it. Thus, when a particular man is called a creature or an animal, there is a sort of tacit refusal of the specific attributes of human nature, as the term implies only the direct acknowledgment of those enjoyed in common with the brutes, or even with the whole creation. The phrases no creature, and every creature, like all the world, are a kind of hyperbolic idioms, which come not under this category. Thirdly, they may proceed from a love of brevity in cases wherein perspicuity cannot be hurt. Thus to say, Your friend Alexander lies here interr'd. is briefer, and not less perspicuous, than to say, "The corpse of your friend Alexander"-Fourthly, they may spring from a desire to find a term that will make a better counterpart, in respect either of the sense or of the sound, to some other word which the speaker or the writer hath had occasion to use, the ideas conveyed by the two words being also related. This occasions sometimes not only that the genus is used for the species, but that the matter is made to signify the thing made of it; both of which will be further illustrated when I come to consider how far vivacity may result from arrangement. Fifthly (and this is the last source that occurs to my thoughts), tropes of this kind may arise from a desire of palliating the representation, and that either from humanity, from courtesy, or from decency. By the first of the five principles above mentioned, if used discreetly, something is done for the sake of variety, where the vivacity of the expression is little affected; by the second, even a further end, a species of animation is attained; by the third and fourth, what is lost of vivacity in one way is more than compensated in another; but by the fifth, we are led to avoid this quality as a fault. There are some subjects of which it may be necessary on certain occasions to speak, which, nevertheless, present an object to the imagination that is either disagreeable or indecent. It is sufficient that such things be hinted to the understanding, so that the meaning may be apprehended, it is by no means fit that they be painted in the liveliest colours to the fancy. There are some things which a painter may find it expedient to introduce into a picture, and to render just discoverable, by placing them in the shade, in the back Y |