to have done it." Yet expected to have found is no better. It is as clear that the finding must be posterior to the expectation, as that the obedience must be posterior to the command. But though the anonymous remarker formerly quoted is in the right as to the particular expressions criticised by him, he decides too generally, and seems to have imagined that in no case ought the preterperfect of the infinitive, to follow the preterite of the indicative. If this was his opinion, he was egregiously mistaken. It is however agreed on both sides, that, in order to express the past with the defective verb ought, we must use the perfect of the infinitive, and say for example," he ought to have done it;" this in that verb being the only possible way of distinguishing the past from the present.

There is only one other observation of Dr Lowth, on which, before I conclude this article, I must beg leave to offer some remarks. "Phrases like the following, though very common, are improper: Much depends upon the rule's being observed; and error will be the consequence of its being neglected. For here is a noun and a pronoun representing it, each in the possessive case, that is, under government of another noun, but without other noun to govern it: for being observed, and being neglected, are not nouns: nor can you supply the place of the possessive case by the preposition of before the noun or pronoun P." For my part, notwithstanding what is here very speciously urged, I am not satisfied that there is any fault in the phrases censured. They appear to me to be perfectly in the idiom of our tongue, and such as on some occasions could not easily be avoided, unless by recurring to circumlocution, an expedient which invariably tends to enervate the expression. But let us examine the matter more nearly.

This author admits that the active participle may be employed as a noun, and has given some excellent directions regarding the manner in which it ought to be construed, that the proper distinction may be preserved between the noun and the gerund. Phrases like these, therefore, he would have admitted as unexceptionable, "Much depends upon their observing of the rule, and error will be the consequence of their neglecting of it." Now, though I allow both the modes of expression to be good, I think the first simpler and better than the second. Let us consider whether the former be liable to any objections, which do not equally affect the latter.

One principle objection to the first is, "You cannot supply the place of the possessive case by the preposition of before

P Introduction, &c. Sentences, Note on the 6th Phrase.

the noun or pronoun." Right; but before you draw any conclusion from this circumstance, try whether it will not equally affect both expressions; for if it does, both are on this account to be rejected, or neither. In the first, the sentence will be made to run this, "Much depends upon the being observed of the rule, and error will be the consequence of the being neglected of it." Very bad without question. In the second, thus, " Much depends upon the observing of them "of the rule, and error will be the consequence of the neglecting of them of it." Still worse. But it may be thought that as, in the last example, the participial noun gets a double regimen, this occasions all the impropriety and confusion. I shall therefore make the experiment, on a more simple sentence. "Much will depend on your pupil's composing, but more on his reading frequently." Would it be English to say, "Much will depend on the composing of your pupil, but more on the reading of him frequently?" No certainly. If this argument then prove any thing, it proves too much, and consequently can be no criterion.

The only other objection mentioned is, that being observed and being neglected, are not nouns. It is acknowledged that in the common acceptation of the word, they are not nouns, but passive participles; neither is the active participle commonly a noun, neither is the infinitive of the verb active or passive, a noun. Yet the genius of the tongue permits that all these may be construed as nouns in certain occurrences. The infinitive in particular is employed substantively when it is made either the nominative or the regimen of a verb. Now in this way not the infinitive only, but along with it all the words in construction are understood as one compound noun, as in the examples following: "To love God and our neighbour is a duty incumbent on us all," and "The gospel strongly inculcates on us this important lesson, to love God and our neighbour." But in no other situation can such clauses supply the place of nouns. They are never used in construction with other nouns followed by a preposition. The quotation brought from Spenser is, I suspect, a mere Grecism, which was not in his time more than it is at present conformable to the English idiom. For is the only preposition that seems ever to have been construed with such clauses, after another verb. And even this usage is now totally laid aside.

I am of opinion, therefore, upon the whole, that as the idiom in question is analogical, supported by good use, and sometimes very expedient, it ought not to be entirely repudiated.

CHAP. V.

Of the qualities of Style strictly rhetorical.

PURITY, of which I have treated at some length in the two preceding chapters, may justly be denominated grammatical truth. It consisteth in the conformity of the expression to the sentiment which the speaker or the writer intends to convey by it, as moral truth consisteth in the conformity of the sentiment intended to be conveyed, to the sentiment actually entertained by the speaker or the writer; and logical truth, as was hinted above, in the conformity of the sentiment to the nature of things. The opposite to logical truth, is properly error; to moral truth, a lie; to grammatical truth, a blunder. Now the only standard by which the conformity implied in grammatic truth must be ascertained in every language, is, as hath been evinced, reputable, national, and present use, in that language.

But it is with the expression as with the sentiment, it is not enough to the orator that both be true. A sentence may be a just exhibition, according to the rules of the language, of the thought intended to be conveyed by it, and may therefore, to a mere grammarian, be unexceptionable; which to an orator may appear extremely faulty. It may, nevertheless, be obscure, it may be languid, it may be inelegant, it may be flat, it may be unmusical. It is not ultimately the justness either of the thought or of the expression, which is the aim of the orator; but it is a certain effect to be produced in the hearers. This effect as he purposeth to produce in them by means of language, which he makes the instrument of conveying his sentiments into their minds, he must take care in the first place that his style be perspicuous, that so he may be sure of being understood. If he would not only inform the understanding, but please the imagination, he must add the charms of vivacity and elegance, corresponding to the two sources from which, as was observed in the beginning of this work', the merit of an address of this kind results. By vivacity, resemblance is attained; by elegance, dignity of manner. For as to the dignity of the subject itself, or thing imitated, it concerns solely the thought. If he purposes to work upon the passions, his very diction, as well as his sentiments, must be animated. Thus, language and thought, like body and soul, are made to correspond, and the qualities of the one exactly to co-operate with those of the other.

Book II. Chap. i.

Book I. Chap. i.

But though the perfection of the body consists, as was formerly observed, in its fitness for serving the purposes of the soul, it is at the same time capable of one peculiar excellence as a visible object. The excellence I mean is beauty, which evidently implies more than what results from the fitness of the several organs and members for answering their respective ends. That there is a beauty in the perceived fitness of means to their end, and instruments to their use, is uncontrovertible. All that I contend for here is, that this is not the whole of what is implied in the term beauty. The eyes of one person may be much inferior in this respect to those of another, though equally fit for all the purposes of vision. The like may be said of every other feature. Analogous to this there is an excellence of which language is susceptible as an audible object, distinct from its aptitude for conveying the sentiments of the orator with light and energy into the minds of the hearers. Now as music, is to the ear what beauty is to the eye, I shall, for want of a more proper term, denominate this excellence in style, its music; though I acknowledge the word is rarely used with so great latitude.

Thus it appears, that besides purity, which is a quality entirely grammatical, the five simple and original qualities of style, considered as an object to the understanding, the imagination, the passions, and the ear, are perspicuity, vivacity, elegance, animation, and music.

CHAP. VI.

Of Perspicuity.

Of all the qualities above mentioned, the first and most essential is perspicuity. Every speaker doth not propose to please the imagination, nor is every subject susceptible of those ornaments which conduce to this purpose. Much less is it the aim of every speech to agitate the passions. There are some occasions, therefore, on which vivacity, and many on which animation of style are not necessary; nay, there are occasions on which the last especially would be improper. But whatever be the ultimate intention of the orator, to inform, to convince, to please, to move, or to persuade, still he must speak so as to be understood, or he speaks to no purpose. If he do not propose to convey certain sentiments into the minds of his hearers, by the aid of signs intelligible to them, he may as well declaim before them in an unknown Prima est eloquentiæ virtus perspicuitas. QUINT.

• Book I. Chap. iv.

tongue. This prerogative the intellect has above all the other faculties, that whether it be or be not immediately addressed by the speaker, it must be regarded by him either ultimately or subordinately; ultimately, when the direct purpose of the discourse is information, or conviction; subordinately, when the end is pleasure, emotion or persuasion.

There is another difference also between perspicuity and the two last mentioned qualities, vivacity and animation, which deserves to be remarked. In a discourse wherein either or both of these are requisite, it is not every sentence that requires, or even admits them; but every sentence ought to be perspicuous. The effect of all the other qualities of style is lost without this. This being to the understanding what light is to the eye, ought to be diffused over the whole performance. In this respect it resembles grammatical purity, of which I have already treated, but it is not in this respect only that it resembles it. Both are best illustrated by shewing the different ways wherein they may be lost. It is for these reasons that, though perspicuity be more properly a rhetorical than a grammatical quality, I thought it better to include it in this book, which treats of the foundations and essential or universal properties of elocution, than to class it with those which are purely discriminative of particular styles.

Indeed, if language were capable of absolute perfection, which it evidently is not; if words and things could be rendered exact counterparts to each other; if every different thing in nature had a different symbol by which it were expressed; and every difference in the relations of things had a corresponding difference in the combinations of words, purity alone would secure perspicuity, or rather these two would entirely coincide. To speak grammatically would, in that case, convey infallibly and perspicuously the full meaning of the speaker, if he had any meaning, into the mind of every hearer who perfectly understands the language. There would not be even a possibility of mistake or doubt. But the case is widely different with all the languages that ever were, are, or will be in the world.

Grammatical purity, in every tongue, conduceth greatly to perspicuity, but it will by no means secure it. A man may in respect of it speak unexceptionably, and yet speak obscurely, or ambiguously; and though we cannot say, that a man may speak properly, and at the same time speak unintelligibly, yet this last case falls more naturally to be considered as an offence against perspicuity, than as a violation of propriety. For when the meaning is not discovered, the particular impropriety cannot be pointed out. In the three