Art. 12.-SHIPPING PROSPECTS.

1. Lloyd's Register of Shipping. Vol. III. 1914-15,

1919-20.

2. Lloyd's Register. Annual and Quarterly Shipbuilding Returns.

3. Chamber of Shipping of the United Kingdom. Annual Report, 1918-19.

4. Merchant Tonnage and the Submarine. Parliamentary Paper. [Cd. 9221.] H. M. Stationery Office.

DURING hostilities the British Mercantile Marine became one of the main fighting forces of the country. It was not designed for the purpose, but it had to defend itself. The number of merchant ships which, before the war, were planned with any idea of self-defence could be counted on the fingers of one's hand. Protests were even made in certain quarters, when the suggestion was put forward that some of the principal vessels should be fitted with gun-mountings in the stern. Attempts were made to bring pressure to bear on newspaper offices to print articles attempting to show how unnecessary such measures were, and suggesting that it would be impossible for any German merchant vessels to arm themselves for the purpose of harrying British commerce.

Although, therefore, some perceived that, in the event of a war with Germany, British merchant ships would have to fight, very few, if any, could have realised the turn which events actually took. It certainly did not ever occur to the public that any Power would be prepared to use the submarine weapon to sink merchant vessels at sight, regardless of the fate of those on board, whether women and children passengers or civilian men and crew. The result was that the Merchant Marine, totally unprepared for such tactics, was called upon to undergo great risks; and it did not flinch. Many of the ships were quite unsuited for fighting. At the outset, and for a long time afterwards, merchant ships could rely neither on the protection of a screen of destroyers nor, as regards the the great majority, on superior speed. Until the convoy system was instituted, fairly late in the war, British merchant ships had to rely

the money required for this expenditure is raised by one unit-the United Kingdom. Pending the federation of the Empire, there would, under the scheme indicated, be only two units concerned-Ireland and Great Britain. Under any scheme of Home Rule for Ireland, just as much as under the federal scheme under discussion, the Irish contribution to Imperial expenditure will have to be determined—probably by a Royal Commission, as Lord MacDonnell proposed in the Irish Convention—and the balance, pending the federation of the Empire, found by Great Britain. The problem would certainly become more complicated and more likely to cause friction if and when the Dominions send representatives to Westminster, and become liable for their share of the expenditure; but this is a problem of Imperial Federation which would arise whether the United Kingdom had been already federalised or not. Whether the scheme indicated above-namely, that of two local parliaments in the United Kingdom, one for Great Britain and one for Ireland, with identical powers-is desirable or not, it seems to negative the idea that the federalisation of the United Kingdom is necessarily incompatible with the grant of a full measure of self-government to Ireland or vice versa.

Before passing from the federalisation of the United Kingdom to the federalisation of Ireland, it may be worth while to consider, in the light of the views expressed above, how far the actual scheme of selfgovernment framed by the Irish Convention is consistent with federalism in the United Kingdom. Lord Dunraven, the best-known advocate of Federalism in the Convention, declared that they were not incompatible, though he regretted that the Convention did not proceed 'on more definite federal lines.' Some well-known supporters of United Kingdom federalism have, however, criticised the Convention's report as anti-federal. There seems to be singularly little foundation for this opinion. In the first place, much of this criticism is based on a fallacy already discussed-that of applying to what can at most

One fairly simple solution of this problem of Imperial Federation has already been indicated by Mr Lionel Curtis in 'The Problem of the Commonwealth' (cap. xviii).

be a quasi-federal arrangement the canons of strict federalism. It is true that the powers proposed by the Convention for the Irish Parliament are greater than those possessed by a local legislature in any known federation; but any less powers would probably be inadequate to secure an Irish settlement. Moreover, as has been pointed out above, there is nothing to prevent the same powers as were proposed for the Irish Parliament being, now or later, conferred upon one co-ordinate legislature in Great Britain, though there may be insuperable difficulties in the way of conferring them on two separate legislatures in England and Scotland. Further, the Convention's scheme definitely reserved to the Imperial Parliament control over the matters most necessary for a central parliament, viz. the Crown, foreign relations, peace and war, defence, etc., and it expressly recognised the liability of Ireland to contribute towards Imperial expenditure. Finally, and most important of all, it provided for the continued representation of Ireland in the Imperial Parliament. It is significant to note that the plan recently advocated in 'The Times' closely follows the Convention's scheme so far as the place of Ireland in the United Kingdom and the Empire is concerned.

The truth appears to be that the Convention went as far as it could in the federal direction; and it is not apparent what more it could have done, or how it could have proceeded on more definite federal lines,' unless it had suggested that a local legislature should be established in Great Britain simultaneously with the Irish Parliament. The business of the Convention, however, was to formulate a constitution for Ireland; to have gone further and drafted a constitution for Great Britain also would have been to exceed its function. It may well have been thought that the anomaly of the Imperial Parliament continuing to combine purely British work with its Imperial task would soon have brought about the obvious remedy for that anomaly-the establishment of a local legislature for Great Britain with powers similar to those possessed by the Irish Parliament. The Convention, at any rate, put no obstacle in the way of development; and its plan of self-government for Ireland within the Empire may be fairly described as consistent

with and leading up to the larger policy of United Kingdom federation. After all, federalism is more than a frame of government, it is an attitude of mind; and the Convention certainly encouraged the development of that mental attitude which is so urgently required, the mental attitude which leads men to regard the Empire, as has been finely said, 'not as a prison house into which they have been thrust by invincible force,' but rather as a vantage ground where the pursuit of high Imperial ideals may be combined with the fostering of national pride and patriotism.

It is a matter for regret that the manifesto of the Irish Dominion League shows a marked departure in this respect from the spirit of the Convention. Why it should do so is not, at first sight, clear. More than a year ago Sir H. Plunkett, the Chairman of the Convention, who is now the spokesman of the League, pointed out that the Irish constitution agreed upon by all the members of the Convention, except the Ulster Unionists, was characterised by three points of departure from the normal Dominion status, viz.: (1) lack of control over defence matters (except as regards conscription and, in certain eventualities, territorial forces); (2) representation of Ireland at Westminster; and (3) payment by Ireland of a contribution to Imperial expenditure, which was to be, at any rate at first, secured by a Statute of Imperial Parliament. There was a difference of opinion, which has been already explained, about indirect taxation; and the Report of the Convention suggested some minor departures, of no great consequence, from full Dominion status. One would have expected that an association of moderate men like the members of the League, who desired a full measure of self-government for Ireland, would have taken their stand on this 'foundation of Irish agreement unprecedented in history'-to use Sir H. Plunkett's own words-modified in the direction of fiscal autonomy, for the reasons explained above, and, if necessary, in other directions for cause shown. The manifesto of the Irish Dominion League, however, proceeds on rather different lines, and practically ignores the agreement reached in the Convention, apparently in order to emphasise its own demand as one for the Dominion status, though it does not seem

to have got much nearer its ideal. It is not easy to compare the clear-cut scheme propounded by the Convention with the somewhat vague proposals of the League, but the only important difference between the two proposals seems to be that the League insists on the cessation of Irish representation at Westminster.*

Undoubtedly the League's proposals would in this respect more clearly place Ireland in the position of a Dominion than would the Convention's scheme, but the change is hardly an improvement. The Dominion analogy has, of course, but little relevance. The colonies were never represented in the Imperial Parliament, as Ireland has been since 1800. Undoubtedly, however, there is a general, though perhaps not an informed, feeling in Ireland against representation at Westminster, of which the League was not unconscious. This feeling is commonly based on a tendency to identify non-representation with Dominion Home Rule, and representation with Federal Home Rule, which is persistently portrayed as 'gas and water' autonomy-a view that seems wholly erroneous. A prejudice against Federal Home Rule was not unnatural among Repealers and the Young Ireland party over seventy years ago, since the establishment of a subordinate parliament in Dublin, coupled with Irish representation at Westminster, seemed less desirable to them than their ideal of an Irish Parliament co-ordinate with the Imperial Parliament. Such a prejudice, however, seems meaningless to-day, when the demand of all constitutional Nationalists is for a parliament which would be in law subordinate, as are all colonial legislatures. It has been already pointed out that the full satisfaction of the demand made by constitutional Nationalists is quite compatible with the federalisation of Great Britain and Ireland, though it may not be with the federalisation of England, Scotland

The League demands full fiscal autonomy; the attitude of the Convention has been explained. It is not clear how far, if at all, the League's proposals differ from the Convention's as regards defence. The League, like the Convention, agrees to an Irish contribution to Imperial expenditure, though the League's interpretation of that expression seems to include only the cost of the army, navy and diplomatic services and neither the charge for the National Debt nor the Civil List. Possibly this was not intended.