III. have received from Him into their protection; for whether Discourse peace and right ecclesiastical discipline be increased or decayed by Christian princes, God will require an account from them, Who hath trusted His Church unto their power." All this power the king of Spain exerciseth in Sicily, in all ecclesiastical causes, over all ecclesiastical persons, as well in the first instance as the second". This power a lay-chancellor exerciseth in the court Christian. This power a very Abbess exerciseth in the Roman Church over her nuns. Whilst all the mariners are busied in their several employments, the sovereign magistrate sits at the stern to command all, and order all for the promotion of the great architectonical end, that is, the safety and welfare of the commonwealth. It follows in the oath, "as well as temporal;" that is, as truly, and as justly, but not as fully, nor as absolutely. "And that no foreign prelate hath or ought to have any jurisdiction or authority ecclesiastical or spiritual within this realm." That is to say, neither the Pope nor his Court: for a general Council, which is no standing court but an aggregate body, composed partly of ourselves, is neither included here nor intended. If this be "the new Creed of the English Protestant Church," as he calls it in scorn, it was the old Creed of the Britannic Church, as I have proved evidently in the Vindication. If this profession of royal supremacy in our sense do 'make men heretics and schismatics,' we shall sweep away the most part of the Roman doctors along with us; and for sovereign princes, we shall leave them few, except some necessitous persons, who could not subsist otherwise than by the favourable influence of the Roman Court. 'Very many doctors do hold, that, for the common good of the republic, princes have jurisdiction in many causes otherwise subject to the ecclesiastical court, not only by the positive law of God, but by the law of nature*.' And many more give them a power indirectly in causes ecclesiastical over ecclesiastical [Ibid. See Just Vindic., ibid. pp. 233, 234.] u [See Just Vindic., ibid. pp. 228, * [Franciscus] a Sanctâ Clarâ, Expos. Paraph., in Art. 37. [p. 409. See Just Vindic., c. iii. vol. i. p. 125.] PART persons, so far as is necessary for the preservation of the I. peace and tranquillity of the commonwealth: "nec putem ullum doctorem Catholicum refragari," saith the same author in the place cited,-" neither do I think that any Catholic doctor will be against it." Now I have said my mind concerning the oath of allegiance, who they were that first contrived it, and in what sense we do maintain it; I hope agreeably to the sense of the Christian world, except such as are prepossessed with prejudice for the Court of Rome. As our kings out of reverence to Christ did freely lay by the title of "Supreme Heads of the English Church," so, though it be not meet for me to prevent their maturer determinations, I should not be displeased if out of a tender consideration of the consciences of subjects, who may err out of invincible ignorance, they would be pleased to lay by the oath also. God looks upon His creatures with all their prejudices; why should not man do the same? It seemeth to be hard measure to destroy men for mere speculative opinions, which it may be are not in their own power, so long as there is neither blasphemy nor sedition in the case. It is often easier to secure a man's actions, than to cure the errors of his judgment. No contra my words. SECTION THE SECOND. In the next place he chargeth me with 'contradicting of diction in myself",' because I say, "the emperors and other princes of the Roman communion have done the same things in effect 232 with the king of England";" and in another place I confess, that the kings of England have "abolished the jurisdiction of the Bishop of Rome," but the emperors have not.' This, he saith, is 'to give myself the lies.' Certainly he was in some heat or passion, when this word of disgrace dropped from his pen; as commonly disputers [Id.,] ibid., [p. 410.] 2 [Surv., c. vii. sect. 2. p. 103.] b [Ibid., p. 217.] c [This expression is not to be found in the copy of the Survey in the Bodleian Library; where R. C. only says, that Bramhall's assertion is "manifestly untrue" (p. 100).] III. are, when they find that they have gotten the wrong end of the DISCOURSE staff. If he had advisedly read over my assertion, it is this, that either they have done "the same thing in effect,. or at least" have "pleaded for it." If either part of the disjunction be true, my assertion is a truth, and no "contradiction;" much less a 'lie,' which implieth that it is both against truth and against conscience. Now I have shewed clearly in the Vindication, that they have not only "pleaded" it, but sworn it,—that they would 'maintain the rights, liberties, and customs of the Empire inviolated,' against the Pope and the Court of Romed;-and that they have protested, that "they would not have his Holiness to be ignorant that they neither could nor would endure his intolerable pressures any longer," but would vindicate themselves. Further, to "do the same thing in effect" doth not signify to do the same individual action, nor always the same specifical action, but only that which argueth the same power, or implieth the same consequences. If an ordinary do suspend a clerk from his benefice, or degrade him from his Holy Orders, so long as the question is only whether he be under jurisdiction of the ordinary, it is all one "in effect," whilst the one proveth the intention as well as the other. If a thief steal a shilling or a pound, it is not "the same thing in effect;" because the thief pretendeth no right to what he taketh; but if a magistrate impose a tribute of a shilling or a pound, where the question is only whether he have power to impose tribute or not, it is all one "in effect;" for his title is as just to the one as to the other, and as he imposeth a shilling to-day, so he may, if he have occasion, impose a pound to-morrow. The whole and all the parts are "the same in effect." The emperors have done all the particular acts which the kings of England have done-concerning patronage, investitures, legislation, reformation, legates, appeals, tenths, first-fruits, &c.,—and moreover have deposed Popes, which the kings of England never attempted to do; though they have not made one general act of abolition. [Letter of the Elector. College, &c., to Benedict XII. A.D. 1338. See Just Vindic., c. vii. § 2. vol. i. p. 212. See also § 7. ibid. p. 216.] [Centum Gravamina, &c. (A. D. 1522), in conclus. See Just Vindic., ibid., p. 211.] PART Why is not this "the same in effect?" I. He that satisfieth a debt in pistoles, and he who satisfieth it in cracked groats, do both "the same thing in effect." To conclude,-they, who assume the right to be the last judges of their own liberties and privileges in all differences between them and the Court of Rome, "do the same thing in effect," whether the respective privileges of the one or the other be more or less but the emperors and the kings of England did assume to themselves the right to be the last judges of their own liberties and privileges in all differences between them and the Court of Rome: and, therefore, though the one might take (or mistake) himself to be within the old Roman Patriarchate, which the other was not, or whatsoever other differences there might be in the extent of their liberties or in their claims, yet they did "the same thing in effect." The only difference between the emperors and Henry the Eighth is this, that they denied the Papacy in parcels, and he denied it in gross. They denied his sovereign legislative power, they denied his patronage of Churches, they denied his investitures of Bishops, they denied his superiority above general Councils, they denied his tenths, and first-fruits, and pardons, and indulgences, and dispensations. So they pulled away his stolen feathers one by one, and Henry the Eighth uncased him all at once; but except some Patriarchal rites (which Britain never acknowledged, which are no parts of the Papacy), they left him as naked the one as the other. This I might well call "the same thing in effect." [R. C.'s witnesses to Papal SECTION THE THIRD. Now are we come to take a view of his witnesses, to try if he be more fortunate in offending than he is in defending. authority. But truly they are such, that their very names and their well known acts do sufficiently confute all his evidence. 1. Constantine [the Great]. 1. The first is "Constantine the Great," who "professed openly that he could not judge of Bishops'.'" f [Surv., c. vii. sect. 3. p. 106; as [x.] c. 2. from] Ruffinus, [Hist. Eccl.,] lib. III. No such thing. He said only, that "they could not be DISCOURSE judged of all mens." When all men have imperial power, his argument will have more force in it, but nothing to his purpose. The only question between us is about the Papacy, and his proof makes only for the privileges of Episcopacy. Whatso233 ever Constantine did at this time, was a mere prudential act. He had convocated the Bishops together against Arius; and instead of endeavouring to suppress the common enemy, they fell into quarrels and mutual complaints one against another, about businesses of no moment. Constantine seeing, “quod per hujusmodi jurgia causa summi negotii frustrareturh" "that the main business" against Arius "was hindered by these unreasonable brawlings," and, "ne innotesceret ulli hominum," &c., to prevent scandal, "that the faults and contentions of priests might not appear to the world," he suppressed them, and referred them to the "judgment of God." This was a more prudent course, and more conducible at that time to the advantage of Christian religion, than to have examined every scandalous accusation of one against another. even in this there appeareth sufficient proof of Constantine's judiciary power over the Bishops. First, they did all offer their mutual accusations one of another to him, as to their proper judge; secondly, he commanded them all to put their accusations in writing, and to deliver them to his hands; thirdly, he bound them all up in a bundle and sealed them; fourthly, he made them friends, and then burned them in their presence, and imposed upon them a perpetual amnesty or law of forgetfulness'. All these were judiciary acts. It is true, Constantine honoured Bishops very much; he made them his companions in his voyages, his fellow-commoners at his table; he cast his cloak over their faults. But this was not for want of judiciary power over them, but because "they were consecrated to God," and "he believed that in thus doing God would become propitious to him'." But at other times, the case is as clear as the sun,-" he prescribed Yet |