Some Problems of Lotze's Theory of Knowledge

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Page 20 - ... on a subject -very remote from this, found themselves quickly at a stand by the difficulties that rose on every side. After we had a while puzzled ourselves without coming any nearer a resolution of those doubts which perplexed us, it came into my thoughts that we took a wrong course ; and that before we set ourselves upon inquiries of that nature, it was necessary to examine our own abilities, and see what objects our understandings were, or were not, fitted to deal with.
Page 47 - We may exalt the intelligence of more perfect beings above our own as high as we please; but so long as we desire to attach any rational meaning to it, it must always fall under some category of knowledge, or direct perception, or cognition, that is to say, it will never be the thing itself, but only an aggregate of ideas about the thing.
Page 62 - archangel's," — " which stood at the centre of the real world, not outside individual things, but penetrating them with its 1 Outlines of Logic, 5. presence," would stand in no need of thought. "It could command such a view of reality as left nothing to look for, and would, therefore, be the perfect image of it in its own being and activity.
Page 15 - ... with their correlatives freedom of choice and responsibility — man being all this, it is at once obvious that the principal part of his being is his mental power. In Nature there is nothing great but Man, In Man there is nothing great but Mind.
Page 58 - As little as we can say how it happens that anything is or occurs, so little can we explain how it comes about that a truth has Validity ; the latter conception has to be regarded as much as the former as ultimate and underivable, a conLOGIC, VOL.
Page 48 - Nothing is simpler than to convince ourselves that every apprehending intelligence can only see things as they look to it when it perceives them, not as they look when no one perceives them; he who demands a knowledge which should be more than a perfectly connected and consistent system of ideas about the thing, a knowledge which should actually exhaust the thing itself, is no longer asking for knowledge at all but for something entirely unintelligible.
Page 46 - ... images of, things, falls to the ground as soon as it is recognized that it is no part of the function of ideas either to be or to image things, and that we have no possible means of apprehending the things beyond knowledge by reference to which we may condemn it. The criterion of knowledge is not an " assumed external world of the Real which comes in here between our ideas as the standard by which their truth is to be measured ; the standard is always the conception of which we cannot get rid,...
Page 80 - ... fact, of two principles independent of each other which it knows not how to unite ; on the one hand the general laws, on the other hand the given special arrangement of their points of application. In this respect Realism can claim no superiority over Idealism. At the same time it is only enquiries conducted in the spirit of Realism that will satisfy the wishes of Idealism.
Page 10 - We can never look on indifferently when we see cognition undermining the foundations of faith, or faith calmly putting aside as a whole that which scientific zeal has built up in detail. On the contrary, we must be ever consciously endeavouring to maintain the rights of each, and to show how far from insoluble is the contradiction in which they appear to be inextricably involved.
Page 75 - We come to understand the connection of our inner life only by referring all its events to the one ego, lying unchanged alike beneath its simultaneous variety and its temporal succession. Every retrospect of the past brings with it this image of the ego as the combining centre ; our ideas, our feelings, our efforts are comprehensible to us only as its states or energies, not as events floating unattached in a void.

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