PREPARATIONS FOR DEFENSE. 195 XII whatever, had excited their indignation, but without add- CHAPTER ing to their strength; for as the opposition members represented constituencies which owned very little ship- 1798. ping, they seemed to regard these threatened depredations with great unconcern. But the president's message, communicating the total failure of the mission and his recommendations to arm, struck upon the ear of the House like the note of a war-trumpet. Jefferson acknowledged that its effect was great; "exultation upon the one side and certainty of victory, while the other is petrified with astonishment." An attempt was immediately made in the Pennsylvania Legislature, then in session at Philadelphia, to oper- March 20 ate on Congress by the introduction of resolutions deprecating any offensive measures. But these resolutions were voted down, thirty-eight to thirty-three. Another attempt, shortly after, to get the Quakers to come forward with a petition for peace, did not meet with much better success. The House already had under discussion, previously to the receipt of the president's message, a bill appropriating means for the equipment of the three national frigates authorized at the late session. This bill was passed at once, and also another continuing in force the prohibition of the export of arms. The Senate committee to which the president's message was referred soon reported a bill, which passed immediately with only three votes against it, to enable the president to purchase or lease one or more cannon founderies. The three opposers were the two senators from Tennessee, one of whom was Andrew Jackson, and Tazewell of Virginia, who had taken upon himself the leadership of the opposition in that body. This was followed up by another biil, authorizing the president to hire or purchase, in ad XII. CHAPTER dition to the three frigates, sixteen vessels, not to carry more than twenty-two guns each, and to be armed and fitted out as ships of war. The suggestion of a tempo1798 March 23. rary embargo was made by Marshall, of Kentucky; but this was voted down, only five senators rising in its favor. Meanwhile the opposition members had deliberated on the unpromising aspect of their affairs, and the result was, not a motion to adjourn, as Jefferson had proposed, to which, indeed, the Senate would never have consented, but three resolutions offered by Sprigg, of Maryland, March 27 when the House went into committee on the president's message. The first of these resolutions purported that, under existing circumstances, it was not expedient for the United States to resort to war against the French republic; the second, that the arming of merchant vessels ought to be restricted; while the third, as if by way of tub to the whale, admitted that the coast ought to be for tified. The first resolution, it was thought, would prove very embarrassing to the Federalists, and it had there fore been offered, as agreed upon in the opposition caucus, in Committee of the Whole, to avoid the previous question (by which, according to the then existing usage, it might have received a quietus without any direct vote upon it); and in Committee of the Whole on the State of the Union, lest it might be got rid of by the rising of the committee without leave asked to sit again. Harper suggested that this resolution might be agreed to unanimously. For himself, he was quite willing to declare that it was not expedient to go to war with any nation. Sitgreaves remarked that, as the existing dis putes with France might probably lead to a war, it would be better to have no resolution on the subject. Until war was declared, we should remain at peace without the help of any resolution, to which Baldwin replied― DEBATE ON SPRIGG'S RESOLUTIONS 197 XII. and this was doubtless the position agreed upon in the CHAPTER preliminary caucus-that as the president and others had declared a war inevitable, it belonged to the House, if 1798. they did not think so, to declare the contrary. Otis suggested that, if the mover of the resolution would adopt the constitutional phrase "declare war" instead of "resort to war," there would be no difference of opinion. But to this alteration Sprigg declined to accede, observing, significantly, that the resolution, as offered, had not been the work of a moment, and that he was not disposed to allow any change in it. Dayton moved to strike out the words "against the French republic." If any resolution were passed, which he thought unnecessary, why not make it general? Why specify France more than any other nation, unless, indeed, the object was to have peace with France and not with other nations. Finding it not so easy to turn the enemy's position, Harper resolved to meet it in front. "Being of opinion," he remarked, "that the resolution amounted to nothing, out of a wish to gratify the mover he had been willing to let it pass. But he had never said, and would not say that war was the worst thing that could happen to the country. Submission to the aggressions of a foreign power he thought infinitely worse. If by means of this resolu tion gentlemen meant to prevent the country from being put into a state of defense-if they meant by it to effect an entering wedge to submission, he trusted they would find themselves mistaken. The question at present was not one of war, but of defense. No two questions were more distinct; and he believed the distinction was well understood by the American people. If gentlemen con founded these two questions, and were determined to take no measures of defense lest they should lead to war, let them say so openly." CHAPTER Giles and Nicholas insisted, as Baldwin had done, that the president having declared in substance that war ex1798. isted, it was the duty of the Legislature, to which the power of declaring war belonged, to set the matter right by means of the present resolution. Brooks, of New York, wished gentlemen to distinguish between the two kinds of war, offensive and defensive. He was ready to declare against offensive war, and to submit to small injuries rather than make defensive war. At the same time, he was unwilling to say that he was not ready to defend his country against the attacks of any foreign power whatever. Rutledge took the same ground. Sewall insisted that the present state of things ought to be considered a state of war, not declared by us, but declared against us by the French republic. "Though we lack spirit to defend ourselves, let us not say so! Though we refrain from acting, let us not make a formal declaration that we receive injuries with thankfulness! The proposed resolution goes even further. Its declared object is, in this moment of danger, to separate this House from the president. The mover considers the president's message a declaration of war, and this resolution is to be a declaration of peace! As to the presi dent, this is an assumption altogether false. He has neither declared war himself, nor called upon Congress to declare it. To agree to this resolution would be to give countenance to the assertion of the French that we are a people divided from our government. Since we are not equal to offensive measures-he wished to God we were! he was in favor of defensive measures. Our weakness and the divisions which had appeared in our councils, had invited these attacks, and he trusted we should now unite to repel them." Gallatin admitted that the conduct of France furnished DEBATE ON SPRIGG'S RESOLUTIONS. 199 XII. justifiable ground of war, but he denied that it amounted CHAPTER to war in fact, and therefore it became necessary to say whether we would go to war or not. We must expect, 1798. if we went to war, to encounter all its expenses and other evils. If we would remain at peace, we must, in a certain sense, submit-that is, we must submit to have a number of vessels taken, but this he thought very different from the submission spoken of on the other side. Gentlemen need not be so much alarmed about French influence. There had been a great enthusiasm for France, but that feeling was much diminished in consequence of her late conduct toward us. What course the interest and happiness of the country required was a mere matter of calculation. If he could separate defensive war at sea from offensive war, he should be in favor of defensive but as he could not make that distinction, he was in favor of peace measures. Giles took the same ground. March 28 He deprecated war of any kind, unless the country were actually invaded. "Would to God," said Thomas Pinckney, "it were in our power, by this or any resolution, to avert war and maintain peace. In questions of war there are always two parties, one of whom is generally the aggressor and the other passive. In the present case this country is the passive party, and any declaration, therefore, on our part, could have but little effect. Individuals or nations, led by interest or passion to pursue certain measures, are not easily diverted from their object; and if the French are actuated by either of these motives, no declaration of ours will prevent a war. A resolution like the present would rather accelerate the evil. If declarations could have availed, they have not been wanting. Indeed, too much had been rested on such declarations, nothing having been done for defense. |