of both practitioner and student. The author has achieved a conciseness and clearness of statement which add to the value of his work and enable him to set forth the law in a wonderfully small number of propositions. In this respect his work is a model for the more diffuse legal authors to imitate. The Law of Property Acts, 1922 to 1925, with a problems of international relations which he made peculiarly his own. As the title of the volume infers, the more important writings of Grotius and their pre-eminent place in legal literature are considered in their relation to the circumstances of the time and their effect on the international law of succeeding times. A Manual of Roman Private Law. By W. W. Buckland, LL.D. 1925. Cambridge: University Press. Price 16s. net. All teachers of Roman law will feel indebted to Professor Buckland for providing them, in this work, with a text-book which combines the necessary clearness and brevity with that high standard of scholarship which the author's name guarantees. The Manual is designed for beginners in the study of Roman law, and deals of the law. Matters which are still topics of particularly with the classical and later periods controversy are naturally omitted; but the treatment is sufficiently full and complete for the purposes of the ordinary law student. This work does not aspire to be an exposition of the new system of conveyancing and law of property introduced in England by the legislation of last year. It is, however, a useful reprint of the statutes which embody that drastic legal reform, and as such it will prove a welcome addition to the solicitor's library It includes the Law of Property Act, the Settled Land Act, the Land Registration Act, the Trustee Act, and the Administration of Estate Act, all passed in 1925, as well as certain unrepealed parts of earlier Acts on cognate Trial of Ronald True. Edited by Donald topics. A most important and valuable part of the work is an exhaustive and carefully compiled index to these statutes. It may be doubted whether any professional body has ever been asked to absorb such an amount of drastic new law as the English solicitors require to use in their daily practice as the result of the legislation of last year. It is only by such handy aids as this work affords that the undertaking can possibly be accomplished. Grotius has been for long far too much the misunderstood idol of our jurists. His principal works, in ponderous form and in a dead language, accumulate dust upon our bookshelves; a few stock quotations appear in all our standard works on international law. But of who he was and what he did there is not the general knowledge which there ought to be. Much of this unfortunate lack of sound information is due to the want of an adequate biography of the man in our own tongue. Now Mr Knight has set himself to supply the want. In a volume of manageable size, not overburdened with detail, he has given us a portrait of the man set in the environment of his own time, which shews the sources of his interest in those Carswell, Barrister-at-Law. Notable British The long-standing difference between the legal and the medical professions on the relations of insanity to crime are well illustrated in the murder trial recorded in these pages. That, indeed, constitutes the sole interest in the volume. That Ronald True was insane" in every accepted sense of the term hardly admits of doubt-was, indeed, hardly disputed by the prosecution. But was his insanity of such a kind as to free him of criminal responsibility for the particular crime which he committed? Was he incapable of knowing "the nature and quality of the act"? These were the questions which the law propounded, and to which the prosecution answered in the negative. The English law is burdened with the weight of certain alleged principles laid down nearly sixty years ago as the "Rules in M'Naughton's Case," the nature and origin of which are admirably expounded by the editor of this volume. Unable to free themselves from the incubus of these Rules," the Court of Criminal Appeal refused to interfere with the conviction of True, and it was left to the Home Secretary to assign the more appropriate conclusion to the drama in the form of a criminal lunatic asylum. The editor has performed his work with skill, and has provided in his Introduction a learned and interesting treatment of the medico-legal questions involved in the case. REMOTENESS OF DAMAGE. By THEO. SOPHIAN, of the Inner Temple, The decision of the House of Lords in Harnett v. Bond (41 T.L.R. 509) has an important bearing on the law with regard to remoteness of damage. In that case the plaintiff, who had already been received by the defendant Adam under a reception order as a private patient at his home in Malling Place, was subsequently permitted by him to be absent on trial for a period under section 55 (3) of the Lunacy Act, 1890. The plaintiff, a few days later, called at the offices of the Commissioners in Lunacy. He was there interviewed by the defendant Bond, who, having arrived at an unfavourable opinion of the mental condition of the plaintiff, immediately communicated with the defendant Adam. The latter, according to the evidence, replied that he would send a car and two attendants to fetch the plaintiff. Pending the arrival of the car, the plaintiff was detained in a room by the defendant Bond, and he was subsequently removed to Malling Place. He was there examined by the defendant Adam, and detained by him under the previous reception order. These events occurred in 1912, and from that time until the time of his escape in 1921 the plaintiff was detained at various places as the result of examinations and reports made by various other persons. Lord Chancellor is reported as having said: As regards Dr Bond, he (the Lord Chancellor) felt no doubt whatever that the Court of Appeal was right in ordering a new trial. It was not disputed that, on the assumption that the findings of the jury as to the appellant's mental condition on 14th December 1912 were correct, Dr Bond had no right to cause the appellant to be detained at the office pending the arrival of Dr Adam's car, and was liable for damages for that illegal detention. But those damages must, on the authorities, be confined to such as were the direct consequences of the wrong committed; and to hold that the detention of the appellant at the offices for a few hours was the direct cause, not only of his being retaken and conveyed to Malling Place, but also of his being confined in that and other houses until October 1921, appeared to him to be impossible. Dr Bond could not and did not direct or authorise Dr Adam to retake the appellant and confine him at Malling Place; the retaking and confining were the independent acts of Dr Adam, and each of them was a novus actus interveniens sufficient to break the chain of causation. Further, the confinement of the appellant could not have continued during nine years without repeated examination and recertification by the proper authorities; and for the consequences of those events Dr Bond could not on any intelligible principle be held to be responsible." The jury found as a fact that the plaintiff The principle of the law is clear that only was not of unsound mind, that Dr Bond did not that damage is recoverable which is the direct honestly believe that the plaintiff was of unsound consequence of the wrongful act; or, in other mind, or that he was unfit to be at large, or words, the law is only concerned with proximate that he was dangerous to himself or others. In damage and not with damage that is remote. these circumstances and on these findings it These principles and the difficulty of applying was clear that the plaintiff was entitled at law them to the particular facts of each case are to recover from Dr Bond damages in respect admirably illustrated in Weld Blundell v. of his detention at the offices of the Commis- Stephens ([1920] A.C. 956). In that case the sioners in Lunacy, but the question which the plaintiff had employed the defendant, a chartered House of Lords was eventually called upon to accountant, to investigate the affairs of a comdecide was whether Dr Bond was also liable in pany in which he was interested. The plaintiff respect of the whole or any part of the sub-wrote a letter to the defendant which contained sequent detention of the plaintiff until his escape in 1921. The answers of the jury to the questions put to them with regard to this part of the case must be carefully noted. They found, in effect, that Dr Bond caused the plaintiff to be sent back to Malling Place for the purpose of his being detained there, and not solely for the purpose of being examined by Dr Adam, and that Dr Bond, in effect, caused the plaintiff to be taken back to Malling Place. Notwithstanding these findings, the House of Lords decided that Dr Bond was in no way responsible for the detention of the plaintiff beyond, at most, that point of time when the plaintiff was examined by Dr Adam. In his judgment the libellous statements concerning two officials of the company. The defendant handed the letter to his partner, who negligently left it at the offices of the company. The letter was found by the manager, who read it and communicated its contents to the officials concerned. An action for libel was brought against the plaintiff, and damages were awarded against him. It was nevertheless held by a majority of the House of Lords that the damages and costs which the plaintiff had to pay in the libel action did not flow from, and were not the result of, the defendant's breach of duty. The principle to be derived from Weld Blundell v. Stephens may therefore be stated as being that the liability for a wrong stops where the chain of causation as regards the con- Scrutton stated the law to be as follows: To sequences flowing from the wrong is broken by determine whether an act is negligent it is what has been aptly called a novus actus in- relevant to determine whether any reasonable terveniens, i.e. 'the voluntary act of a free person would foresee that the act would cause agent over whom the original tortfeasor has no damage; if he would not, the act is not control, and for whose acts he is not answer-negligent. But if the act would or might able" (Ward v. Weeks, 7 Bingham at p. 215). probably cause damage, the fact that the Applying this test to the facts in Harnett v. damage it in fact causes is not the exact kind Bond, the House of Lords held that the chain of damage one would expect is immaterial, so of causation was broken at several points-long as the damage is in fact directly traceable firstly, by the examination and subsequent to the negligent act, and not due to the operadetention of the plaintiff by Dr Adam, who was a tion of independent causes having no connection novus actus interveniens; and subsequently by with the negligent act, except that they could said later examinations and reports made by not avoid its results. Once the act is negligent various other persons, as a result of which the the fact that its exact operation was not foreplaintiff's confinement was continued. seen is immaterial." Again, Lord Justice Warrington in the same case (at p. 575) said: The presence or absence of reasonable anticipation of damage determines the legal quality of the act as negligent or innocent. If it be thus determined to be negligent, then the question whether particular damages are recoverable depends only on the answer to the question whether they are the direct consequence of the act." The decision at which the House of Lords arrived in Harnett v. Bond is all the more important because the jury expressly found as a fact that Dr Bond caused the plaintiff to be sent back to Malling Place for the purpose of being detained there. Now, the general rule of law is that a person will be responsible for all the consequences which he actually intends; and, in view of the above finding of the jury, it is clear that one of the consequences intended by Dr Bond must have been the subsequent detention of the plaintiff at Malling Place, and yet the House of Lords decided that this was a consequence which was too remote. Is the true principle to be inferred from this decision that unless a consequence of an act is in effect direct the mere fact of intending that consequence is immaterial? At any rate, there is authority for the contrary proposition of law that if certain consequences directly flow from a wrongful act, it is no defence to allege that those consequences were not and could not possibly have been foreseen. Thus, in In re Polemis v. Furness, Withy & Co. Ltd. ([1921] 3 K.B. 560), a charter-party contained an exception clause with regard to fire. The ship was loaded with a cargo, inter alia, of benzene and petrol. During the voyage the tins leaked, and in consequence there was a considerable quantity of petrol vapour in the hold. At one of the ports of call, through the negligence of the stevedores, a heavy plank fell into the hold in which the petrol was stored, as a result of which an explosion occurred and the vessel was totally destroyed by fire. It was held by the Court of Appeal that the exception clause did not protect the charterers against loss by fire caused by the negligence of their servants, and that the charterers were liable inasmuch as the fall of the board was due to the negligence of the charterers' servants, the charterers being liable for all the direct consequences of the negligent act, even though those consequences could not have been reasonably anticipated. In his judgment (at p. 577) Lord Justice If the submission made above is correct, viz. that Harnett v. Bond is an authority for the proposition that a person is not responsible for consequences which are not caused directly by his own acts, even though he may have intended those consequences, intention will to a large extent become an irrelevant consideration in determining whether damage is proximate or remote. On the one hand, there will be the type of case illustrated by In re Polemis, where liability will attach in respect of consequences directly resulting from the wrongful act, even though those consequences were not and could not possibly have been foreseen; on the other hand, there will be the type of case illustrated by Harnett v. Bond, where, although a person intends and desires a certain consequence, yet, nevertheless, that consequence will be too remote in law, because, for instance, it requires for its production the intervention of a third person over whom the original wrongdoer has no control, and for whose acts he is not answerable. It must be remembered, however, that the intervening act of a third person may be such as not to amount to a break in the chain of causation, though in practice it appears exceedingly difficult to determine whether this is so. Two well-known cases may be cited in illustration, viz. Scott v. Shepherd, the squib case (1 Sm. L.C. (12 ed.) 513), and Clark v. Chambers (1878, 3 Q.B.D. 327). In Scott v. Shepherd the liability of the person who originally threw the lighted squib may be explained on the ground that the acts of the various persons who threw the squib away from themselves were not the voluntary acts of free agents, such acts being done entirely in defence either of person or property; and Clark v. Chambers appears to fall within the same principle. But in Harnett v. Bond the subsequent detention of the plaintiff by Dr Adam was entirely a voluntary act on Dr Adam's part, since he was in no way obliged by reason of anything said and done by the defendant Bond to keep the plaintiff in restraint. MONEY-LENDING TRANSACTIONS. By Hon. D. MESTON, of Lincoln's Inn, The recent case of Garde v. Kerman and Others (reported in the "Times," 26th June) does not raise any new point of law under the MoneyLenders Acts, but it provides a good illustration of the harsh and devious practices which are sometimes adopted by professional moneylenders. The facts of the case may be stated briefly as follows: The plaintiff was a woman in a satisfactory business position, being employed by a responsible firm at an income which varied from £600 to £1000 per annum. She borrowed money from two different registered money-lenders on four different occasions altogether, namely: (1) In February 1922 she borrowed on the security of a bill of sale on her furniture the sum of £200, from which 11 guineas were deducted for expenses; interest was made payable on the loan at the rate of 60 per cent. per annum, and it was arranged that the principal and accruing interest should be repaid by monthly instalments of £20: (2) In July 1922 she borrowed £200 on the security of a second bill of sale on her furniture. The plaintiff then repaid the defendants £150 (from which £5 were deducted for costs) in respect of the balance said to be due on the first bill: (3) In January 1923 she again borrowed £200 on the security of a third bill of sale on her furniture, the rate of interest on the loan being 60 per The plaintiff then repaid the defendants £140 (from which £5 were deducted for costs) in respect of the balance said to be owing on the second bill: (4) In October 1923 she obtained a further loan of £230 on the security of a fourth bill of sale. The plaintiff then repaid the defendants £150 (from which £5, 5s. were deducted for costs) to satisfy the balance said to be owing on the third bill. Under the fourth bill of sale the principal and interest accruing were to be discharged by monthly instalments of £15. cent. The first three bills were made in favour of the defendant Kerman, while the fourth bill was granted to the defendants M. Dunn Ltd., who were a private limited company, of which the defendant Kerman was a director. The series of transactions was not simplified by the facts that the third and fourth loans were obtained from different money-lenders, and the fourth loan was brought into account to satisfy the amount alleged to be owing on the third loan. The plaintiff alleged that by 28th February 1925 she had repaid £246, 2s. 6d. in respect of the fourth bill, but the defendants M. Dunn Ltd. still demanded the sum of £158, 4s. 10d. in satisfaction. The plaintiff thereupon applied to the Court, under the Money-Lenders Act, 1900, to reopen all four transactions; to take an account between her and the respective defendants; and to be relieved from the payment of any sum in excess of the amount fairly due in respect of principal, interest, and charges on the four transactions. Now the most important feature of a moneylending transaction is generally the rate of interest charged on the loan. In this and other respects section 1 (1) of the MoneyLenders Act, 1900, provides that: Where proceedings are taken in any court by a moneylender for the recovery of any money lent ... or the enforcement of any agreement or security. . . ., and there is evidence which satisfies the court that the interest charged in respect of the sum actually lent is excessive, or that the amounts charged for expenses, inquiries, fines, bonus, premium, renewals, or any other charges, are excessive, and that, in either case, the transaction is harsh and unconscionable, or is otherwise such that a court of equity would give relief, the court may reopen the transaction, and take an account between the money-lender and the person sued, and may, notwithstanding any statement or settlement of account or any agreement purporting to close previous dealings and create a new obligation, reopen any account already taken between them, and relieve the person sued from payment of any sum in excess of the sum adjudged by the court to be fairly due in respect of such principal, interest, and charges, as the court, having regard to the risk and all the circumstances, may adjudge to be reasonable; and if any such excess has been paid, or allowed in account, by the debtor, may order the creditor to repay it. Now the value of a security may generally be loan, with interest at the above rate, and costs. appraised with approximate accuracy, but the In that case the security was personal, and the solvency of a borrower who has only his personal general financial position of the borrower might security to offer must always be a matter of fairly be described as unsteady but not actually considerable speculation. As Lord Macnagh- perilous. Then, in Wheatley v. Part (27 T.L.R. ten said in Salamon v. Salamon ([1897] A.C. at 303), the defendant borrowed £150 from the p. 53): "It is as easy to gauge the solvency of plaintiff, a registered money-lender, on the an individual as to estimate the financial security of a promissory note for £250, of which ability of a crowd." As a general rule people £100 was payable in three months' time, and the only have recourse to money-lenders when they remaining £150 another three months later. have exhausted every means of obtaining ac- The note contained the usual default clause, and commodation elsewhere. Assurances given by the borrower made default in payment of the expectant borrowers as to their financial first instalment. A writ was thereupon served position in such dire straits are notoriously on the defendant, and judgment was signed unreliable, and the difference in the risk be- against him in default of appearance. After tween "unsecured and "secured" loans two or three weeks bankruptcy proceedings requires no further explanation. And between were taken. The defendant then realised the the wholly "unsecured" loan and the fully gravity of the position and consulted a solicitor, and satisfactorily "secured loan there are with the result that the judgment signed innumerable degrees of partially secured loans. against the defendant was stayed upon the It is therefore impossible to lay down any payment of £150 into Court. In addition, the general rule of application to assist the Court in defendant paid into Court the sum of £20, 11s. determining the rate of interest which may be 9d., being interest at the rate of 30 per cent. regarded as reasonable in every transaction, upon the amount of the loan. The borrower and each case must be decided on its own was the younger son of a gentleman in fair merits. In this respect there have been a circumstances. At the time of borrowing the number of important judicial decisions which money he was twenty-one and a half years of serve to illustrate the difficulty of the problem. age, and had been placed in a motor business Thus, in Fortescue Ltd. v. Bradshaw (27 T.L.R. | with a view to making a start in life. In this 251), the defendant borrowed the sum of £700 business he held 900 £1 shares, and these facts on the security of two promissory notes, were communicated by him to the lender at amounting to £1200, payable in monthly instalments of £100. The notes contained the usual default clause, providing that, on failure to pay any instalment, the whole balance remaining unpaid should become due and payable immediately. The defendant made default in paying the third instalment. On the assumption that the instalments were faithfully paid, the rate of interest worked out at 220 per cent. But in case of default in the first instalment the rate of interest reached the staggering figure of 1003 per cent. At the time of obtain ing the loan the defendant was receiving a salary of £400 as director of a brewery, and was possessed of considerable further private means, encumbered to the extent of £500 for a bank overdraft; and his household furniture was insured for £4000. At the same time he also owed £1500 to other money-lenders, and his pecuniary difficulties were generally due to betting. Taking into consideration the financial circumstances of the defendant, the fact that he owed £1500 to other money-lenders, that he was a gambler, and that he understood perfectly well the nature of the transaction and preferred to pay a high rate of interest to granting a bill of sale on his furniture, the Court (Pickford J.) considered that 50 per cent. per annum was a fair rate of interest, and gave judgment for £700, being the balance of the the time of making the loan. In giving judg- |