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WITH reference to the paragraph in our last GEO. V. CAP. 46), SECTION 3.—Held that where issue wherein we notified the appointment of several works are included in one volume the Mr J. Gordon Dow as having been conjoined royalty is to be calculated on the price of the with Mr Maxwell as Joint-Town-Clerk of Crail, volume, and that it is not necessary to establish these gentlemen being also Joint-Town-Clerks the price at which each particular work is of Anstruther-Easter, Anstruther-Wester, and published. Kilrenny, we understand that there are no other Town-Clerks in Scotland who are TownClerks of four separate and distinct burghs.
THE death of Mr James R. Menzies, writer
BOOK NOTICES. and N.P., Glasgow, occurred at his residence 44 Athole Gardens, Glasgow, on 5th June, A Concise Treatise on the Construction of Wills. after a brief illness. Mr Menzies, who was
By Francis Vaughan Hawkins, Barrister-atfifty-three years of age, was a native of Glas
Law. Third Edition by Charles Percy gow, and was educated at Fettes College and
Sanger, Barrister-at-Lau. 1925. London: Glasgow University. He served his apprentice
Sweet & Maxwell Ltd Price 13s. 6d. net. ship with the firm of John Steuart & Gillies, writers, Glasgow, and maintained his con
The late Mr Hawkins enjoyed a high reputanection with that firm throughout his tion as a Chancery lawyer, and his work on the professional life, being assumed a partner of construction of wills has been widely used the firm in 1918. He was admitted a law agent editor has in th
and often quoted in the English Courts. His in 1899, and was also a member of the Faculty
lition adhered to the method of Procurators, Glasgow, and of the Royal adopted in the second edition of distinguishing Philosophical Society of that city. Mr Menzies clearly in the text between the original words was specially well" versed in company and of the author and the editorial accretions. The shipping law
most important changes in the law which have had to be taken into account haye been those which are introduced by the Law of Property
Act, 1925. The embodiment of these and DECISIONS OF THE ENGLISH other changes in the law will give a new lease COURTS.
of life to a leading text-book.
Hyman v. Steward.
WAR-EMERGENCY LEGISLATION -STATUTORY RENT RESTRICTION-PREMISES TO WHICH APPLICABLE SHOP
OR DWELLING-HOUSE -INCREASE OF RENT AND MORTGAGE INTEREST
Transactions of the Grotius Society. Vol. X.
Problems of Peace and War. 1925. London : Sweet & Maxwell Ltd. Price (to non-members) 7s. 6d. net.
(RESTRICTIONS) ACT, 1920 (10 & 11 GEO. V.
The Grotius Society maintains its useful CAP. 17), SECTION 12 (2).—Premises were let work as a medium for the interchange of ideas consisting of a shop and living-room behind it among those interested in the problems of on the ground floor, a kitchen in the basement, international law, and no student of that and on the first floor a sitting-room, two bed- subject can fail to find interest in the reprint rooms, and a store. The tenant and his wife of the papers read before the Society. The at first lived in the premises, but later went topics are for the most part practical and to another house, They took meals at the essentially modern. More than one essay in original house, and the tenant sometimes slept this volume treats of the international position there. Held that the tenant was still protected of the United States at the present time; and by the Act.-K.B. Div. (Salter and Green JJ.). other contributors deal with European problems --8th May 1925.
arising from the recent peace settlement. We are glad to commend the volume for the interest
ing and informative reading which it offers. Osbourne v. J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd.
EDITOR'S NOTE. COPYRIGHT LITERARY PROPERTY REPRODUCTION OF COPYRIGHT WORKS AFTER AUTHOR'S DEATH-ROYALTIES-SEVERAL WORKS INCLUDED Articles of Legal Interest, and if accepted for publicaIN ONE VOLUME,PRICE ON WHICH ROYALTY TO tion these will be paid for, but no responsibility is BE CALCULATED—COPYRIGHT ACT, 1911 (1 & 2 | undertaken for the safe custody and return of MSS.
R'S The General Editor will be pleased to consider
SOME ASPECTS OF RENT RESTRICTION Woodhead v. Putnam ( 1 K.B. 252); LAW.
Barrett & Evans v. Hardy Bros. (41 T.L.R..
426 ); Phillips v. Potter (ibid. 460); and it is By THEO. SOPHIAN, of the Inne Temple, to be observed that the objects with which an Barrister-at-Law.
apportionment may be made in such circumIII. APPORTIONMENT.
stances are not only to determine the correct
statutory rental for the part in question, but Section 12 (3) of the Act of 1920 provides even to determine whether the standard rent for the apportionment of the standard rent or of the part, as determined by apportionment, rateable value in cases where apportionment is comes within the statutory limits, and thereby necessary, but no indication whatever is given brings the part itself within the operation of as to the circumstances in which an apportion- the Acts. ment must be made, and for this purpose it is Nor does it
appornecessary to refer to the decided cases.
tioning is confined merely to cases where the In the first place, it should be observed that comprising whole is outside the Acts by reason the moment the comprising property acquires of the standard rent thereof being beyond the a standard rent, each part of the comprising statutory limits, since in Phillips v. Potter it property acquires a standard rent as well; but, appears to have been decided that there might whereas the standard rent of the comprising be an apportionment, even where the comprising property is ascertained, the standard rent of property was not within the Acts by reason of each part is merely notional until it is determined other matters than that the standard rent or by means of apportionment. Thus, assume that rateable value thereof exceeded the prescribed a house consisting of two floors is let in August limits. Thus Mr Justice Salter is reported in 1914 at a rental of £100. The house as a whole Phillips v. Potter (p. 461) as having said : has a standard rent, i.e. £100, so also has each Suppose that in a district to which section floor and each room in each floor a standard 12 (2) (c) applies, a tenant was paying £80 & rent, but the notional standard rent in these year on 3rd August 1914 for a cottage, a cowshed, latter cases can only be determined by means a pasture field, and the use of a few cows. Suppose of apportionment.
that in 1921 the cottage is let separately. It It was at one time considered that there is obvious that the cottage was let in August would be no jurisdiction to apportion in such 1914, as part of the whole, for much less than cases, where part of the comprising property £78 a year. It is a dwelling-house to which was let at a time when the comprising property the Acts apply. Is the tenant or the landlord itself was not within the Acts, and this view of the cottage entitled to apportionment of of the law was put forward by Lord Justice the £80 to determine how much of it was paid Scrutton in Sinclair v. Powell ( 1 K.B. for the cottage in August 1914 ? In my 393). Thus, for example, according to this opinion either is so entitled. The comprising principle, if premises with a standard rent property is a house, a shed, a field, and an interest and rateable value of over £105 were split up in chattels. No question can arise whether into flats, the standard rent of each flat would this is or ever was a dwelling-house to which be the rent at which each was let separately the Acts apply. Can it then be said that if for the first time, and there would be no power the comprising property, instead of being a to apportion.
mixed property of this kind, had chanced to be The Courts have, nevertheless, refused to a dwelling-house, there would be no right to adopt the above-mentioned principle, and have apportionment? I do not think so.' in effect decided that even in such cases, where One word of warning is perhaps necessary. the letting of the part takes place when the The above principle should be used in the light comprising whole is not within the Acts, an of the express provisions of section 12 (2) and apportionment may be made.
section 12 (8) of the Act of 1920, and it should A fortiori a case for apportionment may arise be noted that the unit for the purposes of the where there is a letting of the parts at a time Acts may be not only the whole of a house, but when the comprising property is within the also part of a house, or even rooms therein, 80 Act (Woodward v. Samuel,  W.N. 82; that if the part has been let separately at a Sutton v. Begley,  2 K.B. 694; Sinclair v. material date, e.g. 3rd August 1914, that part Powell, supra).
will have an independent standard rent of its With regard to the principle mentioned own which can only be ascertained by reference above, that the Court is not prevented from to the separate letting in question of such part. making an apportionment by reason only of Another interesting question that calls for the fact that the letting of the part took place consideration is the effect of a reconstruction at a time when the comprising property was of the premises where the reconstruction only within the Acts, reference may also be made to affects part thereof. For example, assume
that premises consist of basement, ground floor, vinced that his idea that there are any excepfirst, second, and third floors. The first, tions at all rests on a misconstruction of the second, and third floors are altered by recon- section, for certainly it is regrettable that such struction into three separate self-contained a sensible and useful rule should be at all
. Powell, that there can be no apportionment in The difficulty arises from the precision with respect of any of these converted flats, and which section 3 is expressed. In the case of that the standard rent of each, will be the irredeemable rights the only reference is to a standard rent at which each is let for the first disposition " granted by a person uninfeft, time after the conversion. But what of the and in the case of heritable securities the only basement and ground floor, which have not deeds mentioned are “ assignation, discharge, been affected in any way by the reconstruction or deed of restriction.". It may be admitted It has been decided by the Court of Appeal in that it would not be unreasonable to read Abrahart v. Webster (41 T.L.R. 44), over- disposition " as covering every deed dealing ruling the Divisional Court on this point, that with a property right, and especially every deed there may be an apportionment notwithstand where the estate is actually transferred, whether ing, in respect of that part of the premises the word “ dispone " be used or not. In like which has not been affected by the conversion. manner, while assignation "and"
discharge If, however, it can be shewn that the unaltered are words of precision, one might be disposed portions of the premises derive some benefit to say that “ restriction” would cover a good
a from the alterations made to other parts, then deal, and need not necessarily be confined apparently no apportionment can be ordered to the case of letting out part of the property (Stockham v. Easton, (1924) 1 K.B. 52).
from a sécurity. But then, unfortunately, the In conclusion, reference might be made to surrounding circumstances are singularly unBainbridge v. Conydon (41 T.L.R. 480), which favourable to these suggested liberal construcdeals with the principle of apportionment to tions. As regards disposition," the later be applied where the rent is a composite one. language of section 3 itself seems to point to In such a case the Divisional Court held that a strict reading. That is greatly emphasised the apportionment had to be made with reference by the terms of the relative Schedule À which solely to the tenancy, at the material date, of the assumes a dispositive clause and a term of entry. whole, and that no consideration could be paid Then the word “ disposition " is not dealt with
" to the added amenities which the tenant of the in the interpretation sections of any of the Acts part, in respect of which the apportionment of 1868, 1874, or 1924. Not only so, but the was being made, happened to be then in enjoy- interpretation section of the 1868 Act (carried ment. A similar principle appears to have on into the 1924 Act) draws a marked distincbeen applied for the purpose of determining tion between “conveyance” and “ disposition.” net rent" in Westcott v. Bowes (ibid. 332). Conveyance " is there adopted as a statutory
label of the very widest significance, covering a great number of documents of different kinds,
and it is not unimportant to note that that NON-COMPLETION OF TITLE.
enumeration includes charters and disThe principle or rule embodied in section 3 positions. One is, therefore, with regret driven of the 1924 Act is, perhaps, the most useful to the view that the words a disposition of innovation introduced by that Act after the land ” in section 3 of the 1924 Act have a radical curtailment of documents of trans- limited meaning, though the degree of limitamission and extinction of heritable securities. tion may not be clear. Then as to heritable As is now well known, section 3 dispenses with securities it probably is the case that the completion of title and allows full effect to deeds expression “ deed of restriction” is not so wide granted by persons uninfeft, provided the title as “ restriction ” by itself might have been. is deduced in a simple manner in the deed. The Besides which, deeds of restriction have a deed so granted then authorises infeftment of section (section 30) to themselves, and that the grantee de plano. This applies both to section refers to Schedule K 5, where one sees irredeemable rights and to heritable securities. at once what is meant in the Act by a deed It may, or may not, have been intended that of restriction.” the new rule should be of universal application; Taking property rights first, it is readily and but however that may be, the fact is that with pleasure admitted that section 3 is not to consideration and practice go to shew that be read in any spirit of slavish bondage to the there is quite a number of apparent exceptions mere word “disposition.” The word “dispone where the rule does not apply, and the purpose has not been essential since 1874, and therefore, of this article is to deal with these exceptions. if a deed is a conveyance or transference, it The writer would be extremely glad to be con- I matters not whether the word “dispone” be
in the body of it, or the word “disposition” on with principle that any deed granted for the the back of it, or not. That may enable some purpose of creating, or modifying, or extinof the cases mentioned below to pass muster. guishing a servitude should be based upon the Indeed, it may be possible to put it even more infeftment of the granter. Further, those deeds strongly than that, for it may be contended with are not dispositions. For those two reasons much force that, if the section can apply in the it seems that section 3 can have no application. absence of the word " dispone, " multo magis - 7. Waivers.--Notwithstanding section 9 of must it apply whenever that word is present. the 1924 Act, deeds or minutes of waiver will Passing to particular instances :
continue to be obtained from superiors with 1. Original Feu-rights, whether taking the form reference to, e.g. delay in recording the grant of feu-charters, feu-contracts, or feu-disposi- beyond the time limit therein prescribed. Not tions. These deeds necessarily all contain only so, but, whether based on sound practice dispositive clauses and clauses of entry, express or not, it has been, and is, not uncommon to or implied. Accordingly, the opinion is ex- have writs of this nature for the purpose of pressed that these are all“ dispositions ” in the varying the conditions of the feu. All these sense of section 3, notwithstanding the separa- seem to be in the same position as the documents tion of charters and dispositions in the inter- referred to in the two preceding paragraphs and pretation section of the 1868 Act under the head for the same reasons. of
conveyance.” If this be correct, it is as- Turning to heritable securities the position sumed that the same would apply to charters of may be illustrated by the following instances :: novodamus,
1. The Original Bond.-Probably few will 2. Writs of Clare Constat.—Here, on the maintain that section 3 can apply to the grantother hand, it is thought that section 3 can have ing of a bond and disposition in security, so as no application, both because those writs are to enable the lender to obtain de plano infeftment in no sense dispositions, and also because it is under it if the borrower is not infeft, and though understood that it is an essential condition that in the bond the borrower's title is deduced. the granter of such writs shall be infeft.' As to Heritable securities are dealt with in section 3 that it is to be noted that the scheme of section 3 by themselves, and the only deeds there menis, not that the granter obtains a constructive tioned are assignations, discharges, and restricinfeftment, but that the grantee obtains infeft- tions. This seems to be a deliberate exclusion ment notwithstanding that the granter is, and of the original bond itself. It would be a bold continues, uninfeft.
argument that would bring in the bond as a 3. Contracts of Ground Annual.--The applica-“ disposition.”
disposition.” No doubt it is a disposition tion of section 3 is here absolutely clear, for though under reversion, but the view is those deeds are simply dispositions under real submitted that it is not a disposition in the burdens. No new estate is created, and the conception of section 3. It must be admitted, deed simply transfers or dispones the existing however, that this case demonstrates the diffiestate.
culty of construction of the word “disposition 4. Leases. It is thought to be clear that in that section. section 3 cannot apply, whether the lease is 2. Postponements.-One would like to think registerable under the 1857 Act or is not of that that deeds of postponement might pass under nature. Leases of either kind are not disposi- section 3 as restrictions, which in à peculiar tions of land, but are really personal contracts sense they are; but, for the reasons already in relation to land. Further, it is a condition indicated, it is thought that that argument of any lease being valid against singular cannot be maintained. Apparently, therefore, successors of the lessor, that he shall have been the granter of a deed or clause of postponement infeft. It is also to be remembered that must be infeft. Deeds of postponement are successors of the lessor cannot insist in an nowhere referred to in the Act nor, so far as action of removing without infeftment. known, in any other Act, and there is no
5. Changes in Reddendo, including (1) alloca- statutory form. Accordingly, it is thought to tion of feu-duty; (2) commutation of casualties; be clear that they may be allowed the benefit (3) discharge of casualties; (4) commutation of of the other simplifications introduced by the carriages and services ; and (5) conversion of new Act, namely, the omission of all reference grain feu-duties. It is understood that in all to the property and the omission or simplificathose cases the infeftment of the superior is a tion of deduction of title when the granter is necessary condition; and if so, section 3 cannot not the original creditor. apply. The same conclusion would follow from 3. Writs of Acknowledgment.-By the prethe consideration that none of these writs is viously existing law the granter must be infeft à disposition, not even on the most liberal (1874 Act, section 63). Accordingly, it is thought conception of that term.
that section 3 of the 1924 Act does not apply. 6. Servitudes.—It seems to be in accordance On the other hand, the other simplifications are
in terms applied to writs of acknowledgment
NOTICE. by section 31.
4. Consents, e.g. to the granting of feus and The sittings of the First Division of the Court to discharges of casualties, etc. The above for the trial of causes by jury in the ensuing remarks regarding postponements are adopted vacation will begin on Monday, 20th July next. in these cases also.
J. P. On the whole matter there are certain general
EDINBURGH, 25th June 1925. considerations which it seems useful to set
The sittings of the Second Division of the down.
Court for the trial of causes by jury iu the In the first place, it is thought that there is ensuing vacation will begin on Monday, 20th nothing in section 3 of the 1924 Act to supersede July next.
J. A. any previously existing rule of law which, in the case of any particular class of deeds, elevated
EDINBURGH, 25th June 1925. infeftment of the granter to what may be Vote.-With regard to the transmission of causes for fairly described as a solemnity. In the case of trial at these sittings, agents are referred to the Codifymost deeds there never was any such rule, and ing Act of Sederunt, Book F, chapter i.
, section 5. A in those cases the non-infeftment of the granter trial to proceed at the sittings, along with a print of the
copy of the Lord Ordinary's interlocutor allowing the simply meant that he could give no warrant or closed record and of the adjusted issue or issues, nust precept for direct infeftment of the grantee, which the cause is to be tried, and that not later than
be handed to the Keeper of the Rolls of the Division in and that the grantee must take infeftment as twelve o'clock noon on Tuesday, 30th June, otherwise on a transmitted warrant by sasine or notarial the cause will not be taken at the sittings. instrument. That is the class of case with which section 3 deals, and the effect of it is to put the substance of the notarial instrument into the
Box-DAYS-AUTUMN VACATION, 1925.grant itself, and then the grant may be recorded Edinburgh, 25th June 1925.—The 'Lords of de plano to the effect of infeftment. But there August, and Thursday, 24th September, to be
Council and Session appoint Thursday, 20th always was another class of deed where the the Box-days in the ensuing vacation. granter's infeftment was practically a solemnity,
J. A, CLYDE, I.P.D. subject, no doubt, to the principle of accretion, with which we need not here trouble. Examples are writs of clare constat, writs of acknowledg;
THE Lord Ordinary officiating on the Bills ment, and leases, if these last are to be valid will sit in Court on Wednesday, 26th August, against singular successors. The suggestion and Wednesday, 30th September, each day at here made is that section 3 has no application, eleven o'clock forenoon, for the disposal of and cannot be made to apply, to such cases.
motions and other business falling under the In the second place, this rule about leases 93rd section of the Court of Session Act, 1868, seems to put a serious difficulty in the way of and the 3rd section of chapter i., Book A, the title of trustees ever being allowed to get Codifying Act of Sederunt; and Rolls will be into such a position that none of the acting taken up on Monday, 24th August, and Monday, trustees is infeft. Whether known to the 28th September, between the hours of eleven tenants or not, it would never do for trustees and twelve o'clock. to grant leases if none of them was infeft.
EDINBURGH, 25th June 1925. Indeed it might not even be safe in connection with warrandice, express or implied.
In the third place, in the case of heritable securities there is at least some ground for
We are informed that the firm of Messrs saying that section 3 of the Act was not required T. & W. Liddle, Maclagan & Cameron, 5 Hill to enable anyone, with a good title to the debt, Street, Edinburgh, was dissolved on the 11th to assign or discharge the security also, without ult. Mr Thomas Liddle is carrying on business himself going on record, provided his title to as before at No. 5 Hill Street, Edinburgh, and the debt was set out on the face of the new is also arranging for the assistance of a junior deed (Macrae v. Gregory, 1903, 11 S.L.T. 102). partner; and Messrs D. P. Maclagan, W.S., If that be so in regard to assignations and and James A. Cameron, W.S., have arranged discharges, much more would the same rule to join, on 1st July, the firm of Fyfe, Ireland apply to deeds of postponement and consent. & Co., W.S., of which the present partners are
Mr Neil Macvicar, W.S., and Mr John I. MESSRS STORIE, CRUDEN & SIMPSON, advo- Falconer, W.S. The business will continue cates, Aberdeen, have assumed Mr Francis to be conducted under the firm name of Robert Young, solicitor, as a partner. Mr Fyfe, Ireland & Co., at their present address, Young is a son of the late Mr James Young, 7i Hanover Street, Edinburgh. Telephone No. solicitor and town-clerk, Portsoy, N.B.