Art. 10.-MODERN AUSTRIA.

1. Modern Austria. Her Racial and Social Problems. By Virginio Gayda. London: Unwin, 1915.

2. The Hapsburg Monarchy. By H. Wickham Steed. Third Edition. London: Constable, 1914.

3. The Southern Slav Question. By R. W. Seton-Watson. London: Constable, 1911.

SIGNOR VIRGINIO GAYDA, whose work, entitled 'La Crisi di un Impero,' has now been most opportunely translated into English, is a writer of ability. His facts are marshalled with lucidity. His generalisations, though perhaps at times somewhat too comprehensive, are bold and striking. His proclivities are ardently nationalist and anti-Clerical, with apparently a strong tinge of Socialism. He pours forth all the vials of his wrath on the Christian Socialists of Austria who, he considers, under the auspices of the late Dr Lueger, betrayed the cause both of Nationalism and Socialism by forming an unnatural alliance with the Church. His work, which may without exaggeration be termed an account of what is possibly the last agony of the Hapsburg Dynasty, merits the attention of the politicians of all countries. It is, moreover, especially instructive for Englishmen. We are in this country so accustomed to associate Imperialism with over-seas dominion that we are perhaps somewhat inclined to forget that the essentially land Empire of Austria furnishes object-lessons of the highest import as to the manner in which Imperial problems may be solved.

If we seek to differentiate between the tasks which Austria and England have respectively set themselves to perform, we find that, in dealing with race problems, the former country has not, save to a very limited extent in the case of Bosnia, had to encounter the obstacles created by colour antipathy, which precludes intermarriage; religious practices, such as the Hindoo caste system, which discourage social intercourse; or the various incidents which crop up in countries where polygamous institutions exist, or where the legal status of slavery is recognised, or where, as is the case amongst Moslems, religion and custom have given a character of

rigid immutability to archaic laws. As regards the cleavage caused by differences of religious faith, it is not only possible, but highly probable, that Christian animosities, inter se, have proved an even greater impediment to amalgamation and assimilation in the Austrian Empire than those apparently more profound differences which separate all Christians from all Moslems and Hindoos. On the other hand, absolutist Austria has possessed one advantage which has been denied to democratic England. From the days of Pericles downwards, laws and politics in all democratic countries have invariably tended to produce a series of isolated measures lacking in that sustained consistency which absolutism renders possible. The advantage, however, is more apparent than real. History has abundantly shown that the instincts of blind, blundering, but withal wellintentioned Demos have, in many matters essential to national welfare, often led to happier results than those obtained by the trained intelligence, consistency of purpose and transmitted traditions of government possessed by the few. When, however, all these points of difference have been eliminated, there remains one central fact where similarity exists. Both England and Austria have been endeavouring to solve the main problem of Imperialism, which consists in harmonising under one rule the interests of various races speaking divers tongues, differing widely in ethnological origin and culture, and often animated by conflicting national aspirations.

How have the two countries faced this problem? By methods which lie as the poles asunder. The difference becomes especially prominent if, leaving aside all purely administrative measures, which must necessarily present many features of identity in all civilised countries, we consider, not so much what England has attempted to do-for both the merit and demerit of Democracy is that it often cannot define its ultimate object with any degree of precision-but rather what she has not attempted to achieve. From the first connexion of the English with the subject races which have fallen under their sway, a consistent and comprehensive policy of Anglicisation has been definitely discarded. A sympathy, at times tepid but never altogether extinct, for the

national aspirations of the subject race has been persistently evinced. It has been sought to conjure the danger to which Imperial rule is exposed through the action of extreme nationalism by just and beneficial administration, and by timely and limited concessions to natiɔnalist demands.

The main aim of Austrian policy has been totally different. From the days of Maria Theresa and her headstrong son, Joseph II, onwards, although the methods adopted have varied, the object pursued has been the same. It has been to effect the Germanisation of the various heterogeneous units which collectively make up the Austrian Empire. History records but one partial success in the execution of a policy of this sort. The easy-going polytheism of the ancient world greatly facilitated the process of Romanisation, but even the Roman success can only be accepted with qualifications. There was a good deal of poetical exaggeration in the oft-quoted boast of Claudian that Rome's maternal instincts led her to gather into her capacious bosom all her subject races on equal terms, while the eulogy of Rutilius-Fecisti patriam diversis gentibus unam'-was speedily belied shortly after it was written by the dismemberment of the Roman Empire. Moreover, the stubborn monotheism of the Jews successfully resisted even temporary Roman assimilation; and total disruption ensued when it became evident that that complete homogeneity amongst the component parts of the Empire, which constitutes the only sure foundation of a powerful national character, was wholly wanting. As M. Le Bon says in his Lois Psychologiques de l'Évolution des Peuples':

'Cette communauté de sentiments, d'idées, de croyances et d'intérêts créés par de lentes accumulations héréditaires, donne à la constitution mentale d'un peuple une grande identité et une grand fixité. Elle assure du même coup à ce peuple une immense puissance. Elle a fait la grandeur de Rome dans l'antiquité, celle des Anglais de nos jours. Dès qu'elle disparaît, les peuples se désagrègent. Le rôle de Rome fut fini quand elle ne la posséda plus.'

By what methods has Austria attempted to give effect to the policy of Germanisation? The chief

interest of Signor Gayda's book lies in the fact that he has subjected those methods to a pitiless analysis. He gives us a picture of an Austria which assuredly no longer deserves the epithet of 'felix,' with which the world has been familiarised by the old mediæval distich. The country is riven and torn asunder in a very special degree by all the most volcanic tendencies of the present age. Eight different nationalities contend for equality of treatment, and even at times for supremacy. It will be as well to enumerate them. They are the Italians, the Northern Slavs (Czechs, Ruthenes and Slovaks), the Southern Slavs (Slovenes, Serbs and Croats), the Poles, the Roumanians, and the Hungarians (Magyars). The whole political and administrative machinery of the country is honeycombed by the mutual rivalries of these various races. Amidst this mosaic of nationalities, there is no room for an Austrian fatherland. When the German speaks of 'Austria,' he thinks of Vienna, the Czech of Prague, the Pole of Cracow, and the Croat of Agram. Amidst all this nationalist chaos, the non-national Jew steps in and is gradually causing a social and economic revolution. He ousts the peasant proprietor, and in some cases the large landowner, from his rural possessions. He fixes with a relentless grasp on all the industries of the country, and he inspires all classes alike with fear and hatred. The need for social legislation of various sorts is urgent. It may be illustrated by a single, but very significant, fact. The census of 1900 showed that in Vienna there were no less than 165,000 people habitually living more than six in a room. Yet little or nothing can be done, because national rivalries and jealousies block the way to effective legislation. The aristocracy is tinged with mediævalism, and still holds tenaciously to many of its moribund privileges. The Church, which is animated by extreme Ultramontane sympathies, still exercises a predominant influence over the action of the State; while, at the same time, the political character which Catholicism has assumed has led to a decay of real religious faith. Nationalist sentiments are gradually penetrating into the army.

These are but a few of the symptoms of a disease which, if Signor Gayda's account be correct, permeates the whole body politic of Austria. They must be taken

into serious account in considering a question which must inevitably before long engage the attention of the statesmen of Europe. That question is, Can Austria, as a single political entity, survive the crisis through which the world is now passing? With the experience furnished by history, it would be rash to answer this question with a confident negative. There is much truth in Signor Gayda's remark that 'there has always been in the history of this great and ancient Empire something which has, as it were, retarded its course. Revolutions, which have radically transformed other Western nations, have scarcely touched it in passing.' The power of recuperation shown by the bundle of disconnected national units termed Austria' from staggering blows which seemed calculated to ensure the total shipwreck of the whole machine of State has, indeed, been such as to astonish the world; but it is to be observed that this recuperative power was manifested at a time when dynastic rather than national interests determined the course of policy. The recoveries of Austria are not, in fact, indications of that sturdy and unquenchable health which enabled a homogeneous people like the French to recover from crushing defeat, but are rather to be regarded as incidents arising from the principles, then generally accepted but now loudly challenged, which were applied by all Europe in deciding on the destinies of nations. They happened when the maintenance of the Balance of Power was regarded by all statesmen as the cornerstone of European policy.

It is now very generally admitted by politicians of all shades of opinion in England that the principle of the Balance of Power, even if it be not altogether discarded, must be applied in a very different spirit to that which has heretofore prevailed. It was denounced by John Bright as 'a foul idol, fouler than any heathen tribe ever worshipped'; and Bright's political successors, with the full assent of others of more conservative tendencies, have, in a greater or less degree, joined in the condemnation. There is rather more to be said in favour of the abstract principle of the Balance of Power than some of its extreme opponents are at times inclined to admit. Some balance of power is very necessary in order to ensure the peace of Europe, and to prevent the abuse of power on