places, to the public fervice, are almoft the only refource left in the exhaufted ftate of our finances. But befides this ftrong argument of neceffity that preffes upon the prefert moment, fuch and fo great are the abufes in the management and expenciture of the public money as would call for the fricteft enquiry and animadverfion even in the best of times. The practice of expending immenfe fums without confent of parliament, under the fallacious head of contingencies and extraordinaries, the greater part of which might eafily be comprifed in an eflimate; but because fome unforeseen articles are not capable of fuch precifion, the minifter has, under that colour, found out a method of expending the public money first ad libitum, and when it has been fo expended, has found means to induce parliament so think itself bound in honour to ratify and make it good, deferves the higheft cenfure; and no minifter who fhall dare to take the public credit, for money that has not been voted, ought to be juftified by a lefs authority than an Act of Indemnity. The millions which remain in confequence unexplain ed and unaccounted for; the fhameful facility of admitting almost every claim; the improvident bargains made for the public fervice; the criminal neglect and even contempt of the few checks establifhed in the Board of Treafury. befides great part of the money being fhared in its paffage among a tribe of collectors, clerks, agents, jobbers or contractors, or paid away by official extortion, or flop ped in its courfe to breed intereft for fome ingroffing individuals, are

grievances which the prefent motion has in view to remedy.

zdly. But great and important as the motion is in this view of it, it is fill more important in another, as it tends to narrow the wide fpreading influence of the crown, that has found its way into every corner of the kingdom.

It is fufficient to allude to this grievance, without any farther enlargement; but this argument, though perhaps the frongelt in favour of the motion, has been turned into an objection to it, as if it meant to abridge the rights of monarchy, and make the crown dependent on the parliament.

if the objection means to infi, nuate that corruption is neceffary to government, we fhall leave that principle to confute itfelf by its own apparent iniquity.

That this motion is intended to dimmish the conftitutional power of the crown, we deny. The conftitutional power of the crown we are no leis folicitous to preferve, than ave a are to annihilate its unconftitutional influence. The prerogative rightly understood, not touched or intended to be touched by this motion, will fupport the crown in all the fplendour which the king's perfonal dignity requires, and with all the authority and vigour neceffary to give due effe&t to the executive powers of government.

It has been argued that this is not a proper time for reformation, when all the attention of the kingdom fhould be employed upon the war, as the great and only obje& in the prefent time of diftrefs: to which we beg leave to infift that the prefent is, for that very rea[X] 4

fon,

fon, the propereft time, because nothing is fo effential to the conduct and profecution of the war as the frugal management of that fupply by which only it can be carried on with any prospect of fuccefs. Nor ought the plan of œconomy to be any longer delayed at the rifque of a general bankruptcy; and from the hiftory of this, as well as other countries, times of neceffity have been always times of reform.

3dly. Because we conceive that the mode of a committee, which might act with a committee of the other Houfe, and might, if neceffary, be rendered durable, and vefted with due powers by an act of the whole legislature, might bring back the public expenditure to its conftitutional principle, might devife proper regulations for opening contracts to the propofals of every fair bidder for reforming the abufes of office, and the enormity of fees, with a variety of other abuses, particularly that of large fums of money lying in the hands of individuals, to the lofs of the ftate,

An objection has been ftrongly urged on the ground of an apprebenfion expreffed by fome lords, as if they seriously entertained it, of its producing a quarrel between the two Houles of parliament; in confequence of which, the. public business might be obftructed, by a claim on the part of the Houfe of Commons to an exclufive right of confidering and providing for the fubjects of this motion.

Such a claim certainly cannot be fupported, as a confequence of the claim of that Houfe to originate money bills. Not a fingle Lord appeared to entertain an idea

that fuch a claim would be well founded. In truth, the objection fuppofes it to be ill-founded, and that therefore the House will refift it; and yet it affumes that the Houfe of Commons will advance and perfift in this ill-founded claim. We cannot difcover any colour for fuch a fuppofition, unlefs we were to adopt the infinu. ations of those who reprefent the corrupt influence (which it is our wish to fupprefs) as already per. vading that House. Those who entertain that opinion of one Houfe of parliament, will hardly think lefs difrespectfully of the other. To them it will feem a matter of indifference, whether the motion is defeated by the exertion of that influence, to excite a groundless claim in the one Houfe, or by a groundless apprehenfion of fuch a claim in the other. But we, who would be understood to think with more refpect of both, cannot entertain an apprehenfion fo injurious to the Houfe of Commons, as that they would at this time especially, and on this occafion, have advanced fuch a claim.

The motion has likewife been objected to on account of its difqua. lifying perfons poffeffing employments or penfions, to be of the propofed committee, We are far from fuppofing that the poffeffion of place or penfion neceffarily cor rupts the integrity of the poffeffor. We have feen, and the public have feen, many illuftrious inftances of the contrary; yet we cannot but fuppofe that the public expectation of advantage from this measure would have been lefs fanguine, if they had feen perfons poffefling offices felected to diftin

guifh how far their offices were use ful or their falaries adequate; they perhaps would not think the poffeffor of a penfion or office the fit Left judge how far that penfion or office had been merited or was neceffary. We cannot therefore think the motion juftly exceptionable on this ground; it rather appears to us to have been drawn with a proper attention to noble lords in that predicament, exempting them from a fituation which they must neceffarily wish to decline.

We conceive ourselves warranted in the mode propofed, by precedent as well as reafon, and it was ftated to the House to have been recommended by the most approved conftitutional authors who have written fince the revolution; but having offered to meet any other propofition which might carry with it fubftantial remedy, and no fuch being offered, not withstanding the time this propofition has lain before the Houfe,

cannot help confidering the prefent negative as going to the fubftantial as well as formal part of the motion, and hold ourselves obliged to avail ourselves of our right of entering our protest against the rejection of the above propoition.

4thly. We are farther impelled to prefs this motion, because the object of it has been feconded and called for by a confiderable majority of the people who are affociating for this purpose, and feem determined to purfue it, by every legal and conftitutional method that can be devised for its fuccefs; and however fome may affect to be alarmed, as if fuch affociations tended to disturb the peace, or en proach upon the delegated power

of the other Houfe, we are perfuaded they have no other view but to collect the fenfe of the people, and to inform the whole body of the reprefentatives, what are the fentiments of the whole body of their conftituents, in which refpect their proceedings have been orderly, peaceable, and conftitutional. And if it be asked, what farther is to be done if these petitions are rejected? The best anfwer is, that the cafe cannot be fuppofed; for although upon a few feparate petitions it may be fairly faid that the other Houfe ought not to be decided by a part only of their conftituents, yet it cannot be prefumed they will act in defiance of the united opinion of the whole people, or indeed of any great and notorious majority. It is admitted they have a power to vote as they think fit; but it is not poffible to conceive that fo wife an affembly will ever be rash enough to reject fuch petitions, and by that means cause this dan gerous queftion to be broached and agitated, Whether they have not broke their truft? The voice of the people will certainly be complied with.

Ministers may, as they have done in recent inftances, deprive any man of what he holds at their pleafure, for prefuming to exercife his undoubted right of thinking for himself on these or other public fubjects: but it will not be wife in them to treat thefe affociations with contempt, or call them by the invidious name of Faction, a name by which the minority in both Houfes of parliament have been fo frequently and fo falfely calumniated, because the name fo applied will recoil back upon themselves, when acting against

the

ing of that day; and whereas the Right Hon. the Earl of Pembroke was likewife difmiffed from the office of Lord Lieutenant of Wilthire, a few days after he had given his vote upon the fame queftion; therefore this houfe have reafon to fufpect that they were difmiffed in confequence of the faid votes; it is tefolved therefore that an humble address be prefented to his Majesty, befeeching him to be graciously pleafed to inform the house, whether he was advised, and by whom, to difinifs the faid two noble lords for their conduct in parliament.

After a long debate, the queftion being put,

Nugent Temple,

Contents 31

Bolton,

Courtenay,

Stamford,

Camden,

Coventry,

Richmond,

Manchester,

Derby,

Effingham,

Tankerville,

Not contents 56

Proxies 8 39

Proxies 36 92

DISSENTIENT,

I. Because we cannot entertain a doubt, but that the two noble lords, whofe removals from their lieutenancies have given aife to this motion, suffered this mark of his Majesty's, difpleafure for their conduct in parliamen

The facts expreffed of the motion were fufficient in themselves to fatisfy any reasonable perfon, that this was the fole caufe of their dififfion, and might well have juftified an immediate cenfure on the advifers of that unconflitutional measure. But the motion, at the fame time that it was calculated to point the cenfure at those advifers by name, if it fhould have been merited, gave them an opportunity

of being exculpated if guiltless, by the folemn teftimony which his Majefty would, in fuch cafe, have given of their innocence.

II. Because the offer made by the noble lord who propofed this addrefs that it should be withdrawn, if any one of his Majesty's

minifters

minifters would declare upon his honour, that thefe removals were for any other caule than that' which has been alledged, and the filence with which minifters thought fit to receive this propofal, although called upon by almost every lord who spoke for the motion, is an additional reafon for confirming us in our belief, that his Majefty has been advised to remove the two noble lords from their lieutenancies for their conduct in parliament.

III. Because we confider this difmiffion of lords from high and honourable offices, on account of their proceedings in parliament, to be a violation of the Bill of Rights, which declares, That proceedings in parliament ought not to be impeached or quellioned (much lefs punished) in any court or place out of parliament." And we are greatly apprehenfive of the confequences, if this daring attempt to fubvert one of the most facred principles of our conftitution, fhould pass with impunity and grow into precedent.

IV. Because the mifchievous tendency of fuch influence is greatly augmented by the connection which the offices in queftion (lieutenancies .of counties) have with the proper conftitution of the militia. That important branch of the national defence has been fo altered as to have almoft loft fight of the original principles of an English militia. The notorious abufes introduced into it, and the disregard paid to the few wholefome regulations remaining in it, would foon make the militia a dangerous intrament in the hands of the minifter, were it not

for the exemplary zeal of those gentlemen, who, facrificing every degree of domeftic comfort, and fubmitting to unneceflary and diftant removals from their counties, ftill endeavour to maintain its purity in the character of its officers; and we confider thefe alterations and abufes as giving the more juft grounds of apprehenfion and jealoufy, as they tend to affimilate the militia in principle and in habits to the ftanding army, in which alfo dangerous innovations appear daily taking place; innovations, which though charged in the debate, were neither denied nor defended.

Laftly, because when minifters, in the fame moment that they are exerting the influence of the crown in a moft corrupt and unconftitutional manner, think fit to affert, in contradiction to the evidence of all our fenfes, that it is not increased, and is not formidable, we can have little hope that fuch minifters will ever fuffer that influence to be diminished, although its diminution is one of the principal objects of the prayer and petition of the people, founded on a feeling fenfe of the increased, increasing, and formidable extent of it.