SENATE.] Mr. Foot's Resolution. [MARCH 4, 1830. stitutional law, passion and feeling are to be regarded as general principle that the right to remove can be exerpoor auxiliaries. We should go for nobler game than cised only where the right to appoint exists. But I do not mere party interests. Principles are to be first settled concur with the honorable gentlemen who have viewed here; but then the application of them must be fearlessly this power as unlimited by the spirit of the constitution, made. The first inquiry ought to be, what are the true and, having arrived at the conclusion that sie volo is the lcprinciples, not what is the interest, of any party? It will gal tenure of office, would leave it to become the sport be found that my view of these principles differs as much, of a spirit not less arbitrary and tyrannical than that of abin some respects, from those of some to whose judgment solute despotism. Every administration, preceding this, I usually defer, as it does, in others, from those of some has professed to exercise this power within certain estawho profess to be politically arrayed against me. blished constitutional limitations, regarding removals as The power of removal is nowhere expressly conferred expedients to be resorted to by the President only for the by the constitution, except in the section which provides purpose of securing a faithful execution of the laws, or that all civil officers of the United States shall be removed when really necessary for the general welfare. And if a from office on impeachment for, or on conviction of, trea- single instance can be shown in which any President beson, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors. A fore this has ever prostituted this authority to party uses, judge, the tenure of whose office is dum bene se gesserit, or for personal aggrandizement, it will be found that he is removable only by this means. But where good beha-has, at least in terms, assumed the virtue of administering vior is not the tenure of office, the power of removal the Government on different principles, and denied that is properly and generally incident to, and a conse-he intended to invade the right of opinion, or pervert his quence of, the power of appointment. The power to power from its legitimate object. The history, as well destroy is ordinarily implied from the power to create. of the precedent on which the Senator from Tennessee so It is a common axiom of our jurisprudence, that the much relies, as of others to which he has not adverted, authority to dissolve a thing must be as high as that shows that this constructive power would have never been which formed it. The Legislature which has the ex-acknowledged, if it had not been supposed to have been press power to pass a law for raising revenue, for exam- strictly limited and distinctly defined. 66 ple, has the necessary power to repeal it. The Gover- When the bill for establishing an Executive Departnors of many of the States enjoy, by express provisions ment, to be called the Department of Foreign Affairs, in their respective constitutions, the power of appoint- was under the consideration of the House of Representament to office, and yet exercise, by construction and by tives, during the first session of Congress after the adopimplication only, the power of removal from it, their State tion of the constitution, the debate to which the gentle. constitutions being silent on that subject. The Postmas-man from Tennessee has referred arose upon one of its ter General, who, harmonizing with this administration, provisions, granting to the President the right of remov has removed, within the last year, his thousand deputies, ing the Secretary to whom our foreign relations were to agents, and clerks, though vested by law with the express be principally entrusted. That provision was then so right of appointing them, can point you to no statute con-modified as not to carry with it the appearance of a grant ferring upon him the right to remove one of them. The of something not before given, but to recognize a constinumerous clerks and agents appointed under express legal tutional power of removal already subsisting in the Presiprovisions, by other Heads of Departments here, are re-dent. The power was strongly denied by Mr. Gerry and movable only by the same construction. The law has Mr. Roger Sherman, and maintained by Mr. Madison and conferred upon the Supreme Court the power of appoint- Mr. Baldwin. These gentlemen had all been members of ing its clerk, and, although considered removable by it, the convention that made the constitution, and yet were yet no law has thus limited the tenure of his office in ex- thus equally divided in opinion on the construction of the press terms. But then this authority, thus derived from very instrument which they had, so recently before that, implication and construction, if kept within the spirit of assisted in forming. The point, then, was regarded as exthe constitution and the laws, instead of being used arbi-tremely doubtful. There were others, who had not been trarily or tyrannically, can be exercised only for the pub-members of the convention, who engaged on different lic welfare. sides, with equal zeal in the contest, until at length, a In two classes of cases, the power of appointment is construction implying the existence of the power was esexercised by the President alone: first, where Congress tablished, so far as a tribunal which had no jurisdiction have, by law, vested in him the appointment of such infe- over the subject could do it, by a vote of thirty-four to rior officers as they thought proper: and, secondly, where twenty. It has often been observed, and I apprehend it he is empowered to make appointments by virtue of the is unquestionably true, that the character of Washington, last clause in the second section of the second article. then President of the United States, had great influence There are some peculiar considerations growing out of in producing this decision. Add to this, too, that the the manner in which the power of removal, in the first of question arose in the very strongest case which could have these classes, has been exercised, which it is unnecessary been presented for the advocates of the Executive—the to enter into now, as they are not immediately connected case of a Secretary, between whom and the President it with the executive rights of the Senate. Appointments was absolutely necessary that the most confidential relaof the second class are temporary only by the express tions should subsist. These supporters of Executive auprovisions of the clause which authorizes them. The thority were then, as men will ever be, influenced, in some President shall have power to fill up all vacancies that degree, by the circumstances immediately around them. may happen during the recess of the Senate, by granting The statesmen of the day literally vied with each other in commissions, which shall expire at the end of their next expressions of their high confidence in the man who then session." With these exceptions, the second section re-filled the Chair of State, beloved by all, and distrusted by ferred to expressly confers the power of appointment up- none; and it is but too evident, from the arguments adon the President and Senate, by the words "he shall no-[vanced on this occasion, that they were beguiled by the minate, and, by and with the advice and consent of the imagination that none but beings of such exalted virtue Senate, shall appoint." and spotless purity would ever be elected to succeed him. Although the constitution has thus recognized the Se- They reasoned from an illusion to which human nature is nate as an essential component part of the appointing au- at all times liable. Under such circumstances, a princithority, yet the power of removal has been uniformly ex-'ple was decided, which forms a distinct exception to an ercised by the President alone, since the constitution was established general rule; and, it cannot escape observaestablished. This, then, has been a deviation from the tion, that, under other auspices, a very different result MARCH 4, 1830.] would probably have been produced by the deliberations dismission of a meritorious officer was an abuse of power of 1789. The discussion to sustain this power mainly above his conception, and would merit impeachment." rested on these brief positions: that the constitution had Again, he qualifies the power he advocates, and explains conferred upon the President the Executive power; that it thus: "The danger then consists in this: for the Presithe general concession of Executive authority embraced dent can displace from office a man whose merits require removals as well as appointments; that the power granted that he should be continued in it. What will be the mato the Senate, being an exception to this general provi-tives which the President can feel for such abuse of his. sion, ought, therefore, to be construed strictly, and could power, and the restraints to operate to prevent it? In the not be extended beyond the express right (with its neces-first place, he will be impeachable by this House, before sary incidents) of negativing appointments; and, above all, the Senate, for such an act of mal-administration; for I that the President, being bound to "take care that the contend that the wanton removal of meritorious officers laws be faithfully executed," must therefore remove, would subject him to impeachment and removal from his whenever the public interest imperiously requires it. own high trust." Our constitutional lawyer, then, thinks The last position, aided by all the extraneous considera- your President ought to be removed from office, if he tions referred to, was successful. Every reasoner dwelt has acted on the principle avowed by his friends here, apon it as the key-stone of the argument. It was not and says, the kind of power you contend for is above his then contended, by the fathers of the republic, that the conception. This does not seem to work well; and pergeneral grant of Executive power was to be construed haps you may now think our constitutional lawyer, “who alone by the strict specifications of it, subsequently en-understood the constitution and structure of the Governtered in the same instrument. True, our modern rea- ment as well as any man that ever lived," in an error. soners revolt at the thought of extending the powers of Then let us look into the opinions of others, expressed on Mr. Laurence, Congress beyond the specific enumeration of them, by a the same occasion, who were aiding in the establishment general grant of "all legislative power;" and although of this precedent, admired so much. the honorable gentleman from New Hampshire has in-though an advocate of the same power, denied that, acformed us that the friends of this administration, claiming cording to his understanding of it, it was ever to be exerthe authority to remove, in its utmost latitude, need not cised "in a wanton manner, or from capricious motives;" dread the discussion of their right to do so, yet he has, and, with a view to silence the apprehensions of those in this very debate, stoutly denied a construction to the who were alarmed lest it might be exercised without regeneral delegation of power to Congress in the constitu-straint, he put to them the question which had been antion to provide for the general welfare," similar to the swered by Mr. Madison: "Would he (the President) not one placed, in 1789, upon the general delegation of Execu- be liable to impeachment for displacing a worthy and able tive power, "to take care that the laws shall be faithfully man, who enjoyed the confidence of the people?" Mr. executed." Without this latitudinarian interpretation, Vining, on the same side, remarked "that, if the Presi the power of removal would have remained forever, on dent should remove a valuable officer, it would be an act But of tyranny which the good sense of the nation would nethe general principle, in the President and Senate. it was not urged, in 1789, by any man, that this construc- ver forget." Such were the views of all the prominent tive power was unlimited and absolute; on the contrary, advocates of this right, at that time. Do I go an inch, gauging it by the strict standard of the rule which de- then, beyond your own authority, when I infer, from the fined while it conferred it, they declared that it was gi- opinions of the very men upon whose judgment you now ven to the President only for the purpose of "securing a build, that the system of removing meritorious officers, faithful execution of the laws," as an incident to his great before the regular expiration of their terms of service, prerogative to preside over his country for his country's for either personal or party motives, is hostile to the spigood. They pointed out the very cases for its proper ex- rit of the constitution, an "impeachable mal-administraercise: they said it was necessary to remove a traitor from tion" of the Government, and a "tyrannical" encroachoffice, "to secure a faithful execution of the laws:" they But when we trace the history of the same bill in its urged that an officer who should become insane, corrupt, disabled, or in any manner, or by any means, unfaithful progress through the Senate, it seems not to admit of a or disqualified to serve the public to the public advantage, doubt that, but for the extraordinary concurrence of exought to be, and was, of right, removable, in order to traneous circumstances then co-operating to produce this secure a faithful execution of the laws:" and, having thus construction, the right of removal would never have been measured and marked down the length, breadth, and the recognized. While that bill was under consideration in depth, of the whole principle recognized by them, they this House, on the 18th July, 1789, a motion was made doubtless little expected that any opinion given, or pre- to strike out of the clause, implying the existence of the cedent set by them, would ever be adduced to sanction right, the words "by the President of the United States;" The the object of which was to deny that right altogether. the exercise of uncontrolled and despotic power. ment on the liberties of the people? suppose that honorable gentleman from Tennessee, who has filled the The Senate then sat with closed doors, and we have no office of a judge with great credit to himself, says, that account of the discussion. But we see from the records he loves precedents; and, having informed us that Mr. how the vote stood. Mr. Madison's constitutional opinMadison understood the constitution and structure of our ions were then unpopular in Virginia, as being too latituGovernment as well as any man that ever lived," holds dinarian; in consequence of which he had lost his election up the Congressional Register of that day, points to the to the Senate, that State being, at the period referred to, opinion of that able statesman there given, and triumph- represented here by William Grayson and Richard Henry Both those gentlemen voted against the power, and antly announces that there we may see his doctrines, and Lee. there his constitutional lawyer. Sir, we may venture in favor of the motion to strike out; and I here, I think, to meet the gentleman on his own grounds. the doctrine of strict constructions of Executive power I say, too, that, like others from the schools of forensic was at that time, as it often since has been, the prevailing disputation, I love precedents; and that Mr. Madison, on sentiment of the State. Georgia, South Carolina, and this subject, is also my constitutional lawyer. But then, New Hampshire, were all united against the power, and when I like the opinion of a constitutional lawyer so well, they were supported by Johnson, of Connecticut, and I take the whole, and not merely a part of it. I do not Maclay, of Pennsylvania. Among the friends of the mogratuitously reject one-half of it, while I rely so much up- tion we find Johnson, Few, of Georgia, Butler, of South on the other. I read from the same volume, Mr. Madi- Carolina, and Langdon, of New Hampshire, who had all son's words, uttered on that same occasion, that "the been members of the Federal Convention. Nine voted for VOL. VI.-30 SENATE.] Mr. Foot's Resolution. [MARCH 4, 1830. the striking out, and nine against it; and Mr. Adams, the his to get laws repealed, or the constitution altered to exVice President, having given a casting vote in favor of the tend his powers and prerogatives, under pretext of adpower, the words were retained. So the honorable gen-vancing the public good, and gradually render the Governtleman from Tennessee will perceive that he owes the ment a despotism. This seems to be according to the whole of his favorite precedent at last to that same "elder course of human affairs, and what may be expected from Adams," the "tendencies of whose opinions" were, if we the nature of things." The views of Mr. Adams on this are to rely on his friend from New Hampshire, "to con- subject appear to have been different from those of any solidation and monarchy." I do not call his attention to other man who participated in the decisions of 1789, of this fact, however, because I concur in any of these sweep-which we have any information now, as well as from those ing denunciations of that great patriot. The same ques- of the Federal Convention itself. tion arose again in the Senate on the 4th of August, 1789, It is true that Washington exercised this power during on a motion to strike out of the bill "to establish an Ex-his administration. The gentleman from Tennessee proecutive Department, to be denominated the Department duced nine cases as the result of his industrious researches, of War," the words, "and who, whenever the said prin- which had occurred during the whole eight years in which cipal officer shall be removed from office by the President Washington presided, to justify the hundreds which have of the United States;" and again, on the same day, pend-been made in the first year of this administration. But in ing the bill "to provide for the government of a territory every instance, Washington's removals were made (and it Northwest of the Ohio," which contained a clause re- will not be denied) only when necessary for the pubcognizing the right to remove the Governor of the terri-lic good, exactly complying with the rule which had tory. Similar decisions followed in each of these cases; been established. In announcing the exercise of this right so that the question was, within three weeks, thrice decided to the Senate, he used the word "superseded" instead of here; and these decisions form the grounds upon which removed," or "dismissed," which were subsequently the power, under its proper constitutional restraints, has adopted by his successors. But whether he did or did not ever since been claimed for the Executive. These facts, consider the removals as provisional, and dependent on I submit, leave not a shadow of a doubt that, without the the future action of the Senate, we have no distinct inforinfluence which the character of the Father of his Coun-mation. On all occasions he manifested the highest retry was calculated to produce upon the minds of the Sen-spect for its concurrent powers in the business of Execu ators, many of whom were his old compatriots and most tive appointment, and prescribed a duty for a President, intimate friends, and without the powerful co-operation of which has certainly not been regarded as such by one of Mr. Adams, the decisions would have been different. his successors, when, in his message of the 9th of FebruaUnder such circumstances, I would pause to inquire whe- ry, 1790, containing a few nominations to supply vacancies ther it is reasonable to suppose that the understanding of which had been temporarily filled in the recess, he says, those Senators, who so established this power, was, that "these appointments will expire with your present ses the President, upon whom it was conferred, was to exer- sion, and, indeed, ought not to endure longer than until cise it without limitation? Is it probable that uncontrol- others can be regularly made." led and absolute authority would have been acknowledged The gentleman from Tennessee informed us of twentythen, and that, too, by a body of men whose patriotism three cases in which Mr. Jefferson had removed; and then and devotion to the cause of liberty have never been sur-read, to justify the immense proscription now made, his passed? answer of the 12th July, 1801, to a remonstrance of the The opinions of Mr. Adams, on this subject, are proba- committee of the merchants of New Haven, on the apbly in a great measure attributable to a belief which he pointment of Samuel Bishop to the office of collector at had indulged, in opposition to the Federal Convention, that New Haven, then lately vacated by the death of David the power of the Senate, in regard to appointments, ought Austin. That letter was doubtless written under some exto have been entrusted to "a council selected by the Pre-citement, caused by the memorial itself; and the fame of sident himself at his pleasure"-in fact, a mere privy Mr. Jefferson is rescued from the imputation now attemptcouncil, without the authority to check him. He thought ed to be cast upon it by better evidence. Yet even in that the people would be jealous that the influence of the this answer, he places his removal upon the ground that it Senate, if it were entrusted with appointments, would was for the public good, and to secure the necessary co"be employed to conceal, connive at, and defend, guilt in operation with the Government; expressly stating, too, Executive officers, instead of being a guard and watch that his general object was to remedy the very evil now com upon them, and a terror to them." These opinions are plained of. "During the late administration,” says he, disclosed in a correspondence which took place between the whole offices of the United States were monopolizhim and Roger Sherman, in the summer of 1789. With ed by a sect." He considered that the former incumbents these opinions, thus known to have been entertained by had been appointed merely for party and personal 2 ggranhim at the very time when he decided by his casting vote, dizement, and not for the public welfare. Try the prehe went far, we now find, to destroy the rights of the Sen- sent abuses of power by the standard of that letter, and ate, and to reduce it to a mere privy council, without any you find yourselves standing on the very doctrine which effective power. In that correspondence Mr. Sherman, he repudiated, and the deleterious effects of which he who had been a member of the convention, urged against says he endeavored to correct. "I shall correct the prosuch opinions the views of that convention, which ought to cedure; but, that done, return with joy to that state of have been decisive in favor of the rights of the Senate. things when the only question concerning a candidate "But," said he, "if the President was left to select a shall be, Is he honest?- -is he capable?--is he faithful to council for himself, though he may be supposed to be ac- the constitution?" The last administration removed no man tuated by the best motives, yet he would be surrounded for party motives, before the regular expiration of his by flatterers, who would assume the character of friends term, and even went beyond the line prescribed by Mr. and patriots, though they had no attachment to the public Jefferson, by regularly re-appointing political opponents good, no regard to the laws of their country, but, influ- when their offices had expired. You now rest, therefore, enced wholly by self-interest, would wish to extend the on the principles which Mr. Jefferson attributed to the power of the Executive in order to increase their own; they would often advise him to dispense with laws that should thwart their schemes, and in excuse plead that it was done from necessity to promote the public good: they will use their own influence, induce the President to use elder Adams, and your policy, as avowed here by the Senator from New Hampshire, does not "follow up the doctrines of the great revolution of 1800." This con struction of the answer to the New Haven remonstrance makes Mr. Jefferson consistent with himself. In his let MARCH 4, 1830.] Mr. Fool's Resolution. [SENATE. It may be ter to Mr. Gerry, of the 29th March, 1801, he says: "Oftry, and rendered conspicuous its rulers. These are the ficers who have been guilty of gross abuses of office, sentiments of a friend; they are the feelings, if I know such as marshals packing juries, &c. I shall now remove, my own heart, of an undissembled patriot." as my predecessors ought in justice to have done. The said, sir, that this constitutional lawyer has since abaninstances will be few, and guided by strict rule, and not doned these views as unsound. But I ask, when? Why, as party passion. The right of opinion shall suffer no inva- late as May, 1824, he maintained the same moral and son from me. Those who have acted well have nothing mental elevation, confirming the same opinions, and imto fear, however they may have differed from me in opi- printing them more deeply by the increased authoritative nion." In other parts of his correspondence we see the sanction of his own great name. In a letter to the Honorsame view taken of his constitutional power. On the 6thable George Kremer, of that date, so far from retracting of July, 1802, in a letter to David Hall, then Governor of them, he says, "my advice to the President was, that he Delaware, hic acknowledges the receipt of communica- should act upon principles like these: consider himself tions covering two addresses, the one from a democratic the head of the nation, not of a party; that he should have republican meeting at Dover, and the other from the around him the best talents the country could afford, withgrand and general juries of the circuit court of the United out regard to sectional divisions; and should, in his selecStates, both of them praying a removal of Allen McLane, tion, seek after men of probity, virtue, capacity, and the father of our present minister to England, from the firmness; and, in this way, he would go far to eradicate office of collector of the customs at Wilmington. It appears those feelings which, on former occasions, threw so many that Mr. McLane was objected to by them, on the ground obstacks in the way of Government, and be enabled perof personal dislike, and for the alleged warmth of his fe-haps to unite a people heretofore politically divided." deral opinions. Mr. Jefferson, in this letter, replying to Those who delight to view the result of the last Presidenthose addresses, refuses to remove the incumbent for such tial election as a verdict rendered by the people on an reasons, "lest he should bring a just censure on his ad-issue joined, can best inform us how far these sentiments ministration." He says, "we are not acting for ourselves and constitutional opinions should be viewed as having alone, but for the whole human race. We must not, by formed a part of that issue, and how far they were sancany departure from principle, dishearten the mass of our tioned by the then expression of popular approbation. fellow-citizens." He then lays down the very principle These opinions and precedents of great constitutional on which this power can be constitutionally and properly lawyers lead us to other reflections upon the general exexercised. "If Colonel McLane has done any act incon-pediency of the two doctrines, and the probable reasoning sistent with his duty as an oflicer, or as an agent of this ad- of those who made our constitution. By the old articles ninistration, this would be legitimate ground for inquiry, of confederation, the power of appointment was vested in into which I should consider myself free to enter." He Congress. Under the present constitution, the same power takes a distinction between refusing to appoint a political was transferred to the President and Senate. The House opponent, and removing him during his term, the last of of Representatives, chosen biennially, was not entrusted with which he refuses to do: thus leaving your thousand re-any portion of this important power. Why not? Honormovals from the Post Office and other Departments of the able gentlemen have strongly pressed the importance of Government under the full reprobation of the "doctrines what they call the principle of rotation or change in office, of 1801," upon which you have attempted to justify them. to comply with the popular will. The House of RepreThe next President, whose removals were referred to sentatives being entirely subject to the mutability of poby the gentleman from Tennessee, was Mr. Madison, our pular opinion, would be most apt to change with every "constitutional lawyer," under whose opinions we have popular breeze, and give effect to that opinion. Did this. already seen there is no shelter to be found for this ad- escape the intellects of the fathers of the republic? Sir, ministration. Then came Mr. Monroe, who not only dis-if we are to accredit their contemporaneous expositions of avowed such policy as is now pursued, but practised poli- the constitution, and the very writings which procured tical tolerance in its widest signification. H. had a great its ratification, their reason for not investing the Repreconstitutional lawyer to advise him--one whose precepts sentatives with this power, was to prevent the removal of ought to be now adhered to, even as strongly as the gen- valuable officers with every popular change, and to give tleman from Tennessee grasped those of Mr. Madison. stability to the administration of the Government. That constitutional lawyer, sir, was Andrew Jackson, over, when the gentleman from New Hampshire states whose advice on any question should not be slightingly here, that the saine political causes which induce the passed over by the gentleman from Tennessee, and espe- people to change their Chief Magistrate, should operate cially when we are considering the special force and effi- upon all the subordinates, agents, and deputies, he forgets cacy of the second section of this article in the constitution. that the popular attention never is, and never can be, On the 12th of November, 1816, before Mr. Monroe's while absorbed by the consideration of the merits and election had been officially announced, he gives this mag-demerits of contending candidates for the first office in nanimous view of the duties of a Chief Magistrate: "In their gift, sufficiently diverted to decide upon all the offievery selection, party and party feelings should be avoid-cers in the country. In a State or a small Territory, where ed. Now is the time to exterminate that monster, called the people know all their officers, they may act with a party spirit. By selecting characters most conspicuous view to them. But hundreds of thousands voted, during for their probity, virtue, capacity, and firmness, without the last great political contest, for men politically opany regard to party, you will go far to, if not entirely, posed to officers whom they had never seen, and of whom cradicate, those feelings which on former occasions threw they knew nothing--nay, to their dearest friends, whom so many obstacles in the way of Government, and perhaps they neither wished nor expected should be removed. have the pleasure and honor of uniting a people hereto- You cannot justify your course, then, by saying it is the fore politically divided. The Chief Magistrate of a great popular will, and especially when your President, with and powerful nation should never indulge in party feeling. his election in full view, and with a knowledge of the His conduct should be liberal and disinterested, always effect of the sentiment on the public, told us that "the bearing in mind that he acts for the whole, and not a part Chief Magistrate of a great and powerful nation should of the community. By this course, you will exalt the na-never indulge in party feeling.' Under such circumtional character, and acquire for yourself a name as im-stances, is it not fair to conclude that, if his election must perishable as monumental marble. Consult no party in be regarded as any expression of popular will, in regard your choice: pursue the dictates of that unerring judg- to subordinate officers, that will was in favor of his senment which has so long and so often benefited our coun- timent, and against the indulgence of party feeling to More SENATE.] Mr. Foot's Resolution. [MARCH 4, 1830. office, and B nominated to supply the vacancy, were only our consent asked on the appointment of B, we might possibly, adopting his construction, vote, ay; when, if we are asked whether we would advise as well as consent to the appointment, we might answer, "no, we know a thousand better men, though we do not think the noWe think the man removed is remove them. Still I admit that, although the great mass fined to the question of the fitness or unfitness of the perof the nation know little, and care less, in the election of son nominated to succeed. Now, if A be removed from a President, about the qualifications of inferior officers, yet they have in recent practice been too much guided in their choice by the hopes of Executive patronage, and the love of office. And it is time to lay before them the true principles of their constitution, which teach that, for the gratification of personal ambition, or the mere elevation of a party, for private pique or for personal vengeance, for minee absolutely unfit. the free exercise of the right of opinion, for hatred or for a better man." It is said, however, that we must restrict favoritism, or for any other cause than to secure a faithful our advice to the nomination before us, and that, if we discharge of public service for the public good, Executive go beyond that, it is advice unasked. I answer that even power cannot be legitimately exercised; and shall now and if I am, as his adviser, to consult the interests of the Preforever after be effectually and fearlessly restrained. The sident alone, I cannot always know whether B will really expectants for "dead men's shoes" will then disappear. suit his purposes, until I learn why A has been removed, The elective franchise will be restored to its pristine pu- and thus ascertain what his purposes are. He may be derity. Executive patronage will no longer teach us at the ceived either in the character or qualifications of his nopolls that "power over a man's support is power over his minee; and we knowing, perhaps, more about them than will;" and the action of our Government will, by thus the President, if bound to look to his interests alone, cleansing the very spring from which it flows, become, ought to advise him of his error. Is it our object to adhenceforth, refined, healthful, and vigorous. But if these vise him to appoint such persons as will aggrandize himprinciples be now disregarded, despised, and prostrated, self, or sustain his party? He may have recommended our people will be converted into office hunters, the con- one of the opposite party to supply the vacancy created test for power will be everywhere conducted without refer- by the removal of his own party man. With a view to ence to principle, the elective franchise will sink under his interest, then, as his adviser, we ought, I suppose, to the influence of personal hopes and personal fears, uni- tell him so. Well, I inform him of it, and he tells me, in versal corruption will be substituted for that virtue with- reply, that he knew that, but has dismissed his old friend out which a republic cannot exist; and at the expiration because he has lost his influence. Then, if I know it to of every four years the tumult will swell, and the venality be a fact that his nominee has lost his influence too, I will fester, until, the depravity of the whole system of should tell him so; should I not? How, then, even acgovernment being no longer tolerable, disgusted and cording to the views of those who think the President is dispirited by the complete failure of our attempt at self- to consult his own pleasure, can we be faithful advisers, government, we shall sink into the arms of the first Cæsar without asking, in our confidential way, here, what that who shall be willing to strike a mortal blow at the liber-pleasure is, or ferreting out the causes of his removals? ties of his country. Let me not be told, then, that the On the other hand, if I am to advise with an eye single to most sacred of our constitutional privileges is to become the public good, which I take to be my true standard, I the victim of any slovenly draughtsman of a commission or ought not to advise him to appoint B when I know that A, a statute, confounding Executive power with Executive whom he has removed, and can re-appoint, is a better man pleasure. By the paramount law of the land, a President for the office. Is it not then expedient for us, nay, is it not can officially know no pleasure but the people's interest; sometimes absolutely necessary to the proper discharge of and when you suffer him to sink the officer in the man, our advisory duties, to learn why our servants have been you violate its simplest and most salutary restrictions. dismissed? And if so, where is the clause in the constituWith this view of the duties of a Chief Magistrate, and tion which limits us in the exercise of these duties? If of his constitutional power, it must occur that, as his we have, as gentlemen say, no constitutional right to inauthority to remove can be exercised only for cause, quire into the causes of these removals, we have no power there must be some tribunal to inquire into and ascertain to investigate the propriety of the appointments to fill vacanthat cause. I regard this right, though denied by the cies; for the first of these principles being conceded, the gentleman from Tennessee, as a necessary incident of the other will flow as a consequence from the concession. advisory power of the Senate. We know well that there This makes the President independent of the Senate in is a great dividing line between us in this body. One his appointing power, and of course of any other tribunal party here denies our constitutional right to put such established by the constitution. And the Senator from troublesome questions or to test any part of the ground- New Hampshire has reminded us, in discussing another work of our " great and glorious reform." We want to topic of this debate, that Mr. Jefferson's "axiom of eterlearn a little of the rationale of this operation. We have nal truth in politics" was, "that whatever power in any been all along, as you tell us, benighted and in the dark. Government is independent, is absolute also." I appreGive us light, then, we say. We consider ourselves hend, too, that this new restrictive construction of our bound to advise the Chief Magistrate in his appointments. constitutional duties differs entirely from that adopted by We are not restricted to a mere expression of consent to, all our predecessors. True, their Executive records or dissent from, his nomination. We may, ay, must, go show that the subject has not been moved on every nomifarther. If you ask me whether I will consent to a choice nation; yet the right to exercise the power appears not to which you alone can make, I may answer, yes. But have been denied before: and those records show us that if you ask me whether I will advise you so to choose, the Senate has often inquired into the propriety of nomimight point you to a better. The words advice and nations, and of removals also. When Robert Purdy meconsent are not synonymous-their meaning is essen-morialized this body on the 15th of January, 1822, repretially different. Consent is the mere agreement of the senting, as he did, that his removal from the army had mind to what is proposed by another. Advice ordinarily been improperly made, and even charging, expressly, implies the recommendation of some opinion, or the offer- that favoritism, with the President, had superseded the ing of some information worthy to be weighed and act- claims of merit," the Senate, instead of deciding against ed upon by another. The gentleman from Tennessee, their own power, or branding it as inquisitorial, appointed expressing an opinion current, as we all know, among his a committee to investigate the whole subject; and on the political friends here, denies the constitutional right of 13th of April afterwards, they, by resolution, called for the Senate to examine into and judge of the propriety of the report of the board of general officers, upon which removals from office, and declares that our power is con- the reduction and new arrangement of the army had been 66 |