difficulties; but, after a crisis lasting over a week, Signor Bonomi, a former Socialist and Minister of War, succeeded in assuring himself of a majority among the groups of the Centre and the Moderate Left. His Cabinet excludes the reactionary elements which provoked the last general elections; and consequently the three parties of the Right-the Nationalists, the Fascisti, and the Democratic Liberals, supporters of Signor Giolitti—have passed into opposition. No sooner had the new Government been formed than intrigues were begun to overthrow it. The most formidable was an anti-clerical move made by the Democrats, who sought a more powerful combination including a large Liberal element, and directed against the presence of several Catholics in the Government. For a moment it seemed as if the days of the Bonomi Cabinet were numbered. But the Socialists scented the Liberal danger and detected the intrigues for the formation of a new national Bloc. When, therefore, the new combination agreed with the finding of the Electoral Board confirming the election of an ex-Minister under Signor Giolitti, the Socialists at once sided with the Catholics and defeated the Liberal- Democrats by twenty votes. This and other failures afforded ample evidence that the Bonomi Government could not easily be replaced, and that any further endeavour to precipitate a crisis would be to play an unpatriotic game.

If the Chamber appeared to be hesitating in its support of Signor Bonomi, there was no doubt that the country generally was with him. At the very outset he took a firm stand against all the factions which were trying to undermine the authority of the State. Fascist violence tried to show its head again, but the action of the Government was prompt. On July 21 about a thousand Fascisti organised a 'punitive expedition' to avenge the death of two of their comrades, alleged to have been hung by the Communists of Sarzana near Spezia. They were, however, met by a large force of Carabinieri, which had been summoned to preserve order, and were obliged to beat a hasty retreat, after leaving 27 killed and many wounded.

Two days after this incident, the Bonomi Cabinet emerged triumphant with a majority of 166 on a vote of confidence taken before the summer recess. The

ig concluding words of the Premier on this occasion were: eed 'We bind ourselves to accomplish the task of reconps struction and pacification, and we ask of the Chamber whether we have enough force, enough energy, and enough authority to carry that task through.' In applauding this sentiment the Chamber was conscious that it was responding to the will of the nation. in Whether the Bonomi Government will survive the session of Parliament that has just begun (1921) will I largely depend on its ability to terminate the FascistSocialist feud, which is a constant menace to the internal peace of the country. Through the Premier's own initiative and the direct intervention of Signor de Nicola, the Speaker, peace between the two factions was signed at the beginning of August 1921; but soon afterwards several important Fascist groups refused to abide by the terms of the agreement a defection which brought about the resignation from the Central Executive Committee of the Fasci of Benito Mussolini, the idolised Fascist leader and editor of the Fascist organ, 'Il Popolo d'Italia.' Mussolini has been regarded as the symbol of national regeneration for which Fascism stood, at best, in its idealistic significance. His resignation, therefore, meant the defeat of the nobler elements of Fascism and the triumph of the undisciplined turbulence of the more or less organised groups whose only bond of coherence is the exercise of force.

Another factor making for the continuation of Italy's internal crisis is the resolution adopted by the Socialist Party Congress at Milan in October 1921, by which the traditional policy of Italian Socialism not to collaborate with a bourgeois Government will be maintained. One of the main incentives in the minds of the signatories of the peace between the Fascisti and the Socialists was the growing movement among the latter towards collaboration. Prominent Socialist leaders, like Turati, Modigliani, Treves, and D'Aragona, are of opinion that this abstention from Government is doing harm to the Socialist cause, and should be given up. Mussolini and other Fascist leaders of the more balanced type are also of the opinion that the interests of the nation demand that the Socialists take a share in the Government. Thus for the moment the vote of the Milan

Congress has wrecked the hope of bringing the bourgeois and proletarian classes together in the government of the country-a hope that prompted the signing of the Socialist-Fascist peace.

Despite, however, Serrati's second victory at Milan, nine months after his first at Leghorn, Socialist participation in the Government has not been ruled out completely. The Labour Confederation is becoming growingly hostile to the Communist Party and the Third International; and Serrati may yet discover that his policy is leading to a catastrophic revolution which Italian Labour is now determined at all costs to avoid. Another ground of hope is the present widespread belief in Italy in the necessity of the rehabilitation of State authority, which means of course the disintegration of the Fascist movement. The essence of Fascism is the usurpation of the powers of the State by an organised faction within the State. Although the majority of the Fascisti have been and still are animated by the best of patriotic motives, their ardour has blinded them to the fact that their methods lead straight to anarchy. Reconstruction at home and prestige abroad cannot be secured by the aimless activities of an organisation largely inspired by a desire to discredit Parliament. As for the Fascisti themselves, they know that their power is on the wane. Manifestoes, demonstrations, and violent attempts to reduce the cost of living have been some of the means recently employed by the Fascist leaders to win back popular favour. But it is too late. The nation has lost its confidence in Fascism, and is once more looking to its own Constitutional Government for salvation.

VINCENT BUGEJA.

Art. 11.-RUSSIAN DIPLOMACY BEFORE THE WAR.

1. Diplomatische Aktenstücke zur Geschichte der Entente. politik der Vorkriegsjahre. Herausg. von B. von Siebert, ehemaliger Sekretär der Kaiserlich-Russischen Botschaft in London. Berlin & Leipzig: De Gruyter, 1921.

2. Aus den Geheim-Archiven des Zaren; ein Beitrag zur Frage nach den Urhebern des Weltkrieges. Von M. Pokrowski, Volkskommissar für Schul- und Bildungswesen in Moskau. Berlin: Scherl, 1919.

3. Kriegsursachen: Beiträge zur Erforschung der Ursachen des Europäischen Krieges mit spezieller Berücksichtigung Russlands und Serbiens. Von Dr M. Boghitschewitsch, ehemaligem Serbischen Geschäftsträger in Berlin. Zürich: Füssli, 1919.

THOSE who have occupied themselves in investigating the causes of the war will know that a peculiar importance attaches to the actions and wishes of the Russian Government; and it is on this point that the controversy, which is being continually kept alive in Germany, especially turns. It is not merely the general mobilisation of the Russian forces at the end of July, but the whole course of Russian policy during the previous years, which has to be considered. The case, as put by the more responsible German writers, is that, while it may doubtless be true that Sir Edward Grey did not himself desire war, he allowed himself by the Entente with Russia to be entangled into a position in which it was within the power of the Russian Government at any time to provoke a war, from which, when it had once begun, Great Britain could not stand aloof. This criticism has received influential support here, as for instance from Lord Loreburn; and it is one which cannot be neglected by any one who wishes to get at the real truth. It might quite well be that the British Government, while honestly using every method to keep peace, had put itself in a position in which all its efforts were necessarily frustrated. In these circumstances, anything which will throw light upon Russian policy in the years before the war is important.

Of such revelations we have had many. One of the

first acts of the new Bolshevik Government, after the Revolution of November 1917, was to publish in the pages of the 'Pravda' selections from the secret documents which they had found in the archives of the Russian Foreign Office. The object was avowedly to persuade the world that the responsibility of the war rested not merely with the German Government, but with those of all the nations of Europe, and to stir up public feeling against the capitalist system, of which war, as they represented, was the inevitable outcome. Since that time these disclosures have been the basis and text of nearly all that has been written on the origins of the war by critics of the Allies. Here was to be found, as it seemed, a convenient escape from the charge that the sole responsibility rested upon Germany. Even if the adverse view generally taken of the acts and motives of the former German Government were maintained, it was something if it could be shown that they were not alone in their crimes and in their blunders.

The importance of this aspect of the controversy was increased by the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, for in it the sole responsibility of Germany for the war is asserted; and this is made the basis on which the demands of the reparation chapter are justified. Anything therefore is seized on by the German Government and the German nation which will tend to alter this view; and the German case on Responsibilities, as presented to the Conference, was largely based on these Russian documents.

It is much to be regretted that it has always been impossible to procure a complete and systematic collection of all the papers originally published by the Bolsheviks. We have had to depend on the quotations and selections made in controversial writings. It was, however, from the beginning quite obvious that these formed very unsatisfactory material on which to base an historical judgment. They were merely isolated documents chosen for propaganda purposes out of a great mass of material; and any one who has studied these matters knows how misleading any conclusion may be unless one has the whole correspondence before him. For this reason we welcome a new and important publication, which appeared during the summer of last