local pilots; and by raising the buoys and putting out the lights it has become impracticable even with them. Under these circumstances, the approach to Jahde, where the Prussian fleet lies, became impracticable to the French fleet; and though it might possibly have bombarded some of the commercial ports in the Baltic, to which access was not so difficult, as it had no troops to land, no object would have been gained by such an operation at all adequate to the risk or to compensate for the indignation such an act would have excited. It is true, no doubt, that the mouth of the Thames might, to some extent, be protected by the same means; but if we withdrew the Nore light, and raised the buoys, we should debar all ingress and egress from Chatham and Sheerness, and so deprive ourselves of the use of the only naval establishments we possess in the North Seas; while above Sheerness the navigation of the Thames is easy to any one familiar with the river, with or without buoys. On the other hand, the argument in no way applies to such harbours as Portsmouth, Portland, Plymouth, and Milford Haven. In all these the water is so deep, the course so straight, and the landmarks so unmistakable, that no captain would hesitate to run his vessel in, at high water, without any other pilotage than his own crew ought easily to afford. These places must, therefore, for their defence depend on their active means of offence, and on that only; and their defences being in the backward state they now are in, is consequently a source not only of weakness to the fleet, but of danger to the country.

While Parliament has been grudgingly doling out the funds considered necessary in 1860 to put our Dockyards in a decent state of defence, science has been marching onwards with gigantic strides. When the first Commission issued its report, the largest gun in the service was the 68-pounder smooth bore of 95 cwt.; and when the Warrior' was built her armament was intended to consist of these now antiquated pieces, and her armour and that of the French ships of the same period was only intended to resist such shot. Since then the thickness of our armour-plating has increased from 4 inches with backing, to the 12-inch plates and 14-inch backing of the 'Thunderer' and her sister ships; and the guns have been enlarged from 68-pounder smooth bores, to 12inch 25 ton rifle guns, throwing 600 lb. shot with a charge of 70 lbs. of powder, instead of the 16 lbs. of the 'Warrior's' original

armament.

To meet this enormous increase of power and resistance on the part of ships, necessi

tated a corresponding increase in the strength of the structure of the forts and the character of their armament. As it was hopeless, however, to expect any great augmentation of the grant from Parliament, the difficulty was met first by the abandonment of the central arsenal, for the purchase of a site for which 150,000l. had appeared in the Estimates for several years.

Then the eastern defences of Chatham dropped out, and one work after another was either abandoned or so modified as to lead to some saving. The number of guns to be mounted on the sea defences was reduced from 1200 to about 800, and other economies were from time to time effected, frequently, it is feared, at the expense of efficiency, to meet this growing difficulty.*

Although the indifference of the public and the disfavour with which the scheme for fortifying the dockyards has always been regarded by Parliament are, no doubt, the principal causes of the delay which has taken place, still the Engineers are not free from blame in this matter. Naturally they have been most anxious that the works should be as perfect as possible, and there is no doubt that had they been completed three or four years ago, as they might have been, they would have been less perfect than they will be three or four years hence, when it is hoped they may be completed. But in war, as in other affairs, it is often wiser to avail ourselves of the best practicable rather than to wait in the endeavour to obtain the best possible. At all events, when all the plans and estimates were settled and sanctioned in July, 1869, and the last moneys cheerfully-as the Act expresses it-voted, there was no longer any excuse for delay. Contracts ought immediately to have been entered into for all the remaining works, and if they had been pushed forward with vigour during the last eighteen months, our position might have been very different in this respect from what it is now. No doubt, since Parliament rose, shields have been ordered and some may be ready, and guns have been mounted in various directions with or without shields, as the case may be. But many of the most important works-such as those at Spithead,

*It is impossible to state these numbers with anything like precision. So many changes have taken place during the last ten years in the form and number of the works at first proposed, that a correct comparison in this respect between the old scheme and the present one is nearly im; ossible. This reduction in the number of guns was, however, a natural and proper saving, and might probably be carried even further, for the mounted in the forts more than compensated for increased power of the guns proposed to be the diminished number.

blockading squadron at some distance, and | so prevent its boats from fishing them up, or destroy the connecting wires; and even then, without the additional aid of gunboats or armed steam-launches, or some of the smaller fry of the navy, it would be almost impossible to protect these submarine mines efficiently, especially at night. With forts and auxiliary floating-defences, torpedoes might be so arranged as to ensure our harbours against hostile entrance. All this is perfectly well known to the authorities; both at the War Office and the Admiralty every part of the problem has been thought over, and designs are ready for everything, and some half measures adopted; but no Minister has hitherto dared to tell Parliament the whole truth, and ask for money requisite to carry out a complete scheme at once. By spreading the outlay, over a great many years, the Government expects to avoid the certain opposition that would be caused by an immediate demand, and hopes-in these times-that no one will be so unreasonable as to attack us till we are quite ready to receive them!

An American Congress is not generally considered, on this side of the Atlantic, as a model of deliberative assemblies; but, in their exuberant patriotism, they possess at least one virtue in which the British Parliament is lamentably deficient. Nothing so astonished the Western World as the apparently reckless manner in which Congress, during the civil war, authorised loans of millions and hundreds of millions of dollars, almost without even asking for what purposes they were wanted, and never caring to enquire how they were to be repaid. Then, and since that time, the Executive have only to send a message to Congress to say that fifty or one hundred millions of dollars are wanted to put the harbours of the coast in a proper state of defence, or for any other purpose which touches the safety and honour of the country, than they are granted almost without a dissentient vote. The British Parliament, on the other hand, claims as its proudest distinction the title of careful guardian of the national purse, and prides itself more on being the protector of the taxpayer than being the defender of the national interests and honour. Every member, in fact, feels and knows that if he can go to his constituents and boast that he has been instrumental in knocking a million or two off the Navy and Army Estimates, his return is secure. If, on the other hand, he is simple enough to confess that in his conscience he believed an increase was indispensable, he must hand over his seat to some more economical candidate.'

While this difference exists in the temper of our National Assembly as compared with that of the United States, or of France, or of other nations, we need not be surprised that America sets herself up as her own judge in the case of the Alabama claims, or Russia in that of the treaty of Paris-and that every nation accuses us of imaginary breaches of neutrality or other crimes. They know our parsimony, and our consequent unpreparedness, and feel that they may safely take advantage of it. The truth of the matter seems to be, we have so long been accustomed to consider the Channel as a complete and sufficient protection against invasion, that it is impossible to bring the national mind to believe that it can be violated. What has lasted and answered for eight centuries, they argue, may be trusted for a good many more, while people of the greatest influence bid us rely on the 'streak of silver sea,' and denounce as alarmists all who try to arouse their countrymen to a sense of their danger.* We are continually told that we have done hitherto without fortifications or a defensive flotilla, and cannot therefore want them now. With very many people a numerous army and a strong fleet seem only a temptation for Government to meddle in foreign politics, and involve the nation in additional and it may prove expensive entanglements. It is in vain to point out to these people that England is only a small part of the British Empire, that India and our colonies are integral parts of the aggregate bearing that name, and that our commerce is as essential to the subsistence of our people, as our farms and our mines. Our fleet has, in fact, other duties to perform besides protecting our shores, and unless they are made sufficiently secure to bear, at least, its temporary absence, we are in infinite danger of a catastrophe. Malta and Gibraltar, for instance, are not so fortified or so armed as to resist an attack of a powerful iron-clad squadron, if left to their own resources, and Parliament has steadily refused the sums requisite for putting them in a state of sufficient defence. With the assistance of the flect they are safe; but defences that require such nursing are sources of weakness rather than of strength, and may lead to a division of naval resources which may be fatal. In attempting to relieve Malta, a squadron de

ed and overpowered as MacMahon was at Wörth, and the victorious fleets combined may be more than a match for what remains to us. The fact is, and no one probably doubts it, that powerful as our present fleet is, we have no such reserve of iron-clad vessels as would enable us to supply the place of those we might be deprived of by a reverse at sea, and no sufficient means of repairing or refitting those that escaped, in anything like the time requisite to place us in a position of safety. It must also be borne in mind that iron-clad vessels cannot be extemporised. Two years are probably the least time in which one of the first class can be built and ready for commission, and even those of the second class require at least twelve months to complete. As wars are now conducted, it will consequently be too late to think of much increase, if any, after the struggle has commenced.

Under these circumstances no one can feel surprise that men are anxiously inquiring what our means of resistance are if an enemy should force our first line of defence by gaining the requisite ascendancy in the Channel. If, for instance, the French or any other equal or nearly equal fleet could be equipped and fitted for sea, more rapidly than ours, or were able to select some time when our fleet was absent and engaged elsewhere, few will doubt that they might, in the present incomplete and unfortified state of our dockyards, convert a temporary ascendancy into a permanent disaster. When the recommendations of the Commission of 1860 are fully carried out-if they ever are -this would not be the case, and the fleet would probably have leisure to resume the superiority, which is assumed as the first condition of the problem, that it now possesses. But in the event of the fleet being overpowered or destroyed, the Channel, instead of being a defence, is practically a means for facilitating the invasion of the country. It is easier to transport men and materials by sea than by rail, it is easier to conceal the knowledge of the point intended to be attacked, and the first blow can consequently be delivered far more suddenly and effectively by sea than by land. But to do this the enemy must feel sure of his naval superiority at sea. Abstractedly it is not true-though so frequently assertedthat steam has bridged the Channel. would of course be so, if the enemy employed steam and we were debarred from its use, but the power of concentrating rapidly our means of defence is an advan

It

party. It may of course be that a larger force could by its means be despatched from Cherbourg, Brest, Antwerp, or Jahde, and more rapidly thrown on our shores by steamers than could be done by Napoleon I.'s flat-bottomed boats from Boulogne and Calais. But in both instances, though the bridge may be formed, a superior fleet will inevitably break it down, and till the attacking party feel sure that they can prevent this being done, the attempt will not be made. In other words, the invasion of this country will not take place till the enemy has such a superiority at sea as will enable him to bring over and land his troops and stores, and allow him time to advance into the country and fight such a decisive battle as may enable him to obtain possession of the capital. During the last great war we had that superiority, and, if we had had the men, could at any time after the battle of Trafalgar have landed an army on any part of the French coast we chose, and have maintained its communications with its base for any time that was required. If the conditions as to the command at sea were reversed, it is evident any other power might do the same by us. If, however, the invader is cut off from his base before he has time to effect the main object of the campaign, his army, however powerful at first, would almost certainly be worn out by degrees, and, unless we were more pusillanimous than it is hoped we are, must eventually be compelled to surrender as prisoners of

war.

In order to understand such a problem as the invasion of England, of which no actual experience exists, it is necessary to assume some hypothetical data which shall represent the facts of the case as nearly as possible. Any one may make such additions or deductions from these assumptions as in his judgment may be required, but it is necessary to state them in order to be intelligible. Let us assume therefore that for some reason or other Prussia had agreed to accept the now famous Benedetti Secret Treaty. No one understood better than the Emperor Napoleon, that the invasion of Belgium meant war with England, and we by our declarations in Parliament at the close of the last session accepted that interpretation. This being so the 300,000 men who in July last were available for the invasion of Germany, were equally so for a British Belgic war.

No one probably would be so absurd as to suppose that in the event of this course being determined upon, the French would quietly have marched their army to Brussels