country, and might still more complicate the existing difficulties in that region. That this Government was doing all in its power to prevent the departure of unlawful warlike expeditions for Nicaragua, and hoped to succeed. That Lord Napier had informed me, a similar measure had been adopted by the British Government, and I had explained to his Lordship the serious objections to it, which were entertained by the United States, arising not only out of general considerations connected with the condition of the Isthmian States, and the peculiar interest the United States had in their progress and condition, but out of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, which would be violated by such a proceeding on the part of Great Britian. "I remarked to M. de Sartiges that the United States would regret to learn that any concerted arrangements have been agreed on by Great Britain and France, in relation to those regions. That tho' France was no party to the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, nor bound by its stipulations, and we could not object to her right to guard her interests there, still the position which had been taken by this country against European interference was well known and had become a part of our established policy, and that any concert of action looking to the control of the Isthmus or to a protectorate, as this would be supposed to be, would be peculiarly unacceptable here. That I hoped no action would take place, for if it did it would produce great excitement in this country, and could not fail to call for the attention of the Government. I requested M. de Sartiges to communicate these views to Count Walewski and also to express the hope that the contemplated measure might yet be stopped." In an instruction to Mr. Lamar, No. 20, March 4, 1859, animadverting upon the non-ratification of the Cass-Yrisarri treaty by Nicaragua, General Cass complained that preference had been given by Nicaragua to a similar treaty with Great Britain. In this relation, Gen. Cass said: "The provision which is contained in the article of the British treaty, No. 22, as transmitted by you, which requires the United States to prevent the fitting out of armed expeditions within our borders to operate against Nicaragua, or to render assistance to any political party in that country, cannot be assented to by this Government. A similar proposal was rejected by the United States when the Cass-Irisarri treaty was negotiated, and was again rejected when proposed by General Jerez as an additional article to the treaty. It involves an offensive doubt whether this government will continue to execute in good faith the neutrality laws of the United States, although such laws have been in existence since the administration of Washington, and have always been scrupulously enforced." (MS. Inst. Am. States, XVI. 32.) In a later instruction, No. 22, April 1, 1859, General Cass directed Mr. Lamar, if, on receipt of the dispatch, the Nicaraguan Congress had adjourned without ratifying the Cass-Yrisarri treaty, or should have ratified it with the obnoxious additional article on neutrality, or if, the Congress still being in session, the treaty should not be ratified without this obnoxious article within two weeks after the receipt of the despatch, to demand his passports and return home. The Nicaraguan Government was to be informed of this and also of the fact that unless its whole course towards the United States was at once changed and reasonable redress made for injuries to citizens of the United States, the President would regard all peaceful negotiations with Nicaragua as at an end and recommend to Congress to seek redress by force. (MS. Inst. Am. States, XVI. 36.) Before this instruction was written. Mr. Lamar had concluded a treaty with Nicaragua which was a transcript of the Cass-Yrisarri treaty, with the addition of the modifications which Nicaragua had proposed. Mr. Lamar stated that his motive for so doing was that Sir W. Gore Ouseley had adopted these very modifications, and he thought the United States might on reconsideration accept them, since otherwise no treaty could be made. (MSS. Dept. of State.) As to Walker's expeditions, see Mr. Cass, Sec. of State, to Mr. Molina, Nicaraguan min., Nov. 26, 1860, MS. Notes to Cent. Am. I. 177. The British Government disapproved the insertion by Sir W. Gore Ouseley, in his treaty with Nicaragua, of an engagement on the part of that Government to prevent the organization of filibustering expeditions in British territory against Nicaragua, and declined to ratify the treaty. not only because the article had "no real meaning so far as Great Britain and Nicaragua are concerned, except as a simple concession," but also because it had been used by Nicaragua as the basis of an attempt to require a similar concession from the United States. (Lord J. Russell to Sir C. L. Wyke, Aug. 15, 1859, Cor. in relation to the Proposed Interoceanic Canal, 130; 50 Br. & For. State Papers, 267.) "You will impress upon Count Walewski that we want nothing of Nicaragua which is not honorable to her, and which we have not a fair right to demand. We shall, under no circumstances, abandon the determination that the transit routes across the Isthmus shall be kept open and safe for all commercial nations." (Mr. Cass, Sec. of State, to Mr. Mason, Apr. 12, 1859, MS. Inst. France, XV. 412.) With regard to the proposal of arbitration, it may be stated that it was suggested by Lord Clarendon to Mr. Buchanan in a conversation in November 1854. Mr. Buchanan, in reply, "playfully observed that it would now be difficult to find an impartial umpire, as they had gone to war with our arbitrator, the Emperor of Russia." The subject was again mentioned by Lord Clarendon a year later, when Mr. Buchanan made the same reply. Neither Mr. Buchanan nor his Government regarded Lord Clarendon's remarks as intended to convey a formal offer of arbitration; and it appears that Mr. Crampton, who had been directed to make such an offer, overlooked that part of his instructions and failed to communicate it till the end of February 1856. (Blue Book, Corre spondence with the United States respecting Central America, 1856, 296-303.) The subject was renewed by Mr. Crampton's successor at Washington, Lord Napier, who stated to Mr. Cass officially, although not instructed to do so, that her Majesty's Government "regarded the principle of arbitra tion as the ark of safety for nations differing as to the sense of treaties," and that he did not doubt that his Government "would gladly refer the decision of all controverted points to the decision of any one of the European powers." General Cass, as reported by Lord Napier, answered that he did not repudiate the principle of arbitration on all occasions; he had invoked it, and would do so again where it seemed justly applicable;" but that in the pending matter it was declined by the United States because, in the first place, the language of the treaty was so clear that in his opinion there ought not to be two opinions about it. say black is black," remarked Gen. Cass, "but we think that you say that black is white." Besides, said Gen. Cass, it was a mere question of the interpretation of the English language, concerning which no foreign government was so competent to decide as the United States and We England, who possessed that language in common; and, finally, the Senate of the United States had accepted the treaty in the sense that it stipulated for the absolute withdrawal of all British protectorate or possession in Central America. He had himself separated from some of his party and voted for the measure on that understanding, and on no other would the treaty have had a voice in the Senate or in the country. (Blue Book, Correspondence respecting Central America, 1856–60, 62–63.) 4. ARRANGEMENT OF 1858-1860. § 356. By a convention between Great Britain and Honduras, signed by Sir Charles Lennox Wyke and Señor don Francisco Cruz at Comayagua, November 28, 1859, Great Britain recognized the sovereignty of Honduras over the Bay Islands and over the district occupied by the Mosquito Indians within the frontier of Honduras, whatever that frontier might be. Provision was at the same time made for the preservation of any interests of British subjects by grant, lease, or otherwise, obtained from the Mosquito Indians in lands situated within the district in question, and, in order that this stipulation might be made effective, provision was made for the appointment of a mixed commission to investigate the claims of British subjects arising out of grants, or leases, or otherwise. 49 Brit. & For. State Papers, 13. For a further account of this treaty and the proceedings of the mixed com mission, see Moore, Int. Arbitrations, II. 2106. "Aside from the well understood doctrines of this Government as to any new acquisitions of American territory by European powers, it seems unquestionable that the Clayton-Bulwer treaty precludes the acquisition of those islands by Great Britain. The intentions which are imputed, therefore, to that power, looking in that direction may well be discredited. Still they should awaken the attention and arouse the vigilance of this Government. Even should the tendency you report toward the aliénation of the Bay Islands take another direction, it would, of course, be impossible for us to remain indifferent or to acquiesce in any other European power acquiring any of them." (Mr. Evarts, Sec. of State, to Mr. Logan, Mar. 4, 1880, MS. Inst. Cent. Am. XVIII. 73.) By a convention between Great Britain and Nicaragua, signed by Sir Charles Lennox Wyke and Señor Pedro Zeledon, at Managua, January 28, 1860, Great Britain recognized the sovereignty of Nicaragua over the district occupied by the Mosquito Indians "within the frontier of that republic." The convention looked to the ultimate formal incorporation of the Mosquito Indians into the Republic of Nicaragua, and provided for the preservation of the rights of British subjects to lands within the district under grants or leases from the Mosquito Indians. 50 Brit. & For. State Pap. 96; Moore, Int. Arbitrations, II. 2106. For the Wyke-Aycinena convention between Great Britain and Honduras, signed at Guatemala, April 30, 1859, see Correspondence in relation to the Proposed Interoceanic Canal (Washington, 1885), 294. For an explanation of the failure of Sir William Gore Ouseley's mission, With reference to the mission of Sir C. L. Wyke, see Mr. Cass, Sec. of "Our relations with Great Britain are of the most friendly character. Since the commencement of my Administration the two dangerous questions arising from the Clayton and Bulwer treaty and from the right of search claimed by the British Government have been amicably and honorably adjusted. "The discordant constructions of the Clayton and Bulwer treaty between the two Governments, which at different periods of the discussion bore a threatening aspect, have resulted in a final settlement entirely satisfactory to this Government. In my last annual message I informed Congress that the British Government had not then 'completed treaty arrangements with the Republics of Honduras and Nicaragua in pursuance of the understanding between the two Governments. It is, nevertheless, confidently expected that this good work will ere long. be accomplished.' This confident expectation has since been fulfilled. Her Britannic Majesty concluded a treaty with Honduras on the 28th November, 1859, and with Nicaragua on the 28th August, 1860, relinquishing the Mosquito protectorate. Besides, by the former the Bay Islands are recognized as a part of the Republic of Honduras. It may be observed that the stipulations of these treaties conform in every important particular to the amendments adopted by the Senate of the United States to the treaty concluded at London on the 17th October, 1856, between the two Governments. It will be recollected that this treaty was rejected by the British Government because of its objection to the just and important amendment of the Senate to the article relating to Ruatan and the other islands in the Bay of Honduras." President Buchanan, annual message, Dec. 3, 1860. (Richardson's Messages and Papers, V. 639.) 5. MR. SEWARD'S COURSE. § 357. "It is the policy of the United States Government to keep the Nicaragua transit open to the commerce of the world, and to discourage its interruption by the visionary schemes of adventurers." Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Riotte, No. 60, Sept. 8, 1863, MS. Inst. Am. As to Mr. Seward's action in 1862, with reference to the Panama route, see By Art. XIV. of the Clay-Colindres treaty, between the United States and Honduras, concluded at Comayagua, July 4, 1864, stipulations, similar in terms to those embodied in Art. XXXV. of the treaty of 1846 with New Granada, were made with reference to interoceanic routes in Honduras, and particularly to the way to be constructed by the Honduras Interoceanic Railway Company. The guarantee thus given does not imply "that the United States are to maintain a police or other force in Honduras for the purpose of keeping petty trespassers from the railway." (Mr. Fish, Sec. of State, to Mr. Baxter, min. to Honduras, May 12, 1871, For. Rel. 1871, 581; Mr. Fish, Sec. of State, to Mr. Torbert, min. to Salvador, March 20, 1871, For. Rel. 1871, 691.) "It seems obvious that the renunciation by the parties to this instrument [the Clayton-Bulwer treaty] of a right to acquire Suggestion as to dominion in Central America was intended to prevent Tigre Island. either of them from obtaining control over the proposed ship-canal. At the time the treaty was concluded, there was every prospect that that work would not only soon be begun, but that it would be carried to a successful conclusion. For reasons, however, which it is not necessary to specify, it never was even commenced, and at present there does not appear to be a likelihood of its being undertaken. It may be a question, therefore, supposing that the canal should never be begun, whether the renunciatory clauses of the treaty are to have perpetual operation. "Technically speaking, this question might be decided in the negative. Still, so long as it should remain a question, it would not comport with good faith for either party to do anything which might be deemed contrary to even the spirit of the treaty. "It is becoming more and more certain every day that not only naval warfare in the future, but also all navigation of war vessels in time of peace must be by steam. This necessity will occasion little or no inconvenience to the principal maritime powers of Europe, and especially to Great Britain, as those powers have possessions in various parts of the globe where they can have stores of coal and provisions for the use of their vessels. We are differently situated. We have no possession beyond the limits of the United States. Foreign colonization has never been favored by statesmen in this country either on general grounds, or as in harmony with our peculiar condi |