elaborate business of publicity and uses the press as a branch of her military machine. She sows tares in every neutral field and does her foolish best to creep in by night to the Allied furrows. We have failed to emulate her activity, and perhaps it is as well. England would not be England if she could play that game as adroitly as her enemies. Other Powers may use their press to spread false news and mislead the foe; our traditions of freedom and candour make it difficult for us to follow suit. Our press will never lend itself readily to Government control; but, if it cannot be adapted to cripple the enemy's strength, let us see that neither by sins of omission nor of commission it cripples

our own.

II. IN AMERICA.

ONE thing is abundantly clear to those who have followed the War in the American newspapers-that the British Government appreciates neither the uses nor the dangers of publicity. It knows neither how to direct it nor how it affects national success. It has grasped one elementary fact that certain information must be concealed from the enemy; but beyond that it has not advanced a single step. If there was nothing to be gained by the publication of news but the gratification of curiosity and the allaying of anxiety, the authorities might be right in dropping a veil of mystery over the War. But there are other nations besides the combatants; and to them England looks not only for sympathy, but material and financial aid. The Censorship must be considered as it affects these, as well as the belligerent Powers.

Hitherto, the Government has been singularly fortunate in its relations with the United States. There the British and French raised an enormous loan. They induced the bankers, against strong opposition from the pro-German financiers, to advance $500,000,000 upon no more specific security than the Allies' promises to pay. Moreover, it is not at all unlikely that before long recourse will be made again to the coffers of Wall Street. Again, it is to the United States that the Allies, and Great Britain as much as any of them, are looking for

the supplies of munitions, of clothing, of draft animals, of drugs, and of all the innumerable commodities, without which the conflict could not be carried on for a month. From the United States Europe is drawing more than its ordinary quantity of grain and raw materials for the support of its armies in the field; yet against the United States Great Britain is using her great naval power and enforcing justifiable, but to the American shipper none the less galling, supervision over foreign trade.

Common prudence, then, should impel the British Government to see that its side of the great argument is properly set forth in America, and, to use an Americanism, that the Allies put up a good front.' Such news should be cabled across the Atlantic as would hearten their friends and induce confidence in their ultimate success, so that bankers and manufacturers might be encouraged to put their capital at the service of the British, French and Russian Governments, without misgivings concerning the safety of their investments. As things are, it is not the Censor's fault that the American, for sheer business reasons, has not buttoned up his pocket and asked to be shown the colour of British gold before accepting a single order for munitions or merchandise.

For what is the news vouchsafed to him, on which he must build his confidence? From the actual battlefronts he gets day by day brief paragraphs bristling with proper names, hardly more comprehensible than chemical formulæ. From the neutral capitals he learns of diplomatic activities that too often bode no good for the Allies. From special correspondents in England he hears of awful conditions in the trenches, or heroic deeds that only bring out the enormous difficulties of victory. From special correspondents in Germany, on the other hand, he gets glowing descriptions of Prussian thoroughness and morale, and the carefully coloured matter that the Wilhelmstrasse doles out to the American writer. Sayville, with only its wireless, can manage to supply the United States with the announcement of German successes every day; while all that the cables from England can do is to send word of strikes and political differences, despairing appeals for recruits and pessimistic speeches in Parliament. Truly, if it were not for their abounding Vol. 225.-No. 446,

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belief in the justice of the Allied cause and the race-pride that will not hear of defeat, even the pro-Ally Americans might despair of the downfall of Germany.

The Government should remember the enormous difference between the experience of England and that of the neutral nations in this War. Away from England the great crisis has produced no atmosphere. No one can realise what the War is until he has lived for a while under its shadow. He can appreciate neither its curse nor its blessing; he has no idea of what it has brought nor what it has taken away. To him, isolated facts stand out without proper background or perspective; and, since the Government has chosen to paint its scanty disclosures in such dull grey tones, the colour of the unofficial information is startlingly vivid. In England there is abundant and obvious evidence of self-sacrifice, patriotism and determination; but in foreign lands, these things are not perceived; and there is nothing to reduce unfortunate incidents to their true value.

In England a true conception of the condition of affairs is helped by the tales that fly from mouth to mouth, the abundance of which has been such a curious consequence of the muzzling of the Press. In London, in truth, Rumour has come into its own again; and at every street-corner one can hear a new tale from a 'man just back from the Front,' or a 'close friend of a Minister.' One statement sets off another; the average person takes what he hears lightly; and in the end a fair balance is struck. But in America these same rumours receive an altogether undue importance. They come from fewer persons; they have acquired the prestige of the 3000 miles they have travelled; and they are seized by the newspapers as additions to the regular despatches of unquestioned authenticity. Thus mere scraps of clubgossip acquire the dignity of semi-official statements; and that they have in the main favoured the Allies is as much the result of good luck as anything else.

No one wants the newspapers to publish a line that would assist the Germans; but there is no reason why the American public should not be given news that would assist the Government, and be kept posted up on matters which would encourage the friends of the

Allies throughout the world. Once or twice Mr Balfour has been persuaded to write letters or grant interviews for publication; and the relief they afforded to those filled with anxiety is a token of how much can be accomplished by lifting the veil with discretion and authority. For months last summer the Government maintained an obstinate silence with regard to the submarine peril and the way it was being met, which made it very difficult for Englishmen in America to uphold the prestige of the Fleet. At the date of writing, an intricate and technical dispute concerning shipping is clouding the relations between Great Britain and the United States, the British side of which might well be given to the Press with the happiest results. Why should not the Government call in the aid of a competent writer, possessing adequate knowledge and gifted with the art of clear, terse and popular expression, supply him with the requisite information-inspire' him, in fact--and let him supply a leading New York journal with such a statement. We undertake to say there would be no need to add the words, 'American papers, please copy.'

The Censor, in short, should be entrusted with positive as well as negative functions. He should be required to supply the newspapers with material for articles on all matters, the publication of which would assist the cause of the Allies. He should realise that, in this World-War, all men are interested and all men are anxious; and that the more it depends upon the success of attrition, the more the belligerents will need the sympathy and aid of the neutrals. Without deviating a hair's breadth from the truth, he can do much to spread confidence in the ultimate victory of the Quadruple Entente; and, if he does that, he will bring that victory appreciably nearer. News the neutral peoples will have, whether Whitehall wishes it or not; and it depends mainly upon the British Cabinet whether that news will be to the country a hindrance or a help.

Art. 10.-BRITISH DIPLOMACY IN THE NEAR EAST.

1. The War and Democracy. By R. W. Seton-Watson, and others. Macmillan, 1914.

2. The War and the Balkans. By Noel Buxton, M.P., and C. R. Buxton. Allen & Unwin, 1915.

3. Roumania and the Great War. By R. W. SetonWatson. Constable, 1915.

4. Nationalism and War in the Near East. By a Diplomatist. Edited by Lord Courtney. Clarendon Press, 1915.

5. La question du Bosphore et des Dardanelles. By N. Dascovici. Geneva: Georg & Cie., 1915.

THE trend of British policy in the Near East in recent years was summed up by His Majesty's Ambassador in Petrograd in seven words, when, in response to the hope expressed by the Russian Foreign Minister that Great Britain would not fail to proclaim her solidarity with Russia and France, he pointed out that direct British interests in Serbia were nil.'* From an economic point of view, in the mouth of a British Consul, the statement would have been literally true. As a guiding principle in relation to the possibility of the gravest developments in the Near East, the dictum can only give rise to amazement. That M. Sazonoff evidently shared this feeling is shown by the pointed rebuke which Sir George Buchanan naïvely records, when he adds: 'To this M. Sazonoff replied that we must not forget that the general European question was involved, the Serbian question being but a part of the former, and that Great Britain could not afford to efface herself from the problems now at issue.'* The cogency of the Russian Foreign Minister's remarks requires no emphasis to-day, but in July 1914 Sir Edward Grey, having read his view of British interests in the Near East, could still telegraph to Sir G. Buchanan: 'I entirely approve what you said.'

Criticism on British diplomacy in the Near East is based on its failure, both before and during the war, to realise that the Near Eastern question, in whatever form it might be raised, was a part of the general European

White Paper, Miscellaneous, No. 6 (1914), [Cd. 7467], No. 6.