movement would follow the Ulster precedent. He seems to have believed that everything depended on securing the support of General De la Rey, who, according to the favourable interpretation of van Rensburg's vision, was to play the principal part. De la Rey was now returning from Parliament, and on Sept. 15 had reached Johannesburg. Beyers, therefore, sent Joubert in his motor-car to Johannesburg to induce De la Rey to come on to Pretoria. His invitation was accepted, but there is no evidence that the General had at that time committed himself to the scheme proposed by Maritz. He arrived at Pretoria in the motor-car, and at seven o'clock the same evening the two Generals started on their way back to Johannesburg, which is over an hour's run.

The local police had had orders to capture three burglars known as the 'Foster gang,' who were trying to escape in a motor-car. Instructions had, therefore, been given to stop every motor-car containing three men. The car of General Beyers was challenged repeatedly, but he instructed his chauffeur to drive on without stopping. The chauffeur obeyed, the police fired, and General De la Rey was shot dead. When the news reached the Burghers, who had been told that General De la Rey would address them, it struck terror into their hearts-for van Rensburg's dream had received an interpretation which did not suit Maritz. Beyers had some difficulty in explaining his own views to the local commandos, but he lost no opportunity of stating his case for neutrality. Nothing was yet known by the Cabinet concerning Maritz's rebellion; and Beyers seemed to have decided to wait until Oct. 15 before taking any action. In the mean time every effort was being made by the Government to promote conferences and to give explanations to the men who were hesitating between loyalty to the Government and the influence of General Beyers in the Transvaal and General De Wet in the Free State; and the Government did not omit preparations for the situation which might arise if conciliation failed.

Maritz now began to remove the mask, and revealed to some of his closest friends that he had been in communication with the Governor of German South-West Africa with whom a definite plan of action had been

arranged. We are fortunately in possession of a copy of the agreement, though perhaps it was never formally executed. The copy is neither dated nor signed, but probably we may regard it as a draft agreed on between Maritz and the Governor, each of whom would no doubt trust to the honour of the other to see the clauses of this 'scrap of paper' duly executed if the desires of both parties were realised.

The preamble states that the agreement is made between the Imperial Governor, representing the German Emperor, and General Maritz, acting in the name of the officers and men who were prepared to declare the independence of South Africa. The terms were that Maritz was immediately to raise the standard of rebellion, whereupon Germany would recognise all Africander forces fighting against England as belligerents and would support them in the struggle. The Governor undertook to use every means to secure the recognition by Germany of the independence of South Africa; and this would be included as part of the general conclusion of European peace. In consideration of the assistance which Germany would render to the newly formed State, Maritz agreed that Germany should take Walfisch Bay and the British Islands off the coast of German SouthWest Africa, and that the southern frontier of the German Colony should be moved to the centre of the Orange River instead of the North Bank. In return for this the German Empire undertook to permit the acquisition by independent South Africa of the Portuguese possession of Delagoa Bay. The last clause was that, if the insurrection proved a failure, the rebels proceeding to German territory should be regarded as German subjects.

It is therefore clear that all this time Maritz was putting forward any excuse to justify a rebellion which he had long been contemplating. There was first of all the plea that the European war had no concern with South Africa, which might well remain neutral. Maritz himself exploded this theory by permitting the Germans to cross the frontier in order to fetch back the recalcitrant Africanders who were determined to leave German territory when war seemed possible. A second pretext was that the Government were going to commandeer

burghers for service in German South-West Africa, and that it would be illegal for the Government to utilise its powers under the Defence Act for an attack on a neighbouring territory. It was on these grounds that Maritz persuaded his own commando to follow him. There was, in reality, no truth in this statement, for from the outset the Government made it quite clear that they would only rely on volunteers for service in German South-West Africa.

It was also urged that Germany was bound to win in Europe, and therefore the Boers were safe in throwing off the British yoke. In order to substantiate this argument it seems that the wildest possible statements were put forward regarding the success of German arms in Europe. A certain Mr Oost, who was at one time Secretary to General De Wet, made a practice of visiting the camp-fires of the various commandos every night in order to give them the latest news from Europe. It is not known how Mr Oost received his information concerning the capture of Paris and London, but it is not improbable that the wireless station at Windhoek was the means of stimulating his fantastic imagination.

On Oct. 6 a man was arrested at Kroonstadt in the Free State for using seditious language. This was Mr J. J. Smit, another of the Boers who had taken refuge in German South-West Africa after the Vereeniging Peace; and he was working with Maritz and Joubert. His business seems to have been to fan the rebellion in the Free State; but he was a clumsy person who did his work badly, and garrulously blurted out to a Mr De Wet, who was a loyal South African, that Maritz had promised to join the Germans when the proper time came, and that he had arranged this with the Germans for the last three years. Smit had just arrived from German South-West Africa and had seen Maritz on his way, and was then sent by Maritz into the Free State. He also boasted with much detail that he had told General Botha a lot of lies in order to put him off the track; if, however, we may judge from the fact that Smit was arrested and Major Enslin had been despatched from Pretoria to the German frontier to act as Chief of Staff to Maritz, the lies seem to have had an exactly contrary effect from what was intended.

Major Enslin, who is an experienced soldier and served on General Botha's Staff during the Boer war, at once found himself in a position of great difficulty; and the British and Union Governments owe him a great debt for the masterly way in which he managed to save an extremely dangerous situation. He succeeded at last in communicating the exact relations between Maritz and the German Government to General Botha, who then recalled Maritz. Maritz refused to obey the order from Headquarters, and, standing on a box, he addressed his commando and told them boldly of the contract he had made with the Government of German South-West Africa He then divested himself of his distinction marks as an English Lieut. Colonel, and said he would shed his blood for his country. His men at once rallied to his side and appointed him Commandant General for the Cape Province and head of the Government of the North-Western District. Those who refused to join were taken prisoners and sent over to the Germans.

Thus the die was cast; and it remained for Maritz now to insure a real rebellion. He at once made a public appeal for support to Generals Hertzog, Beyers, De Wet, Kemp and Muller. This appeal caused consternation in the minds of the men mentioned, who were none of them prepared for the move. The Government responded by proclaiming Martial Law; but Maritz had managed to communicate to his supporters in the Free State and in the Transvaal the fact that Germany was placing at his disposal money, ammunition and guns. General De Wet visited Mr Hertzog, and appears to have differed with him as to what action should be taken, for the soldier instinctively knew that the psychological moment had come for action, whereas Hertzog was clearly of opinion that the rebellion might fail. A meeting was accordingly called in the dining-room of a Dutch Reformed Minister, named Ferreira. There were present a number of Herzogite members of the Legislative Assembly, some Dutch Reformed Preachers, and a number of soldiers who had seen service in the Boer war. General De Wet took the chair and told the meeting that Maritz was already fighting and had plenty of money and arms. Some one asked, 'Where are Generals Beyers and Hertzog?' De Wet replied that he had seen Hertzog the day

before and that he thought it better not to come to that meeting. De Wet added a remark which indicated his frame of mind. He said, 'Hertzog is not a soldier-he is only a lawyer.' There was a difference of opinion at the meeting as to what should be done. Some were for following the example of Ulster and others for a deputation to the Government, while De Wet was for fighting at once. As a matter of fact each party took its own course, for the clergymen went on the deputation; and, when they had left the room, De Wet called the soldiers together to a war council and took no further notice of those who were for conciliatory methods.

There can be no doubt that Beyers and De Wet were largely influenced by a chivalrous feeling that they could not leave their young colleague Maritz in the lurch, so on Oct. 29 they issued a joint protest against the invasion of German South-West Africa and the proclamation of Martial Law. They also announced their belief that God's curse would fall on the country if the Government carried out its determination to conquer the German territory; and they called on all burghers to refuse to fight against the Germans. Great play was made all this time with the idea that the protest was based on the Ulster precedent. General Beyers insisted that this was an 'armed protest' against the entry of South Africa into the European war; but De Wet did not understand the distinction between open warfare and armed protest. He understood war, he advocated war, and he made war. He flouted even the suggestions of ex-President Steyn that there should be a conference, and without further delay proceeded to commandeer men and material, announcing his intention to join Maritz and then to capture Pretoria.

This put an end to further hair-splitting; General Beyers had to choose between De Wet and the Government. It was no doubt a tight corner, but he made up his mind that he must unite his forces with De Wet; so he brushed aside all further observance of the law and tried to push his way through the Government forces into the Free State. He was at once defeated by General Botha, losing half his men as prisoners at this first encounter. As he had been head of the Defence Force, many of these men probably thought they were obeying