are, to call my client fraudulent and wicked, was going beyond the bounds and limits which must be fixed.

Mr. Baron Wood was not for giving sanction to this action, brought for the first time, because it would be most mischievous, not merely to the bar, but to the public. The words might overstep the bounds of propriety, and be too severe, but they were not to be corrected by such an action. If they had been said elsewhere, if they had been published, they could have been punished. In the privileges of parliament it was the same. The principle was this; whatever is said in judicial or legislative proceedings, is not actionable. It had been said, some limits must be set. His objection to this action was the difficulty of fixing limits. During one assize they might have nothing to do, but try actions brought for words used by counsel at the previous assize. The plaintiff was nonsuited.

A motion was afterwards made in the Court of King's Bench, for setting aside the nonsit; when, after a long argument, the judges thus delivered their opinions.

Lord Ellenborough said, the law privileges many communications which otherwise might be considered calumnious, and the subject of actions: in those, for instance, regarding the characters of servants, it is necessary, for the convenience of mankind, that there should be a free disclosure; and if it be made bona fide, and without express malice, without a design to state what is untrue and unprovoked, the law protects it from being the subject of an action. So in the case of counsel, who are appointed by the parties as better able to conduct their causes, the client con

signs his interests to a counsel, who only speaks from information; and he is privileged, when commenting upon the evidence or instrument produced in the course of the trial. I should say, that in the present case the language is strongly charged; for it accuses Mr. Hodgson of a fraud between man and man, and with wickedness in foro divino. This was perhaps not displaying that forbearance which it might be prudent to adopt; but yet I cannot say that the accusation does not arise out of the subject matter of the case. If the attorney knowingly placed the parties in a situation where they must undoubtedly be sufferers without any benefit, it does seem to give a colour to the charge of being fraudulent and wicked; I cannot say that there is no reasonable or probable cause for a counsel so to state, in the exercise of his duty of commenting. It appears to me that the words spoken were uttered in the cause, and relevant to the cause; and consequently, that the action is not maintainable.

Mr. Justice Bayley thought that the expressions were harsh, but they came within the privilege.

Mr. Justice Abbot concurred; words used in the course of a judicial inquiry, relevant and pertinent to the matter in issue, are not actionable, unless it appear that the counsel availed himself of his situation to gratify personal malice previously entertained against the person slandered. Justice could not be properly administered, if on every occasion counsel were to be questioned for the strength of an expression employed in the fair conduct of a cause. Here the words were relevant and pertinent; and if a new trial were granted, the result would, and ought to be, the same as it had been.

Mr. Justice Holroyd observed, that the slanderous words only expressed the opinion of an individual to the jury, who were subsequently to decide upon the merits, and whether the counsel had spoken truly or untruly. A less latitude ought to be allowed to counsel than to parties, on account of their superior knowledge and cooler temperament; but they were not liable to actions, unless it clearly appeared that the slander had no relation to the cause. He referred to four cases in Hawkins, Saunders, and Coke, in order to shew that parties were not liable for words in the course of a judicial proceeding, unless express malice were established. He thought the present action not maintainable, for the reasons stated by the rest of the court.-The Rule for setting aside the nonsuit was discharged.

LENITY TO FEMALE CULPRITS.

The late Counsellor E, Chairman of the Quarter Sessions for Dublin, was so remarkable for his lenity to female culprits, that a woman was seldom convicted when he presided. On one occasion, when this humane barrister was in the chair, a prim-looking woman was put to the bar of the Commission Court, at which presided the equally humane, though perhaps not so gallant, Baron S She was indicted

for uttering forged Bank Notes. According to usual form of law, the Clerk of the Crown asked the prisoner if she was ready to take her trial? With becoming disdain, she answered, "No!" She was told by the Clerk, she must give her reasons why. As if

scorning to hold conversation with the fellow, she thus addressed his lordship. "My lord, I won't be tried here at all, I'll be tried by my lord E- -." The simplicity of the woman, coupled with the well-known character of E, caused a roar of laughter in the Court, which even the bench could not resist. Baron S, with his usual mildness, was about to explain the impossibility of her being tried by the popular Judge, and said, "He can't try youwhen the woman stopped him short, and with an inimitable sneer, exclaimed, Can't try me! I beg your pardon, my lord, he tried me TWICE before." She was tried however; and, for the third time, acquited.

BEING IN THE STOCKS.

Lord Camden once presided at a trial in which a charge was brought against a magistrate for false imprisonment, and for setting the plaintiff in the stocks. The counsel for the magistrate, in his reply, said, the charges were trifling, particularly that of setting in the stocks, which every body knew was no punishment at all. The Chief Justice rose, and leaning over the bench, said, in a half whisper, Brother, were you ever in the stocks?" "In the stocks, my lord! no never." "Then I have," said his lordship, "and I assure you, brother, it is no such trifle as you represent." His lordship's knowledge of the stocks, arose from the following circumstance. When he was on a visit to Lord Dacre, his brother-in-law, at Alveley in Essex, he walked out one day with a gentleman remarkable for his absence of mind. When they had reached a hill, at some distance from the house,

his lordship sat down on the parish stocks, which stood by the road side; and after some time, asked his companion to open them, as he wished to know what the punishment was; this being done, the absent gentleman took a book from his pocket, and sauntered about, until he forgot both the Judge and his situation, and returned to Lord Dacre's house. When the Judge was tired of the experiment he had so rashly made, he found himself unable to open the stocks; and asked a countryman who passed by, to assist him. "No, no, old gentleman," replied Hodge," you was not set there for nothing." Lord C protested his innocence, but in vain; the countryman walked on, and left his lordship to meditate for some time longer in his foolish situation, until some of Lord D.'s servants, chancing to pass that way, released him.

ever,

A GOOD APOLOGY.

In the Court of Session in Scotland, the Judges who do not attend, or give a proper excuse for their absence, are, by law, liable to a fine. This law, howis never enforced; but it is common, on the first day of the Session, for the absentee to send an excuse to the Lord President. Lord Stonefield having sent such an excuse, on the President mentioning it, the late Lord Justice Clark Braxfield said, in his broad dialect, "What excuse can a stout fallow like him hae ?"" My lord," said the President, " he has lost his wife." The Justice, who was fitted with a Xantippe, replied, "has he? that is a gude excuse indeed; I wish we had a' the same."