number of Members of Parliament, and were, in fact, a Committee of Parliament, took it into their heads to revive their pretensions to the supremacy of a court of last resort, although they could no longer lay claim in any respect to a parliamentary character, and although statutes had intervened, establishing a right of appeal from their decisions to Parliament. In this unconstitutional attempt to stretch their power, they met with a spirited and manly resistance from the Faculty of Advocates, who contended for the right of the subject on all occasions to appeal to parliament, from the decrees of the Session. The Judges finding both law and reason to fail them in the contest, had recourse to another and a worse stretch of power, to sustain them in their usurpation. An order was procured from the king and council discharging all appeals, and commanding the advocates to submit to the Lords of Session. The profession, indignant at such an arbitrary assumption of dispensing power, immediately withdrew in a body from court; and refusing to act in any proceeding before their lordships, brought the legal business of the country to a complete stand. The Judges, incensed at this resolute proceeding, procured a second order from the king and council, banishing the whole of the refractory barristers to a distance of twelve miles from Edinburgh.

Sir George Mackenzie, afterwards so distinguished as Lord Advocate, during a very troubled period of Scottish history, was among the number of the exiled; and to this gentleman the Judges were, after a short time, pleased to give permission to appear before them, and vindicate, if he could, the conduct of himself and his brethren. Sir George appears to have ac

quitted himself well; he spoke with much warmth, and produced such an impression on their lordships, that they were content to enter into a compromise, which, whatever might have been the saving clauses attached to it, put an end for ever to their pretensions to supremacy, and restored to the bar a body of gentlemen, whose patriotism and spirit would have done honour to the brightest periods of its history.

SIR GEORGE MACKENZIE.

In 1674, Sir George Mackenzie, to whom his country was so much indebted in the question of Appeal, was appointed his Majesty's Advocate for Scotland. Being called to the office in troublesome and rebellious times, when the minds of contending parties were inflamed with political as well as religious zeal, he could scarcely be expected to fulfil the duties of it without incurring the hatred of those, whose friends or relatives suffered from the severity of the law, and provoking a torrent of calumny and abuse on his character. It is quite true, that his political principles accorded singularly well with the sort of work which was required of him, being a zealous advocate for the doctrines of passive obedience and conformity; yet, with all this furniture for persecution, there is certainly nothing in his conduct to warrant the application of such epithets as "bloodthirsty advocate,' """ persecutor of the Saints of God," and others equally coarse, by which we find him sometimes designated. The great care which he took in regulating the forms used in trials for treason, was far from savouring of any desire for a rigour be

yond the law; so much indeed was the contrary the fact, that there never was a period, when so many thousands were pardoned, and so many indemnities granted, as during his administration. He says himself, that he never informed against any man, nor suggested any prosecution; and that when a prosecution was advised by others, he pleaded as much in private for the defendant, as if the case had been dubious, or he had been advocate for him.

The memory of Sir George Mackenzie ought, on a separate account, to be for ever dear to the members of the Scottish bar. He was the founder of the Advocates' Library at Edinburgh, one of the most extensive and valuable repositories of ancient and modern learning of which this island can boast.

GENERAL VERDICTS.

In Scotland, though general verdicts appear to have been authorised by the most ancient practice of the criminal courts, yet it was long customary to consider jurymen as tied down to determine simply, whether the series of facts stated in the libel or indictment were true, the judges reserving to themselves the power of determining the ultimate conclusion of guilty or nor guilty of the crime charged. The accused person was indeed tried by his peers, but his guilt or innocence was rarely within their cognizance; and many a fellow citizen became thus the victim of the arbitrary discretion of the bench. Such was the case till the trial of Carnegie, of Finhaven, before the Court of Justiciary, for the murder of Charles Earl of Strathmore, in 1728. At a meeting in the country,

where the company had drank to intoxication, Carnegie having received very abusive language, and sustained a personal outrage from Lyon, of Bridgeton, drew his sword, and staggering forward to make a thrust at Lyon, chanced to kill the Earl of Strathmore, a nobleman for whom he entertained the highest regard and esteem, and who had at that moment unfortunately stepped between the parties with a view to separate them. The facts of the case were perfectly clear, and the court had by a preliminary award, declared, that if found to be proved, they were relevant to infer the pains of law for the crime of murder. There remained therefore no hope for the prisoner, unless the jury could be roused to assert a right which juries in Scotland had long relinquished, and to vindicate their privilege of deciding generally on the guilt or innocence of the accused. This important point was gained by the powerful eloquence of the prisoner's counsel, Mr. Dundas, (afterwards Lord President Dundas); the jury found the prisoner not guilty and since that time the right of a Scottish jury to return a general verdict, has never been disputed.

ANCIENT HIGHLAND OATH.

The oath used among the Highlanders in judicial proceedings under the feudal system, contained a most solemn denunciation of vengeance in case of perjury; and involved the wife and children, with the arable and the meadow land, of the party who took it, altogether in one abyss of destruction. When it was administered, there was no book to be kissed, but

the right hand was held up while the oath was repeated. The superior idea of sanctity which this imprecation conveyed to those accustomed to it, may be judged from the expression of a Highlander, who, at a trial at Carlisle, had sworn positively in the English mode to a fact of consequence. His indifference during that solemnity having been observed by the opposite counsel, he was required to confirm his testimony, by taking the oath of his own country to the same. "Na, na," said the mountaineer, "ken ye not thar is a hantle o'difference 'twixt blawing on a buke, and domming ane's ain saul?"

TRIAL OF LORD LOVAT.

Mr. Murray, afterwards Lord Mansfield, was one of the managers for the impeachment of Lord Lovat by the House of Commons, in 1747; and when commenting on the evidence, displayed so much candour and moderation, that the celebrated Lord Talbot, on the conclusion of his speech, felt called upon to pay him the following enthusiastic compliment. "The abilities of the learned manager who has just now spoke, never appeared with greater splendour than at this very hour, when his candour and humanity have been joined to those great abilities which have already made him so conspicuous, that I hope to see him one day add lustre to the dignity of the first civil employment in this nation." Lord Lovat himself bore remarkable testimony to the abilities and fairness of his adversary. Alluding to one of the witnesses on the trial, he said, "I thought myself very much loaded by one Murray, who your lordships