"In the face of this fact we must not seek our guarantees in French feelings. We must not shut our eyes to the fact that, in consequence of this war, we must be prepared for a speedy attack from France again, and not for a permanent peace, and that quite independently of any conditions which we may impose upon France. The French nation will never forgive us for the defeat in itself, nor for our victorious repulse of its wanton attack. If we should now withdraw from France, without any acquisition of territory, without any contribution, without any advantages save the glory won by our arms, the same hatred, the same desire for revenge on account of wounded pride and ambition, would remain among the French nation, and it would only await the day when it might hope successfully to indulge these feelings. It was not a doubt of the justice of our cause, nor was it an apprehension that we might not be strong enough, that restrained us in the year 1867 from the war which was then offered us, but the fear of exciting those passions by our victories and of inaugurating an era of mutual animosity and constantly renewed wars, while we hoped, by a longer continuance and attentive care of the peaceful relations of both nations, to gain a firm foundation for an era of peace and welfare. Now, after having been forced into the war which we desired to avoid, we must seek to obtain better guarantees for our defense against the next attack of the French than those of their good feeling.

"The guarantees which have been sought since the year 1815 against the same French desires and for the peace of Europe in the holy alliance and other arrangements made in the interest of Europe, have, in the course of time, lost their efficacy and significance; so that Germany has finally been obliged to defend herself against France, depending solely upon her own strength and her own resources. Such an effort as we are now making imposes such sacrifices upon the German nation that we are forced to seek material guarantees and the security of Germany against the future attacks of France, guarantees at the same time for the peace of Europe, which has nothing to fear from Germany.

"These guarantees we have to demand, not from a temporary government of France, but from the French nation, which has shown that it is ready to follow any government to war against us, as is indisputably manifested by the series of aggressive wars carried on for centuries by France against Germany.

"Our demands for peace can therefore only be designed to lay obstacles in the way of the next attack of France upon the German, and especially the hitherto defenseless South German frontier, by removing this frontier, and with it the point of departure of French attacks, further back, and by seeking to bring the fortresses with which France threatens us, as defensive bulwarks, into the power of Germany.

"You will express yourself in this sense, if any questions are asked of you. "BISMARCK."

The second circular relates to the first circular of Mr. Jules Favre, and to the mission of Mr. Thiers, considers the question with what government peace would have to be made, and then returns more definitely to the subject of cessions of territory, expressly demanding the surrender of Strasburg and Metz. The document is as follows:

"MEAUX, September 16, 1870. "You are aware of the contents of the document which Mr. Jules Favre has addressed to the representatives of France abroad, in the name of the present authorities in Paris, who style themselves the government of the national defense.

"It has, at the same time, come to my knowledge, that Mr. Thiers has undertaken a confidential mission to several foreign courts, and I presume that it will be his task, on the one hand to inspire confidence in the desire for peace of the present Paris government, and on the other to seek the intervention of neutral powers in favor of a peace designed to rob Germany of the fruits of her victory, and to prevent the establishment of any basis of peace which might lay obstacles in the way of the next French attack upon Germany.

"We cannot believe in the earnest intention of the present Paris government to put an end to the war, so long as it continues to excite the passions of the people by its language and its acts, to increase the hatred and the bitter feeling of the population, already excited by the sufferings caused by the war, and to condemn in advance as inadmissible for France, every basis of peace which can be accepted by Germany. It thereby renders peace impossible, for which it should prepare the people by mild language, duly considering the serious nature of the situation, if it would lead us to believe that it aims at honest negotiations for peace with us. It could only be seriously supposed that we would now conclude an armistice without every security for our conditions of peace, if we were thought to lack military and political sagacity, and to be indifferent to the interests of Germany.

"Another thing which prevents the French from clearly comprehending the necessity of peace with Germany, is the hope, which is encouraged by the present authorities, of a diplomatic or material intervention of neutral powers in favor of France. If the French nation becomes convinced, that, as it alone voluntarily inaugurated the

war, and as Germany has been obliged to carry on the contest alone, it will be compelled to settle the account with Germany alone, it will soon put an end to its now certainly useless resistance. It is cruelty on the part of neutral nations towards France if they permit the Paris government to encourage unrealizable hopes of intervention among the people and thereby to prolong the struggle.

"We are far from any desire to interfere in the internal affairs of France. It is a matter of indifference to us what sort of a government the French may choose for itself. The government of the Emperor Napoleon is the only one which has been formally recognized by us. Our terms of peace, with whatever government, authorized for the purpose, we may have to negotiate them, are entirely independent of the question, how and by whom the French nation is governed; they are dictated to us by the nature of the case, and by the law of self-defense against a turbulent and quarrelsome people on our frontier. The unanimous voice of the German governments and of the German people demands that Germany be protected by better boundaries than heretofore against the threats and outrages which have been committed against us for centuries by all French governments. As long as France remains in possession of Strasburg and Metz her offensive is strategically stronger than our defensive, throughout the entire south and that portion of the north of Germany which lies on the left bank of the Rhine. Strasburg is, in the possession of France, a constantly open sally-port against South Germany. In the possession of Germany, on the other hand, Strasburg and Metz acquire a defensive character. In more than twenty wars we have never been the aggressor against France, and we desire nothing from that country but our own safety, which has been so often jeopardized by it. France, on the contrary, will regard any peace which may now be concluded simply as a suspension of hostilities, and will again assail us, in order to be revenged for her present defeat, with just as little reason as she has done this year, as soon as she feels strong enough to do so, either through her own strength or through foreign alliances.

"In rendering it difficult for France (which has been the originator of every disturbance of the peace of Europe hitherto) to act on the offensive, we are acting, at the same time, in the interest of Europe, which is that of peace. No disturbance of the peace of Europe is to be feared from Germany. Since the war has been forced upon us, which we have shunned for four years with the utmost care and at a sacrifice of our national feeling, which has been incessantly hectored by France, we will demand security in future as the price of the gigantic efforts which we have been obliged to make in our defense. No one will be able to reproach us for want of moderation if we adhere to this just and reasonable demand.

"I desire you carefully to take cognizance of these ideas and present them for consideration in your interviews.

No. 165.

Mr. Bancroft to Mr. Fish.

"BISMARCK."

No. 143.]

AMERICAN LEGATION,

Berlin, September 29, 1870. (Received October 14.)

SIR: In pursuance of your instruction of August 30 (No. 128) I addressed to the secretary for foreign affairs a request that measures might be taken for the protection of the large amount of American property in Paris upon its occupation by the German troops.

I append a translation of the reply of Mr. von Thiele conveying the desired assurances.

GEO. BANCROFT.

The envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of the United States of America was pleased in his communication of the 15th instant to draw attention to the fact that there is in Paris a large amount of American property. To this notification was added the suggestion that measures might be taken for the protection of this property during the occupation of the French capital by German troops. The undersigned

may be permitted to mention in reply hereto that German troops respect always private property so far as the necessities of war at all admit. Even under the difficult circumstances which may perhaps occur in Paris, all that is possible will willingly be done by the authorities of this government to guard from injury American property. But it is desirable that the American citizens should themselves also take, on their part, those measures for the security of their property which other inhabitants of besieged towns take, i. e., avoid as far as possible the risk of loss.

VON THIELE.

No. 145.]

No. 166.

Mr. Bancroft to Mr. Fish.

AMERICAN LEGATION,

Berlin, September 29, 1870. (Received October 20.) SIR: On the 24th of this month I sent you the following telegram: FISH, Secretary,

Washington, District of Columbia:

Bismarck offered Favre truce conditions. Convention to be called. Germany to hold Strasburg, Verdun, Toul. Yesterday Favre rejected offer.

BANCROFT.

The account conveyed in the telegram is authentic. In the opinion of Europe the terms offered were moderate. The statement that the Germans demanded Mont Valerien is a misrepresentation. Now, the fall of Toul has been followed by the momentous event of the surrender of Strasburg, just one hundred and eighty-nine years after the day in which it was seized by Louis XIV. Seventy thousand troops are thus set free to invade southwestern France, the left wing to touch Lyons.

It seems very hard to understand the hopes and expectations of the present French government. The constituent convention has been postponed, and most men think, had a convention been held at this time it would not have confirmed the revolutionary ministers in power. The Orleanists see with pleasure the postponement of the convention, for they have as yet had no opportunity to organize their party in the nation, and under existing circumstances could be represented only by a small minority. Indeed, France is distracted by parties, and as yet manifests no unity of aspiration or action in the reconstruction of its civil government.

*

*

*

GEO. BANCROFT.

P. S.-It is now said that the present government, feeling the want of the confirmation of the people and the chance of ending anarchical tendencies through a convention, has decided to hold elections for a convention on the 16th of the next month. The Orleanists, during their eighteen years' reign, were opposed to the extension of suffrage, which was confined to about 18,000 voters in all France.

Mr. Guizot even invented a term to distinguish the governing class of France, calling it the "pays legal." As a consequence, the Orleans dynasty was supported only by surface roots, and not having any hold on the people was overthrown by the first storm. It has now no popularity, but a large part of the industrial class and a large part of the cultivated class in France are in favor of restoring that family.

No. 167.

No. 146.]

Mr. Bancroft to Mr. Fish.

AMERICAN LEGATION,

Berlin, October 3, 1870. (Received October 20.) SIR: I have this moment received, a little in advance of the press, a lithographic copy of Count Bismarck's account of his interview with Jules Favre. Having no time to make a translation or abstract of it before the closing of the mail, I send you the document as I received it from the Foreign Office.

GEO. BANCROFT.

[For a translation of this inclosure see Baron Gerolt's note to Mr. Fish of October 17, 1870, post.]

No. 147.]

No. 168.

Mr. Bancroft to Mr. Fish.

AMERICAN LEGATION,

Berlin, October 5, 1870. (Received October 20.) SIR: In your letter of July 22 to Baron Gerolt you express your hope that the Government and people of the United States may soon be gratified by seeing the principle of exempting private property on the high seas from seizure universally recognized.

Mr. Delbrück informs me that when the time shall come for negotiating a peace with France, one of the conditions to be proposed and insisted on will be the recognition of this principle.

The treaty relating to consulships and inheritances, which I am to close as soon as the incidents of war will admit, may contain references to the former treaties of the United States with Prussia, confirming them in part. Will you authorize me to propose on your part a recognition in the pending treaty of the principle which you affirm in the letter I have referred to? I am sure it will find acceptance here. GEO. BANCROFT.

No. 160.]

No. 169.

Mr. Bancroft to Mr. Fish.

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,

Berlin, November 10, 1870. (Received November 25.)

SIR: Several causes have combined to delay operations against Paris far beyond the time that was at first assigned for them. The King is disinclined to damage the city. The officers of the army have been relying for success on the deficiency of food among the besieged; the heavy cost that transport from the termination of the railways have cut up the roads and made them almost bottomless; two hundred wagons have been used where two thousand are needed, and the construction of the batteries and collection of material have proceeded somewhat languidly. Meantime the besieged have used military skill and their great numbers to complete their defenses. The men have been organized and trained to the offices of war, and their courage and

temper have hardened, so that the attack on Paris is now attended with increased difficulty, except only that the food within the walls is constantly growing less. I am told by good authority that the bombard ment, if it takes place at all, cannot begin before the 20th, and probably not so soon as that. In short, it is evident that the Germans wish to avoid a bombardment if possible, although they are preparing for it as for an eventual necessity. Mr. Thiers went on his mission to Count Bismarck without any plenipotentiary authority whatever. He was very much in earnest, and one of his interviews with the chancellor lasted seventeen hours uninterruptedly. After this he returned to Paris for powers, which were refused him. Jules Favre and Gambetta professed to have been in favor of a truce; Trochu, whose opinion prevailed, was most decidedly against it. The Germans are of opinion that Paris, under any circumstances, must fall. The French are of opinion that unless Trochu can make vigorous and successful sallies it must fall. Another month will hardly go by without manifestly approaching a solution of the question so far as Paris is concerned; but as yet I see nothing that promises a speedy establishment of peace.

The negotiations for receiving the southern states into the North German Union, which will then become the German Union, continue. It seems probable that at the approaching session of the Reichstag Baden, Würtemberg, and perhaps Hesse, will be at once received. Bavaria may hold out a little longer, but public opinion decided not to sacrifice the efficiency of the consolidated union to the scruples of a wayward recusant, and Bavaria may for a time, but not for a very long time, occupy the position of North Carolina after the organization of our Government in 1789.

Your dispatches, as far as No. 257, have been received, with the excep tion of No. 237, which appears to have been lost on the way.

OFT.

GEO. BANCROFT.

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND THE NORTH GERMAN LEGATION AT WASHINGTON.

No. 170.

Baron Gerolt to Mr. Fish.

By order of the King, the North German government begs the United States Government to allow that the United States legation at Paris may protect Germans in France during the war.

[The above was handed to me personally, by Baron Gerolt, at my resi dence, Monday, July 18, about 6 p. m.

H. F.]

No. 171.

Baron Gerolt to Mr. Fish.

LEGATION OF NORTH GERMANY,

Washington, July 19, 1870. (Received July 19.)

SIR: I have the honor to communicate to you the following cable dispatch, received this morning from the chancellor of North Germany, Count Bismarck: