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Art. 2.-BELGIUM AND LUXEMBURG, 1831-1839.

ONE of the most serious difficulties, perhaps the most serious of all those encountered in the establishment of the Belgian kingdom in 1831, was the settlement of its frontiers; they were to be fixed according to the part to be played by the new State in the European system. The feelings of the London Conference with regard to the Belgian nation varied with the course of events. Its principal task was, in the view of most of the members of the Conference, to preserve so far as possible the results achieved by the Congress of Vienna, i.e. to keep a powerful barrier against France, and for that purpose to combine the military system of Belgium with that of Holland. This territorial question, therefore, was a European problem. In its wish to remain literally faithful to the decisions of the Congress of Vienna, the London Conference was led to rob Belgium of its most extensive province, which had served as its bulwark against Germany ever since the Belgian principalities had been united under the Dukes of Burgundy. The Duchy of Luxemburg contained the greater part of the large wooded table-land of the Ardennes and a stronghold of the highest strategic value, the fortress of Luxemburg, which commands the road leading from Trèves to Longwy and Verdun. It had been especially coveted by Louis XIV, who conquered it in 1681, but had to restore it at the Peace of Rijswijk in 1697. From that time, it remained one of the most important fortresses of Belgium and one of the bases of its defensive system.

The Congress of Vienna, however, gave it a new international status in 1815. It agreed to a proposal of Hans von Gagern, the spokesman of the dynasty of Nassau, to turn that province into a Grand Duchy in exchange for a much less extensive and less populous territory, the old patrimony of that dynasty in Germany, which was ceded to Prussia; and it settled the Grand Duchy upon the Sovereign of the Netherlands in his own right, at the same time making him, in so far as the Grand Duchy was concerned, a member of the German Confederation. William I, however, treated Luxemburg exactly like the other provinces of the kingdom of the Netherlands. He gave seats in the States General to its

deputies, and invariably enforced the laws and institutions of the Netherlands there. Moreover, he deliberately neglected to fulfil his obligations towards the German Confederation, although these obligations were of the lightest, as the Confederation was a mere defensive alliance. He refused to provide the federal military contingent claimed by the Diet of Frankfurt; and it was his wish to turn the federal garrison out of the fortress of Luxemburg. The presence of this garrison, a body of Prussian soldiers, was the only sign of the difference made in international law between the Grand Duchy and the other Belgian provinces. The Grand Duchy, therefore, was a mere diplomatic fiction, an artificial creation intended to satisfy dynastic interests without regarding either historical traditions or the wishes of the inhabitants.

When the Revolution broke out, in September 1830, the people of Luxemburg mostly joined it with enthusiasm; and, as the French Government said some months after, they showed themselves more Belgian than the Belgians anywhere else.' Still, they did not attack the fortress, the gates of which were immediately closed by the commander of the Prussian garrison, who declared that the revolutionaries were rebels. On Oct. 15, William I's representative with the Diet called upon it to intervene, and promised that his Sovereign would henceforth strictly fulfil his federal duties and use every means to support the federal (i.e. Prussian) garrison quartered in Luxemburg. The situation might have become very critical, had not the Conference of London promptly taken the decision to suspend hostilities between Belgian and Dutch troops (November). This decision was to exercise the most unfavourable influence upon the future of Belgium, and especially upon its territorial status, for at that time only the old Barrier' fortresses built against France had passed into Belgian possession. The more important strongholds of the interior, the Citadel of Antwerp and Maastricht, were still in the hands of the Dutch; and Luxemburg was in the power of the German Confederation. The truce did not extend to the Grand Duchy, as the Congress of Vienna had placed it in a peculiar political position. Nevertheless, there was a tacit armistice, for the Provisional Government of

Belgium did not care to give offence to the Confederation or to Prussia, whose King, Frederick William III, appeared to act in a more or less conciliatory spirit. Therefore the Prussian garrison in the city of Luxemburg was left undisturbed, and the rights of the Confederation were expressly safeguarded by the National Congress of Belgium in its declaration of independence.

Nevertheless, it was Prussia that called upon the Diet to intervene vigorously for the suppression of the successful rising of the population in the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, although Prussia had no legal standing there whatever. Bernstorff, the Prussian Minister of Foreign Affairs, wrote to Vienna (Nov. 1): 'The Confederation would be dishonoured and would have to renounce all political hopes for the future, if it failed to perform its duty in such serious circumstances;' and at the same time he informed Baron Bülow, the representative of Prussia at the Conference of London, that 'the connexion of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg and of the fortress with the German Confederation must in any case be preserved. Any attempt at changing it by force must be treated as an infringement of federal rights and of sacred treaties, due to the agreement of all Europe.'

The Prussian Government, however, consented to the employment of peaceful means before resorting to compulsion, to the great anger of Tsar Nicholas, who deplored the fact that Prussia did not at once reinforce the garrison of the town of Luxemburg. As soon

as the French Government learned of the appeal sent by Prussia to the Diet, it insisted that the Diet itself, instead of the Courts of Berlin or Vienna, should take the settlement of the Luxemburg question in hand, and informed the two Courts of its views in the matter. It even declared, on Oct. 17, that it would in no case tolerate an armed intervention in Belgium. The Diet refused, after mature deliberation, to acknowledge the Belgians in Luxemburg as belligerents, and decided to treat them as rebels and to dispatch a federal 'army of execution' into their province. At that time, a large section of public opinion in Germany, especially in the Rhine district, was favourably disposed towards the rebels and held Liberal views; many members of the Diet were afraid to offend

it and strove to delay action so as to prevent an outburst. On Nov. 18, the Diet applied to the Prussian and Austrian Governments by a confidential message, asking them to take action at the Conference of London so as to render an armed intervention of the Confederation superfluous. Blittersdorff, the representative of Baden in the Diet, subsequently made an abortive attempt to have the Confederation represented at the London Conference.

The protocol of Dec. 20, by which the future independence of Belgium was sanctioned in principle, was the second important act of the Conference which ultimately led to the separation of Luxemburg from Belgium. It expressly provided that the arrangements to be made should in no way affect the rights which the King of the Netherlands and the German Confederation exercise in the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg.' At the same time, the Conference requested its Commissioners in Brussels to take an opportunity to advise the Belgian Government to refrain from interference in the affairs of the Grand Duchy. This protocol, which was not officially brought to the notice of the Belgian Government before the night of Dec. 31, aroused profound indignation. The Government declared that they could only accept it under protest, and addressed a note to the Conference setting forth its territorial claims (Zealand-Flanders, Maastricht, Luxemburg). This pretension was regarded as exorbitant, as a claim to 'the right of aggrandisement and of conquest.' The Conference returned this note, with the reply that it could not allow to any State a privilege which the Powers denied to themselves.

The discord between Belgium and the Conference might have endangered the existence of the new State, if at that very time the chance that the Prince of Orange might be raised to the throne of Belgium had not been on the increase. This combination might have solved the question of Luxemburg. Palmerston suggested it to Talleyrand in the course of a conversation. King William (he said) would have ceded Luxemburg to his son, provided the Duke were chosen King by the Belgians; and they would have elected him on condition of obtaining Luxemburg.' Then Talleyrand explained that the Grand Duchy was on no account to be attached to Belgium, because of its connexion with the German

Confederation, and he hinted that it might come to France; the consequence would have been a partition of Belgium itself, or at least the yielding to the other Powers of Belgian territory or of some other advantages. Palmerston opposed this system vigorously and insisted that England had no selfish objects in view in the arrangements of Belgium, but wished Belgium to be really and substantially independent.' Talleyrand had made a similar attempt with Bülow, the Prussian plenipotentiary, who also refused to be seduced.

There were other signs showing that Louis Philippe found it hard to resist the pressure of the 'party of movement' which demanded an increase of territory on the Belgian frontier. In order to put an end to such ambitious schemes, the Conference of London, at Prussia's request, decreed the neutralisation of Belgium under the guarantee of the Powers, and, at the same time, the preservation of the connexion between the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg and the German Confederation. Talleyrand strove in vain to extend neutrality to Luxemburg, alleging the precarious position of the French frontier in that quarter, in case of a war against its eastern neighbours. But Palmerston replied that France had no invasion to fear on that side. Moreover, he added, Luxemburg 'seems to belong to the system of defence for the Prussian frontier of which Coblentz is the centre; and it must be important for Prussia, as flanking the line of advance from Thionville to Coblentz.'

Talleyrand fought like a dragon,' Palmerston says, to carry his combination regarding Luxemburg, and even pretended that without it he would not assent to Belgian neutrality, but he was probably confronted with an argument afterwards used by the Prussian Governmentthat the German Confederation was indeed organised solely for purposes of defence, but that it was by no means neutral. The representative of France was unable to obtain anything except the insertion at the end of the protocol of an article permitting other countries to join in recognising the neutrality of Belgium. The clear result of this decision of the Conference was to separate Luxemburg more and more from the rest of Belgium, as the latter was given an entirely different international status. The Luxemburg question was henceforth kept Vol. 229.-No. 455.

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