1. Cui ceteræ partes vel sectæ secundas unanimiter deferunt, cum singulæ principatum sibi vindicent, melior reliquis videtur. Nam primas quæque ex zelo videtur sumere; secundas autem ex vero tribuere. 2. Cujus excellentia vel exuperantia melior, id toto genere melius. 3. Quod ad veritatem refertur majus est quam quod ad opinionem. Modus autem et probatio ejus quod ad opinionem pertinet hæc est: quod quis si clam putaret fore, facturus non esset. 4. Quod rem integram servat bonum, quod sine receptu est malum. Nam se recipere non posse impotentiæ genus est, potentia autem bonum. 5. Quod ex pluribus constat et divisibilius, est majus quam quod ex paucioribus et magis unum: nam omnia per partes considerata majora videntur, quare et pluralitas partium magnitudinem præ se fert: fortius autem operatur pluralitas partium si ordo absit, nam inducit similitudinem infiniti, et impedit comprehensionem. 6. Cujus privatio bona, malum; cujus privatio mala, bonum. 7. Quod bono vicinum, bonum: quod a bono remotum, malum. 8. Quod quis culpa sua contraxit, majus malum; quod ab externis imponitur, minus malum. 9. Quod opera et virtute nostra partum est, majus bonum; quod ab alieno beneficio vel ab indulgentia fortunæ delatum est, minus bonum. 10. Gradus privationis major videtur quam gradus diminutionis; et rursus gradus inceptionis major videtur quam gradus incrementi. OF THE COLOURS OF GOOD AND EVIL. IN deliberatives the point is, what is good and what is evil, and of good what is greater, and of evil what is the less. So that the persuader's labour is to make things appear good or evil, and that in higher or lower degree; which as it may be performed by true and solid reasons, so it may be represented also by colours, popularities and circumstances, which are of such force, as they sway the ordinary judgment either of a weak man, or of a wise man not fully and considerately attending and pondering the matter. Besides their power to alter the nature of the subject in appearance, and so to lead to error, they are of no less use to quicken and strengthen the opinions and persuasions which are true: for reasons plainly delivered, and always after one manner, especially with fine and fastidious minds, enter but heavily and dully: whereas if they be varied and have more life and vigour put into them by these forms and insinuations, they cause a stronger apprehension, and many times suddenly win the mind to a resolution. Lastly, to make a true and safe judgment, nothing can be of greater use and defence to the mind, than the discovering and reprehen |