with the expression too frequently causes forgetfulness of the depth of meaning which it represents. We are satisfied with that which lies upon the surface, and have no desire to plunge beneath.

We are conscious of time, for our senses note its passage; but eternity appeals to the inner thought, and by an effort of the mind alone can it be perceived. Nay, I know not that the voice of reason herself speaks of eternity, for we find that its existence has by many been denied, while a belief in the immortality of spirit, and that in the fleeting nature of sensible objects, has each at times been rejected and received. By the philosophic schools of antiquity the eternity of spirit was more frequently denied than that of matter. Aristotle and the Peripatetics believed the vital heat of the body to arise from an ether which they called a fifth element, "neither heavy nor light, but of which the heaven and the stars are composed, and which, like them, is eternal." But in his treatise on courage this philosopher also remarks that "death is formidable beyond most other evils, on account of its excluding hope; since it is a complete termination, and there

a

does not appear to be any thing, either of good or evil, beyond it." The Sceptics, if indeed they had a fixed belief, preferred death to life, because it offered that "complete state of calm indifference which, in their opinion, constituted happiness." Epicurus taught "that death was not the end of misery only, but the utter destruction of existence." He, with Democritus, however, believed in the eternity of matter. "The Sadducees say that there is no resurrection, neither angel, nor spirit." b

A belief in eternity is of necessity held by all Christians, and indeed to the reality of its existence but few infidels of modern days refuse

assent.

""Tis the Divinity that stirs within us,

'Tis heaven itself that points out an hereafter,
And intimates eternity to man." c

But there are some of us who are looking forward to an indistinct future when eternity shall appear, who believe that it will be created, but deny its present existence. Every doubt on this point is, however, removed by the words of that book in which we read of the "

a Arist. Eth. Nicom. b. iii.
c Addison.

b Acts, xxiii. 8.

High

a

and Lofty One that inhabiteth eternity." From that source, therefore, and from that alone, we draw full assurance that eternal Being, to which we are about to direct our thoughts, is not the uncertain creation of the imagination. There we learn that eternity is Being which now is and is now present.

The nature of eternity we will not now attempt to define, for we must "regard the definition as rather the end of our inquiry than its commencement. Indeed this may generally be observed of metaphysical, or rather psychological, inquiries: they are not like those of the mathematician, who must begin by defining; but that is because his definition is in fact a statement of part of the hypothesis in each proposition. Thus whoever enunciates any proposition respecting a property of the circle, predicates that property of a figure whose radii are all equal, and it is as if he began by saying, 'Let there be a curve line such that all the straight lines drawn from its points to another point within it are equal, then I say that the rectangles are equal; which, &c.' The general definition only saves the trouble of repeating

a Isa. lvii. 15.

this assumption as part of the hypothesis in each proposition. But the nature of any thing of which we discourse in psychology is not the hypothesis we start from; it is the goal or conclusion we are seeking to arrive at. Indeed, so it is in physical science also; we do not begin, but end, by defining the qualities of bodies, or their action on one another.

a

But

there must be a definition of terms which does not imply our stating the nature of the thing defined; it only implies that we must understand what the thing is to which the given word applies." Thus, although we are as yet unable to give a satisfactory definition of that of which it is our object, in the course of inquiry, to obtain a clear idea, it is necessary to understand what that Being is which we propose to contemplate.

Now a full and complete idea of the word Eternity is, I think, given by the conception of Being which has had no beginning, and which will have no end of Being, which includes in its duration the infinite past and the infinite future. It is in accordance with this meaning of the word that we find that those who have endeavoured

a Lord Brougham.

to obtain clear ideas upon this subject have usually considered the whole duration of eternity as formed of two parts:

Infinitum a parte post: a beginning and no end, or the infinite future.

Infinitum a parte ante: an end and no beginning, or the infinite past.

By the earnest contemplation of these two divisions we hope to attain a full and perfect knowledge of the meaning of the word.

But, as we advance in the examination of our subject, we shall be obliged to allude to the course of Time. It will therefore be necessary to obtain clear ideas of its nature, and a short digression must then be made for this purpose, but it will lead us back better fitted for resuming the contemplation of Eternity. After having thus dwelt upon the nature of time and of eternity we shall be prepared to consider whether there subsists between them any proportion or relation, or whether they be absolutely different and distinct.