which amounted to thirty thousand men. At Ravenna he publicly explained his future policy, and proposed the subscription for the million muskets. His idea was at once understood, and subscriptions poured in from all quarters. Upwards of eighteen thousand volunteers were also enrolled, and it was a public secret that the general proposed ere long to invade the kingdom of the Two Sicilies.

From Central Italy Garibaldi proceeded to Turin, where his reception was equally flattering. On the evening of his arrival he had another interview with Victor Emmanuel, but the secret has been carefully kept as to the subject discussed. It is probable, however, that the king did all in his power to dissuade Garibaldi from any aggressive movement, to which the general would not consent. On the contrary, the Sardinians themselves were beginning to grow very impatient, for it was suspected that the king obeyed foreign influences, and Italy was weary of vassalage. Great was the agitation, therefore, when it was suddenly announced soon after that General Garibaldi had given in his resignation as general of the army of Central Italy, and that Victor Emmanuel had accepted it. The proclamation our hero issued on the occasion was couched in the following

terms:

"TO THE ITALIANS.

"As underhand intrigues continually check the liberty of action inherent in the rank I hold in the army of Central Italy, and which I employed to try and attain that object which every good Italian proposes to himself, I am leaving the military service for the present.

"On the day that Victor Emmanuel once again summons his soldiers to arms for the redemption of the country, I shall be again by the side of my brave companions. The miserable and crafty policy which for a moment troubles the majestic progress of our affairs, must persuade us that it is our duty to assemble around the brave and legal soldier of independence, who is incapable of recoiling from his sublime and generous path, and that we should prepare, at present more than ever, gold and iron to receive those who would gladly plunge us again in the horrors of the past.

"Nice, 18th Nov., 1859."

"JOSEPH GARIBALDI.

At Bologna, the dissatisfaction produced by the policy of Count Cavour was so decided, that a manifestation was even attempted, which Garibaldi's friends wisely suppressed, as it would have given a triumph to the Absolutist party. The Tuscan government, compelled to accept his resignation, announced it to the public in a most complimentary general order, in which he was allowed to retain his honorary rank.

After remaining a short period at Nice with his family, Garibaldi proceeded to Genoa, with the intention of settling once more on his islandfarm of Capraja. From this he was, however, dissuaded, and he remained on the continent. Lest his motives in retiring from the service might be misinterpreted, he issued a spirited proclamation to the Italians, in which he urged them never to lay down their arms until they had secured the independence of their country. In conclusion he said, "Fellow-citizens, not a man among you must hesitate to put his mite to the national subscription-not one must neglect to have his musket in readiness, in order to obtain-perhaps to-morrow-by force what they hesitate to give us today in justice." At this time his enemies-and their name was legion -were striving zealously to render the subscription for the muskets abor

tive; but the general put the nation on their guard against the intrigues in the public papers. Towards the end of December, last year, he was requested to accept the presidency of the Nazione Armata, but was induced to decline the offer, alleging his motives in the following proclamation, which we quote, as proving that he never to the latest moment swerved from the path he had laid down for himself:

"TO THE ITALIANS.

"Summoned by some of my friends to attempt the character of conciliator, amid the factions of the liberal Italian party, I was invited to accept the presidency of a society called the Armed Nation.'

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But, as the armed Italian nation is a fact which terrifies all that is disloyal, corrupting, and tyrannical, both within and without Italy, the crowd of modern Jesuits has been alarmed, and shouted Anathema!'

The government of the Rè Galantuomo has been importuned by the alarmists, and in order not to compromise it, I have decided on giving up the office with which I was honoured.

In perfect agreement with all the members, I therefore declare the society of the Armed Nation' dissolved, and invite every Italian who loves his country to aid in the purchase of the million muskets.

"If, with the aid of a million guns, Italy, in the presence of the stranger, is unable to arm a million soldiers, we should have to despair of humanity. Let Italy arm, and she will be free.

"Turin, 14th Jan., 1860."

"G. GARIBALDI.

There were many signs of coming hostilities for those who could read aright. In a letter addressed to the workmen of Milan, Garibaldi told them to hold themselves in readiness. Even the Ost Deutsche Poste was compelled to allow, "We do not conceal from ourselves the dangers which are preparing for Austria in Italy. The popularity and indefatigable activity of Garibaldi seem called on to render further services." The correspondence from Italy in our leading papers will show that the descent on Sicily was being carefully revolved in the general's mind, though we doubt whether it would have been so promptly undertaken had it not been for the annexation of Savoy to France. It seems as if Garibaldi were desirous of obtaining his favourite monarch compensation elsewhere for the loss he had endured.

The events connected with the landing at Marsala, and the march on Palermo, will be too fresh in the mind of our readers to need narrating here. There cannot be an Englishman whose pulse has not throbbed while reading those splendid letters, descriptive of the hero's progress from victory to victory, so vividly chronicled for us in the broadsheet of the Times. The man whom the official journal of Naples branded as a brigand but a short month ago, is now christened "his Excellency," and is placed on equal terms with the legitimate ruler of a kingdom. But that is the very thing which causes us apprehension, for diplomacy is now prepared to intervene, and bitter experience teaches us what the result will possibly be.

As for the general exccration bestowed on the young King of Naples, we do not join in it so readily, for we remember that the nation which is now horror-stricken at the bombardment of Palermo, was very ready to condone the massacre of the Deux Décembre, and send its troops to fight, shoulder to shoulder, with the soldiers who had perpetrated that

atrocity-nay, worse, allow our generals of unsullied honour to stand on equal terms with Canrobert, the man who executed the fell orders of the president. Still, we do not object at all to the marked aversion all the crowned heads are displaying towards Bombino-because he has been unsuccessful-and Lord Palmerston deserves all credit for the words he uttered in the House, though they might have been expressed in better English: "It is the fault and fortune of governments like those of Rome and Naples, when, by the cruelties and atrocities committed under their authority, their subjects have been driven to desperation and have revolted, that they appeal to all friendly powers for assistance to remove the men who are the authors and instigators of the revolution. Those governments forget that they themselves are the real and original authors and instigators of those revolutionary movements, and if their prayer were granted, and steps taken to accomplish the object they desired, unless, which is very unlikely, they were prepared to alter their own courses, the first, most effectual, and only necessary step would be their own removal." In these sentiments we fully coincide, and we sincerely hope that our government will act up to them; but then, we awkwardly remember that, but a week prior to uttering these honourable remarks, Lord Palmerston made a most chivalrous speech in defence of the Reform Bill, which he allowed to be strangled without holding out a hand, or even shedding a tear over the poor defunct. All parties are in this instance unanimous: Bombino is to be got rid of, as a punishment for his clumsy attempts to maintain despotism, and he can follow, for aught we care, the example of his predecessor, Dionysius the younger, and keep a school, though, from what we know of Bourbon education, we are afraid that even such a scanty resource will fail him. Louis Napoleon has spoken out with equal decision about throwing the King of Naples overboard, as the Jonah who brings despotism into discredit; and in this case we are inclined to credit him, for the removal of the king will probably prove advantageous to his own little schemes.

But, while we agree to the necessity of allowing the tyrant to go his own road to destruction, we equally demand that no interference should be made with Garibaldi's progress, for, if he be left alone, he can settle the Italian question in a simple and natural way. From Naples to Rome would be but a step, and if the guerillero again set out for Venice, as in 1849, it would be with very different chances of success. Italy once united under the sceptre of Victor Emmanuel would be really free, and could resist French pressure. This would be so advantageous to the cause of liberty, that we fear Louis Napoleon will do all in his power to prevent the consummation, for, in that case, the war of 1859 would really have been fought for an idea, and he would have spoken the truth in spite of himself. As you cannot stay a lion's appetite with a muttonchop, neither will a Napoleon be satisfied with such a territory as Savoy while the kingdom of the Two Sicilies is going a begging.

We doubt whether even Mr. Bright, the last new friend of a despot, would venture to deny that for months Muratist intrigues have been going on in Naples with various chances of success. As a feather will show which way the wind blows, so we now have suspicious rumours of a constitution, based on the French model, being given the Neapolitans. They ask for the bread of freedom, and they are offered the stone of despotism,

which, though hidden beneath velvet, is as grinding as the wheel of a Juggernaut's car. But a French constitution is, fortunately, a specialty of the Bonaparte family: it is a sceptre which would pierce the hand of any other man that tries to wield it. In any case, the inspiration would hail from Paris, and the result would be the moral disarmament of Sardinia, who, powerless to do good, would gradually be forced down the incline, and become the obedient puppet of which Louis Napoleon would pull the wires.

And this consummation is not so far off, unless England energetically interfere. The object of the diplomatic intervention, we are told, is, in the event of the king running from Naples, to protect the honourable citizens from the atrocities which the lazzaroni and the mercenaries would be sure to commence. But such protection involves the presence of troops, and who so willing to offer such assistance as the French? The work would, in that case, be more than half done; the Neapolitans would be invited to decide their own fate by universal suffrage, and we know by this time to what that leads. Louis Napoleon learned the value of that weapon in 1848, to hold in terrorem over the respectable classes, and we may predict what the result would be in Naples. Those agents who so eminently performed their dirty work in Savoy would be let loose on the Two Sicilies, and a lavish expenditure of five-franc pieces would not weigh in the balance against the possession of the sovereign power over Italy.

Are our ministers prepared to prevent such a state of things by at once sending a sufficient force into the Mediterranean-ready, at any rate, to undertake half the diplomatic business? We fear not, when we call to mind the barren protest against the annexation of Savoy which Lord John Russell offered, and which, terrified by his own audacity, he speedily swallowed again, hoping it might have been overheard. The moment is a critical one: the future destiny of Italy is on the point of solution, and it depends on ourselves whether it prove a guarantee for the tranquillity of Europe, or the final cause of a general conflagration.

Of course we shall be accused (as we so frequently have been by the hired agents of Napoleon) of exaggerating purposely, and doing our utmost to stir up ill blood between two great nations, which only need to know each other more thoroughly to be amazed at the possibility of dissension. Our reply is, that we are English before all: we are as anxious as any one can be to see the Anglo-French alliance rendered permanent and Satisfactory, but we do not wish peace to be purchased by the subversion of the traditional policy of our country. This new doctrine of natural frontiers, however, is one which overthrows the balance of power, and leads constantly to misunderstandings, for no one can say where it may end, and the first Napoleon wished to embrace all Europe in the natural frontiers of France. The present emperor's policy has lately seemed to be verging in the same unhappy direction, and it is time for England to speak her mind out once and for all. By opposing a bold front, Louis Napoleon might be induced to reconsider his policy, but if we limit our interference to useless protests, he will end by despising us, and what the result will be we need not stop to discuss.

In the present case there is, fortunately, no occasion for even a divergence of opinion with France. Let us take the emperor at his word: he

is anxious to stop a lamentable effusion of blood, and we are, assuredly, actuated by the same feelings. Let us not confine our sympathy to words, but, by undertaking a joint occupation, give those of the Neapolitans who are not so enamoured of a French constitution as others appear to be, an opportunity for expressing their deliberate and honest opinion. If, however, we neglect to make our preparations, we may feel assured that French troops will occupy Naples, and then farewell to any hope of Italian independence.

Still, we hold that it would be in every respect better to allow Garibaldi to accomplish his mission without any diplomatic interference. With a chief so energetic and so stern, there is no fear of anarchy getting the upper hand, and if the people of Naples have a chance of rising, they will hold the ruffianly soldatesque and their partisans in check. At the same time, we consider that a French intervention would lead to the very excesses it is intended to prevent, for the Italian patriots who are now ready to assume the helm of affairs would remain in the background if they knew that the French would land to "support order," and the populace, left without leaders, would give way to atrocities, which are only the natural sequence of the tyranny under which they have been trampled for eleven years, which must have appeared to them so many

centuries.

It would be truly a pitiable thing if Garibaldi had unconsciously been doing Napoleon's evil work in Sicily, but we confess to a distrust of the French statement that non-intervention is only provisionally granted as regards Sicily. This seems to show that Louis Napoleon is quite prepared for eventualities at Naples, and we appear to be all in the background as regards our preparations. It would be better for us, then, to accept the pestilent "nationality" theory at once, and let it be carried out to its fullest extent. According to it no foreigner has a right to hold a foot of ground in Italy: then let the French troops be at once recalled from Rome. If Francis Joseph will not voluntarily resign Venetia, let him hold it if he can against the forces Garibaldi would bring into the field within six months, but let no interference be allowed. The Italians only ask to be let alone: while feeling duly grateful to Louis Napoleon for the aid he offered them in 1859, they now consider themselves strong enough to walk alone, and can manage their own affairs without any tutelage. In this way we think that matters would very speedily settle down; the Liberal party would be satisfied, while the Conservatives would be only too glad of a solution which, while it consolidated Italy, would deprive Louis Napoleon for ever of the power of working mischief in the Mediterranean.

Unfortunately, diplomacy must have the last word in such matters as the settlement of European questions, and in that England, by some fatality, always comes off second best. It is said of our sailors that they earn their money like horses and spend it like asses: in the same way it may be asserted of us, as a nation, that we win advantages in the field and throw them away in the council-chamber. Unless we are very careful, we shall be chicaned once again in this Neapolitan business, and have nobody to blame but ourselves.

But, whatever may be the result, whether Bombino be hurled from the throne of his ancestors, or supported on it by foreign bayonets for fear