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few gentle hints, he showed that worthy it would be wiser to leave his daughter unmolested for the future, and I doubt if Mr. Orangia Magnolia, alias Pepe Guari, would know his own child in the joyous, graceful, daintily-dressed mistress of Conran's slap-up establishment at Hyde Park.

Little Grand and I suffered cruelly. We were the butts of the mess for many a long month afterwards, when every idiot's tongue asked us on every side after the health of the Marchioness St. Julian, when we were going to teach them lansquenet? how often we heard from the aristocratic members of the Maltese Peerage? with like delightful pleasantries, which the questioners deemed high wit. We paid for it, too, to that arch old screw Balthazar; but I doubt very much if the tin was not well lost, and the experience well gained. It cured me of my greenness and Little Grand of his self-conceit, the only thing that had before spoilt that good-hearted, quick-tempered, and clever-brained little chap. Oh, Pater and Materfamilias disturb not yourselves so most unnecessarily about the crop of wild oats which your young ones are sowing broadcast. Those wild oats often spring from a good field of high spirit, hot courage, and thoughtless generosity, that are the sign and basis of nobler virtues to come, and from them very often rise two goodly plants -Experience and Discernment. Our governors would have deemed Little Grand and me utterly lost in the foul atmosphere of the Casa di Fiori; I question if we did not come out of it with wiser heads and a good trifle less conceit than before we entered it, and if lansquenet and the Marchioness were not, in their way, as good teachers to make us find our own level and mistrust our own judgment, as all the lectures to young men ever preached in Exeter Hall, that exceedingly commodious building where Crystal Palace tickets are sold at the entrance, and souls bought a little farther on.

We were none the worse, though a vast lot wiser, for the wild oats we sowed at Malta (and a good many places elsewhere, where we read that wisest and widest book, the book of Human Life), any more than for our other natural vents to superfluous energy; our shooting and boating, cricketing and boxing, which a certain author, in a new Cambridge serial, by the way, calls "an involuntary failing of muscularity," and to excuse his patronage of which, to a world that loves to be tickled with such sops in the pan, apologises for by assuring us that among his Oxford acquaintance he actually (only think of the condescension of the embryo lawnsleeves!)-yes, actually knew two bishops guilty of-strong musele!

Perhaps, knowing bishops ordinarily when they have arrived at the old port and mock-turtle era, it may be difficult to conceive of them in the buttery, beer, and raw chop age; but I have not a doubt that both bishops and ordinary men are the better in after life for hard hitting in a Town and Gown row, and pulling stroke up to Henley or Ely; and so -fond mamma, trembling over her boy just launched into life, she may believe me, though she won't, I know, as merely to recommend a thing to the dear sex is enough to set them against it-my tin was well spent in buying me modesty and experience when I was done brown by LITTLE GRAND AND THE MARCHIONESS AND OUR MALTESE PEERAGE. "Bravo! old fellow!" said Powell, when I had finished my tale and refilled my pipe. "You deserve a vote of thanks, or, if you prefer it in

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There is an enters ainst Nature," said Hardinge or`sho Arcillorsz → but I make it the aid indy will go on in her path for all the my insects that buzz at her. Her laws are rather too great ones to be altered by any hue and cry. We are created with omnivorous appetites and, though they may try to restrict us to milk-and-water, they won't succeed. As long as we're unregenerato'—i, e, mortal- -1 take it the boom of those cannon yonder will rouse our blood with sweeter musin than peace-at-any-price lectures. What splendid whisky this is, Fred! Let's toast the ladies at home!"

We did toast them with three times three, with many a name known weil in garrison town and archery party, Woolwich ball and Exotor plu nies, fair Die Vernons of the Tedworth country, the belles of all Worna ter's pretty women, Dover Galateas with soft eyes flashing under Spantak hats, Devonshire Helens, who had set all her miniature Green up at arms. Powell alone drank his in silence, naming, I dare say, in his hear one whom he knew well enough was putting up purest prayers for him.

OUR NATIONAL DEFENCES.

EVERY Englishman, with possibly the exception of the Manchester arch-demagogue, has become imbued, by recent continental events, with the conviction that the defenceless state of Great Britain offers a premium for invasion. The idea has gradually grown stronger since the beginning of the present year, and the recent publication of the report of the commissioners has fully opened our eyes to the danger to which we have so supinely exposed ourselves. Twelve millions are the sum asked of us for ensuring peace, and though it is very heavy, it is the consequence of having a neighbour whose house is constantly filled with combustibles, and we have to pay for increased risk. That the nation are quite prepared to supply the amount we are willing to believe, but the question has first to be settled whether we shall be any the safer when the money has been converted into stone walls at the recommendation of the commissioners.

One thing is tolerably certain: in the event of hostilities with France, London will be the great point de mire; the imperialist navy would not be sent to ravage our coasts and then retire, for such a step would produce retaliation, and our ex-ally would suffer more than ourselves, owing to his greater extent of seaboard. If the French ever attempt a landing, it will be for the purpose of marching straight on the capital of the world, for the occupation of London, apart from the pleasant prospect of plunder, would be a perfect set-off for Waterloo, and other small items written against our account in the ledger of every Frenchman's mind. The first thing to investigate is, naturally, the chance of successfully resisting any landing.

The first great thing which enables Englishmen to sleep comfortably in their beds when the wind blows from Cherbourg, is the possession of a Channel fleet. Sir Charles Napier and Mr. Bentinck, allied for once, have expressed their sturdy opinion that we can depend on our fleet, and uttered the hearty old clap-traps about wooden walls, British oak, and other causes of congratulation which had their value before steam was invented. Unfortunately, we cannot forget that the admiral did not carry his precepts into practice when he had the opportunity at Cronstadt, and though Mr. Bentinck is a well-meaning man, we can hardly accept him as an authority. We are reluctantly compelled to endorse the opinions of the commissioners, that our fleet is not to be entirely relied on for the defence of our coasts, even if we were willing and able to maintain it at the same scale as we had at the beginning of the century. "Since the application of steam to the propulsion of vessels, we can no longer rely upon being able to prevent the landing of a hostile force in this country.' With the tremendous appliances on board our fighting vessels, a contest would be most destructive, and it is very possible that many of our iron-built vessels would soon be sunk. Even supposing that we destroyed the enemy's fleet as well, we should have nothing to fall back upon, for it must never be forgotten that, though our fleet will be always numerically superior to the French, the moment may occur when, owing to the enormous extent of territory we have to

defend, the enemy may possess a temporary advantage. We leave out of sight all possible combinations of the European navies, and we know that the outlay in building a fleet of vessels to begird the entire British coast is simply impossible. We must, therefore, regard our navy as, at the best, but a first line of defence, which must be supported by others, if we wish to render the result of a possible invasion a certainty of defeat to the French.

The next principal feature that causes us grave doubts in the report of the commission is, that while they allow that London would be the object of the invader, they offer no suggestions as to the defence of that city, as being beyond the scope of their inquiry. Common sense seems to suggest that the point vitally menaced should be first defended, and we could not afford what is called a "counter hit," in the language of the ring-that is to say, give our London for the chance of smashing the enemy by a blow in the face. The commissioners remind us most unpleasantly, but truly, that in the line of coast from the Humber to Penzance, which is about seven hundred and fifty miles in length, there is an aggregate of nearly three hundred miles on which a landing could be effected, and which it would be impossible to fortify, or, if fortified, to defend so as to prevent the landing of a determined enemy. With the exception, however, of fortifying Woolwich and Chatham, the commissioners propose to expend the twelve millions on the coast, to prevent the enemy bombarding our dockyards, and thus destroying our resources for the equipment of a fresh fleet. If the enemy delayed his march for the purpose of reducing those fortifications, all would be well, but if he were to turn them and march on London, we can hardly see of what advantage they would prove, for the occupation of the capital would, in all probability, cause a speedy suspension of hostilities. In addition, these extensive works would require large garrisons, who could be invested by a corps of observation, and at the moment when we required every man to check the invader's march, we should find a large factor in our defensive system held in check. The great point is, not so much to render it impossible for the French to get out of England again if they once landed, but to place our country in such a state that it would not be worth their while to attempt it, with the probability that they would be foiled in their darling wish of occupying London.

There is another serious consideration in the fact that the fortifications the commissioners recommend, and whose value is not fully proved, would require at least three years in completing. During that period, the nation would be suffering from its present uneasy state, while the very fact of our fortifications being left so long incomplete, might lead to the very event we are all so anxious to avoid. If Louis Napoleon really meditate those designs against England with which he is charged, he would scarcely be so chivalrous as to allow us full time to place ourselves in a posture of defence. There was a period, we allow, "when the French Guard never fired first," but soldiers have grown more practical now-a-days, and take advantage of every chance afforded them of injuring the enemy.

The first important item, then, appears to us to be the defensive fortification of London, and a proper system of covering the roads which lead from the coast to the capital. Our hedges and ditches would compel an July-VOL. CXIX. NO. CCCCLXXV.

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enemy to follow the beaten track, and along that he might be harassed at every available point by our volunteers, defended by easily thrown-up earthwork entrenchments. By this mode his various corps converging on the capital might be so weakened, that, when they assembled before the entrenched camp, which would be the advanced defensive work of London, their numbers might be rendered no longer formidable.

There is the same objection to fortifying London sufficiently as there is to preventing a landing the size of the city would render it simply impossible, for we could not obtain sufficient armed men to defend the lengthened works. The scheme suggested by a contemporary, of building detached forts around London at the commanding points, appears feasible enough, but the question is, whether it would not be more advisable to trust to the defences of entrenched camps, which have ever offered a most serious obstacle to a foe. In the modern system of defences, every large fortification has such a camp before it, for the troops concentrated there, by continual engagements, prevent the enemy opening his parallels. Such a system would be almost invaluable for London; for, as the enemy would be unable to invest the capital, armed forces could flock up from every part of the country during the protracted struggle, and we should have such a body of riflemen at our command that the foe would eventually be compelled to retreat through fear of being enveloped, and not a man would live to tell the tale of the invasion in France.

It is evident that the nation will never return to its normal state of tranquillity until it be assured of being in a proper posture of defence, and the easiest way of doing that is by protecting London from a coup de main. When the earthworks we suggest have been formed, there would be time for building the detached forts, of which we certainly entertain a very high opinion, especially that suggested for the defence of Woolwich, which should be set about at once. These camps could be employed, too, for the training of our volunteers, who, protected from the necessity of meeting trained troops in the field, would render most valuable aid. But we are strongly of opinion that it would be a very dangerous step to risk everything on a general action, for, were our scanty regular army destroyed, it would take a long time to re-form a corps of sufficient strength to drive the invader back into the sea.

Much stress has been laid on the value of volunteers, and we have more than once seen references made to the heroic actions fought by the Prussian volunteers against the French troops in 1812 and 1813. But it must not be left out of sight that the troops Vandamme led into the field were the merest conscript lads, almost untrained to arms, and were opposed by the flower of the country. If the French landed here, however, they would bring their picked troops, who feel confident of victory against any enemy, owing to their late achievements in Lombardy, and the most important thing for ourselves would be to avoid any doubtful contest, the result of which would heighten the ardour and impetuosity of the French. On the other hand, were they harassed on their march by swarms of sharpshooters, on whom they would find it impossible to retaliate, they would, as is their nature, soon become desponding, and when they found themselves in front of an entrenched camp, which could only be carried by a heavy expenditure of men, and with the certainty of

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