poleon himself estimated the loss in the passage at one hundred vessels, but Admiral Decrès, who was always opposed to the expedition, believed that such a loss would throw the other nineteen hundred into inextricable confusion.

Nearly fifty years elapsed ere England was again disquieted by the rumour of invasion. A Napoleon was again seated on the throne of France, who, while possessing much of the genius of his great uncle, was distinguished by a remarkable reticence, regarded by many as an inspiration. The conditions, too, had been rendered more equal by the general introduction of steam, and the passage of the Channel was not dependent on summer calms or winter fogs. But, even prior to the third Napoleon, jactant voices had been heard in France as to what might be effected by the new lever. The Prince de Joinville wrote the following words, which have considerable truth to distinguish them:

With the aid of steam navigation, a war of most daring aggression is permitted at sea. We are certain of our movements, and free in our actions. Thus, wind and waves need no longer give us any uneasiness; we can calculate to the day and hour. We shall make war with safety, because we shall attack two vulnerable things-the confidence of the English people in their insular position, and their maritime resources. Our steam service would have two distinct scenes of action-first, the Channel, in which our ports could shelter a considerable force, which, going forth by night, could defy the most numerous and dense fleet of cruisers. Nothing could prevent this force from meeting before morning at any part of the French coast agreed upon, when it might act with impunity.

Hear, again, what M. Hippolyte Lamarche, in his letter to MM. Thiers and Barrot does not hesitate to assert :

Steam has thrown hundreds of bridges across the Channel: we can now pass at any time and in any weather from France to England. In estimating at eighty-five thousand the number of troops that England could raise for the defence of her territory, we certainly concede more than the reality. The mass of the people would be of no use to the government; they are absolutely unacquainted with the use of arms. A landing may be effected upon a hundred different points of the English coast, and then a skilful general will not hesitate what course to adopt; he will choose in his rear a point of concentration to recruit his troops, cover London, or march in force against the enemy. France has at this moment 1432 naval officers, and 200 students of the first class, who may be ranked as the staff. If you question them as to the possibility of a descent upon England in the present state of naval science, I may be allowed to say that every voice would answer in the affirmative.

These menaces did not pass unnoticed in England, and our great Duke was one of the first to call public attention to the defenceless state of our shores in his memorable letter to Sir John Burgoyne. Since the period that letter was written, have we once been able to contradict his statement that we have no defence, or hope of defence, except in our fleet? Speaking of the volunteer system, the Duke, ex cathedrá, says: "We hear a good deal of the spirit of the people of England, for which no man entertains a higher respect than I do. But, unorganised, undisciplined, without systematic subordination, established and well understood, this spirit, opposed to the fire of musketry and cannon, and to sabres and bayonets of disciplined troops, would only expose those animated by such a spirit to confusion and destruction." Perhaps the

hitherto excellent working of our volunteer system may have alleviated some of these evils, though we candidly confess we should feel more comfortable with a reasonable increase of our regular army. This army, strengthened by the militia, the Duke considered "would put the country on its legs in respect to national force, and I would engage for its defence, old as I am." Thirteen years have elapsed since these memorable remarks were penned, and we have done nothing for the fortification of our coast save deliberate. The Duke told us that he had in that day reconnoitred the whole coast, from the North Foreland to Selsey Bill, and, excepting immediately under the fire of Dover Castle, there was not a spot on the coast where "infantry might not be thrown on shore, at any time of tide, with any wind, and in any weather, and from which such body of infantry, so thrown on shore, would not find, within the distance of five miles, a road into the interior of the country through the cliffs, practicable for the march of a body of troops." How are matters now along the same line of coast?

Turning to another writer on this much-vexed question, Sir Francis B. Head ("Defenceless State of Great Britain"), we find him drawing the following deductions from facts: "1. The desire for revenge of the French army has materially increased, while, on the other hand, the inclination of the English people to defend themselves from invasion has diminished almost inversely with the increase of their wealth, until it has now become nearly extinct. 2. While, in the French navy, the improvement in the art of gunnery, the establishment of compagnies permanentes, of practical gunner-seamen; the power of steam to tow vessels and boats of all descriptions across the British Channel, during any weather, by day or night, and, lastly, the construction of a gigantic harbour of rendezvous at Cherbourg, capable of containing more than ninety sail of the line, have removed the principal difficulties against which Napoleon has to contend. Owing to the dispersion of the English navy over the world, a French fleet might suddenly be concentrated at Cherbourg, and as the first Napoleon said, 'If we are masters of the Channel for six hours, England has lived her time. Let us be masters of the straits for six hours, and we are the masters of the world.'" Lastly, Sir F. Head urges the lamentable deficiency of our army resources, as offering a positive bait for invasion. In corroboration of Sir F. Head's first argument, we need only make another extract from M. Duhamel's above-mentioned pamphlet:

It has been said that if ever a war was popular it would assuredly be that which we should have with our neighbours and friends on the other side of the Channel. This is not new, but it is true, whatever may happen. But no one in France, any more than elsewhere, is ignorant that above all these aspirations, and above all these feelings, expressed or kept down, there exists an august thought, an imperial wisdom, doing everything in its own season, strong, energetic, and calm, and whose powerful quos ego knows how to restrain every impatience and moderate every passion. This cuts short all interpretations and suppositions, for it is known that nothing can force the hand which this day holds the key of the temple of Janus.

We have more than once expressed our opinion in the pages of this journal that the gauntlet was thrown down to England by the opening of Cherbourg, and that it was intended as a hint to us that we must henceforward share the supremacy of the Channel. But there are many honest

Britons who deride the notions of fortresses menacing us: we always did beat the French on the sea, and can do it again. Very comforting arguments these, we grant, were it not that Sir Howard Douglas has so roughly shaken us from our security. Not alone that France now possesses a finer fleet than she had ever before, and not afflicted with dry-rot, we must bear in mind that naval engagements henceforward will be decided, not according to Nelson's bold and simple tactics, but on principles in which the science of gunnery will have a much larger share than seamanship, and human courage, and muscles. To quote the author's own words: "The navies of Europe and America have so increased the number and strength of their ships and their personnel, in all that relates to the science and practice of war, that in a future contest the sea will become the theatre of events more important and decisive than have ever yet been witnessed."

Again, the conditions under which the French would now attempt an invasion are considerably more equal. The first Napoleon alarmed us sufficiently by his enormous army drawn up opposite our shores, but could effect nothing, through want of a powerful fleet. His nephew not only possesses an equally powerful land force, but also a fleet, by sacrificing a portion of which the passage of the Channel could at any time be ensured. The danger to which we are exposed in 1860 is at least tenfold as great as in 1805. Lord Clarence Paget told us early in the financial year that the French had 34 ships of the line afloat and 13 building, 5 iron-cased ships building, 17 corvettes afloat and 3 building, besides gunboats and small vessels: making in all 244 steam ships; and most of those building might be launched in a few months. Russia had 9 steam ships of the line afloat and 9 building, 18 steam frigates afloat and 3 building, 10 steam corvettes afloat and 11 building: making, 187 steam ships afloat and 48 building, a total of 235 vessels. Unlike ourselves, both France and Russia could call out men to man their navies in a few weeks. To meet either, or both, we had in commission 244 vessels, and he expected that ten line-of-battle ships and twelve frigates would be launched during the year. It is plain that we have not yet carried out Mr. Cobden's wish, that, where the French had two ships, we should have three. But we should never forget that Napoleon possesses two first-class ports in Cherbourg and Toulon, equal to another fleet, while we have nothing to oppose to them. It is not enough for England to be able to defy the French fleet; she ought to be equal to any possible combination on the cards; and Napoleon III. is too close a follower of his uncle not to attempt a renewal of his plan of collecting the navies of Europe as a counterpoise to England. Not long ago we heard of tentatives with Denmark; now we hear of an understanding with Russia on the Eastern question; but these are all but means to an end, and that end is the successful issue of the first Napoleon's policy with reference to England. We were greatly struck the other day in refreshing our memory by a certain passage from a conversation between the Emperor and Lord Whitworth, as quoted in Thiers, for it seems precisely applicable to the present day:

Act cordially towards me, and I promise you, on my part, the most cordial and entire return: I promise you continual efforts to conciliate our interests wherever they are reconcilable. Consider what a powerful influence we might exercise

over the world if we could attain the nearer approximation of the two nations. You have a navy that, in ten years of consecutive efforts, and in employing all my resources, I should not be able to equal; but I have five hundred thousand men ready to march under my orders wherever I choose to lead them. If you are master of the sea, I am master of the land. Think, then, sooner of our becoming united than of making war upon each other, and we may at will regulate the destinies of the world. Everything is possible within the interest of humanity with one double power-France and England in union.

But we had giants in the land in those days, who saw through the insidious offer, and preferred twelve years of internecine warfare rather than that the honour of England should be fastened to the chariot-wheel of the colossal tyrant and trailed through the mud. We can imagine the third Napoleon making the same offer to Palmerston, who, careful only of peace, fell into the trap. For eight years we have been the allies of France, and what has been the result? We have alienated every honest friend; our only support on the Continent is Prussia-a mere broken reed, whose position will some day force her into the arms of Napoleon, and we shall once more stand alone, with the Continent in arms against us. But by that time France will possess a fleet, if not equal to ours, quite sufficient to carry out Napoleon's wish of holding the Channel for six hours, and we shall then learn, at a heavy price, whether his predic

tions were correct.

We have no desire to be alarmists, but we think that our feeling of security may carry us too far. The worst thing in the business is the close imitation of his uncle in which Napoleon III. indulges. To take only one instance: was not the insult to the Austrian ambassador in 1859 just the same as when the First Consul insulted Lord Whitworth? And supposing Lord Cowley was selected as the next recipient of such New Year's congratulations, can we rest comfortably assured that the Zouaves may not enter London with the same serene ease as they did Milan ? Besides, the blow would follow so soon on the contumely, that our envoy might scarce have landed on our shores ere one hundred and fifty thousand Frenchmen came to accelerate his movements. As the Leopard cannot change his spots, neither can the Frenchman his feelings towards England. Waterloo must be avenged. So long ago as March 23, 1811, the Duke of Wellington gave us a terrible warning in a letter addressed to the Earl of Liverpool. Read and ponder, countrymen !

From what I have seen of the objects of the French government, and the sacrifices they make to accomplish them, I have no doubt if the British army were for any reason to withdraw from the Peninsula, and the French government were relieved from the pressure of military operations on the Continent, they would incur all risks to land an army in his majesty's dominions. Then, indeed, would commence an expensive contest; then would his majesty's subjects discover what are the miseries of war, of which, by the blessing of God, they have hitherto had no knowledge; and the cultivation, the beauty, and the prospects of the country, and the virtues and happiness of its inhabitants, would be destroyed, whatever might be the result of the military operations. God forbid that I should be a witness, much less an actor, in the scene; and I only hope that the king's government will consider well what I have above stated. To what are these facts to be attributed? Certainly not to the inclination of the inhabitants of the country to the enemy, but to the system of terror on which the French, and all under their authority, invariably act, and to which no power in Europe has ever, or ever can have, recourse.

Besides, it must not be forgotten that, however much we may doubt Louis Napoleon, he found this feeling of antipathy to England rife when he ascended the presidential chair, and has only cleverly fostered it. Those luckless Bourbons, on whose restoration we lavished such treasures, ever treated us with the grossest ingratitude, and courted popularity by exciting animosity towards England. Even the Napoleon of peace brought the countries into collision more than once, and his nautical son was a perfect firebrand. One of the first acts of the Republic was the establishment of a commission to inquire into the efficiency of the navy. The result arrived at was charmingly simple: "Ce qu'il faut établir d'abord, c'est le nombre de vaisseaux que la France devra mettre en ligne le jour que la guerre sera déclarée. Pour cela il y a une base certaine : l'adversaire est connu : il ne peut être question que de l'Angleterre." On this hint the French government has acted ever since. No sooner was the coup d'état accomplished than the recommendation of the commission was carried out. "The status of the French navy should be raised without delay, either by converting or building forty-five line-of-battle ships of the first class, fitted with screw propellers and engines of corresponding powers. Sixty steam vessels of the highest possible speed and efficiency, with twenty steam transports, each capable of carrying one thousand men, with the requisite stores and provisions, were also to be provided, in addition to the transports already existing." Another recommendation was a considerable enlargement of the dockyards, and increased facilities for the building and repair of ships. All this, and more, the emperor has carried out.

And what were we doing all this while? Alas! we made no preparations; it seemed as if our ministry were fearful of giving the French an excuse for hostilities. We danced to their whistle, to secure Louis Napoleon on his throne; we drifted into that thrice-miserable Russian war, in order to avert a consummation which our quondam ally is apparently now arranging; we had not even the good sense to keep up our armaments after the war was over, though we had a fair excuse. The Manchester party yelled for disarmament, and our ministers most politely complied. The gun-boats were hauled on to the gridirons, whence, we now learn, should an accident happen to the machinery, they could not be got down for months; our Baltic and Black Sea squadrons were broken up, and we fell back into the old state of lethargy.

At length came that memorable New Year's-day, 1859, which acted on the British nation like a shower-bath, and we were aroused to the far from pleasant consciousness that the empire was not quite so peaceful as we had been taught to believe. It behoved us to look about us, for the liberation of the Italians from the Austrian yoke was a pendant to Humbert's expedition to Ireland. The nation's confidence in Louis Napoleon was shaken, never to be restored, although the trial of Dr. Bernard, bearing so close an affinity to the case of Peltier, ought to have opened our eyes before. The defenceless state of England became once more the key-note, and Sir John Pakington certainly achieved wonders during his too brief administration. But a Channel fleet was not enough; our coasts must be protected from a coup de main, and a commission was appointed, which brought in a pleasant little account of twelve millions. This demand put a sudden check on our martial inspirations, and that part of the business