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the interest of Switzerland (declared neutral by the European treaties) to look about for an ally. The choice is not difficult: Switzerland is a natural ally of France, because she covers a portion of the latter's frontier." How charmingly simple! The prince is so perfectly occupied with reflections on the former submission of the federation to the omnipotent mediator, that he forgets that neutral Switzerland covers a far larger portion of the frontiers of Germany and Austria. But let us proceed. "For a small state, neutrality is a chimera. . . . . France is attached to Switzerland through defensive interests: only offensive ones can render Switzerland of value to the other powers. The former is a permanent interest, the latter quite transitory." But we soon learn what the prince understands by the defence of France, and how he proposes to dispose of Basel and the Rhine bridge for that object. He is of opinion that the demolition of the fortress of Huningen was only ostensibly to the interest of Switzerland and Basel. "Huningen should rather be again fortified, and have a tête de pont on the right bank of the Rhine. In that case France, having thus an opening on Germany, could more easily dispense with the bridge of Basel." We must once more admire this delightful candour, which, we hope, will call the attention of the Germans to the Kehl bridge. Further, the prince says: "It is therefore the chief interest of Switzerland to attach itself to a party which will ensure her liberty and independence. All Europe is attached by inextricable bonds: France is the first link of the chain; the prosperity and liberty of all Europe depends from those of her capital." Finally, he advises the federalists even to remain allies of France, "because the interest of their country recommends it to them, and their interest as a civilised nation demands it of them."

We grant that, when this pamphlet appeared, the present emperor was only twenty-four years of age. But we may feel convinced that the young man openly expressed those Napoleonic ideas which he fed on from his earliest youth, which entered into his flesh and blood, which he would not and could not give up in riper years, but which, indeed, must have been strengthened and confirmed by his accession to the imperial throne. This is the nucleus of these ideas: the French nation the mistress of nations; the French capital the mistress of France: a Napoleon the master of Paris, of France, of all the countries round, in so far as they can be purchased sooner or later by the blood and treasure of his French vassals. Napoleon I. also said, frequently enough: "L'Empire c'est la paix." While resting between his wars-while carrying on in France and his conquered states legalised slavery by his conscriptions-it was ever peace, the assured peace of the world, which he promised his tortured peoples as the speedily attained object of his actions. Napoleon 1. also spoke now and then of the liberty and independence of the Swiss and other nations subjugated to him. Perhaps he spoke so in good faith; for the perfection of despotism could not think of nations in any other posture than one of independence dependent on itself. Who can deny that the indefatigable zeal with which Napoleon III. has pursued his object, the imperial throne, is such an extraordinary manifestation than many millions have forgotten the path which led to that object? But he must possess a far greater strength of will than he has ever yet displayed if he can command himself to halt on the path he has once

trodden-if he were more powerful than the destiny which drives him forward with irresistible force in the blood-stained footsteps of the first Napoleon-if he were even yet noble-minded enough to be a Napoleon of peace, a greater Napoleon than Napoleon the Great. But the world can no longer reckon upon this. Hence, let us make no further concessions to the renown-craving emperor of the soldiers; and, before all, let Europe reject liberalism and independence from the hand of a military despotism!

But there is another point in connexion with this pamphlet of 1833. By its cool contempt of national treaties, it bears a strange resemblance to La Guéronnière's pamphlet of 1859; or was the proposition to Switzerland to surrender the Vallée des Dappes anything else than a hint for the rupture of those treaties? In all the negotiations relating to Savoy, and the danger to which Switzerland is thereby exposed, we find very little reference to a consultation of those powers who subscribed the treaty of Vienna. Such is the reward we are destined to receive for allowing such rents to be made in that treaty since 1815.

Since the earlier portion of this article was written, Mr. Horsman has plainly exposed to the House what awaits Europe from Louis Napoleon. Unfortunately, this gentleman's speeches, though to the point, and very exhaustive, are unsatisfactory, in so far as they offer no practical solution. All he asks is, that England should protest against the annexation of Northern Savoy; but we do not see of what advantage such a step would prove. Pauca verba must be our motto at the present critical time. Lord John has protested with a vigour for which we did not give him credit, and has plainly given M. Thouvenel to understand the great disappointment Louis Napoleon's ambition has proved to his sincere friends; but he can do no more. It is impossible for us to go to war with France because of her annexation policy, and a national protest would be humiliating to us through its inefficacy. It is quite certain that Louis Napoleon cannot be turned from his purpose by any words, and we certainly will not employ force. He forfeits the friendship of England for the sake of Savoy, and has destroyed public confidence: he has brought matters to such a state that, whenever he makes a solemn assertion, we believe exactly the opposite. Hence, we are justified in thinking he has designs upon Belgium, because he so needlessly declared that he had no intention of annexation in that quarter.

The Empire is peace, Louis Napoleon has told us, with sickening iteration. Since that sentence was first uttered, France has been engaged in two of the greatest wars ever known, and yet there is no signal of diminution in her legions. Can it be that the Empire will be peace when the whole of the Continent has been humiliated? It certainly looks very like it at present, and the way in which Italian matters have been patched up seems to indicate that another campaign would be welcome to France. She guarantees Sardinia possession of Lombardy, but not of the Legations: those Victor Emmanuel must defend with his good right hand. Austria is well aware that a collision must take place ere long, and Venetia bristles with bayonets. Should the war break out again, Sardinia would be compelled to appeal for French aid, and a heavy price would now be paid for it: if an idea caused the annexation of Savoy,

what reward would not be demanded for taking the field a second time? Plon-plon has not yet given up the idea of gracing his brows with the iron crown; and many a dark intrigue is still going on to produce that result. With a Muratist government in Naples, a viceregal satrap in Lombardy, Louis Napoleon could afford to patch up a peace with the Pope, and become once again the well-beloved eldest son of the Church. We sober-minded English laugh at the idea of the Napoleonic "star of destiny," but there is a certain degree of truth in it, in so far that it gives ambition an object, and at the same time a palliation. By lengthened meditation on the subject, we believe that Louis Napoleon has grown into the mania that it is his mission to found that huge empire over which the great Napoleon held a momentary sway. But he is too crafty to fall into the errors of his uncle, and risk everything on one decisive action. He has contrived to break up the old alliances, and has left England in a state of isolation which his uncle only effected by years of warfare and a continental blockade. Without the sacrifice of a man, Louis Napoleon has destroyed our prestige: he has robbed us of our old and faithful Russian friend, and caused Austria to regard us with loathing. What is to prevent him first weakening Prussia by a brilliant campaign, and then salving the wound with the prospect of a Teutonic Empire? In spite of their patriotism, the Prussians would not object to surrender the Rhenish provinces, always a source of difficulty, and receive compensation in Saxony, for thus their kingdom would be rendered more compact. By the time all this had been effected, even Mr. Bright would be forced to look with suspicion on his new friend; but the mischief would be done, and we, finding war a necessity, would enter on it without a single continental supporter.

It is just possible that the neutrality guaranteed Belgium and Switzerland by the great powers, may be the reason why they stand in their present perilous position. So long as one shred of that treaty of Vienna exists, Waterloo remains unavenged. Louis Napoleon, we have seen, said, twenty-seven years ago, that neutrality was a chimera, and he is now trying to prove the correctness of his views. For some years past, he has been attempting to convert Belgium into a French prefecture, and no sooner did he complain of the Belgian press, than censors were appointed. He and his ministers have been doing their utmost to prevent Brialmont's plan for the fortification of Antwerp being carried out, and even the work in which it was explained was prohibited passing the French frontier. Belgium must not be independent, or his great plans might be thwarted.

On all sides, then, we find the French annexation policy making gradual progress. Not long ago, and the idea of France obtaining the Palatinate from Bavaria was ventilated, and, of course, at once denied by the French authorities. Still, they cannot have the hardihood to assert that the annexation of Savoy has not exposed the Genevese to considerable risk. But there are, fortunately, limits to French conquest in Switzerland, for that country possesses an impregnable fortress in her mountains. The lowlands may be torn from her, but Helvetia can protect herself against utter slavery. But such is not the case with Belgium, and, unless the fortress works be at once commenced, a premium

for spoliation hangs temptingly before the sight of the imperial annexator -so temptingly that he will hardly refrain from taking another step in the path of restoring to France her "national frontiers."

We

One gleam of hope was offered us during the past month, by the announced alliance between England, Austria, and Prussia, for, as there is not the least doubt of the treaty between the second-named power and Russia, we should thus have the coalition once again instituted. have reason for believing that some such measure is seriously entertained, although matters are not yet sufficiently ripe for publicity. Austria, deceived by both England and Prussia during the Italian war, would display great magnanimity by entering on such an alliance, which, at the same time, would afford her the necessary tranquillity to regulate her own internal affairs.

And, should such an alliance be effected, Louis Napoleon would have no legitimate cause of complaint. We gave credit to his protestations up to the last moment, and would not allow our eyes to be opened. Lord John Russell's speech in the House aroused the nation from its fancied security, and proved how little a commercial treaty, however one-sided it might be, would avail to disarm a nation like the French. The seed of suspicion once sown, rapidly burst out into a widely-spreading tree, and years of good behaviour on the part of Louis Napoleon will be needed to regain the confidence of England.

At any rate, matters are rapidly approaching a crisis, and, in all probability the next month will reveal the nature of the game Louis Napoleon has been playing in Italy. We still hold, however, to our conviction that Victor Emmanuel listened to the voice of the charmer, and gave up the home of his fathers, lured by the dazzling bait of an Italian crown. The play is nearly played out, and ere long Louis Napoleon will give the signal to let the curtain fall. He played for a stake which he lost, and, like a clever gambler, carried off what he could, leaving his accomplice to bear the anger of their dupes.

In the mean while we earnestly hope that Belgium will not allow herself to be wheedled into defencelessness by his flattery. Switzerland has shown so bold a front that Louis Napoleon will probably leave that country alone for the present, and, not being fond of idleness, may perchance turn his attention to Belgium. Again, we repeat, that the only prospect of escaping annexation, or, at the least, a very bad bargain, is in fortifying Antwerp.

NEW MONTHLY MAGAZINE.

THE CHANCES OF INVASION.

MR. COBDEN has returned to Paris to see what he can save out of the wreck of disappointed hopes, which he intoxicated us with for a season, in his desire to prove that diplomatists can be carved ex quovis ligno. He has already honoured our journals with a "communiqué," and it is easy to read between the lines that we have henceforth to depend on the generous sentiments of our magnificent and disinterested ally for any shreds of reciprocity he may be pleased to accord to us. Curiously enough, though, while England is, as it were, suing formâ pauperis, the French press is daily growing more embittered against us. According to them, we subsidised Garibaldi, and fomented the Neapolitan insurrection, because our desire is ever to promote embarrassment for the imperial government. These articulations of jealousy have been put in a definite shape by the Count Duhamel in a recent pamphlet, in which he pours out the vials of his wrath on England. Considering the friendly terms existing between the two nations, we certainly did not expect to read such effusions as the following, whatever the private sentiments of the French nation may be:

Oh! if matters had arrived at that point; if the high will which governs us judged that the time had arrived for taking our revenge for Quiberon and Waterloo; if his energetic initiative had let loose the Eagle against the Leopard, never would national enthusiasm have excited to so high a degree this warlike people of France, whose sword is burning in the scabbard. When the old words of "Down on the English!" and "Montjoie and Saint Denis!" struck their ears, children and old men would shoulder the musket; rich and poor would carry their offering for that rising in arms against our old enemies. If hundreds of millions rose spontaneously for the Crimea and Italy, it would be milliards that France would give for the war against England. Not a fishing-boat but would arm to pass the strait; and the shade of the great Emperor would contemplate this popular impulse and the book of history, which would not open at such an hour but at the page of St. Helena.

Coinciding as we do to a very considerable extent in M. Duhamel's estimate of his fellow-countrymen, we purpose in the present paper to discuss the chances of this menaced invasion, and judge from the past what may be awaiting us in the future.

If analogy may be taken into calculation for historical purposes, we find England and France standing much on the same terms now as they did after the peace of Amiens. The first Bonaparte had finished a magnificent campaign in Italy, thereby causing a very wholesome terror to the continental regents, while with ourselves he was discussing a commercial treaty, all advantages of which were to be on his side. Whatever his June-VOL. CXIX. NO. CCCCLXXIV.

K

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