SIRES TO COMPLAIN.

GLADSTONE'S STUDIES ON HOMER

THE CATHEDRAL-THE CRUCIFIX-THE CONFESSIONAL. BY EDWARD P.
ROWSELL

ALEXANDER DUMAS AND HIS PETS

A WINTER IN ITALY

VOLTAIRE AND THE PRÉSIDENT DE Brosses

MR. FAUNTLEROY'S OFFICE. BY THE AUTHOR OF " ASHLEY"

MY FRIEND PICKLES; AND SOME SOCIAL GRIEVANCES OF WHICH HE DE

320

. 379 400

BY ALEXANDER ANDREWS

432

NEW MONTHLY MAGAZINE.

THE PENINSULAR WAR,

AS VIEWED BY A FRENCH STATESMAN.*

WE left M. de Melito when Joseph Bonaparte, after founding a new order of knighthood in place of that of St. January, a royal society of sciences and belles-lettres, and giving to the kingdom of Naples a constitution, had resigned in favour of Murat; and he (M. de Melito) joined that prince in the new kingdom that had devolved on him-Spain-at Miranda, on the Ebro. One of M. de Melito's peculiar claims to confidence lies in the simplicity with which he avows his own diplomatic failures. If he was always disclaiming against the incompetency of others, doubts would inevitably arise as to the spirit by which he was actuated; but when we find him placing quietly on record that but few regrets were manifested at his leaving Naples, and that there was, no doubt, much more politeness than sincerity in what few testimonies of interest were shown to him, we feel that by thus decrying his own labours he is all the more entitled to credit in his animadversions on others.

The actual moment when M. de Melito joined King Joseph was not an auspicious one. The loss of the battle of Baylen, and the defeat and captivity of General Dupont, who commanded the French army on that disastrous occasion, had obliged him to quit the capital. The occupation of Spain had, it is to be observed, been one of the results of the stipulations of the celebrated secret treaty of Tilsit. The first of these, and they are most interesting to recapitulate in the present day, to show what Bonapartist policy was at that time, was that Russia should take possession of European Turkey and extend its conquests in Asia as far as it might judge convenient. The second was that the dynasty of the Bourbons in Spain, and of Braganza in Portugal, should cease to exist, and a prince of the Bonaparte family should succeed to each of those thrones. The third was that the temporal authority of the Pope should cease, and Rome and its dependencies should be united to the kingdom of Italy. The fourth was that Russia engaged to assist France with its navy to reduce Gibraltar. The fifth, that the African conquests of France should be given up as an indemnity to the Kings of Sardinia and Sicily, for the loss of their kingdoms. The sixth, that the island of Malta should belong to France. The seventh was that the French should occupy Egypt; and the last and eighth was that the navigation of the Mediterranean should

* Mémoires du Comte Miot de Melito, ancien ministre, ambassadeur, conseiller d'Etat et membre de l'Institut. Tome III.

Sept.-VOL. CXIV. NO. CCCCLIII.

B

only be permitted to French, Russian, Spanish, and Italian ships. Such stipulations at once vindicate the conduct pursued by Great Britain in the Peninsular war. We fought on Spanish soil, but our commerce and our very existence, as well as the liberties of all Europe, were at stake.

The victory obtained by Marshal Bessières, near Medina de Rio Seco, having opened the road to Madrid, King Joseph left Bayonne on the 8th of July, 1808, and entered the capital on the 20th of the same month. Before the end of the month, however, the catastrophe of Baylen had obliged him to quit his chief city before he can be said to have been fairly installed in it, and to retreat with the French troops to the Ebro. On leaving Madrid, says M. de Melito, the monarchy had disappeared; there only remained a general and an army in retreat. The siege of Saragossa had to be raised, and the three corps under Marshals Bessières, Moncey, and Ney, had all to withdraw from the interior to the left bank of the Ebro. Only a small detachment was left in the rear, at the defile of Pancorvo, on the road from Vittoria to Burgos. The position of the French army, which at that time did not amount to more than 50,000 men, was still further imperilled by the capitulation of the army of Portugal under Junot, after being defeated by the English at Vimiera on the 21st of August. Under such circumstances it was deemed imprudent to assume the offensive, and the head-quarters were removed to Vittoria.

Here Napoleon himself, however, arrived soon after, preceded by such a body of troops as, in M. de Melito's words, to render the position every day more and more formidable. This was on the 7th of November, after the Emperor had declared, at the opening of the legislative chambers of Paris, on the 25th of October, that he was going to crown his brother at Madrid, and plant the eagles on the towers of Lisbon. Napoleon arrived in a state of great exasperation. He addressed the Spaniards in French and Italian, but they could not understand a word he said. M. de Melito says, however, that he could do so, and that the Emperor stormed against the Dons for not appreciating all the advantages presented by being subjected by the French. He more particularly denounced the monks, who, he said, had sold themselves to the English; but, he added, he had now come with the soldiers who had conquered at Austerlitz, at Jena, and at Eylau; and who could resist them? Not the Spaniards, who did not know how to fight. In a few months Spain would be a conquered country, and would be treated as such.

With the reinforcements which Napoleon had brought with him the army presented a strength of 150,000 men, the Imperial Guard and the Royal Guard of Spain, just arrived from Naples, not comprised. There was also a large body of troops in Catalonia, under General Gouvion Saint Cyr, and these were still further augmented by the return of the army of Portugal, which, according to M. de Melito, gave altogether in round numbers some 300,000 men, who only waited for the signal to throw themselves upon Spain, as a prey which could not escape them. The Emperor left Vittoria on the 10th of November. M. de Melito followed in the wake of the army, and, he says, he found the towns deserted and houses devastated; the passage of the French columns, which occupied three days, had ruined the country, and everywhere the soldiers had committed frightful disorders. On the 12th, head-quarters were established at Burgos. This great city, although it offered no resistance,

was devoted to fire and pillage. Nothing was spared save the cathedral. In the convent of Las Huelgas even the tombs were rifled, and the dead bodies scattered about. Night fires were made of furniture and musical instruments. The moral of the French troops, M. de Melito says, was completely gone; they only knew how to fight and pillage, all military discipline had vanished, and the Emperor was witness of these disorders without being able to control them. Joseph is described as having been so much afflicted at the treatment to which one of the first cities of his kingdom was subjected under his own eyes, that he was laid up for several days. The Emperor, however, had no such compunctions; from the day that he entered Spain there was no will there but his own. He stopped at Burgos till the left wing had crossed the Ebro, and then marched on the highway to Madrid, beating down all opposition before him. Once in possession of the capital, he treated the people as a conquered race, without even consulting his puppet king, manifestly to the disgust of M. de Melito, and to the infinite vexation of Joseph himself, who withdrew in dudgeon to an old château built by Charles V. in the midst of a forest near Madrid.

The advance of Sir John Moore on Toro and Valladolid first brought about a change. Napoleon moved at once to encounter the British, but Moore having withdrawn his inadequate force the Emperor was obliged to leave the pursuit to Marshal Soult. The attitude of Austria at the same time called away the Emperor to other regions, so he was obliged to conciliate Joseph before he took his departure, and the latter made his public entry into Madrid on the 22nd of January, 1809.

There was, however, no sympathy for the king among his new subjects. M. de Melito asserts that, personally, Joseph was not unpopular, his affability and urbanity made him many friends; but all durable relations with the Spaniards were put out of the question by the dependence in which he was placed on the will of the Emperor, and by the want of pecuniary resources, which threw the expenses of the army of invasion and occupation on the Spaniards. If even the position was ameliorated for a brief space by the successes of the Duke of Belluna and the fall of Saragossa, it was as soon deteriorated by the recriminations of the two brothers-emperor and king.

It was in the midst of such uncertainties that the English, under Sir Arthur Wellesley, landed at Lisbon, and joining the Portuguese under Beresford, they obliged Soult to retreat by the defiles of Salamanca, at the expense of all his artillery and baggage. The government junta of Spain hastened at the same time, on hearing of the approach of the English and Portuguese, to organise two divisions under Generals Cuesta and Venegas, in the name of Ferdinand VII. The terrible system of guerillas was also put into force.

The English having effected a junction with Cuesta, the king started from Madrid to join the Duke of Belluna's head-quarters, leaving the capital a prey to fear and anarchy. The results of the battle of Talavera (July 28th) naturally added tenfold to the insecurity previously existing, and M. de Melito, who had remained behind, was, with other French employés, obliged to withdraw from the capital. Of the battle of Talavera, M. de Melito says, "The enemy occupied formidable positions, and our troops, notwithstanding their impetuosity, could not succeed in driving

them from them. The English fought with signal valour; the loss was considerable on both sides, and the two armies remained in presence of one another." Again, M. de Melito received letters from his brother, who informed him that "it was true that the enemy had not been beaten on the 28th, but that he had suffered greatly, and had remained in his position." This is a meagre account of an engagement which Alison justly designates as "the glorious battle of Talavera," the first for a century past in which the English had been brought to contend on a great scale with the French, and which in its lustre equalled, in its ultimate effects exceeded, the far-famed days of Cressy and Agincourt. Two-andtwenty thousand British had engaged for two successive days, and, finally, defeated above forty-five thousand French; for the aid which the Spaniards afforded in the battle was very trifling, and not more than ten thousand of the enemy, including the king's guard, remained to watch their lines in the olive woods of Talavera, who never fired a shot. "This battle," says Jomini," at once restored the reputation of the British army, which during a century had declined. It was now ascertained that the English infantry could dispute the palm with the best in Europe."

Although M. de Melito makes no mention of the circumstance by which Marshal Soult was enabled to take up a position in the rear of the British, viz. the pusillanimous abandonment of the Puerto de Banos by the Spaniards, he speaks rationally of the results obtained by that movement, and of the consequent concentration of the forces of Soult, Ney, and Mortier, when he says it must necessarily have obliged the British force to retreat, unless it chose to allow itself to be surrounded.

Alison relates that Wellington left about 2000 wounded in the hospital of Talavera, under charge of the Spanish division under Cuesta, who afterwards abandoned them to their fate. De Melito says that the English general left more than 4000 wounded behind him, whom, by a letter addressed to Marshal Victor, he recommended to French generosity.

The retreat of the English was followed by the defeat of the Spanish under Venegas, and Joseph once more entered Madrid on the 15th of August. The cessation of hostilities that ensued enabled him to direct his attention to administrative reforms and ameliorations, but all his efforts failed in the presence of a deep-seated abhorrence of the new rule imposed upon the nation by force of arms. The Emperor, too, had been irritated by the display made at Talavera; Marshal Jourdan was recalled, and Soult was sent to take his place at head-quarters. Napoleon intended, indeed, once more going to Spain himself, but he was prevented doing so.

Under such circumstances, with a people hostile to them in Madrid, a nation in arms without, and the English withdrawn to the Portuguese frontier, it was deemed that the best thing to be done to recover prestige was to carry on war, and with this view Joseph, after defeating the Spaniards under Arizaga at Ocaña, marched upon Andalusia. The passage of the Sierra Morena was forced without much resistance, and the French were received with an assumed cordiality at the ancient cities of Cordova and Seville. A demonstration made at the same time against Cadiz was, however, followed by no results, and Joseph returned from his grand military promenade by Malaga and Grenada to Andujar. The text