7thly, Because we have seen part of the British forces left useless abroad, at a time when an additional military strength was thought wanting for our domestic defence; and that want supplied by foreign mercenaries, which alarms us greatly, from the reflections we cannot avoid making on the fatal consequences which may be produced to this country, if a prerogative shall be ever established for bringing over into this country foreign mercenaries in British pay, even during the sitting of Parliament, and without previously consulting that Parliament in a matter so new, and so essential to the honour and to the safety of the nation. This alarms us the more, when we see the troops of Hanover, which had been affectedly secreted from the last year's estimates (though paid by this nation then) now taken avowedly again into British pay; for which second variation we are not able to assign any national motive. Our alarm, therefore, must increase, since that patriot zeal seems alarmed no longer, which adopted, at least, the constitutional jealousy, and which had given, at least, the sanction of Ministerial and Parliamentary acquiescence to the popular discontent occasioned before by the troops of Hanover. We therefore consider it as our bounden duty to our country, and to his Majesty's royal family, to warn posterity to watch the exertion of so dangerous a prerogative, by which, upon the same reasoning and pretence, that a small number of Hanoverians may be introduced into this country, any greater number may; and if that shall ever be the case, the rights and liberties of this country may be left at mercy, or the Protestant Succession in his Majesty's Royal House be, at least, endangered by the discontents which such a measure might produce in the hearts of the people. 8thly, Because we are discouraged still more from engaging in the further burthens and hazards of this consuming measure, by the sad view of the situation of affairs at home. The peace of the Kingdom is not yet entirely restored; the whole expense already incurred by the Rebellion is not yet ascertained; the further expense which may be incurred, cannot be yet foreseen; the pressing demands of the Navy Debt weaken us most where we should endeavour to be strongest. And since to these we may add the stagnation of commerce, the decay of our inland trade, the vast increase of our military establishment at home, made up of hands wanted by the manufacturer and the farmer; the decrease of national wealth, the difficulty and enhanced expense of raising supplies; when adding debts to debts, we have parted, in effect, with the very power of redemption, by mortgaging the Sinking Fund; the fluctuation and delicacy of the public credit; the combination of all these circumstances presents to our minds a dark and dangerous situation (such a one as we would not have thus pointed out, if it remained a secret to any one within, or without this island), a situation which, we apprehend, ought to fix our attention, in the first place, at home, and to warn us not to precipitate the too nearly impending ruin of our country. We should rather hope for a proper exertion of our own British naval strength, and by assisting the Powers more nearly concerned upon her Continent, with unsparing, but not with lavish hands, to withstand the ambitious designs of France; that we might regain to this nation from foreign Powers that respect grounded upon our prudence, and upon our strength rightly applied; which alone ought to be made the foundation, and can alone be the support of peace; at least that we might find some leisure from our cares for others, to effect, if possible, our own domestic welfare, instead of promoting (as we apprehend the present measures tend to promote) national calamity, bankruptcy, and military Government. 9thly, Because our duty to God, and to our country, excites us, in such a situation, more particularly to exert ourselves in discharge of that office, for which we stand accountable to both, being established by the Constitution guardians of the people, and counsellors to the Crown, constituted to watch, to check, to avert, to retrieve, to support, or to withstand wherever our duty suggests; in which no desire of opposition, no personal dislike, no little motive of resentment, or of ambition; no selfish, or no partial consideration has animated, can relax, or shall disgrace our conduct; affected deeply, but not depressed with the impending ruin of our country; we are determined not to be remiss in our endeavours to retrieve its welfare, which can only be effected by the re-establishment of peace, and of order, by wise economy, and temperate reformation, by regaining confidence, and authority to Government; and reviving in the nation a truly British and a moral spirit. With all who will concur in such a conduct we will unite with affection; all other connections and views we disclaim and abhor. Charles Noel Somerset, Duke of Beaufort. Herbert Windsor, Lord Montjoy (Viscount Windsor). Henry Bowes Howard, Earl of Suffolk and Berkshire. James Compton, Earl of Northampton. Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury. John Fane, Earl of Westmorland. Laurence Shirley, Earl Ferrers. George Henry Lee, Earl of Lichfield. Philip Stanhope, Earl Stanhope. Edward Harley, Earl of Oxford and Mortimer. John St. John, Lord St. John of Bletsoe. John Ward, Lord Ward. Charles Maynard, Lord Maynard. Price Devereux, Viscount Hereford. John Boyle, Lord Boyle (Earl of Orrery). Fulwar Craven, Lord Craven. CCCXXXII. MAY 21, 1747. A report had been drawn up early in 1747, by Duncan Forbes, President of the Court of Session in Scotland, on the heritable jurisdictions in Scotland, with suggestions for legislation. In consequence, Lord Hardwicke, the Lord Chancellor, introduced a Bill on the 17th of February, for the purpose of abolishing these jurisdictions. The same Bill was introduced in the Commons by Attorney-General Ryder. It was stated, pretty plainly, that one of the reasons, if not the principal reason which induced the Government to undertake the change, was the assistance which such a system had given to the late rebellion, by organising the clans. The chief argument against the change was that it contravened the Articles of the Union. The Bill (20 George II, cap. 43) appears to have passed without a division in the Lords. The following protest was inserted after it was resolved that the Bill should go into Committee. Ist, Because changing the civil Constitution of Scotland, which the Act of Union reserved, and taking from the great families in that part of the Kingdom, without their consent, and against their will, their ancient rights and inheritances to be purchased by the public in this time of their distress, at a great but uncertain expense, appears to us to be so extraordinary an exertion of the power of Parliament, as could only be justified by necessity of state, or by some general, manifest, and urgent utility to the public. 2ndly, Because we apprehend this Bill not to be justified by any necessity of state, since it is manifestly and avowedly ineffectual, if calculated for adding any further security to his Majesty's Government, because it is not so much as pretended that this Bill can have any effect upon the influence of clans, which arises from no legal authority; and since from the legal jurisdictions subject to the control, and necessarily under the direction of the King's courts in Scotland, danger to Government is no more likely to arise, than from the influence which rank and property may acquire in any other part of his Majesty's dominions. 3rdly, Because the utility to the subjects in that part of the Kingdom from this Bill, is not apparent to us, since it is not imagined that a real, a great, and extensive benefit, should not be desired by the people of Scotland, when rendered to them, but, on the contrary, should meet with strong opposition, cold acquiescence, or silent disgust; and since no single instance of grievance has been alleged, but, on the contrary, it has been acknowledged, that no bad use has been made of this part of the ancient civil Constitution of Scotland, which it is intended by this Bill to abolish at and for ever. once, 4thly, Because we do not conceive the policy of making without necessity, at this time by a permanent law, so considerable an alteration in Government; nor do we apprehend the wisdom of purchasing an ineffectual problematical plan by a certain, but unknown expense. Neither do we understand how it is consistent with justice to abolish the rights of the parties concerned without previously adjusting their compensation. Nor can we reconcile with our duty to the public, the delegating to the Court of Session in Scotland, the power of fixing the sums to be raised upon the people, a new method of creating a new load of expense in no degree ascertained, or ever suggested to Parliament. 5thly, Because we apprehend, by the maxims of the Constitutions of this country, influence in the hands of the Crown, is more to be feared from the abuse of ministerial power, especially in the election of members of Parliament, than when in the hands of the nobility and gentry, whose rank and property are naturally the supports of a free Government; and we cannot conceive how the liberty of Scotland will be better preserved by this Bill, which, in our opinion, manifestly tends to constitute, at this juncture, a new influence over all the counties of North Britain, by throwing a great and dangerous power into the hands of Ministers; especially when it is avowed, that such an alteration of Government may necessitate the introduction of a military force. A fatal symptom, when it can even be mentioned in a British Parliament, that a measure avowedly ineffectual for the safety of Government, and evidently unnecessary for the public utility, must, probably, be carried into execution by military force, which, if allowed, and not exerted, must produce an influence of the most pernicious kind; if exerted, establishes a military Government of the most dangerous nature, because masked under the form of civil Government, a practice tending, in either case, totally to subvert the Constitution of this country, and to which, therefore, we can never consent. Edward Harley, Earl of Oxford and Mortimer. George Henry Lee, Earl of Lichfield. Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury. John Fane, Earl of Wes morland. Philip Stanhope, Earl Stanhope. William Talbot, Lord Talbot. Laurence Shirley, Earl Ferrers. John Ward, Lord Ward. William Feilding, Earl of Denbigh. Charles Noel Somerset, Duke of Beaufort. CCCXXXIII. JUNE 1, 1749. An Act, 22 George II, cap. 43, was passed in this Parliament, for continuing certain Acts passed in the twelfth year of Anne and the twelfth of George I, under which certain roads in the county of Worcester were repaired. As was customary, a large body of trustees was appointed under the original Acts, and under this Act a number of others are named who 'are added to and joined with the trustees named and appointed in and by the said recited Acts, or either of them, or elected at any time before the 31st day of July, 1748.' It appears that certain persons elected since this date and before the passing of the Act were excluded from the trust, and that three persons petitioned against the words of exclusion. It was therefore moved that the words 'before the 31st of July, 1748' should be omitted. But the motion was negatived, and the following protest was inserted. 1st, Because it appeared by these books and deed produced before the Committee, that the persons hereby to be excluded were elected into this trust by a legal number of surviving commissioners, in pursuance of an Act passed in the twelfth year of his |