us to the present age, our names in the books may transmit us to posterity Englishmen. Charles Spencer Churchill, Duke of Marlborough. Philip Stanhope, Earl Stanhope. James Compton, Earl of Northampton. Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury. John Montagu, Earl of Sandwich. Philip Dormer Stanhope, Earl of Chesterfield. Thomas Mansel, Lord Mansel. William Coventry, Earl of Coventry. CCCXXIX. JANUARY 31, 1744. On the 19th of January, Mr. Francis Fane reported to the House of Commons the following resolution of the Committee of Supply, 'that £393,773 68. Id. be granted to the King for defraying the charge of 5,513 horse, and 10,755 Hanoverian troops, from the 26th of December, 1743, to the 25th of December, 1744. The grant was carried by 271 to 226, Walpole using every effort with his old friends in order to secure the grant. In the Lords, on the 31st of January, Lord Sandwich moved, that in the opinion of this House, the continuing the 16,000 Hanoverians in the pay of Great Britain is prejudicial to the true interest of his Majesty, and dangerous to the welfare and tranquillity of this nation.' After debate (Parliamentary History, vol. xiii, p. 505), the motion was negatived by 86 to 41. The following protest was inserted. Ist, Because we conceive, that the demand made in the estimates for the continuance of the sixteen thousand Hanoverians in the pay of Great Britain for the ensuing year, rendered the interposition of this House against so fatal a measure the more necessary, inasmuch as it seemed now to be the only means left to prevent it. 2ndly, Because we apprehend, that every national purpose, pretended to be answered by these Hanoverians, may be more effectually served by an equal number of troops, supposing such a number to be necessary, free from the same objections; either of foreign mercenaries, who will thereby be prevented from engaging with our enemies (of which the Hanoverians, when unpaid by us, cannot, we assure ourselves, be suspected), or, at least (which is evidently practicable, even at this time), partly of mercenaries, and partly out of the great and extraordinary establishment of national troops now in this Kingdom. 3rdly, Because it appears to us, that these Hanoverians, though in the pay, can hardly be said to have been in the service of this nation. Some refused to form in the first line at the battle of Dettingen, and retired to the second; others refused to obey the orders of the British General, and march in the pursuit of the enemy after the battle; and the greatest number of them, who, together with some of the British Guards, composed what was called the rear-guard, under the command of a Hanoverian lieutenant-general, took a different route in the march from the rest of the army from Aschaffenburg; and such a one as not only rendered them wholly useless to the army, when the French attacked us in front, but would have rendered them equally useless, if the French from Aschaffenburg (where we left the passage open to them) had attacked us in the rear, in which it was pretended that these troops were left, as in the post of honour: nay, not contented to avoid being of any use, either in the front or in the rear, but determined to be of use nowhere, they halted as soon as they came within sight and reach of the battle, though pressed by the British officer, and invited by the ardour of the British soldiers to share the glory, and complete, as they might have done, the victory of the day. These facts (together with many others which we omit) asserted in the debate in presence of many Lords of this House, who served in the last campaign, denied by none of them, and confirmed in general by a noble Duke of the highest rank and character, prove, as we conceive, these troops to be useless, at least if action be intended; and we will not represent, even to ourselves, what reasons there can be for demanding them, if action be not intended. 4thly, Because, if, as it was insinuated in the debate, other mercenaries could not be relied on, as belonging to princes of the Empire, inclined to or engaged with our enemies, these Hanoverians would, as we conceive in consequence, be useless to the common cause; since it would be in the power of those very Princes, by only marching their troops into proper places, to recall these mercenaries from us, and confine them to the defence of their own Electorate, or disarm them at least, by a second neutrality. 5thly, Because it has not been pretended, that the Administration has so much as endeavoured to obtain any other foreign troops whatsoever, notwithstanding the long notoriety of the universal and deeply-rooted dissatisfaction of the nation at the present measure; a neglect so unaccountable and surprising to us, that we fear the nation will either suspect that we are to have no other troops, than believe that no others are to be had. 6thly, Because we conceive, that the future co-operation of our national troops with these mercenaries has been rendered impracticable, and even their meeting dangerous. We think it, therefore, indispensably incumbent upon us, to remove the object that occasioned the many instances of partiality, by which the Hanoverians were unhappily distinguished, and our brave fellow-subjects, the British forces, undeservedly discouraged. The constant preference in quarters, forage, &c., we wish no occasion had been given to remember; but we cannot pass over in silence the Hanoverian guards having for some days done duty upon his Majesty at Aschaffenburg, which we look upon as the highest dishonour to his Majesty and this nation, and are therefore astonished to observe an unusual, and, to every other purpose, useless proportion of Hanover guards continued upon the estimate. 7thly, Because we apprehend, that the argument urged in opposition to this question, namely, 'that the withdrawing these sixteen thousand obnoxious mercenaries would be weakening our army in the next campaign, alarm our allies, and encourage our enemies,' is fully obviated by the methods we have mentioned above, of replacing them; some, if not all of which (notwithstanding the, to us, unaccountable negligence of the Administration) are still undeniably practicable. Nor can we conceive, in any case, that the removing the causes of discord and division tends to the weakening of that body from whence they are removed; and we are of opinion, that our allies would not (whatever our enemies might) regret the loss of these troops the next year, which, by experience, they found so useless the last. 8thly, Because we apprehend, that the most fatal consequences must ensue, should this nation be once possessed with an opinion, that the discouragements and mortifications which our fellow subjects of the army have received abroad, were derived from any distrust or dislike of the British nation. We are far from entertaining any such opinion, though some degree of foreign partiality may indeed have given occasion to these discouragements and mortifications; though we cannot help ascribing them likewise to some abject flattery, and criminal misrepresentation, which this partiality, blameless in itself, has unhappily given occasion to; and by which, in its turn, it has been fomented. But how groundless soever such an opinion may be, it may still prevail, and the appearances we lament, may produce the effects we dread. The motives to that concern, that have been expressed in this House, and the loud dissatisfaction that has been expressed everywhere else, are in themselves of great importance, and such as would deserve, even if they stood alone, the serious consideration and seasonable interposition of this House. But we confess, that they appear to us still more important, when we consider them relatively to things of the same nature, less apparent, indeed, but equally real, and more detrimental, perhaps, if not more dishonourable to this nation; for more dishonourable they may be thought, if a continued principle of conduct, whereby the interests of one country are carried on in subordination to those of another, constitutes the true and mortifying definition of a Province. We will not here call to memory any former measures of this kind, nor recapitulate all the instances that might be given, wherein the blood and treasure of this nation have been lavishly employed, when no one British interest, and, as we conceive, some foreign interest alone, was concerned. Some of these instances were touched in the debate, most of them are well known, and all of them are at this time, by the course of events, manifested to public view. The former were long hid and disguised under political veils, the present could not by their nature be so; they are such as strike every one equally, from the highest officer to the common soldier, and carry along with them not only their own weight, but the weight of all those that preceded them. They are such, therefore, in our opinions, as must affect, in the most fatal manner, both the peace of his Majesty and his royal family, and the common cause in which we are now and may hereafter be engaged. The present royal family was justly called to the Throne of Great Britain, in order to secure to us our civil and religious rights, and to remove every false and foreign bias from our Administration. The happiness and security therefore, of both King and people, consists in the inseparable union of all these interests, with the interest of the Crown. In a just confidence, that these national views were those of the present royal family, this nation has done every thing that could engage them to adhere to them; and has given to his late and present Majesty far greater sums than ever were given, in similar circumstances, to any of their royal predecessors. Whoever goes about to sever the interests of the Crown from any national interests, is an enemy to both; and every measure that does do, tends to destroy both. It is to guard against such attempts, that our zeal for our King and country exerts itself on this great occasion, as our most earnest desire is, that his Majesty's Throne should be established in the hearts of his people; and as we are struck with horror at every object that can alienate his affections from them, or theirs from him. How much these unfortunate circumstances have already weakened the natural influence of Great Britain in pursuit of the common cause of Europe, is but too apparent in fact, and could not be otherwise in the nature of things. Great Britain is a powerful Kingdom, and whenever she has acted in her true character, and aimed at that great and noble view alone of maintaining a balance between the Powers of Europe, for the common interest of all, the effects have been answerable to the cause, and her influence in Germany, saved by her arms, and supported by her treasures in the last wars, was, as it ought to be, and as it has been everywhere else, superior. But should it ever appear that an inferior German principality is really, and Great Britain only nominally, the director and actor, such a change in the cause must necessarily produce a deplorable difference in the effect; and Hanover, that can neither |