rantable proceeding, is, that a British admiral, soon after, was at Cadiz with a powerful squadron of ships of the line, at the time the Spaniards thus unjustly broke their treaty, and that admiral quietly and undisturbed left them in possession of that ground, and convoyed their troops to take possession of the dominions of Tuscany. 7thly, Because the papers upon the table, delivered to this House from the commissioners of the customs do plainly prove, that Sir Robert Walpole, by publicly conniving for many years at the trade carried on with this nation from the Port of Dunkirk, has given up the 9th Article of the Treaty of Utrecht, which we cannot but look upon as a high misdemeanour, and the greater crime in him, that no man whatsoever declared himself with more passionate zeal than he did, against the authors of the Treaty of Utrecht, for having favoured France in most of the Articles in it, which were incontestably stipulated for the interest of this Crown and nation. John St. John, Lord St. John of Bletsoe. Henry Bowes Howard, Earl of Berkshire. Thomas Mansel, Lord Mansel. Brownlow Cecil, Earl of Exeter. George Henry Lee, Earl of Lichfield. Richard Temple, Viscount Cobham. John Ward, Lord Ward. Richard Smallbrooke, Bishop of Lichfield and Coventry. George Parker, Earl of Macclesfield. Maurice Thompson, Lord Haversham. John Campbell, Duke of Greenwich (Duke of Argyll). Hugh Fortescue, Lord Clinton. George Montagu, Earl of Halifax. Hugh Boscawen, Viscount Falmouth. John Leveson Gower, Lord Gower. John Russell, Duke of Bedford. Charles Bruce, Lord Bruce of Whorlton. Henry Somerset, Duke of Beaufort. Philip Dormer Stanhope, Earl of Chesterfield. John Hervey, Earl of Bristol. CCCXX. FEBRUARY 13, 1741. Immediately on the rejection of the motion for the address to remove Walpole, the Duke of Marlborough moved, 'That any attempt to inflict any kind of punishment on any person without allowing him an opportunity to make his defence, or without any proof of any crime or misdemeanour committed by him, is contrary to natural justice, the fundamental laws of this realm, and the ancient established usage of Parliament, and is a high infringement of the liberties of the subject.' The motion was supported by the Duke of Devonshire, Lord Lovel, and the Earl of Cholmondeley, and was resisted as inopportune, and with much warmth, by Lords Gower and Talbot, and by the Earl of Halifax. It was carried against the previous question by 81 to 54. The following protest is entered. Because we think this question ought not to have been put at this time; for though the proposition contained in it is undoubtedly true in itself, yet we apprehend it to be no wise applicable to the point which had been so long debated the same day. For, we conceive, that public utility may render it necessary that a person should be removed from an office, and yet that removal cannot be deemed a punishment; for instance, in the case of incapacity. Surely then, wilful neglects, breach of duty, and evident malversation in an office, may justly require this great Council of State to present an humble address to his Majesty for the removal of any person guilty of such crimes, in order to prevent public detriment. And we cannot apprehend that the motion which occasioned the former debate, was by any means void of proofs, since the treaties and papers referred to (being as records in the possession of the House), and the notoriety of many facts alleged, were, in our opinion, equal to a cloud of witnesses. For these reasons, although we agree to the matter contained in the question, and, acting in our judicial capacity, would never err from the rules laid down in it, yet we cannot but wish the question had been laid aside, lest a wicked minister hereafter should think himself secure in his office, if he cannot be brought personally to answer at the Bar of this House, and witnesses, vira voce, cannot be produced against him. Francis Scott, Duke of Buccleuch. Thomas Mansel, Lord Mansel. Henry Bowes Howard, Earl of Berkshire. Henry Howard, Earl of Carlisle. Richard Smallbrooke, Bishop of Lichfield and Coventry. Hugh Fortescue, Lord Clinton. John Campbell, Duke of Greenwich (Duke of Argyll). John St. John, Lord St. John of Bletsoe. John Ward, Lord Ward. John Leveson Gower, Lord Gower. Henry Somerset, Duke of Beaufort. Charles Bruce, Lord Bruce of Whorlton. John Russell, Duke of Bedford. Philip Dormer Stanhope, Earl of Chesterfield. John Hervey, Earl of Bristol. CCCXXI. FEBRUARY 26, 1741. A fresh attempt was made to revive the question as to the presence of officers in the Lower House, analogous to the Bill which was passed so many times in the Commons, under the title of An Act to secure free and impartial proceedings in Parliament.' It was thrown out on a motion to commit it, by 63 to 44. There is no record of the debate, except a very meagre summary in the Secker MSS. It is probable that it was brought forward mainly to give publicity to the division and the protest following, which is headed by the Earls of Northampton, Shaftesbury, and Stanhope, and Lord Clinton. Ist, Because we conceive, that our Constitution itself points out this Bill, as one of its principal securities; a due poise and independency of the three several constituent parts of the supreme legislative power being required by the spirit of our Constitution, and absolutely necessary to its existence. If any one of these becomes dependent on the other, the Constitution is dangerously altered; but if any two become dependent on the third, it is totally subverted, and the wisest establishment that ever was formed of a free Government, shrinks and degenerates into a monarchical, an aristocratical, or a democratical faction. We therefore think we cannot be too careful in providing against whatever may, at any time, affect this just poise and necessary independency of the three estates. And this caution seems the more requisite now, when, from the inevitable variation of things, employments are become exceedingly numerous, and are yet further artfully split, divided, subdivided, and increased in value, in order to add both extent and weight to their influence. Two hundred employments are distributed in the present House of Commons; a dangerous circumstance; and which, if it could have been foretold to our ancestors, even in the latter end of the last century, the prediction would have been rejected by them as chimerical, or, if believed, lamented as fatal. And should the number of employments continue to increase in the same proportion, even we may live to see, for want of this Bill, a constant majority of placemen meeting under the name of a Parliament, to establish grievances instead of redressing them; to approve implicitly the measures of a Court without information; to support and screen the ministers they ought to control or punish, and to grant money without account, or it may be, without bounds. In which case, the remaining forms of our Constitution would, by creating a fatal delusion, become our greatest grievance. 2ndly, Though we do not absolutely assert, that employments necessarily must, yet we cannot suppose that they never will, influence the votes and conduct of the gentlemen of the House of Commons; for such a supposition would be equally conclusive against all the Acts of Parliament now in force, limiting the number of officers of any kind in that House; and, in a case of such importance, we think it would be the highest imprudence, to trust the very being of our Constitution to bare possibilities; especially if an experience (which we rather choose to hint at than enlarge upon) should give us just reason to suspect, that former Parliaments have felt the effects of this baneful influence, almost all persons in employments having voted invariably on the same side of the question, often against the known and signified sense of their constituents, and sometimes perhaps even contrary to their own private declarations; and no sooner did they presume to deviate from the ministerial track, than they were divested of those employments that failed of their intended influence. But, admitting that the present House of Commons has kept itself most untaintedly pure from such pollution, yet we think it necessary not to expose future Parliaments to such a trial, nor the Constitution to the uncertainty of the decision. 3rdly, Because, though it should be granted, that this Bill would have restrained in some degree the liberty of the electors, that objection has no weight upon this occasion, every law being, in some degree, a restraint upon the natural liberty of man, but yet justly enacted, wherever the good of the whole (which should be the object of every law) is promoted thereby; and we apprehend, that this restraint is of such a nature, that those only will be uneasy under it who intended to abuse the liberty. The votes of the electors of Great Britain, if unbiassed, would rarely concur in the choice of persons who were the avowed creatures of a minister, known dependants on a Court, and utterly unknown to those who elect them. But if, in an age when luxury invites corruption, and corruption feeds luxury, there is too much reason to fear, that the people may be prevailed upon, in many places by a pecuniary influence, to give their votes to those whom their uninfluenced sentiments would reject with indignation and contempt, we think it necessary to lay this just and constitutional restraint upon the liberties of some, as the only means to preserve the liberties of all. By former Acts of Parliament, the electors are already debarred from electing persons in certain considerable employments; and in the Act for preserving our Constitution, by settling the Crown upon the present royal family, it was enacted, 'That no person whatsoever in employment should be capable of being chosen a member of the House of Commons.' Such was then the spirit of liberty, that even this total exclusion could not be refused, nor could the repeal of it afterwards be obtained, |