Russia should make a quarrel with the Porte in such a manner that there should be not the slightest difference of opinion in any country or in any party in reference to it? Now this point is more than a peculiarity-remarkable and historical. It expresses, in the most significant manner, a judgment of the Russian Cabinet. The genius of Russia has not grown gray that she should fail in device. If she had wished to cloak her act, it would have been cloaked, at least to the extent of presenting "another side" of the case. If she has not made the quarrel upon a point, and in a manner to baffle the penetration of Europe, it was because it was not her purpose that Europe should be deceived. It would have been a fault to introduce disguise if it was possible to brand with infamy.

With less than this she could have achieved nothing. If the Powers had assented only to an impolitic conclusion, and, under the colour of a pretext, safeguarding their honour, or at least their self-love, they would not thereby have been bound to her, and might, at any moment, have stopped short in the course, or withdrawn from the co-operation. Yet she required their active support to hold Turkey down. She has placed them in that position which novelists love to describe, because of the strong colouring it admits, when a man is fascinated and spell-bound by the Power of Evil, and must do his bidding to the utmost, and at all hazard to the body in this life, and to the soul hereafter. Fascinated from the beginning, compromised as they proceed, finally they are led in chains. The indignation aroused against them in their own nation rivets those chains, and thus the Government of England, through a false reflection of the light of conscience, is actually coercing Turkey, in conjunction with Russia, in a matter which it originally entered upon to support Turkey against Russia. And all this she had planned beforehand! She had sat down to devise it as a dramatist composes the march of a play; she creating history as he at spectacle: pursuing the game with combined excitement and attractions, of a work of the imagination to construct, a feat of dexterity to achieve, an operation of science to advance, a system of policy to prosecute, a competition for power to render triumphant, and the possession of one or more empires

to secure.

Now, as regards Turkey. Unless her act had been so

flagrant that no one at Constantinople could doubt England's course, the Porte never would have deferred to England; in full reliance on her, it suffered itself to be betrayed into the fatal position of not resisting aggression, and of meeting acts of war with words of peace-conduct which would be fatal to the existence of any government, however powerful, as at once placing the enemy in the most advantageous position of attack, and turning the spirit by which alone an empire can defend itself, against its own administrators.

In a very able Russian State-paper, which appeared on Saturday as a leader in the Times, the process is directly brought to bear. The resistance or hesitation of the Porte is qualified as "postive infatuation," and its authors are described as "playing to perfection the game of Russia,' who is thus enabled to "claim the credit of moderation." But at the same time we are told that "fresh froops are advancing into the Principalities; the Hospodars have been induced to disobey the orders of their own sovereign, the Sultan; the peasantry are overwhelmed by burdens imposed on them in every shape; trade is stopped. Such is the mode in which Russia fulfils her promises; such, &c."

Such is the Government with which England has allied itself, and such are the acts, resistance to which is "positive infatuation" on the part of Turkey, because England and France are allied to their perpetrator. These lucubrations never took birth from the mists that envelope Blackfriarsbridge; they sprang up under a latitude more fertile in vigorous conceptions.

After Russia's faithlessness is established, the Porte is scoffed out of court for not confiding in the faithfulness of her allies, as," it continues, "the Governments which have recommended this arrangement have publicly expressed their conviction that the immediate and entire evacuation of the Principalities must instantly ensue, and the very last words uttered by Lord Palmerston in the House of Commons were to this effect, The Porte may fairly look to these powers for the fulfilment of that condition.' So, then, it is the word of Lord Palmerston upon which everything rests, the word that all Emperors, and this Emperor in particular, possessed "character and honour." Lord Palmerston simply offers to the Porte the past as a guarantee for the future, and tells it that such conduct as the Emperor of Russia has hitherto

pursued, is, in the eyes of the British Government, the type of character and the soul of honour. Was not Russia, then, right in avoiding every shade to her perfidy, in the nakedness of which consisted the very essence of her triumph?

But Lord Clarendon had also made a declaration. What becomes of it? He expressed his cordial assent to the opinion of Lord Clanricarde, that Russia had committed an act of piracy. He asserted that the "evacuation of the Provinces was a sine qua non of any agreement whatever." Twelve days later the declaration of Lord Palmerston comes forth, on dismissing the dupes to the moors, that this very evacuation was to be abandoned to the " honour and character" of the Emperor.

What, now, is this word of the Emperor? Simply that he will evacuate on the termination of "the differences with the Porte," that is to say, of any differences with the Porte; so that "his honour and character" are, by Lord Palmerston's explanation, beforehand rendered perfectly compatible with the occupation of the Principalities for all time to come.

It will thus appear not that English statesmen yield by weakness to the difficulties of the moment, but that they prepare beforehand, step by step, the ways for Russia, not only with a perfect knowledge of her "character," but also with a perfect appreciation of England's "honour."

The evil lies deeper than the sore that is exposed: it is a malady that has fixed on the vitals, and pervades the frame; it breaks out on different parts, and recurs from time to time; it is only the symptom that appears, and it is only the symptom that is ever proposed to deal with. The reader will anticipate that we mean Ministerial irresponsibility, but even that is not the malady to which we refer. Again, he may suspect diplomatic secrecy. No, it is diplomacy itself. That is the poisonous tree that has to be cut down, and exterminated to its very roots. It shall be our task to describe to our readers this plant of exotic birth, drawing its sap from our soil, and now covering the earth with its mephitic shadow.

CONSEQUENCES OF SURRENDER.

August 30th.

The

Russia possesses the inestimable advantage of daily placing a note or a despatch on the breakfast-table of every political man in the Empire, instructing him as to what he is to think, for it comes in the shape of judgment upon her acts. Times of Saturday prepared the way for the Times of Monday. In the article of Saturday, Russia is represented as insolent and aggressive, but the case is reduced to the decision of the Powers, and he of the principals is meritorious who defers to those Powers, and he obstreperous who does not. This point established, it goes on, on Monday, to charge the Porte with a disposition to prolong negociation, or possibly to take steps which would lead to hostilities." This is not all. The Porte, if it now does not succumb, is positively to be treated as the aggressor, "because," says the Russian writer in the Times, "the Four mediating Powers are entitled to hold that these differences were satisfactorily adjusted by the note they themselves recommended."

The Times having done its work-and having been universally stigmatised, not only in this country, but in all others, as a Russian tool-would, if it consulted merely its own interests, be now soundly abusing Russia, to regain character. If not, there is further work in hand. The English Government having been compromised, it is now necessary to labour to justify it, and the nation must be emasculated by the same process as the Cabinet; it must be talked to, day by day, after the event, as the Cabinet has been talked to, day by day, for a long time before the event. We are at the beginning only. It is not approbation only for the past that is required, but subserviency for the future.

A dangerous, a difficult, and a long career is now before her, and a danger has sprung up by no means anticipated. It was not expected that the English nation would care in this case any more than in any former case. Certainly the English Cabinet would not have been so ready with its assent, had it anticipated the storm of obloquy which that assent has aroused. Perhaps, too, Russia would not have been so ready in crossing the Pruth, had she anticipated the embarrass

ments, from this cause, of her friends in Downing-street, or of its reaction upon the people of Turkey.

The points of resistance are at present the indignation of the English and the Turks. The first is comparatively of little avail, because it has no means of action on the Government. Not so the second. It may prevent its Government from yielding, and the knowledge that the people of England are indignant at the conduct of their Government may have a weighty effect on them. In this respect their appreciation of the part played by the Times, of which we published a striking evidence a few days ago, will not be without its value. Let them then know that if they submit they will be held to be poltroons, even by those nations of Europe who have such terrible fleets and powerful armies, which they dare not use. But if, like men taking counsel from their rights and their courage, they expel the invaders from their soil, a burst of enthusiasm, from one extremity of Europe to the other, will hail that act—not through considerations of policy, but by the instinct of manhood.

Unless they adopt this course, it will not be a Russian occupation, and all its consequences, from which they will have to suffer, but from the hostile action of England and France. The warning is duly given to them in the Times of yesterday, published to prepare England for such a course. Let them cease the unspeakable infatuation of looking to the support of England and of France;-their sole weakness is their waiting for others. Even a weak Power that expects safety from abroad, has, by that alone, lost everything worth preserving; but what shall be said of a powerful Empire, of a proud and haughty people, of a warlike State, and a race of horsemen, who watch the nods and hang upon the whispers of a Foreign Diplomatist?

The Turks were wont to tell a story of 50,000 Jews starting on a pilgrimage, who came and asked a single Turk to mount his horse and be their escort. Now we behold the 50,000 Turks humbly beseeching the escort of the Jews. To the Turkish Government we say, bad to-day, worse tomorrow; every day must make its position worse, alike in Turkey and in Europe. Not only will the spring of its people have been arrested, but the consciousness in that people of its own strength will bring down upon the Government contempt for its incapacity, and indignation for its cowardice.