interests, what troops compromised in case of failure?--what results in case of success?-how much blood will be shed, and what will it cost?

We may set it down as a preliminary, that Russia will not send a fleet into the Thames, and that England will not send an army to Moscow. The power of the one state is on the sea, and that of the other on the land; and as Cossacks cannot attack squadrons, nor line-of-battle-ships Calmucs, as England is enclosed in the seas, and as Russia environs the pole, there remains no field on which they can meet, except in so far as the one or the other may travel beyond its own territories, engage in aggression upon a third state, be compromised in a war with that state; then respectively they may supply resources, and so indirectly make war upon each other. the present occasion Russian armies have travelled out of her own territories into those of Turkey. If the latter country accepts the visitation, you have nothing to say; if not, then the war is between Russia and Turkey. We have first to consider the relative power of the principals.

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In their last war, namely, in 1828, with the exception of a single fortress, Russia encountered no opposition until she had crossed the Danube. She then overran the Principalities, as she has done in 1853, and no importance was attached to that fact. The contest was considered as commencing only after the Danube was passed, and the theatre of it was held to be exclusively Bulgaria. The whole resources of Russia were called up, "after two years of preparation," 200,000 men and 300 guns crossed the Pruth. On the other hand, the defence of Turkey, from temporary circumstances, to which it is superfluous to refer, was, to use the words of Pozzo di Borgo, reduced to the mere Mussulman population on the seat of war. She had, however, 30,000 of her new levies, and about an equal force of irregular cavalry. This was all that she could oppose to the invaders in the field. The Russians were defeated, and driven back at every point, save Varna, the capture of which was owing to our having destroyed the Turkish fleet at Navarino, to which circumstance is also to be referred the unfortunate issue of the subsequent campaign.

The resources of Russia have not increased since 1828, but, on the contrary, they have diminished. The condition of her army, from reasons too long to enter into, is no longer what

it then was, and even then it was, by the avowal of the Russian authorities, no longer what it had been in the previous campaign of 1810. The resources of the southern provinces of Russia have not increased, but, on the contrary, diminished. They are actually proceeding towards depopulation: the Steppes, being adapted to a pastoral people, and requiring the camel even to be tenantable, are reduced to a wilderness, in proportion as the Tartar population is expelled, and a Russian one attempted to be introduced. The navy of Russia in the Black Sea has not increased; she had then thirteen sail of the line; she has thirteen sail of the line now. In respect to the populations, which form, as it were, the two advanced wings of the Ottoman Empire, her position is wholly reversed. In 1828 the Polish Constitution had not yet been put down, nor had the Poles commenced to suspect the identity of their interests with the Turks. The Circassians had not commenced that wonderful political agglomeration and course of military triumphs, which have constituted them so great a weight in the balance of European power. The Cossacks still lent themselves with docility to the Russian Government, nor had yet been awakened amongst them those aspirations, political and religious, which now point to a reconstitution of the ten millions of Malo-Russians, as an independent state. Finally, the commerce of Southern Russia has declined, partly through the depopulation to which I have referred, partly through the competition of the Turkish provinces. The condition, therefore, of Russia has become worse in every point. Now let us turn to Turkey.

Here has occurred one of the most extraordinary revolutions ever observed, and the maxim signally disproved that nations cannot recover. Each of the diseases, severally judged lethal, has been eradicated: bloodthirstiness, anarchy, dilapidation of finances, military disorganisation, and political disruption. The central authority has regained possession throughout the entire empire, and every province has been subjected to the conscription, furnishing now its quota to the army. A yearly sum (£3,000,000), amounting to nearly the entire revenue in 1828, is now expended upon the army, the material of which surpasses that of any troops in the world. At this moment the judgment of General Bem will not fail to be read with interest: I give it as expressed in a letter to the present Grand Vizier, then Minister-at-War :

"MONSEIGNEUR,-Not seeing the order arrive to command my presence at Constantinople, I conceive it to be my duty to address to your Highness some considerations which appear to me to be urgent.

"I commence by declaring that the Turkish troops which I have seen-cavalry, infantry, and field artillery-are excellent.. "In bearing, instruction, and military spirit, there cannot be better. The horses surpass those of any European cavalry. That which is inappreciable is the desire felt by all the officers and all the soldiers to fight against Russia.

"With such troops I would willingly engage to attack a Russian force double their number, and I should certainly be victorious.

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And as the Ottoman Empire can march against the Russians more troops than that power can oppose to them, it is evident that the Sultan may have the satisfaction to see restored to his sceptre all the provinces treacherously withdrawn from his ancestors by the Czars of Moscow.

"I have the honour to remain, &c.,

"MURAD."

This opinion may be considered tinctured by the feelings of the man, but the fact is unquestionable that Turkey can now muster on the theatre of war twice the number that Russia can bring against her; and if these are not all regulars, they are the same irregulars who in 1828, at Kurterpe, under every disadvantage of position, beat twice their number of Russian regulars. As to their quality, the opinion of General Aupick, expressed to the Sultan in 1849, tallies with that of General Bem. "Your Majesty's troops," he said, I are able to give a good account of any enemies that will be opposed to them."

Such, then, is the first ally that England would have in a war with Russia; one singly her match, and which will fight against her, once the contest is engaged, to the very death, conscious that existence is at stake; but this would be only the first.

From what is publicly known respecting the dispositions of Persia, I may content myself with merely stating that the fact of a war of England and Turkey against Russia would bring of necessity a declaration of war by Persia, and the placing of the resources of that state at the disposal of the coalition.

The third is Circassia; but this one has not to be invited, and requires not to be supported; Circassia is at war, and winning daily triumphs. By the very last accounts, another fortress on the west has been captured, and movements of such importance have taken place on that side that a blockade of the coast has again been proclaimed. If they have stood their ground alone, and if, while Russia can bring to bear upon them her undivided resources, they are able to drive her back, take from her fortified places, and to beat her in the field, what would be the effect of their finding themselves suddenly supported by Turkey, Persia, and England? From offensive, the war would at once become aggressive, and 100,000 Circassian cavalry would be on their way to Moscow. Here I must pause to point out that the new organisation of the Circassians has come from the Cossacks. There are no less than 500 Cossack naibs (newabs) or chiefs, under the orders of Shamyl Bey; and taking this fact, in conjunction with the altered dispositions of the Cossacks towards Russia, it may not be too much to assume that the Cossacks should, even as a body, enter themselves on the list of aspirants for freedom, and join their forces to those of the Circassians, who, in the supposed case, would not appear alone in the plains of Russia, but in company with a Turkish army. Such are the allies whom England will have at her disposal, east of the Dnieper and south of the Danube. But after these come the Poles and the Hungarians, of whom it would be superfluous to speak. In fact, 70,000,000 may be moved against Russia, and her territories to the west, south, and east, encircled with a flame of insurrection.

Lord Ellenborough, indeed, called attention to the fact, that a war with Russia would be an "offensive one, because it would in its consequences put in motion the Poles and Circassians. The character of offensive or defensive depends on the acts which give rise to a war, not on the incidents which arise out of it; but the world's attention requires to be called to the fact, that Russia is ever at war with the rest of the world, though she will not gainsay you while you call it peace.

The casus belli arises out of the advance of an army, consisting of her whole available force, into a territory where it will be entirely at the mercy of the power possessed of the maritime supremacy in the Black Sea.

At the period of the French African occupation, the English Government was taunted with suffering a course of policy to be commenced which would bring France into collision with England; it replied by the then organ of the Foreign-office, the Globe, that this measure placed, on the contrary, France in entire dependence upon England, for we had got 100,000 Frenchmen as hostages. Such is precisely the position in which a Russian army would find itself in the Principalities: the Carpathians descending from the west; the marshes of the Danube extending from the east, narrow to a single point, and that, defended by the Sereth, the communication between the vast Russian and the Turkish Empires. By transporting a Turkish force to the north-west angle of the Danube, the communications of the Russians would be cut off in the rear; an English squadron in the Black Sea without even taking part in the conflict, but merely by locking in its harbour the Russian naval force, would enable the Turks, with their own means, to effect this operation. The army in the provinces is, under every circumstances, dependent on supplies by the Black Sea and the mouths of the Danube: by cutting off the communications, that army must capitulate from starvation. The trade of the Black Sea is also exposed; you have but to occupy the line of Perekop, to insulate the Crimea and as effectually extinguish Russia's maritime force by a land operation, as her military force by a sea operation.

The only point to be considered is the force that would be engaged on the Euxine. Turkey has the actual superiority in steam; she has nine or ten line-of-battle-ships, of which five are splendid vessels, of first-rate power, and magnificent in equipments. With the African reinforcements, the Ottoman navy may be considered as quite a match for that of Russia, if not more so. The British squadron now at the Dardanelles is itself far more than a match for the Russian force in the Black Sea, consequently the two conjoined, it would be impossible for a Russian flag to show itself; these results would be thus obtained without the expenditure, except for salutes, of a single charge of powder; there would be no further expense incurred than that which the squadron at present costs, whilst the occasions for that expenditure, or for future armaments, would be removed. No subsidies would be required for Turkey; she, on the contrary, would be