-such an obligation as the Government can never call upon the people to make an effort to discharge, which it cannot itself discharge without such effort-places it, with all its actually realised strength, and the more so because of it—in that position of hopeless and absolute subserviency which Count Nesselrode, by the war indemnity, was fully impressed that Russia had acquired when he wrote his despatch of the 12th February, 1830. If a speedier solution is required, the payinent has only to be called for.

In all such arrangements and contingencies the Powers of Europe, being guarantees for Turkey, will become executioners for Russia. Any resistance on the part of the former will be the "Sultan's making war on Russia," and as their paramount duty is the "preserving of peace," they will know how to employ the terrible force which they hold at their discretion for the discharge of their conscience.

In the despatch of Count Nesselrode, there is a singular reference to the English Ambassador at Constantinople in reference to the navigation of the Black Sea --" Sir Robert Gordon, humiliated by the rôle which he had played at Constantinople, made an imprudent display of his credit in obtaining for the English frigate, the Blonde, permission to enter the Black Sea. This inconsiderate act drew down upon him a severe reprimand on the part of the English Government, which so much the more regrets this useless bravado, as we have taken advantage of it to force the Porte to grant to one of our vessels-of-war the permission to pass in its turn the Bosphorus, and to anchor under the walls of the Seraglio, whither it was followed by a frigate and a brig, having on board M. Ribeaupierre and his suite. These two vessels passed the Dardanelles without covering their batteries, and even received from the forts a salute, never before granted to any Foreign Ambassador."

And so it has been on every occasion; every use that you have made of your ships has led to a Russian triumph and a Turkish humiliation. The present has been the most flagrant, and therefore will prove the most fatal. On the former occasions you had but one Foreign Secretary. What can you expect with four, if not quadrupled treachery and baseness ?

209

SHALL THE TURKS AND THE RUSSIANS BE ALLOWED TO FIGHT IT OUT?

September 17th.

Sir,-It is a very curious fact, that, in the course of last year, an individual should have said, wrote, and published, that Russia should that autumn, or the following, occupy the Principalities. This was no vague, general, or guess, proposition, but asserted in a profound conviction in reference to an indubitable result. It was arrived at not from one, but from two classes of facts, from each of which was inferred the impossibility of Russia's enduring delay.

The two branches were those which were emphatically pointed out in the despatch of Count Nesselrode which you have quoted on Saturday" Commercial and political." The manner of her action was likewise stated as being, not war, but an occupation of the Principalities; to be effected through her control over the Cabinets of Europe;" for that, in a single-handed war between the parties, Turkey was "utterly inassailable by the military force of Russia, if she had to start from the Pruth;" that the supposition of a rising of the Christian populations in favour of Russia was a "contemptible fatuity. The individual who stated these things was set down as a madman, and when the Emperor did the very things that he was stated to be about to do, he also was called a madman.

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The anticipation not only serves as an explanation of the occurrence, it further serves for what is yet to come, justified in all points, except the latter, which has not yet been put to the proof.

Can it be really possible that Turkey is "inassailable" by Russia? Observe the word, carefully selected, and maturely pondered-inassailable. It was not said that the chances of war would be uncertain, or even that there was a probability of Russia's being defeated. These would have been startling propositions enough a month ago; but a year ago to select the term "inassailability," evinced either a wild extravagance, destructive of all confidence, or a profound conviction, based upon a certain knowledge of facts, demanding and compelling the deepest attention.

But it is upon this very inassailability that is based the

conclusion which has been justified by the result, that Russia would convulse the East, and occupy Turkey; because her doing so was requisite to arrest a progress in the Ottoman Empire "which must soon, without the fact of war-without new delimitations of territory-without the tearing of old treaties, or the substituting for them of new-produce, by mere gravity, a change in the balance of power in the East, reversing that preponderance which has become for Russia a necessity of existence."

The facts upon which this judgment rests, consisted in the strength and discipline of the Turkish Nizam; the number and spirit of the Rediff; the value and numbers of the irregulars, cavalry and infantry; the great efficiency of the artillery; the availability of steam for transporting without inconvenience, or loss of men or time, the whole of the resources and contingents of the Empire to the theatre of war; the improved revenues of the Empire; its unity of feeling, patriotic devotion, and military spirit; above all its confidence in the result of a struggle. The resources, not only in positions and extent of territory, but also in men, and enthusiasm of the Principalities themselves, abandoned by the Turks in former wars, and in fact indefensible, except by a regular army; the steam superiority of the Turks at sea-all these combined multiplying, as compared with the last war, the force of Turkey "sevenfold."

As regards Russia, progressive deterioration in her military means, as established by the facts and results of the campaign of 1810 and 1828-9, and inferred as regards the present moment, from observation of the state of her army-progressive depopulation of the wide band of Steppes which these armies would have to cross before they reached the theatre of war, and across which (the Turks taking their stand on the Pruth) the whole of her supplies would have to be transported.

As regards the other masses of populations, the contrast between their positions at the last war and the present moment, Poland not then put down by arms, and unconscious of the connection of its interests with those of Turkey; Hungary not put down by Russian arms, and of no account in the struggle; Circassia, subdivided and inert, unconscious alike of Russia's designs, Turkey's position, and its own strength; the Cossacks, the willing instruments of any war;

the Malo-Russians, not having commenced that impulse towards a nationality, which every recent traveller has commented upon; the absence of any remarkable excitement of religious discontent in Russia, and of all connection between the Dissidents and the Mussulman power in Turkey-in all these respects the diminution of the aggressive power of Russia being no less signal than the increase of the defensive power of Turkey.

This calculation rests upon the war commencing on the Pruth and not on the Danube. There the first shot being fired was, so to say, within hearing of Malo-Russians, Cossacks, Tartars, and Circassians, a Turkish army would have been in the Caucasus, and a Turkish and Circassian army would have marched into Russia. It would also have been within hearing of the Poles; it would have been so of the Hungarians, compromising Austria by the necessities of self-defence on the side of Turkey. Therefore Russia could not have commenced the war against Turkey without holding in reserve 200,000 or 300,000 mẹn stationed between the Vistula and the Caspian; nor could she have attacked Turkey, with any chance of making an impression, with less than 300,000 men, which she has not got, and which, if she had, she could not feed.

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These arguments were advanced to show the necessity for Europe of refusing its concurrence in any which wonld allow Russia peaceably to occupy the Principalities; for, of course, once established there, she would have passed by the greater amount of dangers, and could then commence operations from a basis which, under the most favourable circumstances, has required the efforts of a first campaign to conquer.

Allowing her to enter in peace was exactly the same thing as allowing an enemy to march unmolested up to the walls of a fortress, to pass glacis, lunette, and bastion, to lower drawbridge, raise portcullis, and reserve the defence until the assailant had established himself upon the body of the place.

This has been done yet, notwithstanding; the muster made by the garrison is such, as to evince the ability of expelling from such positions the besiegers. The telegraphic despatches quoted in the Morning Advertiser of Saturday render argument on this point superfluous. The works at Varna, Rutschuk, Silistria, cover the right bank of the

Danube and the dangerous point of the Black Sea, against any possibility of their falling, at least, in one campaign, commenced even from the Danube. The defences in the rear, at Shumla, which, while as yet unprotected, no Russian force has been able to capture, defy all assault. The numerical strength of the Turkish army exceeds by nearly the double what the Russians can bring against them. The Turks therefore as behind the Danube, present a threefold defence, each sufficient to decide the contest-the Nizam, or regular force, the guerilla force, and the defence of fortresses, for which the local population is alone nearly sufficient, as at present provided with retrenchments. I therefore conclude that, notwithstanding the services of the mediators in the Conference, Turkey is still as behind the Danube, unassailable by Russia in as far as warlike operations go.

I am induced to offer you these observations, in consequence of the assertion of the Times of this morning, as to the result of a war :

THIS

"IF THERE IS ANY POINT CERTAIN, IT IS THAT AT ITS CLOSE THERE WOULD BE NO TURKEY IN EUROPE."

I assert, that if there is no war there will be in five years no Turkey in Europe;" that is to say, that if the Conference proceeds to break down the internal state of Turkey, as it has let Russia in through the defences of Turkey, in the Ottoman Empire will either be exposed to an internal convulsion, or placed in that condition which is described in the despatch of Count Nesselrode, extracted in the Morning Advertiser of Saturday, namely, "reduced to exist no longer save under the protection of Russia, to listen no longer but to its desires," and conscious of "the certitude of its ruin if ever again it dared to brave her."

I do not say that war is requisite to prevent this fatal consummation; on the contrary, I assert now, as I have asserted all along, that no war will or can occur, because Russia is not able to make war upon Turkey, even from the position where she at present stands. I assert, that even with Austrian's co-operation, that war would be still impracticable; by how much less could there be war between England and Russia? To use the words of Sir John M'Neill at the time of Turkey's greatest weakness, "If England be with Turkey, then there can be no danger."