The uniformly operating principles of our nature affure us, that the jealoufy of distinct intereft will progreffively aggravate these alarming tendencies. That jealousy has frequently been roused, as we have all seen, and as we have been affured by the leading oppofer of Union. That jealoufy must increase (as we have been told by the fame authority) with two independent legif. latures; it muft ftill farther increase as the objects of intereft become more numerous and important; and, national intereft is fo interwoven with political regulation, that common fenfe concurs with the fame authority in concluding, that without a united interest, political Union will receive many fhocks, and feparation of interest must threaten feparation of connexion.

What can prevent a progrefs of this nature from terminating in deftruction, but an overbearing influence, which in its turn, creates new difguft, indifpofes to mutual amity, and prevents the two kingdoms from gaining the full effect of thofe advantages with which nature and cultivation have fupplied them.

If, however, compleat Union cannot be effected, the only hope then remaining for the permanency of our connexion is, that the virtual dependence of the legif lature of Ireland upon the legislature of Great Britain may be inviolably fecured. The executive, as has been obferved, is no doubt the immediate inftrument to fecure that dependence; but the executive can act only by the aid and under the controul of the fupreme power, the legislature of the state: and it is too plain for controverfy, that unlefs the legislature of Ireland had been ultimately controuled by the. fupreme power

"

of

of Great Britain, and rendered to all fubftantial effect dependent, Ireland could not have been preserved in that connexion which has been deemed neceffary to the well being and even existence of both kingdoms. Party rage, joined to popular commotion, and aided by foreign intrigue and power, must in fome of the many periods of difficulty, have long fince produced feparation, or fuch fubjection as is totally inconfiftent with any degree of publick prosperity.

But the growth of this country has been fuch, as at length to refift and fpurn dependence. It has rivalled the fuperiour, or as it may substantially be called, the Parent Country, and has claimed, almost enforced, a perfect equality of rights: and the legislatures are now profeffedly and by folemn declaration compleatly independent, and, if fuch an expreffion can properly be used, equally fupreme. There is therefore no rightful dependence whatsoever, ho avowed regular means by which to preferve the neceffary dependence; and confequently, the means to be used must be irregular, unjustifiable, and offenfive, and as fuch cannot fail to furnish additional caufes of difcontent and diffenfion. The growth of diftinct Ireland in power, must certainly render this dependence the more precarious, and confequently, render means more powerful neceffary, Ireland, advancing in power and dignity, could not but feel and act as all other nations have felt and acted in fimilar fituations. Her people, through all their ranks, would imbibe the fpirit of refiftance. We are well aware how, and by whom, the occafion would be improved; and looking at the present transformed statę

of furrounding nations, we cannot think on the confequence without the deepest anxiety.

To whatever fide we turn, we are affailed by new difficulties and diftractions, and can find no ground on which to build a ftable hope of lafting and useful connexion, while the fupreme authorities in the imperial ftate remain diftinct. But by a Union of the two legiflatures, liberally and wifely adjusted, in which the effence and form of the British conftitution fhould be compleatly preferved, every ground for recurrence to former offences and animofities, or to their unhappy effects, and all jealoufy arifing from diftinct national intereft and diftinct national pride, would be for ever done away. The only influence then to be exercised, would be that of the executive, flowing from and maintained by the conftitution, for the purpofe of preferving the neceffary equipoife of the feveral powers and orders of the one great ftate, and of carrying on with promptitude and effect the neceffary measures of national concern. There could not then be diftinct laws for different parts of the fame Empire; but in ke manner as the great fecurity of the civil liberty of the fubject, under the British Conftitution, confifts in this unalterable fact, that whatever laws the members of the legislature enact, bind themselves and all their interests and connexions, equally with thofe for whom they legiflate, fo the laws to be enacted in the.common legislature, could not bind or affect any district or divifion of the united kingdoms exclufively, but muft equally affect all and every part, and by uniform operation, produce not a diftinct but a common intereft; and in conformity with the opinion of the late Doctor

Franklin,

Franklin, refpecting Great Britain and the colonies, we might expect," that by fuch a Union the people of "Great Britain and the people [of Ireland] would "learn to confider themselves, not as belonging to dif "ferent communities with different interefts, but to one "community with one intereft; which would contribute "to strengthen the whole, and greatly leffen the danger " of future feparations."*

The members to be fent by Ireland to the common legislature of the two kingdoms, would be confiderably lefs in number than the prefent legislature of Ireland; the members for the commons, as we have now good reafon to believe, would be chiefly, if not entirely, chofen by the counties and great towns; while the lords of parliament would be chofen by the great body of the nobility: The reprefentation of Ireland therefore, would contain at once, the highest birth, the most independent property, the best education, and the first abilities. Such a number of leading characters, deeply interested in the welfare of the country, and placed on fo confpicuous a theatre, could not fee, with indifference or without refiftance, any attempts of palpable partiality or injustice: and truly, any attempts of fuch a nature must be palpable indeed; for, what would they be? They would be attempts in a common legif lature, to act the part of a separate, nay hostile legislature; and certainly, great ingenuity as well as great violence would be neceffary, to enact laws, calculated to differve one third of the common territory, for the purpose of serving the remaining part. Indeed fuch a fyftem feems to be

* See his Letter to Governor Shirley, dated 22nd Dec 1754.

impoffible

1

impoffible in its own nature; for, fo nearly fimilar, in all the leading features and circumstances, has nature formed and placed these islands, that it is not in human power to frame a regulation, which should serve Great Britain at large, and which would not also ferve Ireland at large, or regulation which fhould differve Ireland at large, and which would not differve Great Britain at large. No doubt laws could be conceived which might ferve fome particular town or towns, diftrict or diftricts, of either country, to the detriment of the great remaining part of both countries. But in a parliament compofed of the lending interests of the united kingdoms, in which fo many of the most liberal and enlightened characters of the age would always act a commanding part, it is not in human credulity to believe, that the local intereft, the narrow policy, of a particular town or diftrict, could influence the lords and commons, in violation of reafon, in defiance of opinion, in destruction of the common intereft, and in diminution of national strength, to confpire in facrificing the great to the little, the whole to a part.

All reafoning from what the parliament of Great Britain has done, or would probably do, as a feparate legislature, is totally inapplicable to the present fubject, even if all were found that has been invidioufly infinuated.

In all fuch cafes, a feparate legislature guards and promotes a feparate interest; and the laws deemed partial, operate by way of privilege and protection, in favour of the fubjects of a distinct kingdom, as against a foreign ftate, fo far as a diftinct intereft is concerned.

Bnt

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