« PreviousContinue »
manner, but no farther. Horsefall v. Mather.
bankrupt. Io trover by A. against the wharfinger for the benefit of his assignees ;-Held, that B.'s right of stoppage in transitu was gone; but that there might still be a question for the Jnry, whether the sale was not made under such gross circumstances of fraud as to vacate the contract altogether. Noble v. Adams.
Page 248 4. A., in London, orders goods of
B. at Manchester; B. forwards them by a carrier to London. Whilst they are on their transit, B. hears of A.'s insolvency, and directs the carriers to stop them; and for this purpose he makes out a new invoice to D., which he transmits to the office of the car. rier in London. The goods, by a mistake of the carrier, are delivered to A., who becomes a bank. rupt; his assignees claim to retain them.--Held, that B. had a right to recover them in an action of trover against the assiguees of A. Litt v. Cowley.
1. In an action of trespass for false
imprisonment, a constable may justify under the general issue, though he acted without a warrant, provided there were a reasonable charge of felony made; although he afterwards discharges the prisoner without taking him before a magistrate ; and although it should turn out in fact that no felony was committed. But a private individual, who makes the charge, and puts the constable in motion, cannot justify under the general issue : he must plead the special circumstances, by way of justification, in order that it may be seen whether his suspicions were reasonable. M'Cloughan v. Clayton.
Page 478 2. In trespass, there are two inde
pendent parishes in one district, as St. John's and St. James's, in Clerkenwell; if the trespass be stated to have been committed in Clerkenwell, generally, and be proved to have been committed in the parish of St. James's, it is a fa. tal variance. Taylor v. Hooman.
Sec EVIDENCE, 2.
The name of a witness, though not
in the original subpæna, may be inserted therein at any time, if she have been regularly served with a copy. Wakefield v. Gall.
No action at law will lie against
trustees, either by their cestui que trust, or, in case of his bankrupt. cy, by the assignees of such cestui que trust. Allen v. Imlett.
TENANT AT WILL.
Tenant at will is not liable to gene
ral repairs ; he is bound to use
to the secretary of the West India
having neglected to do so in the first instance, he was excluded from future objections. Yeats v. Pim.
Dock Company, claiming the delivery of some coffee, in the possession of the company, at their docks, adding, that he was in. structed to take legal measures, if it were not delivered forthwith," is not a notice of action within the meaning of the 39th Geo. III. c. 69. s. 185. ; the act which incorporates the company. Quære, if the notice of action should not be to the treasurer of the company? Lewis v. Smith. Page 27
USE AND OCCUPATION. Though an agreement for use and
occupation is void by the statute of frauds, nevertheless, if the tenant take possession of the premises under it, he becomes a tenant at will ; and recourse may be had to the original agreement to calculate the amount of rent. De Medina v. Polson.
TOLLS, See AssUMPSIT, 7.
VARIANCE, See BANKRUPT, 2. Trespass, 2. VENDOR AND PURCHASER, See AUCTIONEER AND ASSUMPSIT.
USAGE. 1. An usage of trade cannot be set up
to contravene au express contract. Therefore, when 4. agreed to sell to B. a quantity of bacon, which he warranted to be of a particular quality, part of which B. weighed and examined upon delivery at the wharfinger's, and paid for the whole by a bill at two months, but before the bill became due, gave notice to A. that the bacon was not agreeable to the contract, -Held, that B. could not give in evidence a custom in the bacon trade, that the buyer was bound to reject the contract, if dissatisfied therewith, at the time of ex. amining the commodity; and that,
1. A., in consideration of a certain
sum of money, conveys premises to B., and, at the same time an agreement is entered into between them that A. shall re-purchase the same premises, within fifteen months, at a considerable advance upon the original purchase-money; and B. agrees to sell and re-convey at such advance.—Held that, in point of law, such contract was not usurious, uoless it were meant as a cover for a loan of money, which was a question of fact for the Jury. Metcalf v. Brown.
295 2. A. employs B. to get a bill dis
counted, and agrees to give him a sum of money beyond the legal interest. B. procures C. to discount it, who requires B. to indorse the bill, but takes no more than the legal interest upon the discount. B. then pays over to A. the proceeds of the bill, minus the sum which A. had agreed to give bim for procuring the disa count.-Held that, in an action against A., brought by the indorsee of C., 4. could not defend himself on the ground of usury
between him and B. Jones o. | in the event of the plaintiff's reDavison.
Page 256 covering, he would be liable to the
costs of the action brought against · W.
C., as special damage in an action
against himself for the violation WARRANTY,
of his duty. Harman v. Lasbrey. See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.
2. Where a witness is examined on Crib-biting is no such unsoundness
interrogatories by the plaintiff, in a horse, as to entitle a pur
and cross interrogatories on the chaser, who has bought under a
part of the defendant, although it general warranty, to maintain an should appear when his evidence action for the breach of it, upon
is read at the trial that he was an this fault only. Broennenburgh
interested witness, and ought to v, Haycock.
have been released; his evidence,
notwithstanding,may be read, withWAGER.
out proving him to have been re1. A. lays a wager of twenty-five leased previously to such examinaguineas with B. upon the event of
tion. The objection is too late at a horse-race, and C. takes the risk the trial ; and should have been of ten guineas (part of the twenty made at the time he was examined. five) as his share of it. A. wios Ogle v. Paleski.
483 the wager; but, before he receives 3. When a witness's character is at. the money from B., he pays C. ten tacked in a court of justice, the guineas, as his portion of the bet. questions should be confined to his B. never paid the wager to 4.,
general conduct, and should not and all hope of obtaining it was point at specific charges. Sharp lost.-Held, that A. was entitled,
517 notwithstanding the statutes of
4. The examination of a prisoner gaming, to maintain an action of before a magistrate, who examines money had and received against such prisoner as a witness, alC. for the ten guineas which he though he holds out no threat or had paid him. Simpson v. Bliss.
inducement, cannot be used against 732 him. Rex v. Wilson. 597
5. It is an objection to the comWITNESS.
petency of a witness, who comes
to discharge certain premises from 1. A. who is indebted to B., gives
a rate, that he has property of the him a bill of C. to get discounted.
kind in question, in the occupaB., instead of discounting it, holds
tion of a tenant, subject to such the bill as a security for the debt
rate, if established: apd, thereof A., contending that A. gave it
fore, his own reversionary inteto him by way of payment of his
rest may be affected thereby. debt. In an action upon this bill,
Rhodes v. Ainsworth. 619 brought by B. against C., A. is not a competent witness to prove, 1
WRIT. on the part of the defendant, that he delivered the bill to B. merely In an indictment under Lord Elto get it discounted, not as pay lenborough's act, for cutting and ment, without a release. Because, 1 maiming a sheriff's officer, it is in.
cumbent on the prosecutor, not only to produce the warrant made out by the sheriff to the officer, but likewise the writ. Meade.
2. Evidence of a general perception of
rent of the tenements, of which those demanded formed part,Held, to be sufficient of possession to support a fine levied with proclamations, against the plea, quod partis finis nil habuerunt, &c. so as to bar the heir who never made actual entry after the death of his ancestor. Hardman v. Clegg.
WRIT OF RIGHT.
1. Tender of the demy mark: and what
the demandant is bound to prove upon such tender, previous to the tenant being put upon proof of his title.